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I have attempted in the  following  pages to  examine Athenian 
law and customary practices that shaped the lives of widows and orphans 
in the society during the classical period, using evidence mainly from the 
Attic orators. The work has two main divisions classified as follows: 
(A): The Athenian Widow in Law and Society; 
(B): Orphans in Classical Athens. 
Among the main issues discussed in section A are, the impact of 
the cycle of wars (foreign and internal) and other demographic features 
on family life and structure, instances of family laws about widows and 
orphans,  and what role the  archon could play to  protect the  welfare of 
widows and orphans in the society. Other matters discussed also are the 
status of  the widow's marriage and dowry at the death of  her husband, her 
residential  status,  rights  to  maintenance  and  support,  the  question  of 
remarriage among widows, and what influence the widow could exert in 
either her deceased husband's household or that of  her kindred. 
One  of the  two  categories  of women in  Athens  who,  together 
with male  orphans,  enjoyed  the  special  protection of the  law  was  the 
pregnant widow.  Section A,  therefore,  deals also with the  status of the 
pregnant widow, interpreting the law quoted in Demosthenes 43.75, and 
showing  how  she  stood  apart  from  her  ordinary  widow  or  woman 
111 counterpart in the eyes of the law and society. And in the final chapter of 
section A,  I revisit the question of women's property rights (one of the 
most thorny issues in Athenian socio-economic history), emphasising the 
widow's rights to property in relation to  property given to  her by her 
kindred, and bequests from her deceased husband. 
The  fundamental  motives  for  the  striking  phenomenon  of 
appointing  nearest  relatives  as  guardians  of orphans  are  discussed  in 
Section B. An attempt has also been made not only to resolve the seeming 
uncertainties among scholars as to whether or not an epikleros, the other 
of the two categories of females with special legal protection, could be 
claimed before her puberty at the death of her father, but to examine also 
her  peculiar  status  in  the  family  and  kinship  structure.  Other  issues 
discussed  also  in  Section  B  are  the  assumption  of responsibilities  of 
guardians, how the duties of  guardians reflected the social and legal status 
of  orphans under their guardians, and the position of  state orphans. 
It is significant that an extension of the law referred to in Isaios 
10.10 that precludes a minor orphan from disposing of his property by 
testament is a limitation on his legal capacity to manage his patrimony. 
The law thus transfers the orphan's right to administer his property to his 
guardian who managed it on his behalf.  Section B,  therefore,  attempts 
also  to  examine  the  nature  of the  rules  for  managing  the  orphan's 
IV patrimony and the socio-economic implications for the orphan whether or 
not his or her property was let out by the guardian. 
It  is  not obvious  what  particular rewards  a  guardian  derived 
from the onerous duty of guardianship. But it is evident that if  he did not 
deliver satisfactory services to his ward(s), he  could be held to account 
for his bad stewardship to his ward(s). Thus section B examines also the 
socio-economic  and  legal  implications  of the  age  of majority  for  the 
epikleros and the male orphan, and for  the guardian. But since it was a 
common  practice  for  remarried  widows  to  enter  their  new  marital 
households together with their orphaned children, and also because some 
Athenian sons held their inherited patrimony in common, or waited until 
late in life before sharing it, there is an attempt to examine the status of 
the orphan under a step-father, and what his or her position could be in 
matters relating to joint-ownership of  property and collateral inheritance. 
In general,  I  have not only attempted to  interpret the  relevant 
laws  and  customary  practices,  exploring  their  application  and 
implications, but also tried to examine potential areas of socio-economic 
litigation, attitudes of family members and the  society at large, how all 
these affected the lives of individual widows and orphans, and how they 
could assert their rights in practice. Given the greatly variegated nature of 
the Attic lawsuits, my main sources of information, and considering the 
fact  that the great majority of them are not directly about widows and 
v orphans, my approach has been, where direct evidence seems lacking, to 
interpret the situation on the ground, teasing out silences and drawing out 
most probable conclusions.  There  are  also  in both sections,  occasional 
references  to  British  and  Ghanaian  experience  or  situations  for  the 
purpose  of cross-cultural  comparison  to  elucidate  where  these  three 
cultures  differ  and  where  they  converge,  and  to  demonstrate  also  the 
resonance of  human experience with time and change. 
In  the  course  of  my  general  discussions,  however,  I  have 
attempted to invalidate certain conventional opinions of some scholars in 
classical  scholarship,  two  of which may be noted here.  I  consider the 
traditional view that women had no role to play in the politics of Athens 
as  not  quite  tenable.  It  is  my  contention  that  if the  woman's  own 
citizenship and her legitimate marriage by E'Y'YU1")  became a sine qua non 
for the citizenship of her sons, as  well as in political suits against them, 
then the Athenian woman's status provided the basis for the citizenship of 
her  sons  who  became  the  dramatis  personae  in  the  political  life  of 
Athens. She thus had a significant role to play in Athenian politics. 
I deny also as wrong the view that a widow could decide whom 
she should get remarried to.  I would hold that any exercise of choice by 
the widow seeks to undercut the law on marriage in Demosthenes 46.18, 
and plays down the conferred power of the father or legal representative 
of  the woman who had such authority to give her in marriage. 
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Xll INTRODUCTION 
Scholarship on the classical Athenian family during the last 
two or three decades has experienced such a boom that the sheer output 
of relevant  publications  appears  intimidating  and  seems  to  dwarf any 
other recent innovations  and redirections  in  the  field  of ancient  social 
history.  In view of the  rate  of proliferation of studies  on  this  subj ect, 
anything  else  than  the  fashionable  topics  of the  general  position  of 
women, marriage, kinship and inheritance, adoption, the household and 
property,  and  adultery  would  have  been  a  big  surprise  and  probably 
impossible to achieve. 
But the busy and systematic study of these segments or features 
of Athenian  family  life  can  fully  be  vindicated  only  when  the  more 
shadowy and obscure regions of the family are not allowed to be passed 
over  in  silence.  The  juridical  status  of widows  and  orphans  in  the 
Athenian family  and the  society at large is  an  issue  that  falls  squarely 
within  that  latter,  underprivileged  category  of subjects.  This  does  not 
mean, of course, that virtually no effort has been made in this direction. 
Isager's work on marriage patterns in Athens in the  classical period in 
which she has documented the presence and numbers of widows
l  has its 
merits though it is based on only the speeches of  Isaios. 
I  See C et M33(1981-82),81-96. 
1 Equally illuminating and stimulating is Hunter's 2l-page paper 
on the Athenian widow and her kin
2  to  which I have had occasions to 
refer in this work.  And although Harrison's chapter on guardianship of 
orphans
3 
is limited in scope, it still remains an essential reference for any 
work on orphans in the Athenian society as  at present.4  Nevertheless, I 
think it is  fair to  say that very little progress has been made, given the 
lack of a more systematic and vigorous inquiry into the matter of widows 
and orphans, and that much further study is needed. The present attempt 
hopes  to  provide this  missing factor of a more vigorous  and extensive 
treatment of  the subject. 
There are two further points that are also noteworthy. The first of 
these  is  the  controlling phrase  'social  and  legal  position'  in  the  topic 
itself.  It  is  to  be noted  that  the  terms,  'social'  and  'legal'  stand  in  a 
complementary relationship to each other; and it is therefore difficult to 
draw a wedge between them in the discussions that follow.  To the social 
historian,  the  legal  institutions of a given society are  embedded in the 
society, and they are studied in order for the laws to  throw light on the 
society.  For  the  law,  after  all,  reflects  the  way  in  which  a  society 
perceives  its  own  internal  relationships  or  seeks  to  define  its  inner 
2  JFH 14(1989),291-311. 
3  Harrison, Law, p.97-121.  . 
4  For other discussions on widows and orphans, see MacDowell, Law, p.93-98; HarrIson, Law, p.97, 
n.1; Hunter, JFH 44( 1989),306, n.1. 
2 structure.
5 
Thus  in  this  study,  no  distinction  is  made  between  social 
position and juridical status. For we cannot simply say that the status of 
\\'idows  and  orphans  before  the  law  is  different  from  what  we  must 
address if  we are to define their place within the structure of  the Athenian 
society. 
The  other  point  to  note  is  the  occasional  references  to  or 
comparisons with the  Ghanaian and British experience  in some of the 
chapters.  The  procedure  might  appear intrusive  if not  surprising  in  a 
discussion of  a subject that is not a cross-cultural study; but considered on 
its  own  terms,  as  a  purely  descriptive  account  of Athenian  law  and 
customary practices that tend to underline and shape the status of  widows 
and  orphans  in  the  Athenian  society.  My  objective,  however,  is  to 
illustrate what Ghanaians in particular have in common with the ancient 
Athenians in the family. It is also meant to show the differences between 
the two cultures, and to demonstrate the continuity of human experience 
despi  te the distance of  centuries between ancient Athens and Ghana. 
A study of the legal position of widows and orphans in classical 
Athens  appears  necessarily specific.  But it  requires  one  to  ask certain 
general and non-legal questions. It is generally recognised that the sight 
of widows  in  the  Athenian  society  during  the  classical  period  was 
5  Cf. Stephen Todd, ' The Use and Abuse of  the A~i.c Orators', G&:R  37(1~90),159;  J~hn Gould, 
'Law Custom and Myth: Aspects of  the Social PosItIon of  Women m ClaSSIcal Athens, JHS 
100(980),43: J. A. Crook, 'Legal History and General History', BICS 41(1996),31. 
3 ubiquitous,  and  their number high  enough  to  create  a  potential  social 
problem.
6 
This omnipresence of widows in classical Athens would surely 
signify  a  corresponding  high  rate  of  orphans  in  many  Athenian 
households  that  could  also  pose  equally  a  compelling  problem  to  the 
society.  It  is  thus  not  surprising  that  we  have  instances  of funeral 
speeches in Athens in which addresses are made to widows and orphans, 
highlighting their plight and elucidating what steps the  state intends to 
take to  cater for their interests.? All this is in a way a recognition of the 
disruptive  force  of the  widows,  and  the  vulnerability  of the  young 
orphans in the society. 
What then does  it mean to  say that  the  presence of widows  in 
classical Athens was a common sight with a corresponding high rate of 
orphans in many Athenian households? What circumstances must have 
prescribed for some Athenian wives and children such status as  widows 
and orphans respectively in relation to  other women and children of the 
population?  How  could  the  familiar  sight  of widows  and  orphans 
potentially have sociological consequences for the society in which they 
lived? Naturally, one is tempted to observe that such wives and children 
had become widows and orphans because of the death of their husbands 
and fathers. But such a terse observation is not likely to demonstrate and 
6  Mark Golden, , Demography and the Exposure of  Girls at Athens " Phoenix 35(1981),316-331, 
esp.329· V. Hunter, JFH 14(1989),291. 
7  See  Thucy, 2.45.2: Lys. 2; Plato, Menexenus; Hyperides, Epitaphios. 
4 reflect clearly the enormity of  the situation, as death is necessarily the end 
of human life. A better and more informative answer therefore requires a 
sort of demographic exposition on classical Athens if we should have a 
deeper appreciation of  its social impact on the Athenian society. 
The  first  chapter of this  study,  therefore,  has  three  fundamental 
objectives.  In  the  first  place,  an  attempt  will  be  made  to  examine 
demographic features and their impact on family life during the classical 
period.  I  shall,  however,  not wish to  delve  into  the  several  details  of 
Athenian geographical and citizen population
8
,  but only to  select for our 
purpose  such  demographic  aspects  as  were  likely  to  have  social 
consequences for some Athenian wives and children, thereby prescribing 
for them the status of  widows and orphans of  the population. 
The chapter will also look at some of the- Solonian family laws 
that directly concern the widow and the orphan. This discussion will be 
made against the background of  the prevailing socio-economic conditions 
of Solon's day that prompted him to enact these laws that subsisted to the 
classical period. The chapter will then close with an examination of the 
role of the archon as general overseer of the family in the administration 
of  justice in cases concerning widows and orphans in the family and the 
society at large. 
8  For this  see Gomme, A.W. The Population of  Athens in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C. (Oxford 
1933); H;nsen, M.H. Demography and Democracy: The Number of  Athenian Citizens in the Fourth 
Century (Henning;Systime,1985); Three Studies in Athenian Demography (Copenhagen, 1988). 
5 The theme of  the position of  widows will be examined against the 
background of the  general position of women in  classical Athens.  The 
discussion may thus appear positively trendy in view of  the spate of  work 
recently produced, including two whole numbers of Arethusa about two 
decades  ago  devoted  to  the  subject  of women  in  antiquity.9  But  it  is 
certainly through such perspective that we can interpret and elucidate the 
widow's status in the  eyes of the  law,  and assess  whether or how  she 
stood apart from her ordinary Athenian woman counterpart. 
It is common knowledge that women in Athens were severely 
restricted by law. l
O In marriage,  for  instance,  a  woman had no  say in 
whom she married or how the marriage was contracted. She was given in 
marriage by her nearest adult male relative, as the case may be. If she was 
the  only child of her father,  epikleros,  she  formed  part of the  father's 
estate  and  could  be  claimed  in  marriage  together  with  the  father's 
property by his next-of-kin.(Dem.43.51) 
In court, although a woman might be present either as a plaintiff 
or defendant, she could not herself give evidence in court, unless she was 
a metic.ll  She had to be represented by either a brother, or her husband, 
9  Arethusa, 6 (1) (1973); 11  (1-2) (1978). 
10  Dem. 46.18; Harrison, Law (i), p.1-21; Lacey, F~mi~y,  p.1~O-112; Mac?owel.I,.Law, p.86-89; Hans 
Julius Wolff, ' Marriage Law and Family OrganisatIOn III AnCIent Athens  Tradltzo 2(1944),43-95, 
esp.46-53. See also R. Sealey, Women, p.25-36; Sue Blundell, Women, p.119-124. 
II  Cf. Neaira in Dem.59. 
6 h 
12 
or  er son.  She could,  however,  attend a  family  arbitration  and  give 
evidence that could be used in court.  13 
The  Athenian  woman  appears  also  legally  restricted  from 
transacting business beyond the  value  or measure  of one  medimnos of 
barley.14  And  in  matters  of intestate  succession,  although  the  woman 
could inherit property, as  Phylomakhe does  in Demosthenes 43.31,  she 
could not legally dispose of  it. She was, however, able to transmit right of 
succession  in her own family  to  her  sons,  who  were  members  of her 
husband's family.(Dem.43.51) 
In the oikos the Athenian woman's position was vicarious.  She 
belonged to  the  household through her relationship  with her  father  or 
husband, or failing them, through some other man who was her kyrios. 
And  the  woman in the  community  or  district,  deme,  of the  city-state 
belonged to  the deme in the  same relationships as  she  belonged to  the 
oikos  .15  It was very rare indeed for a woman either to  use or be given a 
demotic  name  of her  own;  rather  what  was  indicated,  explicitly  or 
implicitly, was her relationship with either her father or her husband or 
both of  them. Thus in court women were identified by either the names of 
their husbands,  or when unmarried the  names  of their  fathers  or male 
12  Lys.19; Dem. 27-29; 40. 
13  Lys. 32.11-18; DemAO.I0; 55.27; Is.12.9. 
14  Is.  10.10. 
15  Cf. David Whitehead, Demes, p.78; Gould, JHS 100(1980),45-56. 
7 I ·  16 
re atIves.  In fact, they were seldom identified by their own names, and 
mostly in a derogatory manner.I7 
The  universal  opinion  is  that  the  Athenian  woman  took  no 
practical part in the politics of the  city-state.  In fact,  women could not 
attend  the  Assembly,  or  vote  and  be  voted  for  to  hold  any  political 
position.  It is,  as  noted  already,  against  such  general  background  of 
women in Athens that widows will be placed in chapters 2 to  5 in this 
study. 
Chapter  2  discusses  the  immediate  impact  of the  death  of a 
husband on the widow's status as  a married woman, and looks at what 
rights  she  could enjoy with regard to  support  and  maintenance  if she 
chose to live in her deceased husband's oikos.  An attempt will also be 
made  to  establish the  fact  that  although  as  a  wife,  her legal  position 
certainly placed her in a position of great subservience to  her husband 
like any ordinary Athenian woman in the household, the widow wielded 
considerable authority and influence in her deceased husband's household 
if she  did not leave to live with her kindred.  Following the  pattern in 
chapter 2, chapter 3 takes up the position of the widow who returned to 
her family of origin to live with her kin. But as remarriage was a striking 
feature of Athenian family life, and some Athenian widows remarried at 
16  See Is.2.18,36; 3.3; 5.5,9; Lys. 32.2,4-5; Dem. 28.3; 40.6; 57.8. 
17  See Is. 3.2,30,32,34; Andok. 1.16; Dem. 40.12; 45.28; 57.20-21,37,68; 59 passim. For various 
motives for avoiding or mentioning women's names in the orators, see Schaps, CQ 71(1977),323-330. 
8 the  decease of their husbands,18the chapter further examines remarriage 
of  widows and some of  the reasons for the practice. 
One category of widows  that has  since  antiquity  received very 
little  attention  is  the  group  of pregnant  widows.  This  may  not  be 
surprising.  The ancient sources on pregnant widows  are  indeed sparse. 
Thus there  seems to  be a marked reluctance on the  part of scholars to 
investigate  systematically their  status  in  the  society.  And where  some 
attempt is made, the available literature on their position is very marginal, 
with the information mostly appearing in a line or two in the  works of 
commentators,  or  sometimes  as  a  brief comment  in  their  footnotes. 19 
Chapter 4 therefore gives a much closer examination of  pregnant widows' 
position from the scrappy and incidental references to them in the orators 
and shows their role in relation to the families of  their deceased husbands. 
In this chapter, an effort will also be made to establish through the status 
of the pregnant Athenian widow that, contrary to the orthodox view that 
women were completely excluded from the politics of the city-state, the 
woman had a very significant role to play in the political life of  Athens. 
The  question  of women's  property  rights,  including  of course 
those of widows, at Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries is one of the 
most difficult issues in Athenian socio-economic history.  The  standard 
18  w. E. Thompson, (a) , The Prosopography of  Demosthenes, LVII' AJP 92(1971),89-91; 
(b) , Athenian Marriage Patterns: Remarriage' CSCA  5(1972),211-225. 
9 works  on  the  subjeceO  are  not  sufficiently  helpful,  partly  because  of 
apparently inconclusive observations offered by some scholars but chiefly 
because  scholars  are  not  agreed  on  what  precisely  were  the  property 
rights which a woman could enjoy, and what kinds of  property she could 
own in  classical Athens.  In  chapter 5,  I take up  the  matter of widows' 
rights  to  property.  Against  this  background,  I  shall  examine  the 
fundamental  issues  of property given  to  a  wife  by the  husband  at  his 
death,  her dowry,  property owned by the  widow in her own right,  and 
property left with her as epikleros for her son. I shall go further to argue 
that  the  Athenian widow had rights  of ownership,  controlled her own 
property and managed it as she thought fit, and could dispose of  it at will, 
but lost her rights when she got remarried. 
From the general discussion of widows' status, the work turns to 
the position of orphans in the society. The Greek word opcpuv6s  means 
'fatherless' (translated orphan); but it does not necessarily imply that the 
child had lost his mother too.  It has also the connotation of a fatherless 
female  child.  However, except where otherwise specified,  I use  orphan 
here collectively in the  context of either a male child or a female  child 
who had lost his or her father. 
19  See Harrison, Law (i), p.38-39, n.9 on 39,44, 111; Rhodes, Commentary, p.633; Davies APF, 
p.265; Boer, Private Morality, p.35; MacDowell, Law, p.88; Gould, JHS 100(1980),43; Thompson, De 
Hagniae, p.103.  "  .  , 
20  See the discussion on, ' The Atheman WIdow and OwnershIp of  Property. 
10 It  is  impossible  to  know  the  number of children  who  became 
orphaned during the classical period, though their numerical proportion 
appears  considerably large.  But given  the  high rate  of orphans  in  the 
Athenian society and the general practice of guardianship, one can easily 
realise  the  society's  great  concern  for  the  welfare  of such  unfortunate 
children  in  the  affected households.  Chapter 6  therefore  discusses  the 
procedure for,  and the pattern of appointing guardians of orphans.  The 
chapter examines also the question as to what point in time at the death of 
a father the appointed guardian assumed his duties of rearing and caring 
for the minor child or children. Chapter 7 then takes up the various duties 
and responsibilities of  the guardian to his ward or wards. 
The Athenian epikleros - the female orphan with no brother, or 
grandfather - was a distinctive female. This is so not just because she was 
a female heir, but because she was a female heir who remained with or 
upon her paternal estate, and was claimed together with the patrimony.21 
This unique status of the epikleros is reinforced by the Athenian public 
interest  in  her  marriage.  According  to  the  Athenaion  Politeia,  a 
circumstance under which an ephebe could abandon his training and enter 
into the public domain was to marry an epikleros.  Other circumstances 
pertained  to  inheritance  to  an  estate  or  priesthood.22  Athenian  public 
21  See Dem.43.51. 
22  See AP, 42.5. 
11 interest in the marriage of the epikleros is again reflected in a fragment of 
Isaios: 
,- For we consider the next-of-kin ought to marry this woman (the 
epikleros)  , and that the property ought for  the present to  belong to  the 
heiress; but that, when there are sons who have completed their second 
year after puberty,  they  should have possession of it."  (Is.frag.26.  Cf. 
Is.8.31; Dem.46.20) 
Thus the question as to who in the Athenian family should marry 
the epikleros is definite. Commentators are, however, not agreed on what 
point in time at the death of her father the epikleros should be claimed in 
marriage?3  This is  the issue that chapter 8 attempts to  address.  But an 
effort will be made also to examine rules relating to the epikleros, how a 
guardian  was  appointed  for  her,  and  what  special  marriage  rights  she 
enjoyed in view of  the public interest in her marriage. 
A very important function of  the guardian was the administration 
of his ward's patrimony. In fact,  it appears that the fundamental reason 
for  the  institution of guardianship  of orphans had less  to  do  with  the 
welfare of the children than with the welfare of their property. In chapter 
9,  an  attempt is made to  examine rules  and procedures relating to  the 
administration of  the orphan's estate, and to evaluate his or her position if 
the patrimony was administered either personally by the guardian or let 
12 out to a lessee. The final chapter, chapter 10, has four main sections. The 
subj ect  of the  appointment  of guardians  as  well  as  assumption  of 
responsibilities naturally leads to termination of  tutelage at the child's age 
of majority.  The  first  section  of chapter  10  therefore  discusses  the 
implications  of  the  orphan's  age  of  majority  and  the  issue  of 
accountability of  the guardian. 
The most notorious difficulties that faced the orphan during the 
period of tutelage seem to be three- fold.  There was the  question as  to 
\yhether the guardian would show dedication in the administration of the 
patrimony.  The  second problem was  whether he  would render honest 
accounts at his or her majority; and finally what actions could be taken 
either to restrain a scoundrel guardian from looting his ward's patrimony 
during his or her minority,  or punish him and retrieve the  estate if he 
proved dishonest. These pertinent issues are also subjects for discussion 
in chapter 1  0.  The last two sections of the chapter address the nature of 
the  guardianship  of orphans  who  lived  with  their  stepfathers  at  the 
remarriage  of their  mothers,  and  what  rights  the  orphan  enjoyed  in 
matters  pertaining  to  joint-ownership  of  property  and  collateral 
inheri  tance. 
23  See Harrison, Law (i), p.109, n.1, 138; MacDowell, Law, p.98; Thompson, De Hagniae, p.16, n.2S. 
13 SOURCES 
I may appear eclectic in my selection of source  material.  My 
principal sources of evidence, however, are the Attic forensic  speeches, 
given the nature of the subject. It is significant that the period before the 
Attic  law-court  speeches  saw  a  radical  restructuring  of the  Athenian 
society.  However,  not much is  reflected in  the  sources  of the  time  in 
terms of  social history and family life. This is mainly because the sources 
are less preoccupied by history of  things other than war and politics of  the 
period.  Thus information on the position of widows and orphans in the 
eyes of  existing laws is scarcely available. 
But as  soon as  we tum to  the period of the Attic orators, and to 
their forensic speeches, we no longer have to  explore remote comers to 
search for legal and social evidence. It is through the law-court speeches 
that we have glimpses of family and household dynamics and real family 
life which conventional historical narrative and inscriptions cannot give 
us.  However,  the  orators  have  their  strengths  and  pitfalls;24  a  few  of 
which may be noted here. 
The  speeches  are  intensely  predisposed  to  advocacy  and 
sometimes reluctant to address the facts of the issues on the ground; the 
24  See Ian Worthington, , Greek Oratory, Revision of  Speeches and Problem of  Historical Reliability', 
C et M 42(1991),55-74; Christ, Litigious, p.5; S. Hornblower, , Sources and Their Uses', in CAH, 
Vo1.6 p.17-18; Stephen Todd, G & R 37(1990),159-178; V. Hunter, JFH 14(1989),292; S. C. 
Humphreys, , The Discourse of  Law in Archaic and Classical Greece " Law and History Review (LHR) 
6(1988),455-456,473-482; L. Cohn-Haft, JHS 115(1995),2; S. Swain, , Law and Society in 
14 speakers,  quite  naturally  putting  their  clients'  verSIons  In  the  most 
favourable  light  and  distorting  their  opponents'  replies.  They  cannot 
therefore  always  be  trusted  for  veracity  since  opposing  speeches  are 
rarely extant.  They also highlight only conflicts that reached court;  and 
often little is known about the  court's verdicts,  though they sometimes 
allude to  those that were settled out of court.  Furthermore  the  orators  ,  , 
themselves  typically  members of the  social  elite,  exhibit necessarily a 
bias towards the upper class in the Athenian society who had the means 
to employ their services in their suits. Not much light is thus thrown on 
the less privileged class. This tendency makes it not easy for us to know 
more about the family background of  the underprivileged in society.25 
None the less, the forensic speeches deal with real cases, questions 
of law  and  the  social  implications  of legal  rules  as  they  affected 
individual members of the family and the society at large. They are thus 
especially valuable because they have the precious aspect of guaranteed 
verisimilitude, although some of the speeches could be revised versions 
of  what was said in court. For one thing, there is no doubt that the orators 
often record with reasonable accuracy what the litigants said and did in 
court. For another, although we cannot simply assume that the speeches 
tell the truthful stories, it does seem most probable that the presence of an 
Thucydides', in The Greek World (ed.) Anton Powell (London, 1995),p.550; Cox, Household, p.xix-
xx; Thompson, De Hagniae, p.ix. 
15 audience in court could put a check on how far a speaker could distort 
information in his evidence.
26 Furthermore, it is significant that incidental 
references and comments in the  speeches could contain grains of truth 
that the litigants would have had no reason to distort.27 
Philosophical  works,  mainly,  of  course,  those  of  Plato  and 
Aristotle~  for  instance,  The  Laws,  and  The  Republic,  the  Politics  of 
Aristotle,  and  the  disputed  Athenaion  Politeia,  are  also  sometimes 
referred  to.  Although Aristotle,  unlike  Plato,  was  not  an  Athenian by 
birth, he nevertheless spent a greater part of his life in Athens;  and his 
works  much reflect  Athenian  thoughts  and  customary  practices.  It  is 
noteworthy  that  while  Aristotle  appears  to  be  a  down-to-earth  or 
pragmatic philosopher, Plato's works are much laden with imagery and 
myth,  and  directed  towards  philosophical  speculation.  In  general, 
however, the philosophical works of both are necessarily theoretical and 
unhistorical;  and  the  references  to  their  texts  do  not  mean  that  their 
regulations were applied. None the less, they are a source for comparative 
study;  for  in  some  cases  they  reflect  Athenian  legal  and  customary 
practices; and can confirm what is known though they do not establish 
Athenian practice. 
25  Two of  the possible exceptions of  speeches which do not depict the world of  the Athenian rich are 
Demosthenes, 55: Against Kallikles, and Lysias, 24: For the Invalid, as noted by Todd, n. 24 above. 
26  Cf. Humphreys, Sally'  Social Relations on Stage: Witnesses in Classical Athens.' HA I( 1985),316-
321; Jonstone, S. Disputes, p.12.  . 
27  Cf. Dover, K.J, Popular Morality, p.13-14; Ober, J, Mass and Elzte, p.43-49; Todd, S.C., G&R 
37(1990),171-175. 
16 I  have  made  references  also  to  some  of the  comIC  plays  of 
Aristophanes and Menander for the purposes of illustration, for it seems 
that their works virtually replicate every experience an individual might 
undergo  in  classical  Athens.  There  is  a  striking  difference  between 
Aristophanes and Menander which must be noted. That is, Aristophanes' 
presentation  is  replete  with  much  exaggeration  and  fantasy,  and 
sometimes  devoid  of real  life  situation,  while  Menander's  is  more 
representative of real life situation, though the poet lived at a time when 
changes \\'ere taking place in Athenian family pattern and practices. 
Both poets,  however,  employ  satire,  exaggeration,  stereotypical 
characters,  and fantasy.  28  None the  less,  their comedies  are  a valuable 
source for the social historian. As is said about Aristophanes, and quoted 
elsewhere  in  this  work:  "The extant plays  of Aristophanes  are  firmly 
rooted in the  present,  and each of them explores  the  possibilities of a 
fantasy  constructed  out  of the  present.,,29  There  is  no  doubt  that  the 
evaluation  of comic  evidence  could  be  a  complex  matter,  but  it  is 
frequently possible to distinguish between a joke or a piece of abuse and 
the fact that makes a joke meaningful. As MacDowell rightly notes; "It is 
over-simple to assume that, if  a play is a comedy, everything in it must be 
a joke  .. .it is reasonable to expect that we shall find, at least occasionally, 
a scene or passage in which Aristophanes is not just trying to make the 
17 Athenians laugh but is making some serious point which is intended to 
influence them.  ,,30  Thus evidence from comedy is potentially useful, and 
must not be taken as mere poetic fiction;  for Athenian comic characters 
and situations could have their real life counterparts in the society. 
I  have  drawn  information  also  from  biographical  and  historical 
works  of Plutarch,  Diogenes  Laertius,  Diodorus  Siculus,  Herodotus, 
Thucydides,  and  Xenophon,  though  my  reliance  on  them  appears 
selective.  It  is  noteworthy  that  evidence  for  the  juridical  position  of 
widows and orphans is scarcely available in the histories or sources on 
those turbulent and anxious years of  Athens' struggle for survival during 
the  periods  of the  Persian  and  Peloponnesian  Wars.  Thucydides  for 
instance,  had  treated  certain  types  of  history,  particularly,  social, 
economic,  and  religious  subjects  only  selectively.31  And  even  in  the 
fourth  century,  Xenophon's  works,  the  Hellenica  and  the  Anabasis 
though in general provide a rich source of  material for the period down to 
362 B.C.32  they do not address relevant questions of social history and 
family life as reflected in the existing laws. 
However,  despite  his  selective  treatment  of subjects  other  than 
matters political, Thucydides allows us peeps at the impact of  the wars on 
the Athenian society, as well as the vulnerable status of war widows, and 
28  Cf. Golden, M. Children, p.16; Hunter, Policing, p.6. 
29  Dover, K.J., JHS 86(1966),41. 
30  Aristophanes and Athens, p.5-6. 
18 particularly war orphans, and the state's concern for the orphans of state 
warriors.  There  is  also  Xenophon's  Oeconomicus  as  well  as  his 
Memorabilia  from  both of which  I  have  drawn  infonnation.  From its 
general  perspectives,  the  Oeconom icus ,  seems  to  be  a  treatise  on 
agricultural ethics for the Athenian farmer. But it could also be said to be 
on the social position of  women in Athens. For its relevant sections on the 
status of the wife in relation to that of her husband cannot be denied. His 
reflections on the woman's contributions to the household economy, and 
the status of her dowry as  a woman in marriage also illustrate the areas 
and roles in which the wife could be affected at the death of  her husband. 
One further point to note concerns the authenticity of the sources. 
Where the authenticity of a work is a matter for dispute, especially in the 
case of the Attic orators and their forensic speeches, I do not bracket the 
author's name. As I have observed in note 166 below on page 111, certain 
questions  regarding  the  authenticity  of a  speech  may  be  broached. 
Particularly, whether the speech was written by the person attributed to, 
whether or not it was genuine (which might raise the question of dating), 
and whether or not it was a parody.  But I find such questions not very 
material for my present purpose. I select the text and use the evidence if  it 
best illustrates the situation under discussion. In this regard, I share the 
method of  Prof. MacDowell in his work on Athenian law: 
31  Cf. Hornblower, S.  CAH 6(1994),p.1. 
19 " I refer to Attic speeches by names of  the orators to whom they are 
traditionally  attributed~ that should not be taken as  implying necessarily 
that I think the attribution correct in any particular instance.  ,,33 
I  wish  to  state  also  that  except  where  otherwise  noted,  the 
translations  of Greek texts  in  the  work as  a  whole  are  from  the  Loeb 
Classical  Library  series  with occasional modifications  and adaptations. 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the word 'bastard' (nothos) as used in 
this  work includes  the  child of two  Athenians  who  were  not married. 
~\nd as regards references to British and Ghanaian situations, evidence is 
taken from British and Ghanaian newspapers, Parliamentary Reports of 
the House of  Commons, and other documents all of  which have been duly 
acknowledged in the relevant sections of  the thesis. 
32  Cf. Tritle, L.A. (ed). The Greek World, p.4. 
33  MacDowell, Law, p.9. 
20 SECTION A : THE ATHENIAN WIDOW IN LAW  AND SOCIETY 
CHAPTER 1 
DEMOGRAPHY. SOLON AND ADMINISTRATION 
OF JUSTICE IN THE ATHENIAN FAMILY 
(l.a) DEMOGRAPHY, WIDOWHOOD AND ORPHANAGE IN ATHENS 
"  Every  state  is  in  a  natural  state  of war with  every  other,  not 
indeed  proclaimed  by  heralds,  but  everlasting.,,34  This  is  Plato's 
description of warfare in antiquity. His remarks are meant to  emphasise 
the fact that warfare was endemic to Greek society, resulting mainly from 
competitive values of the classical system,35 and really the main causes of 
wars.  Thus  for  reasons  of competition  and  other motives,  Athens  got 
embroiled in a spate of warfare for most of the fifth and fourth centuries 
B.C.  Not altogether surprisingly, warfare is  one area of human activity 
which greatly affected the demography of  classical Athens. This situation 
no  doubt  contributed  in  no  small  way  to  bring  about  a  high  rate  of 
widows and orphans in many Athenian households. 
34  Plato, Laws, 1.626A 
35  On the competitive tendency of  the Greek and Roman society, see A.W. Gouldner, The Hellenic 
World: A SOCiological Analysis (New York, 1965,repr. New York, 1969) p.41-77; Donald Angels, 'The 
Problem of  Female Infanticide in the Greco-Roman World' CP 75(1980),112-120, esp.114. See also 
Adkins, A.W.H, Merit and Responsibility: A Study o/Greek Values (Oxford 1960); Finley, M.l. The 
World o/Odysseus (New York 1954, repr. Chicago 1972). 
21 Bradeen
36 
has noted that Athenian defeats of any real magnitude 
In  the  fifth  century  occurred  at  Tanagra,  Egypt,  Koroneia,  Delion, 
Amphipolis, Sicily, and Aigospotamoi. At Tanagra in Boiotia in 457 for 
instance, Thucydides informs us of the great loss to both the victor and 
the vanquished in the following words: 
..  The  battle  took  place  at  Tanagra  in  Boiotia,  and  the 
Lacedaimonians  and  their  allies  were  victorious,  but there  was  much 
slaughter on both sides." (1.108.1) 
We have no knowledge of  the exact number of casualties to the Athenian 
side in the battle, but this could probably apply to a conservative figure of 
500 or more losses on each side. 
And in the  Egyptian campaign, the minimum losses  stood at  80 
ships  with  most  of  their  complements,  around  15,000  men.  The 
percentage of  ships lost to the Athenians is not known. But Bradeen must 
be  right  that  the  losses  could  be  more  than  4%:  "  it  is  clearly  very 
unlikely,  if not  impossible,  that  it  would  have  been  less  than  4%.,,37 
Thucydides tells us also that at Koroneia, a combined force of Boiotians, 
Lokrians  Euboeans  and others defeated an Athenian allied army under  ,  , 
Tolmides marching home after reducing Khaironeia (1.113), although we 
are not told the exact number of  Athenians killed. 
36  D.W.Bradeen, (i) 'Athenian Casualty Lists,' Hesperia 33(1964),16-62; (ii) 'The Athenian Casualty 
Lists,' CQ 63( 1969), 145-159. 
22 But if Koroneia took place in the spring of  446, as ably argued by 
the editors of Athenian Tribute Lists,38  there certainly would have been 
other casualties in a campaigning season which included the  revolts of 
Megara and Euboea and the  subjugation of the  latter.  If one  considers 
also  Thucydides'  specific  mention  of the  destruction  of part  of the 
Athenian garrison by the Megarians in their revolt (1.114.1), conservative 
figures of losses of from 550 to 850 as noted by Bradeen39  would seem 
reasonable for  that year.  And at Amphipolis, Thucydides estimates that 
600  Athenians  were  killed  (5.11.2).  Thucydides  is  not  exact  on  the 
number of Athenian losses, but the estimated figure of 600 suggests that 
the Athenian casualties could be quite high. However, the Athenian losses 
in the Sicilian expedition seemed the greatest and most alarming by far. 
In 415, the proudest naval expedition ever launched by a Greek city-state 
set sail to Sicily. Two years later only 7,000 men out of a total number of 
44,000 who had left Piraeus found themselves prisoners in the quarries of 
Syracuse  where  conditions  were  so  appalling  that  many  of them  died 
later.  But meanwhile, the rest beside the  7,000 had all  perished in  the 
battle.
40  And  about  a  decade  (424),  before  the  disaster  in  Sicily, 
Thucydides  informs  us  that  the  Boiotians  defeated  an  Athenian 
contingent of7,000 hoplites and some cavalry at Delion. (4.90) 
37  Bradeen, Hesperia 33(1964),24-25. For the difficulties in trying to work out the percentage of 
Athenian losses, see Bradeen, ibid. 24, n.14. 
38  See 1-4 (1939-53), esp.3, p.174-178, n.65. 
23 Then at Aigospotamoi in 405, Xenophon informs us that most of 
the  Athenian crews were captured and all  the  prisoners put to  death.41 
According to Diodorus (13.1 06.6-7), most of the soldiers escaped except 
Philokles who was killed. But his claim is contradicted by Plutarch and 
Pausanias. According to P1utarch,42 the number of Athenians put to death 
stood  at  3,000,  and  Pausanias  (9.32.9)  maintains  that  the  number  of 
Athenians executed was 4,000. In spite of the discrepancy in the number 
of Athenians executed as provided by the sources, the fact still remains 
that the Athenian losses may have been quite considerable. 
Xenophon  informs  us  also  that  even  before  405  B.C.,  at 
Arginousai alone in 406, the Athenians lost 25 ships with most of  the men 
killed. (Hell. 1.6.34.) Although no actual numbers of Athenians killed are 
given, this is one battle in which, according to Xenophon, a good portion 
of the  rowers  were  Athenians.  It  is  therefore  most  certain  that  a 
considerable number of them lost their lives in the  encounter.  Besides 
this, in the same year (406) other casualties must have been recorded at 
Notion and Myti1ene. For though Xenophon tells us that most of the men 
were  able  to  escape to  shore  in those  battles  (Hell.1.5.l4;6.17.23),  the 
loss  of 55  ships  noted  must  have  entailed  a  very  great  number  of 
casualties. 
39  Hesperia 33(1964),25. 
40  For details of  the expedition, see Thucy. 6.30-32; 7.70-81. 
41  Xen. Hell.  2.1.28-32. 
24 All these casualty figures come from some of  the Athenian military 
campaigns  abroad,  and  Athens'  struggle  with  Sparta  during  the 
Peloponnesian  War of 431-404.  The  civil  war  in  Athens  itself in  the 
period 404-403 which followed in the wake of the Peloponnesian War is 
a  well-known  Athenian  historical  event.  This  also  no  doubt  had  its 
demographic consequences for Athens as a whole and certain individual 
families in particular. For the ancient sources infonn us that the oligarchs 
who had supplanted the democratic constitution executed  1,500 men to 
bolster their regime.
43  This figure may be considered as exaggerated as it 
is possible that the sources may be biased against the oligarchs. But it is 
most likely that the executions must have been not less than 1,000 men. 
The  demography  and  sociology  of the  plague  that  convulsed 
Athens in the early years of the Peloponnesian War (430-426) may also 
be noted. Although it is a fact that both men and women became victims 
of the affliction, as is usually the case with every epidemic, its impact on 
the manpower needs, particularly the military strength of Athens, appears 
quite disastrous. The most precise infonnation on the plague is given by 
Thucydides.
44 Noting its effects on the might of  the Athenian anny during 
the initial stages of the plague, Thucydides infonns us that out of 4,000 
hoplites  in  the  expeditionary  force  led  by Hagnon  to  Potidaea,  1,050 
42  Alkib.37.4; Lysand.13.1. 
43  Isok.7.67; Aeschn.3.235; AP 35.4; Lys.12.6-7,83. 
44  See 2.47-58; 3.87. 
25 perished in the plague in about forty days. (2.58.3) He then describes the 
helplessness of the situation in 427 and the toll on the Athenian army in 
particular and the population in general in the following words: 
" In the course of the following winter the plague again fell upon 
the Athenians; and indeed it had not died out at any time entirely, though 
there had been a period of respite. And it continued the second time not 
less than a year, having run for two full years on the previous occasion, so 
that  the  Athenians  were  more  distressed  by  it  than  by  any  other 
misfortune and their power more crippled.  For no  fewer  than 4,400 of 
those emolled as hoplites died and also 300 cavalry, and of  the population 
ciVE~E{,PETOS  apL8I-Los  a number that could not be ascertained." (3.87.1-3) 
Strauss  suggests  that  on  the  whole  between  8,410  and  9,860  of the 
Athenian army were carried away by the plague.
45 
Athens in the fourth century also had no respite as  far as  warfare 
was concerned; though it would perhaps seem superfluous to give details 
of statements of Athenian army strengths  and  casualties in the  several 
wars that also engulfed Athens during the period.  For besides evidence 
from historical writings on the  century,  some of the  Attic  orators  also 
inform us of  families which had lost relatives in either military campaigns 
45  B. S. Strauss, Athens After the Peloponnesian War (London, 1986), p.76. For the possible cause(s) 
of  the plague  see J. C. F. Poole and A. J. Holladay, , Thucydides and the Plague of  Athens' CQ 
29(1979)  282-300; J. A. H. Stubbs, 'The Plague of  Athens: 430-428 B. C. Epidemic and Epizootic' 
CQ 33(1983),6-11; Donald Engels, 'The Use of  Historical Demography in Ancient History' CQ 
34(1984),386-93. 
26 or on peace missions abroad during the period.
46 Nevertheless, one or two 
instances may be mentioned. 
At  Nemea  in  394  for  instance,  Xenophon  notes  that  6,600 
Athenians fought in the battle. (Hell.4.2.17) And Diodorus also, talking 
about the  Athenian casualties in the battle of Khaironeia in 338/7, first 
notes the loss of their best generals (16.85.7), then the slaughter inflicted 
on them by Alexander resulting in piled up corpses (16.86.3-4). And then 
in a terse summary of  the Athenian losses he writes: 
" More than a thousand Athenians fell in the battle and no less than 
two thousand were captured. ,,47 (16.86.5-6) 
Concerning the  Lamian War in 323/2, Diodorus informs us of a 
decree  in  the  Athenian  Assembly  ordering  the  mobilisation  of  all 
Athenians above forty years,  and the launching of 40  quadriremes  and 
200  triremes.  (11.3;18.10.2)  According  to  his  account,  the  Athenian 
contingent which was subsequently sent away comprised Athenian citizen 
soldiers of 5,000 infantry and 500 cavalry, and 2,000 mercenaries.  The 
Athenians,  as  narrated  by  Diodorus  (18.10.2,11.3)  were  eventually 
defeated  both  on  land  and  sea  by  the  Macedonians  under  Antipater. 
Diodorus, however, does not tell us exactly how many of the Athenians 
were  killed in the  encounter,  and  although there  were  apparently  few 
46  Cf. Is.4.1,7-8,18,18-19,26; 5.6; 11.8; Lys.32.7; Dem.43 passim. 
47  For the fate of  prisoners of  war in the Greek world, see W. K. Pritchett, The Greek State at War V 
(Berkeley, 1991), p.203-312. 
27 mercenaries in the fifth century but more in the  fourth,  the  situation as 
described by Diodorus suggests that the Athenian citizen casualties may 
have been very alarming. 
The  catalogue  of wars  involving  Athens  in  the  fourth  century 
could  be  quite  lengthy,  and  the  Athenian  casualties  countless.  But  in 
general,  the  evidence  on  Athenian  casualties  in  the  fifth  and  fourth 
centuries indicates that the scale of the Athenian losses was indeed high. 
The  Athenian  forces  certainly  comprised  citizen  soldiers,  metics  and 
mercenaries, apparently few in the fifth century but more in the fourth. 
And although most ships were manned by Athenians themselves, many of 
the sailors on the vessels would have been foreigners, as in the case of  the 
Egyptian  expedition.
48  Nevertheless,  Bradeen notes
49  that  in compiling 
casualties  in  the  various  wars,  non-Athenian  casualties  were  listed 
separately. 
The impact of the Peloponnesian War on the manpower resources 
of Athens is equally illustrative. Although we know that the  Athenians 
were  able  to  press  on with the  war year after year,  suggesting  a high 
fertility  rate  of the  Athenian population,  it  is  obvious  that  in the  last 
decades of the war manpower shortage began to be felt.  And to  forestall 
the drastic reduction of  the population by replenishing it, the Assembly is 
48  Cf. K.R.Walters, , Perikles' Citizenship Law' CA  2(1983),314-336, esp.330; Bradeen, Hesperia 
33(1964),24,n.14. 
49  See Bradeen, CQ 63(1969),149-151,156. 
28 said  to  have passed a  decree permitting each Athenian citizen to  have 
more than one wife to procreate children.
50  The motive of this decree is 
certainly a reflection of an imbalance of  the sex ratio that had cropped up 
because of  male casualties in the war. 
What were the  consequences  for  Athenian  families,  then,  of the 
many deaths in the wars during most of the  fifth  and fourth  centuries? 
There is no doubt that many families would be severely affected by the 
apparent depletion of  their male members by death in military campaigns. 
A  speaker  in  Lysias,  for  example,  laments  that  in  the  Corinthian 
expedition  in  394  his  tribe" had the  worst  fortune  and  suffered  the 
heaviest losses in the ranks"(16.15). Diodorus (18.10.2-3) also informs us 
that citizens from seven tribes out of  the ten tribes of  Athens were sent on 
the Lamian campaign which ended in the humiliating defeat of Athens, 
with only the remaining three tribes posting guards at Athens. 
Taken  as  a  whole,  therefore,  the  demographic  cost  of the  wars 
seems  staggering.  And although an  immediate implication of it is  that 
there would certainly be fewer mouths to feed, the impact of  the death toll 
in  wars  on  the  man-power  needs  of Athens  in  general,  and  family 
structures in particular could be worrying.  But more importantly, these 
examples  point  to  an  immense  number  of wives  and  children  who 
50  Diog. Laert. Socrates 2.26; Athenaeus, 13.555d-556; ~em.57.30. The question ~s to whether the 
Athenians practised polygamy or bigamy as a result of  thIS  dec~ee  ~as been the  s~bJect  ,of an endless 
debate in scholarly circles. See Athenaeus 577b-c; Plutarch, Arzsteldes 27; J.W.FItton,  That Was No 
29 respectively became bereft of  their husbands and fathers. For it is obvious 
that the wars, foreign and civil, periodically produced a great number of 
widows and orphans in the Athenian society. 
It is  very  hard  to  draw  any  firm  conclusions  as  to  how  many 
Athenian  citizens  in  the  Athenian  contingents  during  the  wars  were 
married. But the Athenian youth attained his age of  majority at the age of 
eighteen, and was due for military service two years after this age. Thus 
there is no doubt that many of  the Athenian citizens serving in the army at 
any point in time were within the year range of 25  and 49.  This would 
certainly be the situation in that it would be this year class which would 
have the greater energy and strength to  fight than any other year group. 
And granting that most Athenian males married within this year range, it 
is  very possible that very many citizens of the Athenian forces  had got 
wives and children. 
In fact,  one point of emphasis regarding the decree passed by the 
Assembly,  as  noted  above,  is  not  on  whether  or  not  the  Athenians 
tolerated polygamy or bigamy, but that during this period the Assembly's 
recognition of the  severely weakened  military man-power of the  city-
state was actually a tacit recognition also of a shortage of husbands for 
Lady, That Was' CQ 64(1970),56-66; Sallares, Ecology, p.98; Harrison, Law (i), p.16-17; R.Sealey, 
CA 3(1984),111-133; Wolff, Traditio 2(1944),85ff. 
30 women of marriageable age in Athens.51  Significantly, this shortage of 
husbands affected not only girls of marriageable age who had no men to 
marry them, but also wives who had lost their husbands in the wars. As 
widows, their male families would have wished to give them in marriage 
again but there were no men for them. Thus a great social consequence of 
the Athenian casualties in the campaigns of the fifth and fourth centuries 
is that the wars affected the Athenian population as  a whole, and left a 
considerable number of  widows and orphans in many families. 
The age at first marriage of both sexes is also noteworthy. One of 
the primary factors  determining the development cycle of the  family  is 
the age at first marriage of  men and women. This is the age of admission 
to  the  breeding population,  and thus  the  most important of all  human 
demographic parameters.  But,  as  rightly observed by Gallant,52  age  of 
marriage is not a  static phenomenon, but a  feature  of society that can 
change  quickly and in several  cases  is  determined by socio-economic 
circumstances. In fact,  a wide range of factors can affect the age at first 
marriage. Two factors easily come to mind. 
In the first place, if  property devolved at the death of the father, it 
is most likely that the sons would have to  marry later.  This is  because 
they would lack the necessary resources to establish their own households 
51  See Aristoph. Lys is tr. 591-597 where the women complain that there are too few men to marry, and 
so girls miss their chance. Cf. Strauss, Athens, p.74. 
52  Thomas W.Gallant, Risk, p.18. 
31 (though  this  was  not  a  regular  practice)  until  the  father  was  dead. 
Secondly  ~  if in the case of male orphans with sisters it is incumbent on 
brothers  to  delay their own marriage until  they  have  married off their 
sisters in the event of their father's death, then brothers would probably 
marry at a later age. The same would be the situation with male orphans 
for  whom it was obligatory to  look after their widowed mothers living 
with them(Is.2.6; Lys.16.1 0; Dem.27; 28.29). 
Ancient literary sources are not very definite on the customary age 
for male Athenians at first marriage, and even the actual ages suggested 
are in doubt. Plat0
53  and Aristotle
54 note that the age at first marriage of 
the male Athenian was 30, or at the latest, 37. But at another point, Plato 
twice puts the earliest suitable age at 35; then between 25  and 35.
55  On 
the other hand, Aristotle suggests 37 or a little before, but again notes that 
the body is  most fully  developed from  30  to  35  years.
56  Although the 
philosophers'  recommendations  may not  correspond  to  real  life,  they 
throw some light on the stage at which the male Athenian was considered 
old enough to enter marriage life and begin to  raise  a  family.  What is 
significant about the suggestions of Plato and Aristotle, however, is that 
there  seems  to  have been no hard and  fast  rule  about the  age  at  first 
53  Laws, 721b,785b. 
54  Pol.  1335a6. 
55  Leg.4.721b; 6.772d, 785b.  ,  . 
56  Pol. 7.1335a29; Rhet. 2.1390b9. Sallares notes that Aristotle s suggested age of37 was sunply due 
to the fact that he married his own wife Pythias when he was 37 years. See Ecology, p.48. 
32 marriage of the man; though marriage usually took place at the age of 30 
which was the regular Greek generation.(Lacey, p.l  06-107) 
However, there is a general consensus that women in Athens, like 
women in Rome, married for the first time at a much younger age at 14, 
but at the latest 20. In fact, the young marriage age of the Athenian girls, 
like Roman girls, seems typical of the Mediterranean family pattern.  57  A 
speaker of  Isaios (ls.6.14), also seems to suggest that a woman at 30 years 
who  had not yet been given  in  marriage  was  probably regarded  as  a 
prostitute since a woman of that age should have been married long ago. 
And Demosthenes (27.5 ;29.43) informs the jury that his father expected 
that  his  five-year-old  daughter  would  have  reached  puberty  and  got 
married to his nephew, Demophon, at the age of 15. Moreover, a speaker 
in Lysias (32.4), informs the jury of  a brother marrying his other brother's 
daughter, suggesting a substantial age gap between husband and wife. 
In  general,  the  age  at  first  marriage  of men  and  women  is 
significant for two main reasons, the one demographic, the other social; 
though  the  two  are  interdependent.  Demographically,  for  those  not 
afflicted by sterility, age of marriage is a crucial determinant of fertility 
levels  and patterns.  This is  because it influences the  rate of birth of a 
population;  and  the  social  consequence  is  that  age  at  first  marriage 
57  AP 56.7; Xen. Oik. 7.5; Plato, Laws, 785b; Rep., 5.460e. Cf. Albert G.Harkness, TAPA 27(1896),35; 
Mark Golden, Phoenix 35(1981),322; Arjava, Women, p.32-33, 157. 
33 influences  the  size  and  form  of families  In  no  small  way,  either  by 
increasing it or delimiting it.  58 
Concerning the  classical  Athenian population,  although as  noted 
above. it was thought to have a natural fertility rate, which in fact, implies 
a high birth rate,  it does not seem to  have been increasing rapidly  for 
various reasons affecting the birth rate.  It is  a fact  that males are  most 
fertile at the age of 19, but the majority of Athenian males did not marry 
until later in their 30s. The majority of the ancient sources on Athens do 
not suggest demographic reasons for the late marriage of Athenian men. 
But  Xenophon  (Mem.2.2.4),  who  does  not  appear  to  conceive  of the 
possibility  of  voluntary  family  limitation  taken  by  couples  within 
marriage, recommended that Athenian men should delay marriage until 
about the age of 30. This is because at this age sexual desire for men is 
less strong so that they would avoid having too many children. 
One significant effect of this pattern of first marriage at about 30 
for men and 15  to 20 for women is that the practice does not maximise 
fertility.  It rather inherently tends to reduce it for the simple reason that 
women approaching the peak of their reproductive powers are joined to 
men whose reproductive powers are already waning. Thus to Xenophon, 
one way to reduce the number of children likely to be born in marriage is 
to  delay marriage itself.  Though this idea of family limitation may not 
58  Cf. Sallares, Ecology, p.148; Richard P.Saller, CP 82(1987),21; Gallant, Risk, p.17. 
34 have been a primary concern of the  ancients regarding their customary 
age  at  first  marriage for  men and women, it necessarily became a by-
product of  their recommendations. 
The concept and practice of delaying marriage, however, seems to 
have created a persistent family problem in Athens. Instead of solving the 
problem of having too many children in the  family,  the practice of late 
marriage  of men in  Athens  tends  to  suggest an  important determining 
factor for the prevalence of many widows with a corresponding high rate 
of orphans  in a  considerable  number of Athenian  households.  This  is 
because naturally, the men who would be approaching middle age before 
getting married were most likely to predecease their wives in the course 
of  time. 
One may consider also the ancient economy that may have had a 
significant impact on the life span of marriage. Because of the primitive 
nature of the ancient economy the motive force  for commerce, industry 
and agriculture was largely the muscle power of men and animals. And 
all these occupations were no doubt accompanied by great risks to life 
and health,  such as  piracy,  banditry,  tedious  drudgery,  shipwreck  and 
disease. It is therefore certain that the life of the majority of males who 
35 were involved in these risk-running ventures could be shortened, resulting 
in the widowhood and orphanage of  their wives and children.  59 
What the evidence adduced so far points to is a high probability of 
many widows and orphans in the Athenian society. There is no doubt that 
many of the  widows  would remarry  for  various  reasons  ranging  from 
maintenance to the desire of  men to marry them to bear children for them. 
In his article on remarriage in Athens, Thompson6o  notes that of eleven 
Athenians who married again after the  death of their spouses,  eight of 
them \vere women. This would probably indicate a significant percentage 
of  remarriage of  more widows than widowers if it were possible to know 
the number of  married couples who had lost their spouses in Athens. 
And since  we know that Athenian widows  who remarried would 
remarry Athenians, it implies that they removed eligible husbands from 
the pool available to young unmarried women. The obvious consequence 
of this would be the creation of another social problem of an excessive 
supply of marriageable girls. Even so, it does not necessarily imply that 
all  the  widows who were  still  capable of bearing children got men to 
remarry them. Thus there would still be a significant number of widows 
in the Athenian population without men to remarry them. 
59  I omit murders resulting from domestic disharmony, as for example what we have in 1s.9.16-17; for 
surely these cannot be significant demographically. It is, however, to be noted that another cause of 
death might be legal expulsion. 
60  W.E.Thompson, CSCA 5(l972),2l9,n.41. 
36 (1.b)  SOLON AND THE FAMILY LAWS OF ATHENS 
In or around 594 B.C., Solon was chosen and given extraordinary 
powers as mediator and lawgiver to  try to solve a socio-economic crisis 
that had gripped the archaic Athenian society.61  Solon's solution to  the 
crisis was termed (JELCT<:lX8ELa.,  disburdenment.  This was a liberation of 
the land and the people. Our primary literary evidence on this important 
episode in Athenian history is Solon's own testimony as contained in his 
fragmentary poems handed down to  us  by the  author of the Athenaion 
Politeia and Plutarch. But for more information recourse must be had to: 
(i)  Plutarch, Solon, 
(ii)  The Athenaion Politeia (AP), and 
(iii)  Diogenes Laertius. 
By far, the accounts given by the sources62  seem to imply three situations 
relating to  three categories of citizens in the  society:  (a)  the aristocrats 
who  constituted  the  ruling  body,  and  who  controlled  the  land,  (b)  a 
section of the citizens who tilled the land controlled by the  aristocrats, 
and who paid a fraction of their annual yield to the aristocrats, failing to 
comply with which the aristocrats could seize the insolvent farmer and 
61  Scholars are not agreed on the exact year in which Solon is supposed to have introduced his reforms. 
See MacDowell, Law, p.29; T.E.Rihll, "EKTHMOPOI: Partners in Crime' JHS 111(1991),101,n.1. 
62  Plutarch, Solon, 13.2-3;14.1,2;15.4;16.3; AP 2.1-3;5.1-2;6.1;12.4; Diog. Laert. Solon, 1.2.45. 
37 his  wife  and  children  and  sell  into  slavery,(  c)  another  section  of the 
people who had borrowed money from some aristocrats on their person's 
security,  who  also  in  default  of repayment  could,  together  with  their 
wives and children be seized and sold into slavery by their creditors. 
Against the background of these situations we find the following 
state  of affairs:  (i)  the poverty and dependence of the  underprivileged 
class, (ii) the existence and operation of a primitive law of debt, (iii) the 
degrading fate of  the underprivileged and their wives and children. Above 
all,  these  conditions  seem  to  have  become  compounded  for  the 
underprivileged majority by their political disability or marginalisation, 
as the AP informs us: 
" The most grievous and bitter thing in the state of public affairs for the 
masses was their slavery; not but what they were discontented also about 
everything else,  for  they found  themselves virtually without a  share  in 
anything.  ,,63 
Economic and social reforms, like political reforms, are governed 
by  three  principal  factors.  These  are,  socio-economic  necessity  for 
change,  favourable  social  and  economic  tendencies  of  the  time 
proceeding out of earlier social developments which serve as precedents 
or  preparation  for  the  new  modification,  and  the  particular  occasion 
63 AP,2.3. 
38 which sets  the  change in motion.
64  It is  significant that  all  these  three 
factors for change were present in archaic Athens when Solon was given 
the authority to undertake his reforms. 
Plutarch's description
65  of the appointment of Solon, therefore, seems to 
suggest the terms of  reference for his reforms as given to the lawgiver by 
the Athenians as follows: 
(i)  to set free condemned debtors, 
(ii)  to redistribute the land, and 
(iii)  to introduce constitutional reforms and restructure the form 
of  government. 
It is not very clear what the exact nature and background of the 
apparently general enslavement were.
66  But it seems undeniable that the 
enslavement threatened the  central  fabric  or  structure  of the  oikos  and 
essential integrity of  oikos relationships. As can be seen from the sources, 
particularly Plutarch and the Athenaion Politeia, children were no longer 
heirs but were taken and seized from the oikos as payment for debt. And 
the basic or essential material component of  the oikos, the household plot 
(KA71POS)  was  also  bound  and  tied  down  by  debt  and  itself held  in 
bondage, if  not seized completely by the creditor, in lieu of  payment. 
64 For the three factors which govern political reforms,cf. Stanley Barney Smith, ' The Establishment of 
the Public Courts at Athens' TAPA  56(1925)106-119, esp.112. 
65  Solon, 13.3; 14.1,2. 
66  Cf. Brook Manville, The Origins o/Citizenship in Ancient Athens (Princeton, 1990) for a recent 
assessment of  the crisis and bibliography on it. 
39 The question as to how the socio-economic conditions as described 
in the sources affected the widow and the orphan because of  which Solon 
enacted laws, as part of his reforms, to protect their welfare and interest 
may not be quite so easy to  answer.  This is because the  evidence on it 
appears slight and oblique. For instance, neither the AP nor Plutarch in 
describing  the  conditions  of Solon's time  throws  specific  light on the 
position of the  widow or the  orphan  during  the  period.  And nowhere 
among Solon's own fragments, frequently referred to by Plutarch and the 
author of  the Athenaion Politeia, does Solon himself allude to the subj ect. 
In the light of  the silence of  our authorities, one choice left is to try 
to extract the situation of  the widow and the orphan from the implications 
of the  conditions presented by our sources.  The  following  suppositions 
may therefore be rnade:(l) that if a defaulting father, having been seized 
and sold into slavery together with his wife and children by his creditor, 
died, his orphans and widow continued to live in slavery,(2) that if the 
landowner found it prudent to retain the insolvent tenant and his wife and 
children  on the  land,  as  seems  to  be the  situation  in the  majority  of 
cases,67  the death of the insolvent tenant did not necessarily relieve the 
orphans of  their subservient position. This is because they could either be 
67 See W.J.Woodhouse, Solon the Liberator, A Study of  the Agrarian Problem in Attika in the Seventh 
Century (Oxford, 1938), p.72; Naphtali Lewis, , Solon's Agrarian Legislation' AJP 62(1941),144-156, 
esp. 150. 
40 used as security for loans or sold into slavery by their deceased father's 
next-of-kin who would then have become their guardian. 
These conj ectures, however, do not tell us much about the widow 
and the orphan. More importantly, our authorities describe conditions of 
only the underprivileged class and throw no light on what the situation 
was  with the  family  of the  aristocrats.  In the  circumstances, perhaps a 
more helpful approach seems to be to examine the family laws of Solon 
to  find  out  how  these  laws  reflected  the  social  and  legal  position  of 
widows and orphans during the period. 
We  have  noted  already  our  main  sources  of evidence  on  the 
reforms of Solon in general. Those authorities, however, do not give the 
texts of the laws. For instance, among the laws said to have been enacted 
by  Solon,  as  enumerated  by  Plutarch  (Solon  20-24.3),  are  those 
concerning  the  epikleros,  contraction  of marriage,  making  of wills, 
conduct of  women in public and at funerals, and adultery. 
However, Plutarch's account of  the family laws, like the evidence 
given  by the  AP,  falls  short  for  two  basic  reasons.  In  the  first  place, 
Plutarch gives us just bare outlines or paraphrases of the  laws without 
providing  us with their  texts  as  said  to  have  been  enacted by  Solon. 
Second, it is clear that he informs us of  Dionysios' mother asking her son 
to give her in marriage to one of  his people (20.4). This statement implies 
that she was a widow, whose father was perhaps deceased. And in 21.4, 
41 he informs us also of women's conduct at funerals. But he does not give 
us any hint of a law of Solon on widows. 
With the defects of  the evidence provided by the AP and Plutarch, 
the most informative sources for the texts of most of the Solonian family 
laws  and  their  application  therefore  seem  to  be  the  Attic  orators, 
particularly Demosthenes and Isaios, who frequently refer to them in their 
law court speeches. A characteristic feature of Isaios' presentation of the 
laws, however, is  that although the  orator shows clear evidence that he 
had  the  relevant  laws  in his  possession,  and  his  familiarity  with them 
when he wrote his speeches, he does not normally give the full  texts of 
the laws.  Rather, he paraphrases the  sections of the laws appropriate to 
the case at issue, except the law of succession part of which he quotes in 
one of  his speeches.
68 
The  texts  of some  of the  Solonian  family  laws  that  directly 
concern  the  widow  and  the  orphan  preserved  for  us  in  some  of the 
speeches of  Demosthenes will be cited for the purpose of  illustration. But 
it is  worth noting that in the  last decade  of the  fifth  century (410-399 
B.C.), the Athenians made substantial efforts to revise their code of laws 
to make them uniform and less complicated. Thus in 410 B.C., officials 
(anagrapheis,  'inscribers') were appointed to collect, among other laws, 
copies  of all  the  laws  of Solon  and  have  them inscribed  afresh  on  a 
42 stone.(Lys.30.2-6;Andok.1.81-98;MacDowell, Law, p.46-49; Rhodes,JHS 
111(1991),87-100) 
It does seem, however, that the exercise took longer than it was 
otherwise expected since Athens was to have not only a complete code of 
laws but also a procedure for revising the laws in future.  But eventually, 
the  officials  completed their  assignment  after  the  interruption by The 
Thirty in 404 B.C.; and the code finally approved after 403/2 during the 
archonship of Eukleides was to be applied in the circumstances of 403/2 
and  after.(Dem.57.30;MacDowell,  Andok.128) And,  it is  interesting  to 
note that with the revision of the laws, some of the Solonian laws bear 
features of  recent enactments that do not make them completely Solonian, 
though they are often ascribed to  him by the orators.(cf.p.54-56 below) 
The following may be cited and commented on: 
68 
(i)  "Whenever a  man  dies  without  making  a  will,  if he  leaves 
female  children his  estate  shall  go  with  them,  but if not,  the 
persons  herein  mentioned  shall  be  entitled  to  his  property:  if 
there are brothers by the  same father,  and if there are  lawfully 
born sons of  brothers, they shall take the share of the father. But 
if there  are  no  brothers  or sons  of brothers,  their descendants 
shall inherit it in like manner; but males and the sons of males 
shall  take precedence, if they  are  of the  same  ancestors,  even 
Is.11.11 
43 though they be more remote of kin. If there are no relatives on 
the father's side within the degree of children of cousins, those 
on the  mother's side  shall  inherit in like  manner.  But if there 
shall be no relatives on either side within the degree mentioned, 
the  nearest  of kin  on  the  father's  side  shall  inherit.  But  no 
illegitimate child of either sex shall have the right of succession 
either to religious rites or civic privileges, from the time of the 
archonship of  Eucleides"(Dem.43 .51). 
(ii)  "In regard to all heiresses who are classified as Thetes, if  the 
nearest of kin does not wish to  marry one,  let him give her in 
marriage with a portion of five hundred drachmae, if  he is of the 
class of Pentacosiomedimni, if of the  class  of Knights,  with a 
portion of  three hundred, and if of  the class of  Zeugitae, with one 
hundred and fifty,  in addition to  what is her own.  If there  are 
several kinsmen in the same degree of relationship, each one of 
them shall contribute to the portion of the heiress according to 
his due share. And if there are several heiresses, it shall not be 
necessary for  a  single  kinsman to  give  in marriage  more  than 
one, but the next of  kin shall in each case give her in marriage or 
marry her himself. And if the nearest of kin does not marry or 
give her in marriage, the archon shall compel him either to marry 
her himself or give her in marriage. And if the archon shall not 
44 compel him, let him be fined a thousand drachmae, which are to 
be  consecrated  to  Hera.  And  let  any  person  who  chooses 
denounce  to  the  archon  any  person  who  disobeys  this 
law"(Dem. 43.54). 
(iii)  "Let the archon take charge of orphans and of heiresses and 
of families  that  are  becoming  extinct,  and  of all  women who 
remain in the houses of their deceased husbands, declaring that 
they are pregnant. Let him take charge of these, and not suffer 
anyone to do any outrage to them. And if anyone shall commit 
any outrage or any lawless act against them, he shall have power 
to impose a fine upon such person up to the limit fixed by law. 
And if the offender shall seem to him to be deserving of a more 
severe punishment, let him summon such a person, giving him 
five  days'  notice,  and bring  him before  the  court  of Heliaea, 
writing  upon  the  indictment  the  penalty  which  he  thinks  is 
deserved. And if there be a conviction, let the court of Heliaea 
appoint for the one convicted what penalty he ought to suffer or 
pay"  (Dem.43 .75). 
(iv)  "Any citizen, with the exception of those who had been 
adopted when Solon entered upon his  office,  and had thereby 
become unable  either to  renounce  or to  claim  an  inheritance, 
shall have the right to dispose of his own property by will as he 
45 shall see fit, if  he has no male children lawfully born, unless his 
mind is  impaired by one of these  things,  lunacy or old age  or 
drugs or deprived of  his liberty"  (Dem. 46. 14). 
These laws are in fact not the only ones concerning the widow 
and the  orphan.  There are  also  those in Demosthenes 43.18,20,22,  and 
others which will be examined as  and when they become relevant and 
appropriate  to  the  discussion.  But  these  seem  to  be  the  ones  most 
frequently quoted and referred to by litigants at the Athenian law courts. 
It  is  important  to  note  that  the  succession  law  (Dem.43.51),  also 
paraphrased in Isaios 6.47 and 11.1-2, seems to present peculiar problems 
that do not lend the law to easy interpretation and application. In the first 
place,  some words of the  text are lost.  This makes a very definite  and 
comprehensible interpretation of the law somehow difficult, leaving the 
commentator in a labyrinth of speCUlations and inferences some of  which 
may be speculative and neither here nor there. 
The other problematic section of  the law is centred on the phrase, 
'as  far  as  children  of  cousins'  (l-LEXPL  a.vE~L(7)V  'TTUL8wv).  This  has 
constituted a  crux or point of interpretative issue,  as  illustrated by the 
cases in Isaios  11  and Demosthenes 43;  and has therefore made the law 
severally discussed by commentators.
69  The word  a.VE~L6s is such a key 
69 See Wyse, p.671-713; W.E. Thompson, De Hagniae Hereditate, Mnemosyne Supplement 14,1976; 
D.M.MacDowell,Law, p.l03-108; lK.Davies, APF,77-89; Molly Broadbent, Studies in Greek 
Genealogy,(Leiden,1968)p.61-112;David Cohen, Law, Violence and Community in Classical 
46 expression in the law, but its degree of reference appears so  vague and 
indefinite that it is capable of  various interpretations which intelligent and 
persuasive  litigants  could conveniently exploit to  their advantage.  The 
circle of relatives entitled to claim the property of a deceased man who 
had  no  son(  s)  was  the  U')'XLo"TELU,  and  the  law  seeks  to  define  and 
prescribe the order of  precedence in it. 
But  according  to  Miller,70  the  word  UVEt\;LOS  vanes  between 
cousin of  the first degree and nephew, and each of  these relationships also 
has  its  exact  term,  in  both  cases  a  compound  of U8EA<pOS.  And  that 
aVEt\;Lu8ous  and its synonym UVEt\;LOU  1TULS  may be used not only for the 
cousin's  child  (the  first  cousin  once  removed),  but  also  for  cousin's 
parent's child (also a first cousin once removed). Thus the interpretation 
of the expression l-LEXPL  UVEt\;Ul>V  1TUL8wv  in the law became infinite even 
to  the  Athenians  themselves,  and  it  continues  to  elude  modem 
commentators. Consequently, in inheritance cases, anyone who was able 
to  argue  logically  and  convincingly  to  his  and  the  jury's  best 
understanding of  the law and its application could win his case. 
The four  laws quoted here will be discussed in detail  later in 
subsequent chapters, but a few observations, particularly regarding their 
referentials  may be noted.  In  the  law  quoted  in Dem.43.5l,  the  main 
Athens, 178-180;S.C.Todd, The Shape of  Athenian Law,216-221;W.C.Lacey,The Family in Classical 
Greece 125ff.; A.R.W.Harrison, ' A Problem in the Rules of  Intestate Succession at Athens' CR 
61(1947),41-43; lC.Miles, , The Attic Law of  Intestate Succession' Hermathena 75(1950),69-77. 
47 subj ect matter, as can be seen, is intestate succession. The scope of the 
law  appears  quite  wide.  And some  sections  refer  to  male  and  female 
orphans, though there is no mention of the widow. The following may be 
noted:  (a)  female  orphans  (epikleroi)  who  should be  claimed together 
with the deceased father's estate;  (b) male orphans whose fathers  were 
cousins, who should take their fathers' share of an inherited property; (c) 
the disability of  the bastard orphan regarding succession in the family. 
The following implications of  the law are obvious: if  a man died 
leaving  a  son or  sons  he  or  they  automatically  inherited  the  father's 
estate.  The clauses on bastard sons:  " if there are lawfully born sons of 
brothers;  but no illegitimate child of either sex shall have the  right of 
succession either to religious rites or civic privileges, ...  " seem to suggest 
that there may have been occasions when bastard sons could either inherit 
the whole lot of  a father's estate or be given a share of  it. 
Dem.43.54, Against Makartatos,  has the female orphan and her 
marriage as the main subject-matter. The law however relates to heiresses 
of the Thetes class and makes no mention of those of the other classes of 
citizens.  But  it  is  the  only  law  which implicitly  seeks  to  distinguish 
between women of  the aristocratic class and the underprivileged group. It 
would appear surprising that Solon should stipulate the marriage portions 
for female orphans of the lowest class of citizens. The feeling one gets 
70  M.Miller, ' Greek Kinship Terminology' JHS 73(1953),46-52,esp.46. 
48 from the force of the law and the powers vested in the archon is thus that 
heiresses from poor family background may have had difficulty getting 
husbands. 
One of the family laws that explicitly seek to protect the interest 
of the  widow  is  the  one  cited in Dem.43.75.  The  law  has  three  main 
referentials:  male orphans;  female  orphans;  and pregnant widows.  The 
implications  of a  pregnant  woman  granted  permission  by  the  law  to 
continue to live in her deceased husband's house will be discussed in a 
later chapter. It would however seem a bit strange to  the modem reader 
that  the  law  is  silent  about  non-pregnant  widows.  The  presumption 
therefore is that a non-pregnant widow was at liberty to return to her kin 
on the death of  her husband. 
Dem.46.14 that specifically relates to wills had a great deal of 
press among the ancients, particularly the Attic orators/
1 and continues to 
draw  attention  among  modem  scholars.  In  a  penetrating  introductory 
appraisal of Solon's measure Plutarch writes: 
"  He  was  highly  esteemed  also  for  his  law  concerning  wills. 
Before  his  time,  no  will  could  be  made,  but  the  entire  estate  of the 
deceased must remain in his  family.  Whereas he,  by permitting a man 
who  had no  children to  give  his property to  whom he wished,  ranked 
71  Is.2.13;3.68;4.16;6.9; Dem.20.102;44.14; Isocr.19.49; Hyper.3.17; Plut.Solon 21.3. 
49 friendship above kinship, and favour above necessity, and made a man's 
possessions his own property."  72 
This Solonian family law has a wide scope of implications from 
land tenure issues in general to particular family matters. I do not intend 
to enter into a discussion of  law of  property because of  the difficult nature 
of the subject.  73  But it seems to me that Solon by this law took the first 
step towards making land legally alienable. In fact,  land in pre-Solonian 
Athens was held under a system of family tenure and could not pass out 
of the family. This implies that the plot (KAfjpO~) was something of which 
its holder enjoyed only the use; after whose death the plot was absorbed 
into the family land if he had no surviving sons.  But as  Plutarch points 
out, after the law, the plot became the property of the holder who could 
now bequeath it to anybody of  his choice ifhe had no sons. 
Plutarch's statement, "Before his time no will could be made, but 
the entire estate of the deceased must remain in his family," also appears 
very striking. It points back to the system of  inheritance in Athens before 
Solon  enacted  his  laws;  and  reflects  the  retention  of land  in  family 
ownership over many centuries based on a law which was valid in the 
state and the clans before Solon's legislation. It is generally known that in 
pre-classical  Athens  the  only  one  system  of inheritance  was  intestate 
72 Solon 21.2. I fmd Perrin's translation of  paides as children without qualifying it rather simplistic and 
too general. I think Plutarch is using paides here in the technical sense to mean sons, as the text of  the 
law cited in Dem.46.14 indicates, and  not just children in general. 
50 succession whereby sons were considered as the natural and legal heirs of 
their father's household. And in absence of male children his next-of-kin 
inherited from him. We do not know what happened if  a man died leaving 
behind female  orphans, except to  assume that they most probably lived 
under the  care of their father's next-of-kin.  At any rate,  this  system of 
inheritance  was  likely  to  place  the  female  orphans  in  a  vulnerable 
position at  a time when people could be used as  security for  loans,  or 
when  children  could  be  sold  into  slavery  because  there  was  no  law 
forbidding the practice. 
Quite apart from any female  orphans who may have been left 
behind by the deceased, one other issue is the continuity of the person's 
household.  The system of inheritance by the next-of-kin if the deceased 
had no surviving sons, and the fact that a man was not permitted to make 
a will before the time of  Solon promoted the extinction of  the lineage of  a 
man who died childless. This is because the household of the deceased 
without male children would eventually be absorbed into that of  his next-
of-kin;  a  situation  which  certainly  constituted  a  serious  threat  to  the 
independent continuity of the households generation after generation by 
the  eventual  lack  of male  issue.  It  would  appear,  therefore,  that  the 
Solonian law on wills was intended as a means to preserve the households 
of citizens without sons as  independent units.  At the same time, it was 
73  Cf.Harrison, Law (i),p.200 
51 also meant to prevent collaterals from inheriting and thus weakening the 
concentrative tendencies of  the genos.
74 
The preservation of  the household, which, in fact, is a social and 
religious implication of the law is certainly what Thrasyllos, a speaker in 
Isaios underlines when he tells the jury: 
"  All  men,  when  they  are  near  their  end,  take  measures  of 
precaution on their own behalf to prevent their families  from becoming 
extinct and to secure that there shall be someone to perform sacrifices and 
carry out the customary rites over them. And so, even if they die without 
issue, they at any rate adopt children and leave them behind. And there is 
not merely a personal feeling in favour of this course, but the state has 
taken public measures to secure that it shall be followed, since by law it 
entrusts the archon with the duty of preventing families from becoming 
extinguished."  75 
The  law,  as  noted  already,  makes  no  reference  to  female 
orphans,  but it is  clear that a man who had a  surviving  son could not 
make a will to bequeath his property to anybody, thereby protecting the 
source of  livelihood of  the male orphan. An interesting feature of the law 
on wills, however, is that, like the law on inheritance (Dem.43.51),  this 
law  also  seeks  to  exclude  bastard  children  from  inheriting  from  their 
74 Cf. David Asheri, , Laws of  Inheritance, Distribution of  Land and Political Constitutions in Ancient 
Greece' Historia 12(1963),1-21,esp.8 
75 Is. 7.30 
52 father,  as  is implied in a clause of the law, "if he has no male children 
lawfully born." 
I  t has already been noted that the  laws cited here are not the 
only  laws  of Solon  concerning  the  family  and  which  border  on  the 
welfare of the widow and the orphan. As discussions in the subsequent 
chapters will show, other family laws equally significant and relevant to 
the  position  of the  widow  and  the  orphan  are  attributed  to  Solon.  A 
characteristic feature of the family laws is that, although Solon's reforms 
were prompted by the plight of the underprivileged class, his family laws 
do  not apply to  a particular class of citizens in Athens,  except the  one 
concerning  the  marriage  of  heiresses  (Dem.43.54)  which  seeks  to 
stipulate  the  dowry to  be 'given to  an  epikleros  given in marriage.  We 
have no knowledge of  how much was given to a woman not of the thetes 
class, but this  suggests that Athenians gave  dowries  that were large in 
proportion to their means. 
The family laws in fact, do not explicitly describe the conditions 
in which widows and orphans lived before Solon's measures, they none 
the less reflect what the situation may have been for the widow and the 
orphan in archaic Athens.  And the  fact  that these and other laws were 
enacted to protect and promote their interest suggests that the widow and 
the orphan, whether high born or base born, may have had a raw deal for 
several decades before Solon. 
53 We  may  take  the  sale  of children  as  a  typical  example.  If 
parents could sell their own children into slavery because of economic 
hardships, then one can imagine the fate  of orphans whose nurture and 
care became additional burdens for their father's next-of-kin. The judicial 
role and extraordinary powers conferred on the archon (Dem.43.75) also 
seem to suggest that pregnant widows, male orphans, and heiresses may 
have  suffered various kinds of injustice before the  time of Solon.  And 
these may have prompted him to extend special protection to them and to 
confer such powers on the archon. 
As for the bastard orphan, if his lot was hard like that of some 
other orphans, his future  did not look brighter either with regard to  the 
family laws. The account given by the AP (56.6-7) of  the functions of  the 
archon  in  respect  of the  family  makes  no  mention  of bastards.  And 
Demosthenes 43.51 which enjoins the archon to take care of orphans and 
to preserve oikoi, rather speaks against the interest of bastards, excluding 
them from the father's property. 
Furthermore, another law attributed to Solon relieving the bastard 
son of the duty of looking after his father seems to have complicated the 
already worsened position of  the bastard.
76 For duty to the father naturally 
goes with the reciprocal compensation of succeeding to him at his death. 
76  Plutarch, Solon 22.4. Cf. Wolff, Traditio 2(1944),87; Ogden, Bastardy, p.39. 
54 And if the bastard son is  relieved of his  services to  his  father,  then he 
could have no moral justification to inherit from him at his death. 
However, it would appear that at some point in time in Athens, a 
bastard could get a share of his father's property. This is implicit in the 
AP 13.5  where the author tells us that a considerable part of those who 
joined Pisistratos' party were those who were not of  pure descent because 
they feared for their rights as  citizens. This position is partly implied in 
Demosthenes 43.51  and 46.14. But the law of succession abolished this 
flexibility  and  thus  did  away  with the  bastard's rights  to  his  father's 
estate.  This  situation  is  explicitly  dramatised  in  Aristophanes 
(Birds,1641-90), where the hopes of  Herakles, the bastard son of  Zeus, to 
inherit from his father are dashed by legal restrictions. 
The Aristophanic passage may be thought to  be no reliable 
historical source, presenting a funny situation involving comic characters 
as it does - speaking of the gods as if they were ordinary human beings, 
and Athenians at that. But the legal rules introduced one after the other by 
Aristophanes to develop the comic scene all reflect genuine rules of the 
Athenian law of inheritance as  they existed under the democracy.77  For 
the  Aristophanic  joke  with  the  legal  text  raises  Herakles'  hopes  by 
implying clearly in the  first part of the  law that bastards could indeed 
succeed  in  the  absence  of legitimate  children,  while  the  second  part 
55 dashes them again by passing over bastards in favour of collaterals as it 
happens  in  Demosthenes  43.51  and  46.14.  Thus  during  the  classical 
period the lot of the bastard orphan saw not much improvement with the 
existing rules of  succession in the family.78 
So far the attempt has been to  sketch the deteriorating socio-
economic  conditions  which  compelled  the  Athenians  to  choose  and 
empower Solon to  introduce reforms in the  society.  Some of the  laws 
relating to the family have also been outlined. One question, however, is 
whether all laws attributed to Solon were really Solon's. According to the 
AP  (7.1),  Solon  repealed  all  the  Drakonian  laws,  except  those  on 
homicide, and made new laws that the Athenians began to observe. Thus 
by the time of the orators the Athenian homicide laws were called 'the 
ordinances of  Drakon' and the rest of  the Athenian code of  laws 'the laws 
of Solon.'  79  But whether all  the laws attributed to  Solon were,  in fact, 
enacted by him is quite another matter. 
A  case  in  point  is  the  law  against  subversion  quoted  by 
Andokides in his On  the Mysteries (1.96-98).80 The orator introduces the 
law as 'Solon's law' (1.95). But the law itself is shown by its preamble to 
77  Cf. Ogden, Bastardy, p.34-37; MacDowell, Aristophanes, p.219-221. 
78  For the most extensive treatment of  the status of  bastards in Athens as at present, see Daniel Ogden, 
Greek Bastardy (Oxford, 1996), p.32-212. But see also Wolff, Traditio 2(1944),75-95; Harrison, Law 
(i), p.63-65; S.C.Humphreys, , The Nothoi of  Kynosarges ' JHS 94(1974),88-95; MacDowell, 
'Bastards as Athenian Citizens' CQ 79(1976),88-91; K.R.Walters, ' Perikles' Citizenship Law' CA 
(1983),314-336; Ogden, , Women and Bastardy in Ancient Greece and the Hellenistic World' in The 
Greek World (ed. Anton Powell, London 1995), p.226-228. 
79  Cf. MacDowell, Law, p.43; Andok. p.120. 
56 have been proposed by Demophantos in 410 B.C., and passed under the 
presidency  and  secretaryship  respectively  of  contemporaries  of 
Demophantos (1.96). This law can therefore not have been a law passed 
by Solon, but the speaker attributes it to him. 
A further example is Demosthenes 43.51  cited above. This law, 
as is obvious, presupposes the existence of  will-making, and can therefore 
not be older than that institution. And according to Plutarch (Solon, 21.2), 
it was  Solon who introduced wills.  Thus Demosthenes 43.51  cannot be 
older  than  Solon;  and  he  must be  the  author of it.  However,  the  last 
sentence of the law refers to the authorship of Euklides, and that was in 
403 B.C. But the orator seems to imply that it was Solon who enacted the 
law.  This  attribution  to  him is  obvious  from  the  background of will-
making  in the  law  itself.  The  other  factor  is  the  epithet  or  title  'the 
lawgiver' (0  VO~08e.TllS) most often applied to  Solon, which the orator 
uses before (43.50) and after citing the law (43.53).81 
Nevertheless, the law in its entirety cannot be ascribed to Solon. 
Thus although it is a fact, as Rhodes rightly points out,82  that throughout 
the  classical period and most of the  Hellenistic era,  the  Athenians had 
direct access to  the  original laws of Solon,  and the  orators on various 
occasions often speak in general terms of their code of laws as  'laws of 
80  For a more detailed discussion of  this law, see Martin Ostwald, , The Athenian Legislation Against 
Tyranny and Subversion' TAPA 86(1955),103-128. 
81  See also Is.l1.3; Lys.30.2,27,28; Dem.43.66,67. 
57 Solon,' not all the legal rules attributed to him can be said to have been 
his, though they could be genuinely archaic Athenian laws. 
Solon was aware that the mere enactment of  his laws, whatever 
their number and the severity of penalties provided, would not have the 
desired  effect if steps  were  not  taken  to  make  his  enactments  a  real 
safeguard  against  a  recurrence  of the  conditions  he  had  sought  to 
terminate.  Linforth comments on Solon's realisation of the enormity of 
the task he had been given to address, and how to deal with the situation 
to  restore  Athens to  a  state of order and contentment in the  following 
words: 
"Solon, like a good physician, understood that quick and powerful 
remedies were needed to cure the acute disorder from which Athens was 
suffering, and that when the crisis was past and convalescence had begun, 
a sound regimen was required to  safeguard the health which had been 
restored.  The  first  of these  requirements  he  met  by  issuing  certain 
executive orders, which, however deeply they cut, the city had given him 
the  power  to  enforce.  Then  when  these  had been  put  into  effect,  he 
proceeded to  draw up a body of written laws calculated to  prevent the 
recurrence of  so grave a situation in the future. ,,83 
With regard to the widow and the orphan, the office of  the archon 
eponymous that became guardian of the family was empowered to check 
82  P.1.Rhodes, ' 'EILArrEAIA in Athens ' JHS99(1979),104; Commentary, p.109-110. 
58 any acts of injustice against them. An auxiliary agent to the authority of 
the archon was the third party prosecution, b  ~ouA6l-LEVOS.  This was the 
legal right extended to any person to prosecute on behalf of an injured 
party  against  anyone  who  perpetrated  any  acts  of injustice  not  only 
against a widow or an orphan, but also against any person in the society. 
83  I.M.Linforth, Solon the Athenian (California, 1919), p.61-62. 
59 (J.c) THE ARCHON  AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 
IN MATTERS CONCERNING WIDOWS AND ORPHANS 
The author of the Athenaion Politeia (AP)  informs us that the 
office of the archon was the third of the  first  three  greatest and oldest 
offices  of the  ancient  constitution  of Athens.
84  This  implies  that  the 
archonship  was  older  than  Solon.  It is  not  certain  when  exactly  the 
archonship was established. But Bonner and Smith suggest that it may 
probably have been instituted in 683/2 B.C.
85 
As has been noted in the  previous section,  the  archon became 
guardian of the family with the reforms of Solon. In this regard, he was 
not only to protect oikos interests in general, but had special powers to 
defend widows and orphans against those who could seriously harm them 
in the society. I do not intend to enter into the question of eligibility and 
manner of  appointing archons as variously discussed.
86 
Briefly stated, the service periods for the officials differed with 
the years. In an earlier time after the monarchy, they were to serve for 
life; but this tenure of office was changed to ten years. And from 683/2 
84  3.3. 
85  RJ.Bonner and G.Smith, The Administration of  Justice from Homer to Aristotle (i) (New York, 
1968), p.169. But see the analysis by P. J. Rhodes based on chronological evidence dating the office 
back to 1069/8 B.C., A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia (Oxford 1981)p.98. 
86  See AP. 8; I.M.Linforth, Solon, p.81-82; N.G.Hammond, ' Strategia and Hegemonia in Fifth-
Century Athens' CQ 63 N.S.19(1969)111-144; D.M.MacDowell, La~  ,p.25; E.B.adian, ' Archons an~ 
Strategoi', Antichthon 5(1971)1-34; W.G.Forrest and D.L:Stockton,  The Ath~man  Archons: A Note, 
Historia 36(1987)235-240; G.L.Cawkwell 'Nomophulakla and the Areopagus  JHS 108(1988)1-12; 
T.E.Rihll, 'Democracy Denied: Why Ephialtes Attacked the Areopagus'JHS 115(1995)87-98. 
60 onwards,  the  archons were  selected annually.87  It does  seem also  that 
before  487/6  B.C.  the  archons  were  chosen by election.  However,  in 
487/6 the method of selecting them was changed, and direct election to 
the office gave way to random selection by sortition. 
I  find  it  hard  to  be  convinced  by  the  impression  created  by 
Badian  in his  article  that  the  archonship  was  an  office  for  relatively 
young men who had just started a political career, particularly during the 
time of  Cleisthenes.  88  One begins to wonder, if for all the importance and 
responsibility of their office, all the nine archons were mere novices. Of 
course there could be a situation whereby an archon might not be versed 
in administrative affairs due to the procedure of  appointment by sortition. 
A  case  in  point  is  that  of one  Theogenes.  In  a  speech  of 
Demosthenes, Theogenes is said to have been appointed archon basileus 
though " without experience in affairs. ,,89 But even so, the Demosthenic 
evidence may be tendentious, considering the nature of the case at issue. 
My belief is that in spite of  the fundamental idea of  egalitarianism behind 
the Athenian democracy, the majority of  men who were appointed to the 
office  of archonship may have had some  taste  of state  affairs  though 
without any specialist knowledge or skill. 
87  AP 3.1-4;8.1;22.5. Cf. MacDowell, Law, p.25; Forrest and Stockton, Historia 36(1987),236-237; 
Rhodes, Commentary, p.98-101,146-148,272-274.  .,  ,  .  .  " 
88  See also the harsh criticism by Forrest and Stockton who descnbe BadIan s ImputatIOn as  a 
fashionable but questionable assumption.' 'p.236. 
89  Dem.59.72. See also MacDowell, Law, p.25. 
61 To return to the main trend of discussion, evidence from the AP 
indicates that the archon had wide-ranging responsibilities,  and that in 
fact he became a very important agent of the administration of  justice in 
the Athenian family. The author notes in describing the archon's areas of 
jurisdiction in matters concerning the family: 
"The eponymous archon also holds preliminary hearing for  some 
lawsuits, and having established a prima facie case he introduces them to 
the court. These are cases of maltreatment of parents (anyone can bring 
such a case with no penalty incurred for failing to convict), maltreatment 
of orphans (these are cases against guardians), maltreatment of heiresses 
(these are cases against guardians and husbands), mismanagement of an 
orphan's  estate  (these  are  also  cases  against  guardians),  madness  (if 
someone  claims  that  a  man  is  squandering  his  property  through 
madness), for the appointment of distributors (if someone does not want 
common property to be divided), for the establishment of  a guardianship, 
for judgement over a guardianship, for production of a disputed object, 
for enrolment as a guardian, and decisions on claims to inheritance and 
heiresses.  He is also concerned with orphans and heiresses and women 
who claim to be pregnant after their husbands have died.  He can either 
himself fine wrongdoers or can introduce them to a court. He also leases 
out the estates of orphans and heiresses (until the heiress reaches the age 
62 of  14)  and  takes  land  as  surety  for  the  lease.  The  archon  exacts 
maintenance from guardians if  they fail to provide it for their charges.'  ,90 
We may compare the following  law in Demosthenes regarding 
the jurisdiction of  the archon that we have already noted: 
..  Let the archon take charge of orphans and of heiresses and of 
families that are becoming extinct, and of all women who remain in the 
houses of their deceased husbands, declaring that they are pregnant. Let 
him take  charge of these,  and not suffer anyone  to  do  any  outrage to 
them.  And if anyone  shall  commit any  outrage  or lawless  act  against 
them, he shall have power to impose a fine  upon such person up to the 
limit fixed by law. And if  the offender shall seem to him to be deserving 
of a more severe punishment, let him summon such a person, giving him 
five days' notice, and bring him before the court of  Heliaea, writing upon 
the indictment the penalty which he thinks is deserved. And if  there be a 
conviction, let the  court of Heliaea appoint for  the one convicted what 
penalty he ought to suffer or pay." 91 
Putting side by side  the  evidence in AP and what we  have  in 
Dem.  43.75,  one  can  easily  notice  a  close  affinity  between  them  in 
structure  and  substance.  Wilamowitz  and  Rhodes  therefore  note  quite 
rightly that what the AP has given us in 56.7 is  a summary of the law 
90  AP 56.6-7. In the main  I follow here the translation given by Robin Osborne, ' Social and 
Econ~mic Implications of'the Leasing of  Land and Property in Classical and Hellenistic Greece,' 
Chiron  18(1988)305. 
63 quoted  in  Dem.43.75.
92 
It  is  clear  from  the  evidence  that  the 
circumstances and conditions of matters affecting the  family in general 
and the widow and the orphan in particular in which the archon's role 
and responsibilities fell are different and various. The archon's role in the 
appointment of  guardians is one such responsibility. 
Legal or statutory guardianship in classical Athens seems to have 
grown out of  convention or tradition. For it is evident that where families 
were kindly disposed to  one another after the death of a father or both 
parents of a child, guardianship would conventionally devolve on them, 
and that one relative or another would take charge of the orphan without 
regard to  any law.
93  Solon's law  on guardianship  may therefore  have 
been  introduced  to  reaffirm the  convention,  streamline  the  process  or 
procedure, and give the tradition a legal backing. 
The relevant clause of the law authorising the archon to appoint a 
guardian reads as  follows  after the preamble to  the law:  ElS  E1Tl'rpo1Tlls 
KUTuaTuaLV,  ElS  E1TLTpo1Tlls  OLuoLKuaLuv:  "  for  the  establishment  of 
guardianship, for deciding rival claims to guardianship"  (AP,56.6). These 
cases were submitted to the archon for action on them.  The exact scope 
and  limits  of these  cases  are,  however,  not  quite  definite.  But  it  is 
91  Dem.,43.75. 
92  Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, U. von, Aristoteles und A then (Berlin 1893)i.258-9, noted by Rhodes, 
Commentary, p.34. 
93  See Lys.19.9,33; Is.1.12; Dem.57.19-21. 
64 conjectured  by  Wyse  and  others
94  that  ElS  I 
KU  'TUo-'TUo-L  V 
presupposes the appointment of a guardian by the archon to an orphaned 
child  when  no  relative  came  forward  to  take  up  the  burden  of 
guardianship according to the law or under the terms of a will; and that 
ElS  E.1TL'TP01TllS  ~ku8LKUo-LUV suggests  a  situation  whereby parties  would 
either be eager to avoid what they considered as a disadvantage, and thus 
shifting  a  burden,  or  competed  to  obtain  a  privilege  by  being  the 
guardian. 
In any case, it is evident that the archon had significant executive 
duties to perform. As Wyse correctly points out, either way the situation 
presupposes  a  law defining  the  conditions  under which persons  were 
called  upon  to  undertake  guardianship  responsibilities.  In  a  situation 
whereby the guardian, appointed inter vivos or by testament, happened to 
be away on the death of  the testator, the most probable action would have 
been  for  the  family,  in  consultation  with  the  archon,  to  nominate  a 
contingent guardian in conformity with the line of succession to act for 
the appointed guardian until he was back home to take over his duties. 
The  question of the  appointment of guardians  will  receive  a 
detailed  discussion  later,  but  I  find  not  completely  convincing  the 
suggestion by Harrison and others that a guardian had to register with the 
archon even when he was nominated in the deceased's will, and that no 
94  Wyse,p.191; Rhodes, Comm.p.632; MacDowell, Law,p.93. 
65 guardian was allowed to enter on his duties before presenting himself to 
the archon and obtaining authorisation.95  Harrison may probably be right 
on the issue of  publicity for the sake of  rival claimants or objectors, and I 
am,  in fact,  aware  also of the  suggestion of formal  ratification of the 
appointment of a father's nominee(s).96 But as I shall argue later on, the 
pressures of funeral rites and other immediate commitments in the wake 
of the  decease  would  have  compelled  an  appointed  or  nominated 
guardian to assume responsibilities before a formal appearance before the 
archon for registration (if any). 
An essential family responsibility that Solon put on the archon 
was the prevention of any Athenian families from becoming extinct. In 
pre-Solonian  Athens,  as  elsewhere  in  pre-classical  Greece,  male 
descendants  had  been  considered  the  natural  and  legal  heirs  to  the 
household of  their father. But if  a man had no male descendants he could 
not  choose  who  should  succeed him.  The  inheritance  thus  devolved, 
according to an invariable order of relationship, on collaterals and their 
descendants;  and  if there  were  no  collaterals  ascendants  and  their 
f
~·  .  97  o Ispnng came In tum. 
Nevertheless, it was possible for a man without a  son to adopt 
one to be his heir. However, the system of  inheritance by which the next-
95  Rhodes,ibid; Wyse,ibid. See also A.R.W.Harrison, Law (i) (Oxford, 1968)p.103, who bases his 
conj ecture on Is.4. 8 and 6.3 6. 
96  See MacDowell, n.  11  above. 
66 of-kin inherited from a deceased who had no natural son of his own was 
found to be unsatisfactory. This is because by that system the property of 
the deceased subsequently became absorbed into that of his next-of-kin  , 
thereby making his own family become extinct.98  To prevent this kind of 
situation from recurring therefore, Solon introduced the law permitting a 
man  without  a  son  to  adopt  one  by will  and  for  the  adopted  son  to 
succeed him after his death.  And if a man without a son died without 
making  a  \"ill  to  adopt  one  to  inherit  from  him,  we  are  informed  of 
posthumous adoption by which the family of the deceased could adopt a 
son to be his heir.99 The right to adopt was thus given to a man without a 
son, or to his family to find an heir to inherit from him after his death in 
order to preserve his household as an independent unit. 
But elsewhere in another law attributed to  Solon, the archon is 
given  the  legal  power to  "  take  charge  of families  that are  becoming 
extinct.  ,,100 What is not very clear however is the nature of the archon's 
role in preventing the extinction of  families, as authorised by the law. For 
there seems to be no particular evidence on what special arrangements or 
steps  the  archon  had to  take  if it became  obvious  that  a  family  was 
becoming extinct.  It may therefore be assumed that it was through the 
97  Cf. Dem.43.51. See also Wyse,p.562ff.;680ff. 
98  MacDowell, Law, p.1 00; David Asheri, , Laws of  Inheritance, Distribution of  Land and Political 
Constitutions in Ancient Greece' Historia 12( 1963) 1-12,but 6-7. 
99  See Dem.46.14; 43.12; Is.2.7-8,10; 7.30.For a more comprehensive discussion of  the subject of 
adoption see L. Rubinstein, Adoption in IV Century Athens ( Copenhagen,1993). Also MacDowell. 
Law, p.99-101; Harrison, Law (i), p.82-96. 
67 settlement of  inheritance disputes and claims to inheritance and heiresses  , 
even  where  there  were  no  disputes,  that  the  archon  exercised  his 
authority  of maintaining  the  continuity  of families.  For  as  will  be 
discussed below, any claims to an estate except direct descendants of or 
men adopted by the deceased had to register their claim with the archon, 
who later arranged for the trial and adjudication of the estate; and in the 
case of  an heiress (epikleros), for her award to her claimant in marriage. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  this  procedure  known  as  epidikasia 
conferred on the archon a right of  betrothal in the case of epikleroi. This 
betrothal power of the archon is  evident in a speech of Isaios,  On  the 
Estate of  Philoktemon, where the orator argues that if an epikleros were 
already thirty years of age "  she ought to have been no longer under a 
guardian, nor unmarried and childless, but long ago  married,  given in 
marriage  either by her guardian,  according  to  the  law,  or else  by an 
adjudication of  the court." (6.14-15) 
One other issue is the families of  executed men whose properties 
were  also  confiscated by the  state.  The AP and other ancient  sources 
inform us  that  the  brief oligarchic  regime  of the  Thirty  put  to  death 
without trial  1500 men during their short reign in 404/3 B.C. to prop up 
their regime. lOi We cannot be certain about the marital background of all 
the executed men. But what we can be sure of  is that not all the executed 
100  Dem.43.75; 18.7.30. 
68 men were bachelors, and that among them who were married, some most 
probably had daughters but without sons, or no daughters and sons at all. 
In  any  case,  when  the  property  was  confiscated,  there  is  a  greater 
problem about men who did leave sons than about those  who left no 
children. 
The question that  seems to  have  had no answer,  however,  is, 
with  the  law's  concern  for  the  preservation  of the  family.  How,  for 
instance, were the families of executed men who had no sons prevented 
by the  archon from dying out?  This is  a situation that Solon may not 
have foreseen in making his laws. Not quite surprisingly, the sources are 
silent on the archon's role in such a  situation.  For even with executed 
men who had sons and daughters, the position is not quite clear, although 
the  archon has definite legal powers to  watch the interests of orphans. 
Naturally, it appears that no authority would want to preserve the family 
of  an executed man. For instance, a speaker in Lysias tells the jury of the 
embarrassed circumstances of the orphans of one Aristophanes who was 
summarily  executed  together  with  his  father,  and  their  property 
confiscated by the state after a military debacle in 390 B.C.
102 
The  speaker  who  happens  to  be  the  brother-in-law  of the 
executed Aristophanes laments that he has been compelled to  rear the 
101  AP 35.4; Lys.12.6-7,83; Dem.59.112-113; Isoc.7.67; Aesch.3.235. 
102  Lys.19.7-8. 
69 three  children of his  sister.
103 
This  compulsory  guardianship,  I  think, 
arose not because the archon had exercised his powers conferred on him 
by  the  law,  as  obliquely  implied  by  Harrison,104  but  because  of the 
circumstances of the case. For one thing, the property of Aristophanes, 
father of the children, had been confiscated by the state, resulting in a 
deprivation of the orphans' patrimony (19.8); for another, his sister, the 
children's  mother,  had  been  deprived  of her  dowry  (19.9,32).  Such 
circumstances would naturally'  compel' a sympathetic relative to assume 
guardianship  responsibilities  without  any  external  pressure  from  the 
archon,  as may be asserted.  One even begins to wonder what initiative 
the archon may have taken on behalf of the orphans who seem to have 
had no source of  sustenance for their future. 
To return to the situation in the era of  the Thirty, since there is no 
direct evidence on what happened to the families of executed husbands 
who had no heirs, one may conj ecture that their families presumably died 
out.  Perhaps  the  case  of Theramenes may be taken  as  representative. 
According to the ancient sources, Theramenes, having played an active 
part in establishing the rule of the Four Hundred in 411  B.C., played an 
equally  active  role  four  months  later  in  overthrowing  them  and 
establishing the Five Thousand. 
103  19.9 
104  Law (i), p.lOl. 
70 Then in 404 B.C., he was very instrumental in setting up the 
brief oligarchy of the Thirty of which he was himself one, which put to 
death the 1500 men. But when Theramenes tried to broaden the franchise 
beyond the 3000 citizens initially approved, we are informed that he was 
condemned  and  executed by the  same  ruling  body  he  had  helped  to 
establish.
105  With  regard  to  his  family,  Davies
106  notes  that  there  is 
absolute lack of evidence on collaterals or descendants of Theramenes, 
and that his family seems to have died with him after his execution. 
The  fact  is  that  even  if there  were  collaterals  of an  executed 
husband who had no  sons  of his  own,  his  next-of-kin would have  no 
property  to  inherit  so  that  he  could perhaps  undertake  a  posthumous 
adoption  in  the  future  to  continue  the  deceased's  family.  This  is 
particularly because the estates of  executed persons were also confiscated 
by the  state.  It seems therefore that under such political circumstances, 
the arms of  the law apparently became defective, and that the archon had 
very little or no effective role to play to ensure the continuity of families, 
or protect the interests of  orphans as prescribed by the law. 
105  On the rule of  the Thirty and the public career of  Theramenes see Lys.12;13; AP 34-40; Diod. 
Sic.l4.3-6; Xen. Hell.2.3-4. For modem discussion see P.E.Harding , ' The Theramenes Myth' 
Phoenix 28(1974)101-111; A.Andrewes, ' The Arginousai Trial' Phoenix 28(1974)112-122; 
M.Ostwald, Popular Sovereignty (Berkeley 1986),p.460-496; Rhodes, Commentary, p.415-480; 
Krentz, The Thirty (Ithaca, 1982); Usher, JHS 88(1968)128-35. 
106  Davies, lK., Athenian Propertied Families 600-300 B.C. (Oxford 1971),p.228. 
71 Athenian legal procedure required that before a case went to court 
there  should be a preliminary investigation  (anakrisis)  of the  matter. I07 
The case was brought to the archon, and he in tum conducted the inquiry. 
As  illustrated by Isocrates and Demosthenes, and noted by MacDowell, 
on the receipt of  a charge or claim, the archon posted it on a notice board 
in the Agora near the statues of the ten Tribal Heroes for the purpose of 
informing or notifying the person or parties concerned.  I 08  This was the 
general practice whether the case was public or private. 
Demosthenes informs us that if someone was accused of having 
committed  an  unlawful  act,  the  defendant  was  asked  by  the  archon 
whether or not he admitted the charge, and that if he denied it he had to 
submit a formal statement to the archon to that effect.  109 Among the cases 
in the family which would normally require preliminary investigation by 
the  archon  are  claims  to  inheritance  and  heiresses,  maltreatment  of 
parents, widows and orphans, and embezzlement of  an orphan's estate. 
As  the  term  for  the  procedure  implies,  the  actual  form  of the 
anakrisis was examination or interrogation of  the parties concerned in the 
case. The archon " put questions to the disputants or claimants, and they 
could also put questions to each other. This would give each of them a 
clearer  idea of what the  other was  alleging  and  what  were  the  exact 
107  42  See MacDowell, Law, p.240-2  . 
108  Isoc.l5.237; Dem;21.103; MacDowell, ibid.240. 
109  Dem.45.46. 
72 points of dispute, and it would help them to decide how it would be best 
to  present  their  arguments  in  the  trial  and  what  supporting  evidence 
ld b  d  d 
,,110 I  .  .  wou  e nee  e  .  t IS Important to note that the anakrisis enabled the 
archon also to lrnow the basis and legality or otherwise of the case that 
had been brought before him for action. 
There  is  evidence  to  suggest  that  the  archon  could  have 
considerable power and influence at the preliminary interrogations. In an 
inheritance dispute in a speech of Isaios in which some account of an 
anakrisis  is  given,  the  speaker seems to  imply that the  anakrisis  took 
place on two occasions apparently on the authority of  the archon: 
"  When the interrogations took place before the  archon,  and my 
opponents  paid money into  court in  support of their  claim that  these 
young men were the legitimate sons of Euktemon, on being asked by us 
who,  and whose daughter, their mother was,  they could not supply the 
information, although we protested and the archon ordered them to reply 
in  accordance  with  the  law.  It  was  surely  a  strange  proceeding, 
gentlemen, to make a claim on their behalf as  legitimate and to lodge a 
protestation, and yet not able to state who was their mother or name any 
of their relatives. At the time they alleged that she was a Lemnian and so 
secured a delay;  subsequently, when they appeared at the interrogation, 
without  giving  time  for  anyone  to  ask  a  question,  they  immediately 
110  MacDowell, ibid. Cf. also Todd, Athenian Law, p.l26-129 where he notes problems of  the 
73 declared that the mother was Kallippe and that she was the daughter of 
Pistoxenos,  as  though it was  enough for  them merely to  produce  the 
name of Pistoxenos. When we asked who he was and whether he was 
alive  or not,  they  said that he had died on military  service  in  Sicily, 
leaving this daughter  ... ' , III 
It  would  appear  from  this  speaker's  account  that  at  the 
interrogations, if  the archon was not satisfied with the facts of  the case he 
could adjourn the anakrisis and send the claimants or plaintiffs off.  He 
would then ask them to come again at a later time to restate their case. It 
seems also that at the interrogations the archon had the power either to 
suggest how a litigant should present his case or to compel him to amend 
his  original  deposition.  In  another  speech  of Isaios  for  instance,  the 
speaker,  son  of an  heiress,  contests  a  posthumous  adoption  to  his 
mother's father, and claims the grandfather's property for his mother. But 
he alleges that at the anakrisis he was compelled by the archon to state 
112 Th  . ,  h'  h  that his mother was sister of the adopted son.  e new posItIon w  IC 
the  speaker  had  been  compelled  to  take,  however,  would  mean  the 
recognition of  the posthumous adoption of  the son. This deposition could 
be damaging to his position, and he attempts to disprove it at the trial. 
F  or if  the posthumous adoption is ratified by the speaker, as the archon's 
procedure and the obscurities of  its purpose. 
III  Is.6.12-13. 
112  Is.! 0.2. 
74 directives imply, he would then become a nephew to the adopted son, 
and could put in his claim as such. However this also would mean that in 
law neither he nor his mother could claim the property on the death of  the 
adopted son as long as the deceased had a  surviving brother if he died 
without a son of  his own.113 
Another implication of the position is that the speaker's mother 
too would not be able to claim the estate of  her father as now the adopted 
son would be a recognised son of her father,  and would therefore take 
precedence  over her  according  to  the  Athenian  law of succession.  It 
appears quite easy to understand why the archon compelled the speaker 
to depose at the preliminary investigations that his mother was sister of 
the adopted son, thus being allowed to claim as a nephew of Aristarkhos 
(II). Wyse presumes that the archon was satisfied with the soundness of 
the testator's title,114  though this is a mere conjecture.  In any case, the 
matter clearly illustrates the extent of the authority and influence of the 
archon at the preliminary interrogations. After the anakrisis, the archon 
then sent the case to court for trial over which he presided.  1  15 
The  claims  which  were  to  pass  through  the  archon  were  of 
different kinds  depending upon the  circumstances.  For instance,  there 
was the claim to the property of  men who died without sons or daughters. 
113  Dem.43.51. 
114  P.654. 
115  Dem.48.31. 
75 The majority of  the cases in Isaios illustrate this kind of  claim. There was 
also  claim to property for an orphan. This is illustrated by the cases in 
Isaios  11  where  a  co-guardian claims half-share of an  estate  from  his 
fellow  guardian  for  their  ward,  and  Demosthenes  43  in  which  the 
prosecutor  Sositheos  claims  a  property  for  Euboulides  (III),  a 
posthumously adopted son of Euboulides (II). There were also issues of 
reclaiming  an  estate  from  a  person to  whom adjudication had already 
been made; and claims to heiresses. 
In  all  these  kinds  of claim,  the  archon's  executive  role  was 
indispensable. Every claimant had to apply to him in writing, maintaining 
either that "the deceased had left a will adopting him as a son, or that he 
was the nearest relative of the deceased,"  or in the case of an heiress, he 
had to  claim that "the deceased's nearest relative being a daughter and 
therefore epikleros, he himself was the nearest male relative and so was 
entitled to marry her and assume control of the property."  116  The archon 
sent the claims to the Assembly at whose meeting they were announced 
and read the" lists of suits about inheritance and heiresses, so  that all 
may have cognisance of any vacancy in an estate that occurs."  117  The 
archon  then  arranged  for  a  hearing  of the  claim  after  conducting  the 
anakrisis: " The archon shall assign by lot days for the trial of claims to 
116  Andok. 1. 117-121. Cf. MacDowell, Law, p.102. 
117  AP 43.4. 
76 inheritances or heiresses in every month except Scirophorion; and no one 
shall obtain an inheritance without adjudication."  118 
An important area where the archon played an equally significant 
role is the management of an orphan's estate. Though it was possible for 
a guardian to manage the fortune of  his ward himself, he could also lease 
the estate to an entrepreneur for a fixed income to the ward for his or her 
care.  But the guardian could not lease out the estate without getting the 
archon involved. The AP informs us of  the role of the archon, as already 
noted: "And he also leases out the estates of orphans and heiresses ...  and 
takes land as surety for the lease."  119 
The archon's role in leasing out the estate of an orphan was both 
executive and supervisory, as illustrated by a speaker in Isaios. 
In  the  first  place,  there must be an application by the  guardian to  the 
archon for the  lease of the property; the  archon put up the  estate at  a 
public  auction  over  which  he  presided  in  the  court;  and  chose  the 
assessors for the security (apotimema)  on the property to  ensure that it 
was  sufficient.  He then took the  security on behalf of the  orphan and 
d ·  C'.  •  d  f'  120 I  awarded the estate to the lessee who manage  It lor a peno  0  tIme.  t 
is important to note also that the archon had every right to cancel the bid 
if his assessors decided that the highest bidder did not possess sufficient 
118  Dem.46.22. See Dem.48.23-26 for a postponement of  the trial if  a claimant or disputant later 
realised that he would not be adequately prepared for the trial at the time that the archon had sent the 
case to court. 
77 property to  guarantee his obligation.  Furthermore, he had the  absolute 
right to  cancel the bid if it was found out that the application from the 
guardian was a plot to deprive the orphan of his or her patrimony, as the 
case in Isaios 6.36-37 indicates. The decision to cancel a bid outright thus 
shows the extent of  the archon's authority and discretionary power. 
The archon's concern for the heiress had two major implications. 
He was to see to it that she was not deprived of her property and did not 
suffer from lack of  maintenance. The archon was also expected by law to 
ensure that the heiress got a husband. As it happened, the next-of-kin of 
an heiress' father was required by law to marry her himself or give her in 
marriage with a dowry.  And if the next-of-kin would not marry her or 
give her in marriage, the archon, according to the law, had the power to 
compel the next-of-kin either to  carry out either obligation or be fined 
one thousand drachmae which were to be dedicated to Hera.
121  It is worth 
noting also that the same law made it a general obligation for anyone to 
prosecute any next  -of-kin who failed to perform such duties to an heiress 
under his care' and it is evident that such cases and other similar ones fell  , 
to the archon.  122 
In  overall  terms,  the  issues  discussed  above  demonstrably 
indicate  that  the  archon  had  a  wide  range  of executive  powers  and 
119  56.7. 
120  Is.6.36-37. See also 11.34 where the petition to the archon is also mentioned. 
121  Dem.43.54. 
78 responsibilities  in  his  administration  of justice  in  matters  affecting 
widows  and orphans in particular and the  Athenian  family  in  general. 
The question as to the extent to which the archon intervened in cases of 
maltreatment of  widows and orphans, however, does not appear to have a 
definite answer to it. In fact, the available evidence seems to suggest that 
in many respects the archon had little or no power of initiative against 
offenders  who  committed lawless  acts  against widows  and orphans  in 
spite of the powers conferred on him by the  law.  The passivity of the 
archon in the matter of widows and orphans of executed men as well as 
the extinction of  the households of  such men has already been noted. 
The law (quoted above, p.61) required the archon to take charge 
of women  who  on the  death of their husbands  decided  to  live  in  the 
deceased husbands' households, claiming that they were pregnant. That 
the  law makes particular reference to  the care of pregnant widows and 
not widows in general may not be surprising. As will be seen later in this 
work,  a  woman  whose  husband  died  leaving  her  with  sons  could 
probably  make  a  choice  between  staying  in  her  deceased  husband's 
household  and  going  back  to  her  kin.  But  invariably  if she  had  no 
children, or normally if  she had only daughters she would go back to her 
father's household or her legal representative if the father was dead. She 
In  33  Is.3.46,42,62; 11.  . 
79 could then remarry immediately or shortly after. In that case her care and 
protection would be the duty of  her father or legal representative. 
But in general, it is probable, as suggested by Rhodes,123 that the 
archon's  responsibility  to  care  for  those  deprived  of their  master  or 
guardian (kyrios), may have involved great executive duties in archaic 
Athens.  This  situation may have been at the  back of Solon's mind in 
making his law concerning them. However, it is not clear the nature of 
the  executive  powers  the  archon  could  exercise  in  his  care  for  such 
deprived persons including pregnant widows during the classical period. 
Neither is it clear the exact nature of his protection for them as he was 
obliged to do apart from bringing lawsuits concerning them to court and 
his presidency over the relevant court. 
Athenians were required by law to care for their parents while 
alive and to give them proper burial when they died;  and among those 
who suffered some civic disabilities were those" who were found guilty 
of  maltreating  their  parents."  124A  speaker  in  Isaios  showing 
consciousness  of his  familial  duties  upholds  the  law in the  following 
words: " ...  if  my grandfather were alive and in want of the necessities of 
life, we, and not our opponent, would be liable to prosecution for neglect. 
For the law enjoins us to support our parents."  125  Frequent references to 
123  Commentary, p.633. 
124  d  k  An  0  .1.74. 
125  8.32. 
80 the  law  in  other  authorities  are  a  significant  pointer  to  the  Athenian 
concern for aged parents.  126 
But the  fact  that there  was  a  law punishing neglect may also 
suggest that some Athenian parents may have been living in indigence 
despite  the  natural  obligation  that  sons  should  provide  for  the 
maintenance of their aged parents. A classic illustration of a son failing 
in his  duty to his aged mother who by all  indications was a widow is 
given by a speaker in Lysias who tells his audience: 
"  The  strange things of which his mother accused him while  she 
was alive I will pass over; but on the evidence of the measures that she 
took at the close of  her life you can easily judge how he treated her. She 
demurred to committing herself to his care after her death, but as she had 
confidence in Antiphanes, who was no connexion of hers, she gave him 
three minae of silver for her burial, ignoring this man, who was her own 
son. ,,127  The  evidence provided by the  speaker clearly shows that the 
accused was an undutiful son. With this kind of situation, one begins to 
wonder why the archon, with the powers conferred on him by law, did 
not take any action against the son when it became obvious that he was 
not living up  to  his obligations to  his  widowed and aged mother.  For 
there  is  no  doubt that if the  archon had taken  any  action  the  speaker 
would not hesitate to use it also as a supporting evidence. 
126  See Lys.13.91; Xen.Mem.2.2.13; Dem.l0AO;24.105,107. 
81 There  is  also  the  case  of an  heiress  in  Isaios  who  suffered 
injustice  at  the hands of her guardian while  the  archon  apparently sat 
helpless.  According  to  the  account  given  by the  speaker,  his  mother 
became an heiress to the whole of the family's estate on the death of her 
father,  Aristarkhos  (I).  The  heiress  as  a  young  girl  came  under  the 
guardianship  of the  father's  next-of-kin,  Aristomenes.  But  when  she 
came of  age, the next-of-kin did not claim her in marriage with the estate. 
This  is  presumably because he  already had a wife himself,  and would 
probably not risk the implications involved in initiating divorce. 
In fact,  a law preserved for us in Demosthenes  128  indicates that 
the  next-of-kin  was  not  absolutely  obliged  to  marry  an  heiress.  But 
Aristomenes  had a  son  to  whom he  could  have  given  the  heiress  in 
marriage and given her father's estate to her.  Rather, Aristomenes who 
had also a daughter, having failed to take to wife the heiress, or marry her 
to  his  own  son,  gave  his  own  daughter  in  marriage  to  Kyronides, 
endowing her with the property which, in law, belonged to  the heiress 
who  was his  ward.
129  However, Kyronides had been adopted from  the 
family  of the  heiress'  father  and therefore  in  Athenian  law could not 
inherit from him. 
127  31.20-21. 
128  43.54. 
129  10.4-5 
82 The speaker further notes that his mother was subsequently given 
in marriage to his father (10.6), a marriage which certainly took place at a 
later time after Aristomenes had given his own daughter in marriage and 
endowed her with the property. But when the husband of  the heiress tried 
to negotiate for the return of the estate to his wife, he was met with the 
blunt threat from Aristomenes that he would hand the estate over and at 
the same time take it back by claiming the heiress if the husband did not 
keep quiet and be content with only the woman (10.19).  Consequently, 
the husband gave up pursuing the matter since he would not wish to lose 
his  wife by instituting a  legal proceeding he  was  surely going  to  lose 
(10.20). Thus, the usurper's grandson who had inherited from Kyronides 
enjoyed possession of the estate until he perished in battle without issue. 
However, he left a will in which he named his brother Xenainetos (II) as 
his  heir, but Xenainetos (II) was challenged by the  speaker,  son of the 
heiress, disputing the validity of  the will. 
The  behaviour  of  Aristomenes  was  certainly  a  flagrant 
contravention  of the  law which provides  that,  "whenever  a  man  dies 
without making a will, if he leaves female  children his  estate shall go 
with them  ... ,"  130  and also the law which sought to protect the interest of 
the  heiress  and  guarantee  her welfare.  With  this  apparent  outrage  or 
lawless act against the heiress, we have no evidence on what action the 
83 archon  took  against  Aristomenes  in  conformi  ty  wi th  the  powers 
conferred  on  him  in  that  regard.  Unless  of course  the  speaker  had 
purposely decided to conceal the evidence, which is doubtful, it appears 
from the trend of events that the archon took no practical action against 
Aristomenes until the heiress' son, the speaker, came of age to  take the 
matter up himself. 
There is quite a number of  other similar guardianship cases in the 
surviving speeches of  the Attic orators, of  which one or two more may be 
cited here briefly. The best known of them is the case of Demosthenes 
because  his  patrimony is  the  most  fully  documented  orphan  estate  in 
classical  Athens.  In his  case,  all  the  charges  of mismanagement  and 
misappropriation are present, though not of bodily ill-treatment. And in 
Lysias' Against Diogeiton it is alleged that the defendant not only turned 
his wards out without cloaks as soon as  the elder boy was of age,131  but 
also handed over to them at that time only a small fraction of the fortune 
that should have been theirs. 
In Athenian law, wards in their minority were not legally in a 
position to complain of injustice at the hands of their guardians.132  And 
although Solon in his judicial reforms had given the liberty to " anybody 
130  Dem.43.51. 
131  32.16 
132  53  See MacDowell, Law, p.  . 
84 who  wished  to  exact  redress  on  behalf of injured  persons,  ,,133  such 
situations may be matters in which the archon had the right of initiative 
and was expected to  see to  it himself that wards were not deprived of 
their due.  Emphasis on the paramount role of the archon as  well as his 
expected right of initiative is reflected in the following passages. In an 
indictment case against Timarkhos for personal vices that could lead to 
his ban from speaking at the Assembly if  convicted, Aeschines observes: 
"Who of you does not know Diophantes,  called "  the  orphan," 
who  arrested the  foreigner  and brought him before the  archon,  whose 
associate  on  the  bench  was  Aristophon  of Azenia?  For  Diophantes 
accused  the  foreigner  of having  cheated him out of four  drachmas  in 
connection with this practice, and he cited the laws that command the 
archon to  protect orphans, when he himself had violated the  laws that 
enjoin chastity. ,,134 And at the scrutiny (dokimasia) of a man for the post 
of  archonship a speaker in Lysias also rhetorically asks the Council about 
the acceptability of  the candidate by the people he was supposed to serve: 
" What do you suppose will be the attitude of  the great body of  the 
citizens, when they find a man judging murder cases who should have 
been tried himself  by the Council of  the Areopagus; and when, moreover, 
they  see  him  crowned  and  established  in  control  of heiresses  and 
133  AP 9.1 
134  h  Aesc  .1.158. 
85 orphans,  whose  bereavement,  In  some  cases,  he  has  himself brought 
b  t?"  135  a  ou . 
We may note also a case in Demosthenes in which the  speaker 
prosecutes the defendant for breach of contract. The prosecutor inquires 
from the jury: "But, men of  the jury, where are we to obtain justice in the 
matter  of commercial  contracts?  before  what  magistrates,  or  at  what 
time? Before the Eleven? But they bring into court burglars and thieves 
and  other  evil-doers  who  are  charged with  capital  crimes.  Before  the 
Archon? But it is for heiresses, and orphans, and parents that the Archon 
is appointed to care."  136 
These passages reinforce the paramount role and authority of the 
archon  as  prescribed  in  the  laws  of Solon.  However,  the  available 
evidence  suggests that,  although the  archon's authority is  set forth  by 
law,  in his administration of justice in matters concerning widows and 
orphans  to  protect them against unlawful acts,  this  enshrined authority 
had to be activated only if  an interested individual called upon it. 
135  26.12. 
136  Dem.35 Against Lakritos,47-48.Cf. also 37.46; 46.22. 
86 CHAPTER 2 
THE WIDOW IN THE OIKOS OF HER DECEASED HUSBAND 
It  is  very  difficult  to  know  the  proportion  of women  in  the 
Athenian population who became widowed during the  classical period. 
This  is  particularly because  there  were  no  census  returns  at  the  time. 
Furthermore, the majority of the pieces of evidence on widows that have 
come to us through the Attic forensic speeches are on elite families who 
could afford the services of orators in their suits. Very little therefore is 
known about widows from the low class families. Even with the wealthy 
families,  it is not possible to know the exact number of wives who had 
lost their husbands. For one thing, some widows are merely mentioned in 
passing if the evidence on them does not relate so much to  the issue at 
stake.  Also,  others  are  not mentioned at  all,  especially  in  the  case  of 
wives of husbands executed by the state, except perhaps the case of the 
wife of  the executed Agoratos in Lysias 19.39-42. 
Among the elite class whose members could afford the services 
of orators,  and on whom light is  thrown  in the  speeches,  however,  a 
considerable number of widows can be identified. In Andokides, On  the 
Mysteries,  four  widows  can be identified.  In Antiphon  1,  the  accused 
woman  who  is  being  defended  by  her  son  allegedly  murdered  her 
husband through poisoning, thus inflicting onto herself the condition of 
87 widowhood. In Hyperides 1,  the wife of Kharippos was a widow whose 
name and that of her father are not known, nor do we know the name of 
her former husband. Aeschines and Lysias inform us of two and seven 
widows respectively (Aeschn.1; Lys.3;7;13;19;24;31;32). Furthermore, of 
the  thirty-three  private  orations  of  Demosthenes,  the  presence  of 
seventeen widows is brought into focus in eighteen of the speeches (27-
29;36;37;38;40;41 ;42;45;46;47;50;54;55;  58  ;59).  And  in  the  twelve 
extant speeches of  Isaios the life of  seventeen widows is reflected in eight 
of them (3;5;6;7;8;9; 10; 11). As compared to the other orators, Isaios has 
the highest figure of widows recorded in his speeches. This may not be 
surprising. Isaios as a logographos specialised in that thorny and delicate 
department  of litigation,  and  his  speeches,  as  we  know,  deal  almost 
exclusively with wills and disputed cases of  intestate succession. It would 
therefore  appear  not  coincidental  that  the  affairs  of widows  should 
become a common feature of  the speeches of  his clients. 
In  general,  however,  there  are  some  widows  whose  state  of 
affairs is obscure, as not much is said about them in the speeches of the 
litigants. In Lysias  17  for instance, Eraton the creditor of the speaker's 
grandfather died leaving three sons, Erasiphon, Eraton who bore the same 
name as his father, and Erasistratos (17.3). But there is no information on 
the  sons' widowed mother, and we do not know whether or not at the 
time the speech was delivered she was still alive. 
88 In  Andokides  1.16,  Agariste,  former  wife  of Damon,  and now 
married to Alkmeonides lays information against Alkibiades and others. 
There is an assumed silence on her widowhood life as well as her father 
and her previous husband; and so we do not know whether at the time of 
the  speech  her  father  was  dead,  and  who  gave  her  in  remarriage  to 
Alkmeonides. Kirchner makes no suggestion; and on her former husband 
Davies  offers  no  definite  decision due  to  problems of chronology and 
other things regarding the names of  Damon and Damonides.137 
The  speaker  of  L  ysias  19  is  married  to  the  daughter  of 
Kritodemos of Alopeke. We are informed that Kritodemos was killed by 
the Lacedaimonians after the naval battle at the Hellespont (16-1 7).  No 
light  is  thrown,  however,  on  the  circumstances  of his  widow,  and 
therefore no safe guess can be made about her. In Demosthenes, Against 
Euboulides,  the  speaker's mother is  an Athenian on both the male and 
female side who was given in marriage to Protomakhos her first husband 
by her  brother  Timokrates  born of the  same  father  and  mother,  from 
which marriage a daughter is said to have been born (57.40).  Then in the 
subsequent paragraph, Protomakhos who was poor becomes entitled to 
inherit a large estate by marrying an heiress. As it happens, Protomakhos 
divorces the speaker's mother but arranges a second marriage for her to 
Thoukritos, his friend (57.41). 
137  Kirchner, Prosopographia Attica (PA)3133; Davies, APF ,p.383. 
89 We are told again that in this second marriage it is her brother 
Timokrates who gave her out in marriage in the presence of  both his own 
uncles  and other witnesses,  from  which marriage also  the  speaker was 
born (40-43,68-69). It is  evident from the account given by the  speaker 
that even during the time of his mother's first marriage, his mother and 
her brother Timokrates(37) had lost their father Damostratos, though we 
do  not  know  exactly  when  he  died.  Hence  it  was  her  brother  who 
contracted both marriages for her. However, the speaker does not tell us 
whether  at  the  time  of his  mother's  second  marriage  his  maternal 
grandmother Khairestrate(37-38)was still alive or dead, though probably 
at  the  time  his  mother  was  first  given  in  marriage  his  widowed 
grandmother might still be alive, and living with her son Timokrates. 
There is also the statement on the atrocities of the Thirty Tyrants 
In  a  speech  of Lysias  regarding  the  mothers  of the  orphans.
138  This 
statement  is  so  general  that  no  specific  conclusion  on  any  individual 
widow can be drawn. In Isaios' speech On  the Estate of  Kleonymos, it is 
clear that the plaintiff orphans had first come under the guardianship of 
their paternal uncle,Deinias(1.9,10),  though it  is  not known whether it 
was under their father's will or not.
139 On the death of Deinias they went 
to  live  with  Kleonymos,  probably  their  mother's  brother  (1.12-13). 
However, there is no information in the speech regarding their widowed 
90 mother, and we do not know whether at the time the case came to trial she 
was alive or dead.  In another speech of Isaios also the father of  the three 
brothers Eupolis, Thrasyllos, and Mneson died, leaving them with a large 
fortune, so that each of  them could perform public duties in the city (7.5). 
But like some of the other instances, no information is provided on the 
circumstances of their widowed mother, who probably lived with all  or 
one of  them in the dead husband's house. 
There  are  several  other  widows  whose  exact  situation  seems 
problematic. In fact, the lack of information on them may have been the 
speaker's own discretion. For, women are not mentioned in the lawsuits 
unless they are central to the case. Thus though the vast majority of the 
instances of widowhood are  drawn from  lawsuits,  some of them come 
from  speeches  in  which  the  family  relationship  of  the  woman  is 
incidental, and the speaker just happens to mention it in the course of his 
narrative. A reasonable certainty on the widow's status may thus not be 
possible. 
In  overall  terms,  however,  forty-eight  widows  have  been 
identified in the orators, although some of  them later got married again.  140 
This number is besides those whose circumstances appear uncertain. The 
figure  may seem insignificant and unrepresentative of the population of 
138  See 13.45-46. 
139  Wyse,p.176. 
91 Athenian  widows.  But  despite  the  fact  that  there  is  an  imbalance  of 
information  on  both  classes  of the  Athenian  population  besides  the 
seemingly  insignificant  number of widows  identified  among  the  elite 
class,  it  is  generally  recognised  from  demographic  estimates  that  the 
number of widows in the classical Athenian population was high enough 
to  create a potential social problem.
141  As noted in the previous chapter, 
this omnipresence of widows in the Athenian society must have been the 
consequence of a combination of factors  such as  the disparity in age  at 
first marriage of  couples , the exceptional battle casualties of  the 460s and 
the Peloponnesian War, the executions which took place during the brief 
oligarchic regime in the last decade of the fifth century, and the famine 
and the plague of the 450s and 420s respectively, though these affected 
both males and females.  We may note also the incidence of intentional 
h  ··d  h  h  h·  142  omlcI  e t  oug  t  IS was rare. 
In order to determine the consequences of  the death of  an Athenian 
husband on his widowed wife, we may perhaps examine briefly how the 
Athenian wife herself influenced the permanency of her marriage after it 
had  been  contracted;  and  whether  she  continued  to  exercise  such 
influence  at  the  death  of her  husband.  It is  noted  already  that,  the 
140  For a comprehensive statistics of  widows in the Attic orators, see S. Isager, , The Marriage Pattern 
in Classical Athens: Men and Women in Isaios' C et M33(1981-82)81-96,esp.92; V. Hunter, , The 
Athenian Widow and Her Kin' JFH 14 (1989)291-311,esp.304-305. 
141  Mark Golden, 'Demography and the Exposure of Girls at Athens' Phoenix 35 (1981)316-329. 
92 Athenian  woman  had  no  VOIce  in  her  marrIage  transaction.  It  was 
arranged for her by her father, if he was alive, or by his legal heir who 
betrothed her to her suitor by EYYU'll  and gave her out in marriage by 
EKbocrt<;  if her father was dead.  Thus before marriage the  woman was 
under the kyrios of her kin who exercised domestic power over her. The 
chief expression  of this  power was  the  right  to  give  her  in  marriage 
(Dem.46.18). 
After  the  marnage  transaction,  however,  the  woman  was 
transferred from the oikos of  her father to the oikos of  her husband.143 Her 
legal  status  then changed from  being under the  control  of her natural 
kyrios  to  that  of her husband,  though  she  none  the  less  continued  to 
remain a member of her original family for four fundamental reasons. In 
the  first  place, the  concept of the  marriage itself implied a  transfer or 
lending out of  the woman to the man for the purpose of  bearing offspring 
to maintain his family.144 Also the dowry which had to be returned to the 
woman's kin on dissolution  of the  marriage  implied  a  continued link 
between the woman and her original family.  Moreover, the Attic law of 
succession  made  the  woman  fulfil  a  dual  role  in  her marriage  in her 
husband's  family  and that of her kin.  For besides  her function  in her 
142  On the last cause of  death, see Isaios 9.16-17 where the speaker infonns us that his half-brother's 
father, i.e. his mother's fIrst husband, was killed by the man's own brother in a dispute over the sharing 
of  their deceased father's land bequeathed to them. 
143  See MacDowell, CQ 39(1989)10-21,esp.l8. 
144  Cf. Wolff, Traditio 2(1944),50. 
93 husband's family,  the woman had the task of bearing heirs for  her own 
family who might continue it if no sons or descendants of sons or close 
agnates  who could continue the lineage were available.  Furthermore, if 
the woman was an epikleros, she had the task of  bearing sons not only for 
her husband to continue his family at his death but also a son who, after 
attaining  manhood,  would  succeed  to  his  grandfather's  property  and 
.  h·  1·  145  contInue  IS  Ineage. 
I think that it is on the basis of the legal authority a husband had 
over  his  wife,  that  is,  as  her  kyrios,  that  some  Athenian  husbands 
betrothed their wives to  second husbands  in their wills.  Demosthenes' 
father  for  instance,  betrothed  his  wife  in  marriage  to  his  nephew, 
dowering her with eighty minai (Dem.27.5;28.l5,16). Pasion of  Acharnae 
also  betrothed  his  wife  in  marriage  with  a  dowry  of two  talents  to 
Phormio his  former slave (Dem.45.28). And although Diodotos did not 
betroth his wife to any particular man, presumably because he hoped to 
return  alive  from  the  military  expedition  in  which  he  unfortunately 
perished, he provided in his will a dowry of one talent to  his wife in a 
second marriage if  any thing should happen to him (Lys.32.5-7). 
It is noteworthy that once the marriage had been contracted by 
her kyrios,  there were two principal means by which the woman herself 
could ensure the stability and permanency of her marriage. As a speaker 
145  Dem.46.20. 
94 in  Isaios observes, once a marriage took place, it healed bitter enmities 
and created a very strong bond among members of the family involved, 
and, in fact, between husband and wife!46 But this strong bond between 
husband and wife depended, to a large extend, on the wife herself. In the 
first  place,  it  depended  on  her  fidelity  to  her  husband,  which  was 
indispensable  to  the  honour  of her  family  of marriage,147  and  in  the 
absence  of which  the  marriage  could be  dissolved  outright by  law; 148 
though fidelity in marriage did not, in fact, apply to the husband. 
Secondly,  although  the  Athenian  woman had no  voice  in  her 
marriage  contract,  and also the husband could just divorce her for  any 
reason whatsoever, in some cases she had a say in the termination of her 
marriage by her consenting to the termination or refusing to get divorced. 
The  case  of Menekles  and  his  wife  in  Isaios  2  may  be  recounted. 
Menekles, Isaios tells us, married the sister of the speaker after the death 
of his first wife (2.3-5). But later when the marriage would not produce a 
child and Menekles decided that in view of their childlessness his wife 
ought to be given the chance to remarry, her brothers insisted that they 
would take no divorce action until she herself had agreed to the divorce. 
The speaker informs the jury: 
146  See Is.7.12. Cf. also C. A. Cox, Household Interests (Princeton, 1998),p.71. 
147 
See Lys.1.26.  ..  ,.  . 
148  For the law ordering immediate dissolution of  mamage on grounds of a WIfe  s mfidehty, see 
Dem.59.87. 
95 " A month or two later Menekles, with many expressions of praise 
for  our sister, approached us and said that he viewed with apprehension 
his  increasing  age  and  childlessness:  she  ought  not,  he  said,  to  be 
rewarded for her virtues by having to grow old with him without bearing 
children: it was enough that he himself was unfortunate ...  He, therefore, 
begged us to do him the favour of marrying her to someone else with his 
consent. We told him that it was for him to persuade her in the matter, for 
we  would do whatever she agreed. At first she would not even listen to 
his suggestion, but in course of  time she with difficulty consented. So we 
gave her in marriage" (2.7-9). 
We may also recapitulate the case of Pamphile and her father, 
Srnikrines  a  wealthy  citizen  of which  Menander  informs  us  in  his 
Epitrepontes, for further illustration. Pamphile, on the occasion of one of 
the night festivals  at Athens,  some months before the play begins, had 
had  an  adventure  with  a  youth  inflamed  with  wine,  resulting  in  her 
pregnancy. Four months later Pamphile is married to a young man named 
Kharisios (apparently the youth with whom she had had the affair at the 
festival);  and  five  months  afterwards,  during  her  husband's  absence 
abroad,  she  gives birth to  the  child she had conceived at the midnight 
festival. 
She had told neither her father nor her husband of her adventure 
except her old nurse; and now, fearful of discovery, and concerned about 
96 her marriage, exposes the child, which is found and ultimately adopted by 
a charcoal-burner, Syriskos. But Kharisios later hears of the event  and  ,  , 
outraged at his wife's bearing a child after five months of marriage, tries 
to  drown  his  sorrow and forget  his  love  for  his  wife  by drinking  and 
merrymaking with women. 
Pamphile's father,  Smikrines, becomes highly indignant at this 
treatment  of his  daughter by Kharisios  (though ignorant of her story). 
And, being so anxious for the dowry which she brought to her husband, 
he  visits her in great anger and tries to induce her to return to him and 
seek  divorce,  to  save  her  own  honour  and  his  money.  But  Pamphile 
shows  devotion  to  her  husband,  and  knowing  the  true  cause  of his 
conduct,  defends  him  and  refuses  to  get  divorced.  Consequently, 
Smikrines returns to his house frustrated and disappointed.  149 
Thus if what Menander tells us about Pamphile and her father 
Smikrines is not a mere jest meant only for the comic stage (I conjecture 
it is not) but a reflection of a true life situation in fourth century Athens, 
we would then be right in assuming that though the father of a daughter 
could terminate the marriage of his daughter (Dem.41.4), this could not 
be done in all circumstances; and that the woman at any rate could also 
refuse to leave her husband's house and make the divorce effective even 
149  Menander, Epitrepontes, tr. Norma Miller ( Penguin Classics, England, 1987). Cf. A.W. Gomme, 
CP 20(1925),20-21. 
97 if the father was very desirous to end the marriage.I50 This right however 
was  not  enshrined  in  law,  and  in  several  cases  the  women  had  to 
acquiesce in the dissolution of  the marriage. 
At any rate, we notice glimpses of legal and social parameters in 
respect of the Athenian woman and the widow.  These, however, were at 
the  family  plane.  But  in  general,  how  responsive  was  the  Athenian 
society to the very livelihood and welfare of its numerous widows? And 
how did this sensitivity reflect their status in the society at large? 
DEATH  AND STATUS OF MARRIAGE 
Death, as it affects the members of the kin group, also naturally 
affects the wife of the deceased in various ways, both immediately and 
afterwards. In Ghana, the Akans like the other Ghanaian tribes, consider 
the death of  a husband as one of  the worst fates that a woman could suffer 
in  her married life.  It is  an  ill  luck or abomination,  munsuo;  and the 
effects on her life in the society could be various and considerable.  Two 
other disturbing misfortunes are the death of  a child and childlessness in a 
woman. Particularly, the intermittent infant mortality of a wife's children 
could  be  a  cause  for  the  husband  to  divorce  her.  In  the  same  vein, 
barrenness  in a  married  woman  could  cost  her the  marriage.  By all 
150  See Epitrepontes, 492-545.For a detailed discussion on divorce in Athens, see Louis Cohn-Haft, 
98 indications,  a  fertile  woman has  greater joy and  honour than  a barren 
woman in the Ghanaian society. 
With  the  death  of a  husband,  the  situation  could  be  equally 
humiliating and very frustrating, especially if she is a young woman. In 
the  short term,  she might not only be considered as  a woman smeared 
with misfortune but also  as  an  embarrassing burden on her kindred in 
respect  of maintenance  and  support;  and  an  immediate  marriage,  if 
possible,  would be a  good riddance.  In the  long  term,  her remarriage 
could be a problem because of society's socio-psychological attitude to 
widowhood. As noted above, widowhood, though natural, is  considered 
by  the  Ghanaian  society  as  an  abominable  condition  of life.  And 
sometimes a young and childbearing widow finds it very difficult to get a 
second  hus  band,  even  if she  has  the  wish  to  remarry.  Al though  the 
majority  of marriages  are  not  registered,  especially  customary  ones, 
hence  a law was promulgated in  1985,  enjoining couples who  contract 
marriages under customary law to register their marriages ( PNDC Law 
112:  Customary  Marriage  and Divorce  (Registration)  Law,  1985),  it 
seems to be the traditional pattern that it is strangers, who are unaware of 
the  'ill-luck', who contract marriages with the widowed in the Ghanaian 
society. But even in certain situations, a stranger in a relationship or in 
marriage with a widow later tries every means to find a cause to end the 
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99 relationship  or terminate  the  marriage.  The  reason  for  the  end  of the 
relationship  or the  divorce  may be  an  ostensible  one,  but  in  fact,  on 
learning of the  widow's circumstances,  for  fear  that the  woman might 
pollute  him with her  'ill-fate'  and make him also  a  widower.  Thus,  a 
Ghanaian widow might remain in widowhood for a considerable length of 
time, sometimes against her wish, without getting remarried. 
F  or  the  classical  Athenian  wife  who  became  widowed,  the 
immediate impact on her of  the death of her husband was the status of  her 
marriage, which also affected her residential status. But the status of her 
marriage and her future life was also greatly influenced by or depended 
on her own decision as an individual. She, in fact, had two choices before 
her on the decease of her husband. In the first place, she could decide to 
live  in her defunct husband's house until  she  also  died.  Secondly,  she 
could return to  her original family.  If she took the  former decision she 
retained her dowry;  and in that case  there  would be no change of her 
residence. But if she took the latter, she went back with her dowry; and 
her residential status automatically reverted to  her kin.  The widow thus 
exercised some element of choice and influence regarding the status of 
her marriage as well as her own position on the decease of her husband. 
In  certain  circumstances,  the  widow's choice  regarding  her residential 
status  was  backed  by  law,  with  the  archon  exercising  an  oversight 
responsibili  ty over her. 
100 In  the  much vexed  inheritance  dispute  regarding  the  estate  of 
Hagnias in the Demosthenic corpus for instance, the speaker quotes a law 
ascribed to  Solon which, inter alia  , enjoins the  eponymous archon to 
giye protection to pregnant widows who decided to live in their deceased 
husbands' households. The relevant section of  the law reads as follows: 
"  Let the  archon take  charge of orphans and of heiresses  and of 
families that are becoming extinct, and of all women who remain in the 
houses of their deceased husbands, declaring that they are pregnant. Let 
him take  charge of these,  and not suffer anyone  to  do  any outrage  to 
them. And if anyone shall commit any outrage or any lawless act against 
them, he shall have power to impose a fine upon such person up to the 
limit fixed by law.,,151 
The law makes specific reference to pregnant widows who decided 
to live in their dead husbands' homes. Whether it implies that a pregnant 
widow  might  decide  to  leave  her  marital  home  on  the  death  of her 
husband is not very clear. It is noteworthy, however, that it was not only 
pregnant widows who had the choice either to stay in their marital homes 
or go back to their kinsmen if  their husbands died. A non-pregnant widow 
could as  well decide to leave or remain.  So much is demonstrable and 
obvious. 
151  Dem.43.75. Cf. also AP 56.7 
101 In Isaios, On  the Estate of  Pyrrhos, challenging the legitimacy of 
Phile  the  supposed heiress of Pyrrhos, the  speaker poses the  following 
questions to his opponents in which the widow's decision either to remain 
in her late husband's house or return to her original family is indicated: 
"He has  deposed that he  married his  sister to  a man who  possessed a 
fortune of  three talents; what dowry does he allege that he gave with her? 
Next, did this wedded wife leave her husband during his lifetime or quit 
his  house  after  his  death?  ,,152  In  the  third  oration in  his  famous  suit 
against his guardians, Demosthenes the orator asserts that it was for his 
own and his sister's sake that their mother gave herself up to the life of 
widowhood (29.26). 
The events narrated by Demosthenes about the life of his mother 
Kleoboule  in  the  three  orations  make  this  assertion  of Demosthenes 
appear rather curious, and some critics have maintained that Demosthenes 
must  probably  be  lying.  153  For  throughout  all  the  three  speeches 
Demosthenes has persistently argued that Aphobos his  cousin to whom 
his father had betrothed Kleoboule on his deathbed had failed to live up 
to his duties. Aphobos, according to the orator's account, had received his 
mother's  dowry  in  conformity  with  his  father's  will,  but  refused  to 
support her, and had finally married the daughter of  Philomides of  Melite 
(27.5,10,13,15-17,56; 28.11; 29.48). Thus with these facts, Demosthenes' 
152  3.8. 
102 claim about his mother's widowhood life, as noted by Hunter,154  seems 
not only paradoxical but also not even effective rhetoric. 
However, Demosthenes' assertion should not just be jettisoned. It 
is informative as it emphasises the widow's right to  decision regarding 
the  status  of her  marriage  after  the  decease  of her  husband.  I  find 
Hunter's imputation that" even Kleoboule's widowhood in her husband's 
house  came  about by default,,155  not quite  convincing.  For one  thing, 
Hunter does not state who defaulted on whom. Also, whether or not it 
was by default, the element of  choice cannot be ruled out completely. 
In Demosthenes 40, we hear also of the widow of Kleomedon, 
who is  said to have left her deceased husband's family  after his death, 
receiving back her marriage portion (40.6,7). And in Lysias, there is the 
case  of the  widow of Phaedros of Myrrhinous,  who went back to  her 
father after the death of Phaedros, and who was later given in a second 
marriage (19.15). The right of  the non-pregnant widow to leave or remain 
in the deceased husband's house however is not explicitly enshrined in 
law.  It would appear that  it  is  implicit  in the  law regarding  orphans, 
heiresses and pregnant widows. But it seems that it was conventional. 
There is however one situation in which a widow had no choice 
but to go back to her original family after the decease of  her spouse. This 
153  See particularly Hunter, EMC 33(1989),39-48. 
154  lbid.40-41. 
155  JFH 14(1989),298. 
103 \vas  the  case of widows of husbands executed by the  state.  We have a 
speech of  Lysias that clearly describes the situation: 
""Again consider this: in all other cases where you have confiscated 
the property, not merely have you had no sale of furniture, but even the 
doors were tom away from the apartments; whereas we,  as  soon as the 
confiscation was declared, posted a guard in the deserted house, in order 
that  neither  door-timber nor utensils  nor anything  else  might  be  lost. 
Personal  effects  were  realised  to  the  value  of over  one  thousand 
drachmae,- more than you had received in any previous instance.,,156 As 
the account given by the speaker clearly illustrates, in a situation where a 
husband was executed by the state,  and all  his real estate and personal 
effects confiscated and sold, his widow, if  he had a wife, certainly had no 
choice but to go back to her kinsmen. 
In normal situations however, the evidence suggests that although 
one would have thought that the death of a husband naturally dissolved 
the  marriage,  some  widows  exercising their customary right of choice 
decided  to  live  in  their  deceased  husbands'  households  and 
conventionally  remained  married  to  their  deceased  husbands.  Thus,  a 
widow who did not remarry conventionally remained the wife of her late 
husband until she also died. Apparently, her membership of the defunct 
156  Lys.19.31. 
104 husband's household continued, especially if  she had sons with whom she 
stayed in the house, till it was severed by her own death.I57 
Widows who decided to remain in their dead husbands' homes 
may be classified as  non-pregnant widows and pregnant widows.  Non-
pregnant widows may also be grouped into three classes: widows living 
with their sons,  those  who had no  sons but had daughters  living  with 
them, and childless widows. A few of  these widows may be noted. 
In a speech of Lysias at the dokimasia of  Philon, an Athenian, for 
his membership on the Athenian Council, the speaker accuses Philon of 
neglect  of  his  aged  mother,  and  argues  vehemently  for  his 
disqualification.  The  speaker  alleges  that  because  of  Philon's 
irresponsible  attitude  towards  his  mother,  the  woman  objected  to  the 
son's burying of her after death, and made her own arrangements for her 
burial before she died (31.20-21).  The speaker is mute on the woman's 
background.  But the  tone of the passage and the  circumstances of the 
evidence clearly show that Philon'  s mother was a widow who lived in the 
dead husband's home with her son until she died. 
In  L  ysias  19  also,  a  certain  Xenophon'  s  daughter  married  the 
father of the speaker without a dowry(19.14).158 But the husband, whose 
name  and  deme  are  not known  ,  died  as  trierarch  aged  70(62,58,60). 
157 Cf. Wolf, Traditio 2(1944),47.  .. 
158  Davies, APF, p.200, sounds sceptical about the speaker's statement that hIS mother was mamed 
without a dowry. But I think that the speaker might be speaking the truth, as a woman's father or legal 
105 Apart from his mother's marriage to the then husband without a dowry, 
the speaker says nothing more about his widowed mother. But since the 
husband died at the ripe age of  70, and the son, the speaker, was also aged 
30 when he delivered Lysias 19  (15), it is most probable that the widow 
was also advanced in age and never got married again, but lived with her 
son in the deceased husband's house. 
The  account  given  by the  speaker  of Demosthenes  57  clearly 
indicates  that  he  is  an  orphan  (52,54,55,67,70).  But the  same  account 
shows also that though his mother had married twice (40-43,68-69), at the 
time of delivering the speech the woman was still alive and living with 
him as  a widow in his deceased father's household (70).Nikarete is the 
widow's name. We are informed that sometime after her second marriage 
when  two  children had been born to  her the  husband went abroad  on 
military service. Consequently she was compelled by desperate straits to 
serve as a nurse to Kleinias, the young child of Kleidikos (35,40,42,44), 
in order to maintain herself and her children. And it is evident that at the 
time  of the  speech,  the  widow  was  living  with  her  son  and  seen  by 
everybody selling ribbons in the agora (34). 
The situation of the widowed mother of Mantitheos in Lysias  16 
is  not very clear, but a reasonable conjecture may be made. Before the 
Council  at  his  dokimasia  for  membership  on  the  body,  Mantitheos 
representative was not legally obliged to dower her in marriage, though it was usual to do so. Cf. 
106 answers charges of involvement in the activities of the Thirty (16.3-8). In 
his defence, the speaker alludes to the disasters that had befallen both his 
father and the city (4,10).159  If his father was a victim of the disaster in 
405 B.e. as he alleges, then, as Davies has suggested,160 Mantitheos was 
certainly a little over 30 years of age at the time he delivered his defence 
speech at his scrutiny for his membership on the Council (392-390). 
And granting that his  mother married at  the  age  of 15,  and  he 
himselfwas at about 34 years in 392 or about 390 B.C. then his widowed 
mother would have been about 49 years at the time of  his scrutiny, if she 
was still alive. According to his account, although very little property had 
been bequeathed to him as a result of  the disasters, he gave his two sisters 
in marriage with a dowry of thirty minae each.  Besides that he allowed 
his brother to take such a portion of the property bequeathed to them as 
made him (his brother) acknowledge that he had got a  larger share of 
their patrimony than he himself had.  Furthermore, his conduct towards 
everyone  else up to  the time of his  scrutiny had been such that not a 
single person had shown any grievance against him (10). Inferences from 
the speaker's own account therefore lead us to conclude that at the time 
of his dokimasia  his widowed mother was either still  alive  and living  , 
MacDowell, Law, p.87. 
159  The disasters being referred to were the one at the Hellespont at Aigospotami in 405B.C. and the 
briefreign of  the Thirty in 404/403 B.C. For the one at the Hellespont, see Xen. Hell. 2.1.28-32; Plut. 
Alcib.37.4; Lysand.13.1; Paus.9.32.9. For the activities of  the Thirty, see Isoc.7.67; Aeschn.3.235; AP 
35.4; Lys.  12.6-7,83; Dem.59.112-113. 
160  APF.p.365. 
107 with him, or was then dead, though she certainly would have lived with 
him in his deceased father's house until her death. 
Lysias  On  the Refusal of a Pension  to  the Invalid provides yet 
another instance of a widow who lived in her deceased husband's house 
with  her  son  until  she  also  died.  The  speech  was  composed  for  an 
unnamed Athenian cripple in support of  his claim to a continuation of  the 
dole, to which an opponent, also not named, had alleged that he was not 
entitled. Significantly, what is regarded now in Europe and elsewhere in 
the  US  as  a  modem economic  expedient  was  already  in  operation  in 
ancient Athens. Anyone who had less than three minai and was disabled 
was entitled to receive the amount of  one obol a day from the state.
161 
The speaker's accuser had advocated that the disabled defendant 
was of  sound body; that he had a trade which sufficed for his support; that 
everybody knew that he rode about on horseback; and that above all, his 
shop was a meeting-place of undesirable characters and that he himself 
was  a  man  of disorderly  life  (24.4-5).  But  the  defendant  begins  the 
rebuttal of his accuser's charges in the following words: " My father left 
me nothing, and I have only ceased supporting my mother on her decease 
two years ago; while I as yet have no children to take care of  me. "(24.6) 
It is evident that the defendant's widowed mother died two years 
before he delivered his speech before the Council, although we have no 
108 means of knowing when her husband died. However, we know from the 
speaker's opening remarks that on the decease of  her husband, the woman 
lived in widowhood with her disabled son until she died.  We learn also 
that as was expected of  a son, he responsibly performed his duties of  care 
and  support  for  his  widowed  mother  until  her  death,  after  which  he 
performed all the customary rites for her. 
We may note also the case of Kleoboule and Demosthenes, her 
son.  Throughout the three speeches (27-9) she is  a widow living in her 
deceased  husband's  household  with her  son  and  her daughter.  A  few 
factors  may  however  be  considered  regarding  Kleoboule's  residential 
status after her husband's death.  The evidence is not quite certain as  to 
whether at  the  time her husband died her father  was  still  alive  or not. 
Davies however believes that Gylon, the father of  Kleoboule was dead by 
376/5 when the elder Demosthenes died, though the date of the death of 
the elder Demosthenes is also in dispute.  162 
Kleoboule does not seem to have had any adult brother either,  163 
and there is no evidence of her father's next-of-kin, if at the time of her 
husband's death her father was also dead.  A widow in such a situation 
would probably have no choice but to  live  in the  deceased husband's 
house until she also died. For Kleoboule however, even if her father was 
161  The author of  the AP 49, puts it at two obols.  .  ..  . 
162  See Davies APF, p.122-123; L. Gemet, Demosthene, 1.28-29, ill Demosthene: Plazdoyers czvzls,I-
IV,(Paris,1954-60), and noted by Davies,ibid. 
109 still  alive  when her husband died,  the  provisions made  for  her by her 
husband regarding her future at his death (27.5; 28.16) show that nobody 
envisaged that Kleoboule would return to her father's family. 
Wolff suggests that  a  childless  widow returned to  her original 
family and became subject to her father or brother (Traditio 2(1944)47). 
But it seems that some childless widows could as well decide to remain in 
their deceased husbands'  households and never remarried.  The  case of 
Kiron's  widow  in  Isaios  8  readily  comes  to  mind.  In  his  proof of 
allegation of plots by Diokles and his widowed sister to have possession 
of  Kiron's property, the speaker informs the jury: 
" Furthermore, gentlemen, the conduct of Diokles on the occasion 
of our grandfather's death clearly shows that we were acknowledged as 
the  grandchildren of Kiron.  I presented myself, accompanied by one of 
my relatives,  a cousin of my father,  to  convey away the  body with the 
intention of conducting the  funeral  from my own house.  I did not find 
Diokles in the house, and I entered and was prepared to remove the body, 
having  bearers  with  me  for  the  purpose.  When,  however,  my 
grandfather's widow requested that the  funeral  should take place  from 
that house, and declared that she would like herself to layout and deck 
the corpse, and entreated me and wept, I acceded to her request and went 
to  my opponent and told him in the presence of witnesses that I would 
163  Davies, ibid. p.121; Aeschn.3.171-172; Plut. Mor.844a; Dem.4.2. 
110 conduct the funeral from the house of the deceased, since Diokles' sister 
had begged me to do so" (8.21,22). 
The  speaker emphasises the  effective role  and influence of the 
widow  of Kiron  in  her husband's  house.  Throughout  the  speech,  the 
speaker informs the jury of persistent plots by Diokles and his sister to 
have  the property of Kiron.  We do not know whether the  widow ever 
married again. But the various kinds of conspiracy between brother and 
sister to  obtain the property of the  deceased Kiron,  as  narrated by the 
speaker, imply that Diokles' sister most probably continued to live in her 
husband's  house  on her  own  choice  after  his  death,  though  she  was 
childless (8.36-37). 
There  appears  to  be  some  kind  of  uncertainty  about  the 
residential  status  of the  widow  of Polyeuktos  in  Demosthenes  41.164 
Polyeuktos, we are told, had no son but had two daughters both of whom 
were married at the time of his death (41.3  and passim). But before he 
died, Polyeuktos is said to have mortgaged a house to the speaker for a 
debt of 1,000 drachmae he owed him, and had given instructions in his 
will  that pillars  (horoi)  be put on the  house  in  favour  of the  speaker 
(5,6,19  and  passim).  This  evidence  makes  Hunter  suggest  that  the 
mortgaged house might be the family house, and that Polyeuktos' widow 
164  See Hunter, JFH 14(1989),301,309,n.23. 
111 lived  with  one of her married  daughters  rather  than  in her husband's 
house (JFH 14( 1989),309  ,n.23). 
I think that the mortgaged house was not the  family one but a 
different house. Indeed, it would be hard to understand why Polyeuktos 
would have mortgaged a family house in which his wife might be living 
after his death, because he owed a debt and was seriously ill.  Finley is 
probably right in his interpretation of the situation:  "  When Polyeuktos 
realised  he  was  dying,  he  wished to  protect  the  husband of his  elder 
daughter from any possible deprivation of  the unpaid 1,000 drachmae. He 
therefore set aside, from his total estate, one house as  the equivalent. If 
the  plaintiff did not subsequently receive  1,000  drachmae  in  cash,  he 
could take the house in satisfaction.,,165 
The  mortgaged house  can  therefore  not have  been the  family 
house of  Polyeuktos. Certain factors make this conclusion very plausible. 
In the first place, it is evident that the widow continued to look after the 
interests of her deceased husband, and appears to be in charge of all the 
family issues until she died (9,14). Also, she seems not to have been too 
old and beyond the age of  remarriage, although from the speech we know 
that she had two grown up daughters who were already married. She most 
probably  could  therefore  have  got  remarried  and  left  for  the  new 
huaband's  house.  However,  the  speaker's remarks  in  section  9  of his 
112 narrative give the indication that:  (a) the woman gave out the loan when 
her husband was dead; (b) the presence of her brothers was at the house 
of  the deceased husband and not at the homes of  her brothers. 
Moreover, if  she decided to leave her defunct husband's house  she  , 
would certainly have gone back to live with one of her brothers, as was 
usually the case with widows who left their marital homes on the death of 
their spouses but had no fathers to return to. This position is supported by 
the fact that there seems to have been a very cordial relationship between 
the  widow  and her brothers  (41.9).  It may  reasonably  be  maintained 
therefore,  that  although  Polyeuktos'  widow  had  no  male  child,  she 
remained in her dead husband's house unmarried until she also died. 
CARE AND MAINTENANCE 
The  mode of support  and  care  for  the  Athenian  widow  in  her 
deceased husband's oikos was in a way in line with, or influenced by the 
general  Athenian  attitude  towards  war  widows  regarding  their 
maintenance. The attitude is reflected in funeral orations in the period. In 
the  funeral  speeches  that  have  come  to  us  in  connection  with  fallen 
warriors  in  the  classical  period  - those  of Pericles,  Lysias,  Plato, 
165  Moses 1. Finley, Studies in Land and Credit in Ancient Athens, 500-200 B.C. (Oxford,1951),p.49. 
113 Hyperides,  and Demosthenes- although the  widows'  plight is  noted in 
some of  them, support for them seems quite peripheral to the state.166 
I  P  . l'  h c·  167  n  enc es  speec  lor Instance,  some concern for the widows' 
fate  is shown by the orator (2.45.2), but nothing is said about their care, 
except  to  console  them  for  their  loss.  I  share  in  Boer's rejection  of 
Gomme's comment on Pericles' statement in his address to the widows  , 
~PUXE'tCf  1tUPU1VEO'Et  d1tUV  O'rll.luvw  (I  will  sum  all  up  in  a  brief 
admonition) that Pericles' " explanation of the whole matter is not only 
brief and priggish, but advice, not consolation, and advice that is most of 
it not called for  by the occasion."168  1 think that Pericles'  statement is 
both  advice  and consolation.  As Boer has  pointed out,  Pericles  is  not 
explaining  anything  but  giving  a  speech  meant  above  all  to  give 
consolation, such that there is a difference in the atmosphere and even in 
outloOk. 169  The possibility that the widows were pleased by these words 
uttered by the city's leading politician at the time cannot easily be ruled 
out.  There is no doubt that their suffering was thereby raised above the 
personal  level  of  individual  bereavement.  But  that  was  all;  their 
maintenance did not form part of  Pericles' speech. 
166  Of  course, questions of  authenticity of  the speech, as to whether or not it was say, by Lysias,. 
whether the speech was real or fictional, and whether the speech was a parody or not, may be raIsed. 
But I fmd such questions not very material for my present purpose. 
167  See Thucy. 2.35-46. 
168  Gomme, A.W., A Historical Commentary on Thucydides Vol.2 (Oxford,1956),p.143. 
169  Cf.W. Den Boer, Private Morality in Greece and Rome. Mnemosyne Supplementum 57(1979),p.34. 
See also Pomeroy, Goddesses, p.59,243. 
114 In  the  funeral  oration  of Lysias  for  those  Athenians  who  had 
fallen in the Corinthian war, when the orator turns to console the affected 
families,  after  an  impressive  picture  of the  past  glory  of Athens  he 
observes:  "These  (the  fallen  warriors),  prizing  valour  above  all  else, 
deprived themselves of life, widowed their wives, left their own children 
orphans, and brothers, fathers, mothers in a state of desolation ...  We have 
but one way, as it seems to me, of showing our gratitude to those who lie 
here: it is to hold their parents in the same high regard as they did, to be 
as affectionate to their children as though we were ourselves their fathers, 
and  to  give  such support to  their wives  as  they  did while  they  lived" 
(2.71,72). The speaker's words to the widows seem very comforting; but 
although there is evidence of state support for war orphans, there appears 
to be no single evidence in Lysias or elsewhere pointing to  any kind of 
state support for war widows. 
In  Plato's  Menexenos  also,  where  the  fallen  warrIors 
paradoxically  address  those  who  have  been  left  behind,  the  relatives 
(parents and children) are entreated to take care of widows and children 
(248C), but both parents who have lost their sons, and children who have 
been  orphaned  are  assured  of  the  assistance  of  the  state  (248D). 
Furthermore  the admonitions in the funeral  oration of Demosthenes are  , 
directed solely to parents and children of  the fallen heroes: " The children 
of these men shall be reared in honour and the parents of these men shall 
115 enjoy distinction and tender care in their old age, cherishing the fame of 
these men as an assuagement of  their sorrow"(Dem.60.32). 
The  speech has no section  on widows.  And although  the  fragmentary 
speech of  Hyperides mentions mothers and fathers, children and sisters of 
the  fallen  (27),  it  has  nothing  on  the  widows  of the  dead  warriors. 
Eyidently, the assumption is that a young widow will be married again, 
while an old widow will have an adult son (or son-in-law). 
The decree of Theozotides, an Athenian, may also  be noted.  In 
403/2  B.C.,  Theozotides  is  said  to  have  proposed  a  decree  in  which, 
among  other  things,  he  sought  public  support  for  orphans  of those 
Athenian citizens killed in war.
l7O By and large, Theozotides' concern in 
his  decree was with the sons of those who suffered violent death in the 
preceding oligarchy. In return for the loyalty and bravery of their fathers, 
the  sons  were  to  receive  an  obol  a  day  each  from  the  state.  But 
Theozotides' decree made no provision for those wives who had lost their 
husbands in the revolution. 
The  light that these  sources  throw on Athenian attitude towards 
even war widows is that there seems to be a general unenthusiastic and 
uncommitted  attitude  towards  widows  in Athens.  Thus,  in  the  funeral 
orations  children  mothers and sisters are often mentioned, but the least  ,  , 
attention is given to widows. Also in these orations, parents and children, 
116 brothers and sisters are closely connected with the deeds of  the dead, and 
are challenged to  emulate such deeds. But the widows do not fall  within 
this  circle;  they  take no  share in  the  glory of their husbands,  and they 
stand  apart  as  far  as  support  from  the  state  for  parents  or  children  is 
concerned. 
We  might  as  well  note  Dem.  43.75,which  we  have  so  often 
quoted:  ~ 0  apxcov  E1ttl_u~;AEtcr8co  'trov  op~avrov Kat  'trov  E1ttKAYtPCOV 
Kat  'trov  olKcov  'trov  E~EprH.lOUJlEVCOV  Kat  'trov  yuVatKrov,  acrat 
IlEVOUcrl V EV  'tol~  OtKOt~ 'trov  aV8prov  'trov  'tE8vllK6'tcov  <pacrKoucrat 
KUEl v : "Let the archon take charge of orphans and of heiresses and of 
families that are becoming extinct, and of all women who remain in the 
houses of  their deceased husbands, declaring that they are pregnant." 
It can easily be noticed from the sequence of those referred to in 
the  law  that  the  wife  is  mentioned  last.  The  expression,Kat  'trov 
yuVatKrov,  acrat  JlEVOUcrtV  EV  'to1~  olKot~  'trov  av8prov  'trov 
1E8VllK61COV <pacrKoucrat KUEtV,  also indicates clearly that the widow is 
of less importance, and that only the children matter. For it is only when 
she is pregnant that she comes under the protection of  the archon. And, as 
has  been noted by Boer,171  even regarding  the  children,  only the  boys 
170  See Ronald S. Stroud, , Greek Inscriptions: Theozotides and the Athenian Orphans' Hesperia 
40( 1971 ),280-30 1. 
171  Morality, p.35. 
117 count.  Significantly, the only girl who has any status is the heiress, as is 
clear from the law.  172 
Thus,  although  the  Athenians  were  very  much  aware  of the 
embarrassed circumstances of  widows in the society, unlike some modem 
societies  where the  state partly supports widows,  albeit there  could be 
problems, for instance, in UK over war widows and their pensions, the 
Athenian  state  gave no practical support to  them,  not even widows of 
fallen warriors. Thus their maintenance and care appear to have been the 
sole responsibilities of kinsmen. And among kinsmen, this deficiency of 
state support was mitigated by the duty of sons to support their parents. 
However, such support did not apply in the majority of cases to widowed 
wives for three main reasons: some of them might be relatively younger 
than their husbands who had died, either as civilians or as soldiers. 
Such widows might have sons in their minority who would not be 
able to look after their mothers until after some years. Two cases readily 
corne  to  mind:  the  case  of Demosthenes'  mother,  and  the  widow  of 
Diodotos in Lysias 32 who lived in her dead husband's house with her 
minor sons for one year before she was given out in a second marriage. 
Also some widows had no children at all. Kiron's widow in Isaios 8, for 
instance, never had children again after the death of her two sons. Other 
I72  Cf. also Dem.43.51 for the distinct status of  the heiress. 
118 \\'idows also had no sons but only daughters, as in the case of  Polyeuktos' 
widow in Demosthenes 41. 
The right to support and maintenance of  the widow who remained 
in her deceased husband's house with her son or sons derives from two 
main sources:  (I) The moral as well as the legal obligation for Athenian 
sons to support their parents. We may begin with the case of an epikleros 
mother. A law in Demosthenes prescribes that an epikleros' son who had 
attained his age of majority should take over the property of his mother 
and begin to provide for her support: 
Kat  Eav  E~  E1ttKA1lPOU  1t<;  YEvll1at,  Kat  uJ.!a  "~1lcr1J  E1tt 
8tE1E<;,  Kpa1EtV  1roV  XPllJ.!U1cov,  10V  bE  crt10V  J.!E1pEtV  11J  J.!111pt:  "If 
anyone is born the son of an heiress, two years after he has attained his 
age of manhood he shall assume control of the estate, and he shall make 
due provision for his mother's maintenance"(Dem.46.20). 
It  is  not  evident  what  kind  of arrangements  the  son  of an 
epikleros  on reaching his majority had to  make  for  the  support of his 
mother if  she was still living with her husband. But the situation becomes 
more  definite  if the  woman became  widowed.  With the  death of her 
husband,  all  the  responsibilities  of maintenance  and  legal  support 
necessarily devolved upon the son. For at this time the adult son became 
the kyrios of his mother, and would be managing also the property of his 
119 maternal grandfather which his mother together with his deceased father 
had held in trust for him, as is clear in the law. 173  The son's succession to 
his  maternal  grandfather's  household  was  exclusively  upon  his  legal 
capacity and did not depend in any  way on the  death of his  father  or 
mother.17~ But once his mother became widowed, he had a greater legal 
and  moral  responsibility  to  provide  for  her  support  than  he  would 
probably  otherwise  have  done  when  his  father  was  alive.  Thus  the 
epikleros widow had a specific legal protection regarding her support. 
This law of support refers particularly to the epikleros. In general 
however,  adult  Athenian  sons  were  morally  and  legally  obliged  to 
reciprocate the gestures of tendance and care from their parents. Hanson 
notes  this  filial  obligation in his  comment  on relations  in  the  ancient 
Roman  family:  "  If the  parent  owes  certain  obligations  of tendance, 
nurture  and  attention,  the  child  in  return  must  show  dutifulness, 
obedience and devotion.,,175  Hanson was writing on the  Roman family, 
but his comment applies equally to the Athenian situation. For Xenophon 
is very emphatic on the issue. He writes in his Memorabilia: "We owe an 
obligation to  our parents who created us out of that which was not, and 
our  obligations  are  based  on  returning  good  deeds."  Then  in  another 
173  See also Is.8.31·10.12, where reference to the law and its implications are made. 
174 Cf. David Asheri, ' Laws of  Inheritance, Distribution of  Land and Political Constitutions in Ancient 
Greece' His to ria 12(1963)1-21,esp.16. 
175  1. O. deGraft-Hanson, , Pietatis Imago', LJH 1(1974)1. 
120 section of the same work he notes: " The duty of honouring parents, like 
that of  fearing the gods, is an unwritten law, observed in all countries.,,176 
It is on this principle of  sons' support for their parents that, giving 
reasons for  his continued support by the state as a disabled person, the 
speaker of Lysias 24 argues that his resources are limited. For though his 
father had left him nothing, he had had to maintain his widowed mother 
too until her death, but he has no children to support him (24.6). 
In our modem society it may certainly not appear quite natural for parents 
to  let the expectation of reciprocal services be a primary motivation for 
loving and caring for their children. But parents in ancient Athens seem 
to have expected recompense, especially in their old age, for bringing up 
children; and they found in this nothing incompatible with natural love. 
The moral obligation of sons to provide for the maintenance of 
their parents was reinforced by law which punished and disqualified from 
attending  the  Assembly and holding political position,  sons  who were 
found  guilty  of not living up to  their responsibilities  to  their parents. 
Listing  offences  in the  city,  Andokides notes:  " ...  all  who were  found 
guilty of  maltreating their parents, were deprived of their personal rights, 
while retaining possession of their property "(  1.74). It is noteworthy that 
maltreatment  of parents  seems  to  have  three  main  dimensions  of 
176  Mem.2.2.13;4.4.19-20. Plato in his Crito presents a similar situation in his famous metaphorical 
analogy of  parental relationship between the laws and the citizen in the state. Cf. also his Hippias 
Major, 291d-e; Lys.6.49. 
121 application: (1) neglect of support for parents;(2) shirking of  posthumous 
honours  to  deceased  parents  by  not  performing  the  customary  rites; 
and( 3)  physical  assault  on parents.
177  The  importance of the  Athenian 
concern for parental care by sons is  clearly shown by the  fact  that the 
ancient sources are replete with references to this law. 
Significantly, at the dokimasia of people seeking positions in the 
state, one of the questions invariably put to the aspirant was whether he 
maintained his parents, or performed the customary funeral  rites of his 
deceased  parents.  If  it  became  evident  that  he  shirked  these 
responsibilities, he failed the scrutiny, and he was not only disqualified 
from holding the post he was aspiring to get, but also lost certain civic 
rights,  as  indicated  by  the  laws  cited  above.
178  Thus  every  Athenian 
parent had the right in his or her old age to be fed, housed, and protected 
by his or her sons.  A  widow who lived with her son or sons was also 
protected by this law regarding her maintenance by the son or sons. This 
right  was  guaranteed by a  prosecution  for  neglect  or maltreatment of 
parents,YPu<PYt  YOVECOV  KUKroaEcos;  the victim relying on a third person, 
177  See Dem.24.l07; Plato,HM 291d-e, and Xen.Mem.2.2.l3, noted supra; Aeschn.1.28,quoted supra; 
Lys.13.91. Also Harrison, Law (i), p.78,n.1. 
178  CLAP55.3; Lys.31.20-23; MacDowell, Law,p.l67-69; Gabriel Adeleye, 'The Purpose of  the 
Dokimasia' GRBS 24(1983),295-306,esp.297; Harrison, ibid; PJ.Rhodes, Commentary on the 
Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia (Oxford,1981),p.629. 
122 o  ~ouA6f.1EVO<;,  who  suffered  no  penalty  if he  failed  to  convict  the 
accused by not receiving at least one-fifth of  the votes cast. 179 
The  right  to  maintenance of the  widow  who  remained  in  her 
deceased  husband's  house  with  her  adult  son  also  derived  from  the 
retention of her dowry in the deceased husband's property.  One of the 
purposes  for  a  kyrios  of giving  a dowry with his  daughter or sister in 
marriage was to secure her maintenance.
180  The woman in marriage thus 
became the beneficiary of  the dowry. But since she was always subject to 
the head of the family,  who was her husband, she never had any rights 
\yhatsoever of administration of her dowry.  She  handed it  over to  her 
husband, who might administer, use, and utilise it at his own discretion. 
In effect, the woman's dowry as  a financial asset went into the estate of 
her husband. And if  she decided to remain with her sons in her husband's 
household  on his  death,  her dowry  remained and became  part  of the 
deceased husband's estate  inherited by his  sons,  who  then were under 
obligation to maintain their mother.  181 
Apart from  her right to  maintenance,  a widow living  with her 
adult son as her kyrios enjoyed also legal rights of protection by the son. 
As noted already the widow as a woman, could not plead her own case in 
court,  either actively as  a plaintiff or passively as  a  defendant against 
179  Is.8.32; AP 56.6; Harrison, Law (i),p. 59-60,77-78. 
180  Wolff, Traditio 2(1944),62-63; MacDowell, Law, p.89. 
181  Cf. Wolff, ibid; MacDowell,ibid; Hunter, JFH 14(1989),296. 
123 attacks on either her person or her property. She also could not enter into 
any business contract on her own beyond a certain limit of  measurement. 
In all these respects therefore, the widow's adult son as her kyrios had to 
act  for  her.  So in Demosthenes' suit against his  guardians (27-29) it is 
abundantly clear in his speeches that the orator is suing not only for the 
recovery  of his  patrimony, but also  for  the  restitution of his  mother's 
dowry from Aphobos, with interest paid on it (27.15-17 ;28.11). 
The evidence is not very clear on support for other categories of 
\vidows  who remained in their  deceased husbands'  households.  These 
comprise childless widows, those who had daughters only, widows who 
lived with sons still in their minority, and pregnant widows.
182  Kiron's 
widow in Isaios 8 is a typical example of a widow without children. We 
are informed that the woman did not bear children again after the death of 
their  two  sons  (8.36).  As noted  earlier  on,  though  it  is  not  explicitly 
stated, it is implicit in the tenor of the speech that the widow lived in the 
house of her deceased husband.  It is not clear also who inherited from 
Kiron since he died without leaving a son, because of which his property 
became a  subject of dispute.  But it is  evident from the  speech that his 
widow,  together with her brother Diokles,  was  in  firm  control  of the 
estate of  her deceased husband. 
182  The position of  the pregnant widow is examined in chapter 4. 
124 The total value of the real property of the  deceased, apart from 
considerable sums of money lent out on which interest accrued (8.35), is 
said to be ninety minai. We are informed also that before Kiron died, his 
\vife's brother had managed to make Kiron let him handle all  his  sums 
and the interest upon them, and to manage his real property (8.37). With 
this kind of financial background, it would appear that Diokles' widowed 
sister  would not lack material  sustenance.  We  are  not in  a position to 
know  what  her status  was  concerning  other responsibilities;  but  since 
there seem to have been very close ties between her and the brother, it is 
very probable that he would have been giving her the legal support and 
protection that she needed. 
The widow of  Polyeuktos, (Dem.41), had two daughters only and 
had  no  sons.  But  this  widow  seems  to  have  achieved  considerable 
economic independence within the family setting, and been virtually in 
control  of the  family  matters  after  the  decease  of her  husband.  183 
Particularly,  the  speaker  informs  us  that  the  widow  had  lent  1,000 
drachmae to Spudias, husband of  one of  her daughters, on which loan the 
woman had left papers behind on her death as evidence of the transaction 
(41.8-11,21).  It is therefore clear that this widow,  though without sons, 
did not lack the sources of  financial support. Her juridical status however, 
is not very precise. But since there is indication of  very close ties between 
125 her and her brothers until her death (41.9), there can be no doubt that they 
would have been giving her the legal protection she needed while alive. 
The position of widows who remained in the households of their 
defunct husbands with minor sons, like Diodotos' widow  and Kleoboule  ,  , 
mother of Demosthenes, is also not very exact, and may give room for 
conjectures on certain issues.  The speaker of Lysias 32  informs us that 
the widow of  Diodotos was later given in a second marriage by her father. 
But she had stayed in her dead husband's house with her two minor sons 
and their sister in the Peiraeus for one year, after which period the second 
marriage took place (32.8). What was her position before her remarriage? 
We do not know the exact size of Diodotos' property. However, 
the evidence suggests that his fortune may have been very considerable 
(4-6,13-16), out of which he had arranged for a dowry of one talent each 
for his wife in a second marriage, and for his daughter if  anything should 
happen  to  him in  the  expedition  (6).  We  also  know  that  he  held  in 
partnership with his brother and father-in-law,  Diogeiton, their father's 
real property bequeathed to them (4).  On his death, all his own property 
and  his  share  of their  father's  estate  went  under  the  control  and 
administration of  his brother and father-in-law whom he had appointed as 
guardian of  his two sons and their sister, as the sons were still minors. 
183  Cf. Schaps, Economic Rights, pIS; Hunter, JFH 14(1989),301. 
126 It is important to note that although the residential status of the 
widow of  Diodotos did not change until after one year, the authority over 
her at any rate conventionally reverted to her father.  The question as to 
whether her father was legally obliged to provide for her maintenance and 
support during her transitory period before remarriage, since her deceased 
husband had provided her with  a  dowry  is  quite  another  matter.  The 
evidence  suggests  that,  although  technically  she  together  with  her 
children fell  under the care and protection of her father,  her sons being 
minors, in reality she lacked this support and protection from him. 
Weare informed that even on being remarried, her father dowered 
her with only five thousand drachmae, which was one thousand less than 
her dead husband had given her (8). The speaker does not tell us who her 
second husband was. But when it became very evident that the children 
had been defrauded by their uncle and grandfather when the  elder son 
attained manhood, she had to tum to the husband of her daughter (9-10). 
It was he who supported the young boy to sue for the restitution of their 
property;  and at this  trial,  she  also  gave  evidence  at  a  family  meeting 
against her own father (12-13, 15 -1 7). 
The mother of  Demosthenes also lived with her minor son and his 
sister in the husband's household until her son came of age (Dem.27-29). 
But unlike Diodotos' widow, Kleoboule lived in widowhood and never 
got  married again  (29.26).  There is no doubt that Kleoboule  was  still 
127 quite young at the time her husband died. Nevertheless, we are informed 
that  her  arranged  second  marriage  (27.5;28.16)  did  not  materialise 
(27.56);  and that Aphobos, to whom she had been betrothed, would not 
even maintain her though he had her dowry for the remarriage. Her son 
tells the jury: 
"  For when it proved that Aphobos, though he had her fortune, 
would not maintain my mother, and refused to let the property, choosing 
rather to  administer it himself in conjunction with the  other guardians, 
Demokhares remonstrated with him about the matter,  ..  Aphobos admitted 
the fact, and said that he was having a little dispute with my mother about 
the  jewels,  and  that,  when  he  had  settled  this  matter,  he  would  act 
regarding the maintenance and all else in such a way that I should have 
no ground for complaint" (27.15). 
It  does  seem  from  Demosthenes'  account  and  Aphobos'  own 
admission that although Aphobos might have not left Kleoboule derelict, 
he appeared to have refused to provide support for the widow, though he 
had taken possession of  the dowry for her. Thus Kleoboule was left to her 
fate regarding her sustenance, and without a kyrios. In the circumstances, 
certain  questions  come  to  mind.  Who  undertook  the  responsibility  of 
caring for her and giving her legal protection until her son Demosthenes 
came of age to take over such responsibilities, bereft of her dowry, and 
without a kyrios?  Could a widow live without a kyrios?  What was her 
128 status in the household while Demosthenes was so young and could not 
manage affairs? 
The internal  and external  evidence on Kleoboule indicates that 
she  did not lack the  means of sustenance  as  a  widow.  The  husband's 
house itself where she continued to live was a rich one, with furnishings 
and slaves left behind by her late husband (27.5,20,27,46). Kleoboule was 
also reputed to have entered the marriage with a fortune  (27.4).184  It is 
also important to note that since she was an epikleros, she certainly may 
have  had property like clothes, jewels, slaves,  and money of her own, 
which she had brought from her father who lived in exile.18s As a married 
woman her husband had control of her property, but it is most probable 
that  some  of this  wealth remained  in  her hands  on  the  death  of her 
husband even before Aphobos tried to take away her jewels (27.13-15). 
As to the question of  her being without a kyrios, we are informed 
that  when  she  found  herself at  the  mercy  of Aphobos  and  his  co-
guardians she turned to her sister's husband Demokhares who confronted 
Aphobos for maltreating her (27.14-15). Thus, although Demokhares was 
not her official kyrios, it is very probable that he would have represented 
her in the event of any legal proceedings. But this does not rule out her 
vulnerable position in the society. For the situation apparently remained 
184  See Aeschn.3.172. 
185  See Davies, APF, p.121-122; Hunter, Policing Athens (Princeton, 1994),p.30; Gemet, ' Notes sur 
les parents de Demosthenes' REG 31(1918)185-96, noted by Hunter,ibid. 
129 unchanged until Demosthenes attained his majority before he took legal 
action against Aphobos on behalf of  the woman. 
Within the household itself, however, there can be no doubt that 
Kleoboule managed the house, including the family finances. For her son 
was still immature and incapable of doing so. We must bear in mind also 
the fact that as a widow in her dead husband's house her personal fortune 
and her dowry. though the latter was lost, were incorporated in the family 
fortune.
I86  It would thus appear quite natural for her to  take up the full 
responsibility  of household  management  in  the  circumstances.  This 
household  management,  including  advice  to  her  son,  would  certainly 
have  continued  for  some  time  after  Demosthenes  had  attained  his 
majority, at least until he married.
I87  Thus by all indications, K1eobou1e 
seems to be one of the few widows of independence, and had become a 
defacto head of  her deceased husband's household. 
For those other widows living with their sons, and who were not 
so  privileged like Kleobou1e  and the widow of Po1yeuktos,  the  sources 
indicate that some of them took to  income-generating activities such as 
petty trading in the market, wet nurse, and other such economic ventures 
for  their  livelihood.  And for  those  in  rural  Attica,  there  is  the  strong 
186  Cf. Hunter, JFH 14(1989),45-46. 
187  On the age of  majority, see R. Sealey, ' On Coming of  Age in Athens' CR 71(1957)195-197; 
J.M.Carter, ' Eighteen Years of  Age?' BICS 14(1967),51~57; Mark Golden, ' Demosthenes and t?e 
Age of  Majority at Athens' Phoenix 33(1979)25-38; DavIes, APF, p.123-126; MacDowell,  Agamst 
Meidias, p.370. 
130 possibility  that  they may have  engaged in  agricultural  work and  other 
rural labour to contribute to the family finances. 188 
DOMESTIC INFLUENCE 
It is common knowledge that Athenian women had no access to the 
courts, or to the male political sphere.  They, none the less, may still be 
both highly respected and wield great informal authority and influence in 
the  society through their own network within the confines of the oikos. 
This  could particularly be so  in the case of the widow in her deceased 
husband's household. A passage in Aeschines that seems to illustrate the 
authority  and  influence  of some  widows  in  their  deceased  husbands' 
households may be cited. The speaker tells the jury: 
" But, fellow citizens, I beg you not to accept their irrelevant pleas 
at all, ...  But I will go back a little way for your instruction. Demosthenes, 
after he had spent his patrimony, went up and down the city, hunting rich 
young  fellows  whose  fathers  were  dead,  and  whose  mothers  were 
administering their property. I will omit many instances, and will mention 
only  one  of those  who  were  outrageously  treated.  He  discovered  a 
household  that  was  rich  and  ill-managed,  the  head  of which  was  a 
188 Cf.Dem.57.30-35; Lys.32.8-10; Aristoph. Thesmoph.446-48. Also Lacey, , The Family of 
Euxitheus: (Demosthenes LVII)' CQ 7  4(  198~)57  ~  71 ~ Walter S~heidel, , The ~ost  Silent Women of 
Greece and Rome: Rural Labour and Women s Llfe m the Anclent World (I)  G&R 42(1995),202-217. 
131 woman,  proud and of poor judgement.  A  fatherless  young  man,  half-
crazy  ~ was managing the estate, Aristarkhos, son of  Moskhos"( 1.170-72). 
Aeschines is obviously slandering or taunting Demosthenes for 
allegedly  exploiting  rich  and  naIve  orphans  after  depleting  his  own 
patrimony.  Although the passage has been rej ected by Harrison as  self-
contradictory, merely rhetorical and without significance,189  the orator's 
comments  certainly  highlight  what  could  be  the  situation,  and  the 
administrative role of some widows in the households of their deceased 
husbands.190  For despite the administrative deficiency on the part of the 
widow as implied by the speaker, the passage does seem to suggest that 
some  widows had affairs of their deceased husbands'  household under 
their full control and management. 
The  widow's  influence  in  the  funeral  rites  for  her  deceased 
husband could also be quite considerable.  Obligation to  perform burial 
rites was closely associated in Athens with inheritance. By a law cited in 
Dem. 43.57-58, the heirs or next-of-kin had a legal obligation to bury the 
dead,  and if they did not fulfil  this  obligation with the urgency that it 
required,  they could be called upon to pay the costs of burial by deme 
officials. 191  However, although a widow might be her husband's niece or 
cousin, she, like any other wife, was not a close relative of her husband. 
189  Law (i), p.114,n.1. 
190  Cf.Hunter, EMC 33(1989),45; Schaps, Economic Rights,p.15-16,117,n.l04. 
132 But  evidence from Isaios suggests that the widow's role  and influence 
regarding the burial rites for her deceased husband could be very great. 
For the speaker in Isaios 8 informs us that it was not only on the earnest 
request of Kiron's widow that the funeral  for him was celebrated in his 
own house, but also his widow declared that she herself would help to lay 
out and deck the corpse (8.21-22). 
As  the  widow in her dead husband's house  with her adult  son 
appears  to  continue to control affairs in the household when she would 
now  have  been under  her  adult  son,  she  seems  to  have  authority  in 
matters  of adoption in the  household.  Her consent had to  be  obtained 
before her son could be adopted in certain circumstances, especially if  she 
was living alone with the son. And in Isaios (7.14), we hear of a request 
made to a boy's widowed mother before he was adopted. 
It would appear that widows who lived with their sons exercised 
some kind of influence on their sons' decision to marry;  and it is most 
likely that the sons of such widows might marry late in life when their 
mothers  were  very  aged  or when  their mothers  were  dead.  In  Isaios, 
Pyrrhos'  widowed  sister  in  oration  3,  the  widows  of Theopompos, 
Kephisophon,  and  Polyaratos  all  in  oration  5,  and  the  widow  of 
Aristarkhos in oration 10, seem to have their sons as their guardians at the 
time  the  speeches  in  which  they  appear  were  given.  The  widows  of 
191  Cf.also S.C.Humphreys, ' Family Tombs and Tomb Cult in Athens: Tradition or Traditionalism?' 
133 Theopompos,  Kephisophon,  and  Polyaratos  for  instance  have  been 
\\'idows  for  at  least ten years,  implying that they might most probably 
have passed the re-marriageable age, and therefore lived with their sons 
until they also died. In all these cases, however, no information is given 
about the marital status of  their sons; and it is possible that they were still 
not married at the time the speeches were delivered. 
Perhaps  it  would  seem too  premature  to  look  for  information 
about  the  marriage  life  of Demosthenes  in  his  speeches  against  his 
guardians, as he had then just reached his majority. In fact, even his birth-
year as  well as the age at which he attained manhood in relation to  the 
age  at which males reached their majority in Athens seems to  present a 
major prosopographical crux, as maintained on page 418-422 below. The 
puzzle arises from certain statements of the orator in his first speech in 
his  suit  against  Aphobos,  his  principal  guardian  (27.4,6,19,63,69). 
Furthermore,  at  the  time  he  delivered his  speech  against Meidias,  the 
orator  speaks  of himself as  being  thirty-two  years  old  and  without 
children (21.154,187). 
But if Demosthenes was thirty-two years old at the time, and his 
Against Meidias was delivered in 347, he cannot have been born in 384, 
as suggested by some commentators.
192 He would have been born in 379. 
JHS IOO(l980)96-126,esp. 98.  .  .. 
192 See Davies, APF, p.138; J.H.Vince, Against Meidias, Loeb Vo1.3,p.3; MacDowell, Agamst Meldzas, 
p.370-371. 
134 However,  MacDowell  (Against  Meidias,  p.370-371),  argues  that 
Demosthenes  was  rather thirty-seven years  old when  he  delivered his 
Against Meidias, and that he wrote the figure in the form ~MIIII which 
was corrupted to AAAII.  MacDowell's argument seems quite plaussible. 
For if the orator delivered his speech against Meidias in 347, and he was 
thirty-seven years old at the time, then he was born in 385/4. 
This implies that his one certain child, a daughter, as the sources 
tell  us,  was born after his  speech against  Meidias  in  347  B.C.
193  The 
mother of this daughter is said to have been married to Demosthenes in 
343  B.C.;  though her identity is not very clear.
194  If Demosthenes was 
born in 384,  and his  first  marriage  took place in 343,  then the  orator 
would have attained the age of  41  years before he married. This shows a 
period of  twenty-three years after attaining his majority, and eleven years 
after reaching the usual marriageable age of thirty years.  It is therefore 
most probable that he married late not only because of  his political career 
but also because of  his widowed mother. 
We do not know whether the speaker of Lysias 24 subsequently 
married after his defence speech; but we do know that he had maintained 
his widowed mother until her death. But at the time of  his speech he had 
still not yet married, and had had no children (24.6). Two more examples 
may be cited.  In Demosthenes 54,  Ariston informs the jury in his suit 
135 against Konon that when his bearers who were carrying him to his home 
after the assault on him by Konon and his son and their band of gangsters 
reached his  door,  his  widowed mother and the  women  servants began 
shrieking  and wailing  (54.9).  Here,  Ariston  is  not  only portraying  the 
helplessness of the women, but also stating implicitly that at the time of 
the  assault  on  him,  he  was  still  not  married,  but  was  living  with  his 
widowed mother and the women slaves in his dead father's household. 
And in Demosthenes 55,  we are told of  a pair of  widowed mothers, 
the widow of Kallippides (55.3), and that of Teisias (55.5), living in the 
country with their sons. The two were neighbours; and as  it turned out, 
visited each other frequently. On these visits they discussed the problems 
of their respective farms. But throughout the speech, the speaker gives no 
indication about his or his opponent's marital status, implying that neither 
of them was as yet married at the time of  the trial. For it would seem that 
their  wives  might also  have  got  drawn  into  the  case  in  court  as  their 
mothers were, if they were married at the time. These instances seem to 
suggest that some adult orphans most probably delayed getting married if 
their widowed mothers lived with them and came under their care and 
maintenance until such mothers died. 
The widow's knowledge of the  contents of her husband's will, 
and related family matters can hardly be disputed. We have already noted 
193  Cf. Aeschn.3.77; Plut.Dem.22.2, noted by Davies, ibid. 
136 Kleoboule's  management  and  counselling  role  in  her  dead  husband's 
house. It is important to note also that Kleoboule was well apprised of  her 
husband's will and of the state of the family fortune.  In his suit against 
his  guardians,  Demosthenes  alleges  that  his  guardians  had  ignored 
instructions in his father's will to lease his property, and had mismanaged 
and misappropriated his estate. His guardians deny the charge, and claim 
that there were no such instructions in the will that his estate should be 
leased. (27.42; 28.7) 
But Demosthenes persistently maintains that his guardians' claim is 
false, and informs the jury of  the contents of  the will: 
(i)  A statement of  all the property left behind by his father; 
(ii)  Instructions regarding the funds from which his guardians were to 
take what had been given them; 
(iii)  Instructions that his estate should be leased; 
(iv)  That what his father had given to his mother in his will was in fact 
a gift to her from his father (27.40-41,45,65,69). 
The most interesting feature of it all is that the said will was in 
fact in the possession of his guardians; and at the time of his suit against 
them they had still not given him the will despite several requests to them 
to  do  so  (27.40-41;  28.5).  What  then,  was  Demosthenes'  source  of 
information  regarding  his  father's  will?  Demosthenes'  own  statement 
194  Aeschn.2.149. See also Davies,ibid. 
137 provides the answer: it was his mother who told him the contents of the 
will (27.40). The question as to how Kleoboule also got to know that her 
husband's testament contained such statements may have three answers 
to it. 
First, it is very certain that Kleoboule herself was at the meeting 
when her ailing husband summoned his  brother Demon,  and Aphobos 
and  his  co-guardians  to  his  bedside  and  declared  to  them  the 
arrangements he had made in his will regarding the future of  his wife and 
the  children (28.15).  Moreover, it is most probable that Kleoboule was 
present when her husband prepared his document. The possibility that her 
husband told her of  the will and discussed the arrangements in it with her 
cannot  also  be ruled out.  Hence her perfect knowledge of its  contents 
which she imparted to her son. 
But it was  not  only  Kleoboule  who  had such  grasp  of family 
finances, her husband's will and related family matters. Diodotos' widow 
also  demonstrates  absolute  knowledge  of her husband's  will,  and  her 
father's shameful behaviour over what had been in trust for her and her 
children at the family gathering during which she gives evidence against 
her father (Lys.32.12-17). The woman appears literate and makes use of 
documents  that  her  sons  have  found  to  convict her  father.
195 
We  are 
informed also that the papers left behind by Polyeuktos'  widow at her 
138 death also contained a record of family debt amounting to 200 drachmae 
owed her dead husband by Spudias for a slave purchased from his father-
in-law (Dem.41.21-22). 
The social role of  widows in their deceased husbands' households 
as  the  fount of knowledge on the internal affairs of the house, however, 
extended beyond the bounds of their husbands' households. For despite 
their legal disabilities as  women,196  evidence provided by them outside 
court  could be  tendered in  court,  and  carried  considerable  weight  and 
influence  on  court  decisions.  For  instance,  in  Dem.41,  the  document 
recording the two debts left behind by Polyeuktos' widow was tendered 
in court and constituted the major section of  the speaker's evidence. 
We  have  already  noted  the  conclusive  and  decisive  evidence 
given by Diodotos' widow at the family council that she herself initiated. 
Significantly,  the  speaker effectively used it by recounting  it  in  court 
(Lys.32.12-17). We do not know the result of the case; but if Diodotos 
got  convicted,  it  would  seem  that  the  widow's  evidence  might  have 
contributed in no small way to  his  conviction.  The  speaker of Dem.36 
also laments that his client, Phormion, is being sued at a time when the 
prosecutor's widowed mother who knew everything about the case, and 
whose evidence would have been most valuable was dead: 
195  Cf.Gould, JHS 100(1980),50,n.84.  .  . 
196  See R. Just, Women in Athenian Law and Life (London, 1989),p.26-39; Harnson, Law (1), p.l08; 
MacDowell, Law, p.84; R.Sealey, Women and Law in Classical Athens (London, 1990),p.12-49. 
139 "'Indeed,  as  long as  his  (prosecutor's) mother was  living,  who  had  an 
accurate  knowledge of all  these  matters,  Apollodoros never made  any 
complaint against Phormio, the defendant; but after her death he brought 
a malicious and baseless suit claiming three thousand drachmae" (36.14). 
Furthermore,  the  sons of Aristaekhmos  in  Demosthenes 38  are 
surprised that they should be taken to court by the sons ofNausikrates for 
a debt  allegedly owed by their deceased  father  Aristaekhmos.  For one 
thing their father had in fact been given a release of  the debt in full before 
his death; for another, they are being tried at a time when the plaintiffs' 
"own mother, too, was dead, who was well-informed regarding all these 
matters ...  "(38.6).  And  in  Demosthenes  55,  it  was  the  defendant's 
widowed mother who informed him of the  extent of damage caused to 
their neighbours by the water because of her regular visits to  her other 
widowed friend (55.24). 
Moreover, the regular visits by the two widowed neighbours to 
each other made them know the facts of the case, and they consequently 
got drawn into the lawsuit involving their sons to the extent that they had 
to give evidence on oath which was tendered in court(55.27). The overall 
picture  thus points to  the  fact  that a widow in her deceased husband's 
house could have considerable authority and influence. And although she 
herself could not sue or defend in court because of her disabilities, her 
140 evidence could be tendered in lawsuits and be a determining factor in the 
decisions of  the jury. 
141 CHAPTER 3 
THE WIDOW IN HER TRANSITIONAL STATE 
For how long did an Athenian widow have to  remain in her 
transitional  period  under  the  authority  of her  kin?197  Why  would  the 
widow remarry after the death of  her husband even if  she had support and 
maintenance  from her kindred? Could an Athenian widow be given in 
marriage by her natal kin against her will? These questions, among other 
matters, will be addressed in this chapter. It has already been noted that 
the  Athenian widow could decide  either to remain in the oikos  of her 
deceased  husband  or return  to  her  original  family.  Some  widows,  as 
discussed,  decided  to  remain  in  their  dead  husbands'  households. 
However, young and childbearing widows invariably left their deceased 
husbands' homes for the households of their original families,  and later 
got  remarried to bear more children.  And evidence  from  several Attic 
speeches indicates that many of those widows who later got remarried 
continued to bear children for their second or third husbands.  198 
197  By the period in transition I mean the length of  time the widow had to wait between the decease of 
her husband and when she got remarried.  . 
198  Examples of  widows who continued to bear children in their second marriages can be found m 
Isaios 7·8·9·11· Lysias 32· Dem. 36;40;45;46;50.  , "  ,  , 
142 WIDOW'S DOWRY  AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS 
Once a widow returned to her family of  origin on the death of  her 
husband the marriage was considered dissolved, and the woman passed 
back into the legal powers or authority of her kin. An interesting feature 
of the status of the marriage at this stage is that, while contraction of the 
marriage involved a formal betrothal and giving out of the bride by her 
father or nearest adult male relative to the bridegroom, termination of the 
marriage  and restoration of the  woman's original  authority took place 
automatically without any formal act to effect the change of  status. 
In fact,  there is  not yet sufficient evidence for  a marriage that 
\vas  formally  terminated  by  both  families  of bride  and  bridegroom 
meeting together with witnesses present to end the marriage as they had 
met to  contract it.  But we may cite two instances, however marginal or 
slight as they might seem. Isaios informs us that when Menekles realised 
that he could not bear children with his young wife on account of  his old 
age, and decided to divorce her, he discussed the matter with his wife and 
her  brothers  before  the  marriage  was  dissolved.(2. 7  -9)  Also,  in 
Demosthenes 57, when the already married Protomakhos became entitled 
to inherit a large estate by marrying an heiress, he divorced his first wife 
by arranging a second marriage for her (57.41). There is no doubt that he 
discussed  the  divorce  with his  own uncles,  his  wife  and  her brother, 
Timokrates before the marriage ended, and the new one contracted. But 
143 even  with such open discussions, it would seem most probable that as 
soon as mutual understanding had been reached between the couples, the 
\vomen left the husbands' households without ceremony. 
Although if a widow left her marital home on the decease of her 
spouse  the  restoration  of her  original  kyrios  was  automatic  by  mere 
operation of law, it was legally obligatory for the dead husband's heir or 
next-of-kin to refund the full value of the widow's dowry to the head of 
the  family  to  whom she  returned.  If the  dowry  was  not returned,  the 
widow had the right of  maintenance by the deceased's heir or next-of-kin. 
And if the  woman was neither maintained nor her dowry returned,  the 
person keeping it could be prosecuted and asked to refund the dowry with 
interest paid on it. Demosthenes informs us of the law and the interest on 
the  dowry in a passage where Phrastor is said to have been indicted for 
divorcing his wife without paying back her dowry: 
"Stephanos  brought  alimony  against  him  In  the  Odeion  in 
accordance with the law which orders that, if a man puts away his wife, 
he must pay back the dowry or else interest on it at the rate of  nine obols 
a month for each mina; and that on the woman's behalf her guardian may 
sue  him  for  alimony  in  the  Odeion.,,199(59.52)  It  is  noteworthy  that 
although there was no divorce as such when the woman was a widow, as 
the  death  of  the  husband  naturally  terminated  the  marriage,  the 
144 deceased's next-of-kin could be prosecuted if he failed to pay back the 
widow's dowry to her next kyrios, unless of course, it was the deceased's 
own son who inherited from him. 
Action for the restitution of the  dowry,  however,  appears to  be 
discretionary, and in certain situations a father or a legal representative of 
the woman might not decide to  initiate any action to recover his ward's 
dowry.  In Isaios' On  the Estate of  Kiron, for instance, the speaker gives 
an account of the widowhood of his mother and her father in which the 
status of  her dowry is described: 
" My grandfather Kiron, gentlemen, married my grandmother, his 
first cousin, herself the daughter of  his own mother's sister.2oo She did not 
live long with him;  she bore my mother, and died after four years.  My 
grandfather,  being  left  with  an  only  daughter,  married  the  sister  of 
DiokIes as  his second wife, who bore him two sons. He brought up his 
daughter in the house with his wife and her children, and while the latter 
were still alive, he gave her in marriage, when she reached the proper age, 
to  Nausimenes of Kholargos,  giving her a dowry of twenty-five minae 
including raiment and jewelry. Three or four years later N  ausimenes fell 
ill  and  died without leaving  any  issue by our mother.  My grandfather 
199  Dem.59.52. Cf.Is.3.8-9; Dem. 28.11;40.50. A.T.Murray in a footnote to Dem.59.52 (Loeb), 
p.390,n.b, notes that the rate of  interest was 18% on the amount of  money given as dowry. 
200  On endogamy and marriage of  cousins in Athens, see W.E.Thompson, Phoenix 21(1967)273-282; 
CSCA 5(1972)211-225; R.J.Littman, AS 10(1979),5-31; C.A.Cox, Household, p.31-37; 
Davies,APF,p.437. 
145 received her back again - without, however, recovering the dowry which 
he had given, owing to the embarrassed condition of  Nausimenes' affairs 
- and gave her in a second marriage to  my father with a dowry of one 
thousand drachmae" (8.7-8). 
We do not know who inherited from Nausimenes; neither do we 
know exactly the nature of his" embarrassed condition of affairs" which 
made  Kiron  relinquish  the  dowry  on  his  daughter.  But  the  speaker's 
statement suggests that Nausimenes may probably have died in such an 
abject  poverty  that  there  was  no  means  by  which  Kiron  could  have 
recovered the dowry. What is certain, however, is that Kiron received his 
daughter back without instituting any action whatsoever to  recover the 
dowry he had given to his daughter in her first marriage; and later gave 
her in a second marriage with a dowry of  one thousand drachmae. 
The change of marital status subsequently affected the widow's 
residential  status.  Residence  in  Attica  was  patrilocal  with  the  male 
descendants  living in the  various demes  or localities on their ancestral 
lands which also contained the family tombs and residence.
2ol  This was 
usually the case, but of course, a man could move to  another place and 
settle  there.
202  With regard to  living on ancestral  lands,  the  speaker of 
Demosthenes 43,  for instance, who painstakingly presents himself as  a 
201  See 1s.9.18; Littman, AS 10(1979),24; S.C.Humphreys, JHS 100(1980),97-8; Lacey,Family,p.90-
91. 
202  69  Cf. MacDowell, Law, p.  . 
146 member of a household of faultless solidarity and piety towards the dead 
claims  that  the  descendants  of Bouselos,  his  great-great-grandfather, 
shared  a  common  burial  ground  which  was  still  being  used  by  the 
descendants  at  the  time  of the  speech,  implying  that  they  had  their 
residence in the deme where they had the ancestral property: 
" There is a place of burial common to all those descended from 
Bouselos  ( it is  called the burial-place of the  Bouselidae, a  large area, 
enclosed, after the manner of the men of old). In this burial-place lie all 
the  other  descendants  of Bouselos  and  Hagnias  and  Euboulides  and 
Polemon, and all the rest of the host of those descended from Bouselos, 
and all these hold in common this place ofburial"(43.79). 
As rightly pointed out by Humphreys,203  the information given in Isaios 
11  and  Demosthenes  43  in the  series  of suits  regarding  the  estate  of 
Hagnias indicates that this burial place might have contained at the time 
Dem.43 was given up to twenty-two members of  the family (not counting 
those who died before producing offspring) spanning four generations. 
On her marriage, therefore, a woman took up residence with her 
husband on his land in the deme where he lived.  Thus the woman was 
transferred  from  the  oikos  of her father  to  that of her husband.204  In 
Dem.55, for instance, we find the pair of widowed mothers living in the 
203 JHS 100(1980),116. 
204 18.3.8; MacDowell, CQ 39(1989),18; Cox, Household, p.28-31. 
147 country with their sons on their deceased husbands' holdings (55.23-24). 
And in Lysias 32, the widow of Diodotos is said to have lived with her 
two minor sons and their sister in the Peiraieus where her husband had his 
residence, while her father lived in Athens. The widow and her children 
retained this residential position for one year before their status changed. 
According to the account of  the speaker, when the widow and the 
children's resources began to run out, the  children's guardian who was 
also their grandfather and uncle, sent the children to the city to live with 
him, and gave their mother in a second marriage (32.8-9). If the husband 
died and the widow decided to  go back to her original family,  she thus 
left the deme or local area of  her husband for that of  her family of origin. 
In some cases, however, her husband and her kinsmen might come from 
the same deme;205 but of course her status changed once she moved from 
the household of  her deceased husband to that of  her kindred. 
Some  of the  widows  who  returned  to  their  kinsmen  on  the 
decease of their husbands have been noted in the previous section. But a 
few  more  may be cited to  establish exactly in  which households  they 
lived in the society. In Lysias 19, a sister of  the speaker was first given in 
marriage by her father to a Phaidros of Myrrhinous with a dowry of fifty 
minae(19.15). Later, she was given in a second marriage by her father to 
Aristophanes,  son  of Nikophemos,  with  the  same  sum  as  her  dowry 
148 (19.16).  The  speaker  does  not  tell  why  her  sister's  first  marrIage 
terminated.  But  Davies  notes  that  Phaidros  was  dead  by  393  B.C., 
apparently childless.
206 
In any case, it is clear that after the termination of 
her first  marriage, the widow went back to  the household of her father 
who later gave her in the second marriage to Aristophanes. 
The speaker of  Demosthenes 40 also tells us about his widowed mother: 
" My mother, men of the jury, was the daughter of Polyaratos of 
Kholargos,  and sister of Menexenos  and Bathyllos and  Periander.  Her 
father gave her in marriage to Kleomedon, son of Kleon, adding a talent 
as  her dowry;  and at first she dwelt with him as his wife, and bore him 
three daughters and one son, Kleon. After this her husband died, and she 
left his family, receiving back her dowry. Her brothers, Menexenos and 
Bathyllos (for Periander was still a boy) then gave her again in marriage 
with the talent for her dowry, and she dwelt with my father as his wife. 
There were born to them myself and another brother, younger than I, who 
died still a child" (Dem.40.6,7). 
Here, the speaker gives us two important pieces of information 
about  his  mother.  The first  one concerns her residential  status.  On her 
first  marriage  she  was  transferred  from  the  house  of her  father  who 
contracted the marriage for her to that of Kleomedon, her husband. But 
this residential arrangement lapsed when the marriage terminated on the 
205  Cox, Household, p.24-26,31-37. 
149 death of  Kleomedon (40.25-26). However, instead of  going back from her 
dead  husband's house  to  that of her father,  she  went to  live  with her 
brothers.  This  implies  that  either her father  was  dead  at  the  time  her 
husband died, or he had handed over the administration of his household 
to his sons on account of  old age. It was, in fact, usual for fathers to retire 
from  management  of the  household  and  tum  it  to  their  son.207  It is 
possible,  therefore,  that  her brothers  were  living  in  the  house  of their 
father as  his heirs. None the less, in the technical sense of her position, 
her transfer of residence from the deceased husband's house was not to 
the house of her father but to that of her brothers who were then masters 
of  their father's household. 
The situation was the  same with her legal position.  We do  not 
know for how long the widow had to wait between the decease of  her first 
husband and the contraction of  her second marriage. But it is certain that 
the  woman  came  under  the  legal  powers  of five  masters  who  could 
exercise legal authority over her. First, her father who contracted her first 
marriage  for  her;  then her husband;  then her two brothers, Menexenos 
and  Bathyllos  who  gave  her in  the  second  marriage  to  Mantias;  then 
Mantias.  Thus,  on her first  marriage,  the  legal  authority over her was 
transferred from her father to her first husband.  But when the  husband 
died the restoration of  the authority to the head of  her original family was 
206  APF, p.201. 
150 not  reversed back to  the  father  but to  her brothers  who  exercised this 
authority to give her in the second marriage to Mantias. 
In Isaios  9,  the  speaker's mother was  given in first  marriage 
(probably by her father) to Euthykrates. We are not told the name of the 
woman or that of  her father. But we are told that after bearing a son and a 
daughter  (9.1,27,29),  the  husband  died  having  been  assaulted  by  his 
brother in a quarrel over the property bequeathed to  them by their dead 
father (9.17-18). The widow then went to  live with her brother who had 
become  her  kyrios  (9.27).  We  cannot  tell  how  long  she  lived  in 
widowhood in her brother's house; but certainly after some time, if not 
soon after the death of her husband, she was given in a second marriage 
to Theophrastos by Hierokles her brother (9.3-4,23,27,28). 
The  speaker  of Lysias  3  who  decries  the  hybristic  behaviour  of his 
opponent  also  informs  us  of his  widowed  sister  together  with  her 
daughters living with him in his house (3.6-7). 
The  case  of the  widow  in  Lysias  19  needs  mention  again.  As 
noted above  she seems to have had no children in her first marriage; but  , 
she  bore  three  children to  Aristophanes,  her second husband  (19.8-9). 
However,  after  an  abortive  military  expedition  in  390/89  in  Ephesos 
(19.21-23),  Aristophanes  and  his  father  Nikophemos,  who  were 
apparently in control of affairs, were recalled to  Athens and summarily 
207  Cf.Strauss, Fathers, p.66-72. 
151 executed  ,  and  their  property  confiscated  by  the  state  (19.8).208  This 
action by the state consequently made the sister of the speaker a widow 
for  the second time in her life.  It is evident from the  speech that at the 
time Lysias  19  was delivered, the widow together with her three young 
children  was  living  with  her  brother  and  had  not  yet  got  married 
(19.9,31,32).  That she was living with her brother also implies that her 
father was probably dead at the time of  the speech. 
Thus at the time Lysias  19  was given, the speaker's sister had 
changed residence four times, and had come under the legal authority of 
four different people in her life:  (a) from the house and authority of her 
father to that of  Phaidros in her first marriage; (b) from the household and 
authority of the deceased Phaidros back to her father; (c) from her father 
to  the household and authority of Aristophanes in her second marriage; 
and (d) from the household and authority of  the deceased Aristophanes to 
the house and legal powers of  her brother. 
Arkhippe, the widow of the banker Pasion, may also be noted as 
one  of those  widows  who  later  got  remarried  on  the  death  of their 
husbands.  Pasion, much the best-known enfranchised alien of them all, 
had  in  his  will,  betrothed his  wife  Arkhippe  in  a  second marriage  to 
Phormion  his  former  slave  and  administrator  of  his  bank 
(Dem.36.8;45.28). Pasion died in 370169 B.C.(Dem.46.13), but the actual 
208  See also Xen.Hell.4.8.24. 
152 marriage  of Arkhippe and Phormion did not come  on  until  368.  Thus 
Arkhippe lived a year of  her life in widowhood. 
The status of Arkhippe regarding her citizenship has presented 
an  ambiguity  whose  resolution  continues  to  engage  the  attention  of 
commentators  not without much ambivalence.
209  But much of what is 
said about her as to whether or not she was an Athenian may be ignored 
here inasmuch as it does not affect her status as a widow. 
The speeches in which some light is thrown on Arkhippe do not 
tell  us  much  about  her  parental  background(Dem.36;45;46;50;59). 
Certain passages in Demosthenes 46, however, suggest that Arkhippe was 
an  epikleros.  In 46.18, her son, Apollodoros cites the law that specifies 
persons who should be appointed as guardians and therefore empowered 
to  give a woman in marriage. And in the subsequent section, he asserts 
that his mother has none of the persons named in the law living, and that 
she is an heiress, and he her kyrios (46.19). But Apollodoros does not tell 
the jury who his deceased grandfather was. A passage in Dem.36 citing 
examples  of bankers who gave their wives to  their former  slaves  also 
seems to imply that Arkhippe did not belong to the family of either of  the 
former masters of  Pasion (36.28-29). Commentators are therefore right to 
209  See David Whitehead' Women and Naturalisation in Fourth-Century Athens: The case of 
Archippe' CQ 36(1986)109-114; C Carey, , Apollodoros' Mother: The Wiv~s of  Enfranchised Aliens 
in Athens' CQ 41(1991)84-89; Jeremy Trevett, Apollodoros, the Son of  PaSlOn (Oxford, 1992),p.2,19. 
153 conclude that Arkhippe had no male relative alive at the time her husband 
died in 370/69 B.C.
210 
Thus with no male relative alive, Arkhippe would certainly have 
had no male kindred to return to  on the  death of her husband.  But as 
already noted, although betrothed by her deceased husband to Phormion 
in  a second marriage, the  actual marriage did not come on until a year 
after  when  her  son  was  away  from  Athens  on  trierarchy  to  Sicily 
(Dem.45.3;46.20-21). This implies that during the one year that Arkhippe 
lived in widowhood she would certainly have to live with her son, though 
not in the family house in the Peiraieus. For we are informed that at the 
death  of his  father,  Apollodoros  moved  out  of the  family  house  in 
Peiraieus and went to live in the countryside (Dem.53.4). 
But it is not clear whether Apollodoros moved out because the 
residence in Peiraieus where there was the physical establishment of his 
father's  bank itself,  now under  the  full  control  and  administration  of 
Phormion,  was  Pasion's  own  house  or  the  premises  were  rented  by 
him.
211  At any rate, it is most natural that Apollodoros would not leave 
the  family residence in Peiraieus to  go  and live in the  country without 
taking his mother along to live with him.  This supposition is confirmed 
by the fact that Apollodoros was very much opposed to the marriage of 
210  Cf. Davies,  APF, p.429; Trevett, Apollodoros, p.2,19,n.4. 
211  Cf.Davies, APF, p.431. 
154 his  mother to  Phormion,  and that  it  was not until  he  was  away  from 
Athens that the marriage could take place (36.8;45.3-4;46.20-21;53.9). 
It is also evident that some widows remained in their deceased 
husbands'  homes  for  some  time  but later got remarried.  We may cite 
again the case of Diodotos' widow in Lysias 32, who lived in Diodotos' 
household with her children for one year after which the father gave her 
away in a second marriage (Lys.32.8). 
We cannot say much about the widow of Thrasyllos, in Isaios 7. 
F  or the speaker does not tell the jury where she lived after the death of 
Thrasyllos, and who gave her in the second marriage to Arkhedamos, the 
speaker's grandfather. But it is certain that the orphan Apollodoros lived 
with his paternal uncle, Eupolis, for some time until he was taken away 
by his stepfather to live with him, on seeing that he was deprived of his 
patrimony (7.7).  It is probable that the widow and her son either lived 
together in the same household of Eupolis until her remarriage,  or she 
lived in her father's household if he was  still alive,  while Apollodoros 
lived with his uncle. 
As for widows of executed husbands, the evidence indicates that 
they  immediately moved out of their marital homes  to  live  with their 
families of origin as  soon as  confiscation of their husbands' assets was 
announced. The speaker of  Lysias 19 describes the situation to the jury as 
follows: 
155 "  In all other cases where you have confiscated the property, not 
merely have you had no sale of furniture, but even the doors were tom 
away  from  the  apartments;  whereas  we,  as  soon  as  confiscation  was 
declared and my sister had left the place, posted a guard in the deserted 
house,  in order that neither door-timber nor utensils nor anything  else 
might be lost "(  19 .31). 
In  the  circumstances,  a  widow in  this  kind of situation  would 
necessarily have to leave the  executed spouse's household to  live with 
either her father or a nearest adult male relative. It is significant, at any 
rate, that a widow who later got remarried may have lived in one of four 
'transitional' homes before her remarriage. These 'transitional' homes, as 
have been identified, were the father's household if he was still alive at 
the  time her husband died;  a son's house, if he had attained his age of 
majority; a brother's home, if  the father was dead at the time her husband 
also died; and the deceased husband's household. 
MAINTENANCE AND SUPPORT 
The  status of a widow living with her brother or brothers has 
already been noted. In all legal matters and economic transactions beyond 
a medimnos of  barley (Is. 1  0.1 0) until she got remarried, it was her brother 
or brothers who represented her, as  we find in Lysias  19.  The situation 
was  the  same with widows of executed husbands. As we are informed, 
156 the  assets  of executed men were  confiscated  and  sold  to  people  who 
wanted to buy them.  It appears that confiscated assets comprised farm-
lands, houses and the furniture in them, and all kinds of personal effects 
including utensils.
212  And as  the  dowry of the wife became part of her 
husband's estate for her maintenance, an executed man who had a wife 
had  the  dowry of his  wife  also  confiscated together with his property. 
However, her dowry was treated as a debt that could be set apart from the 
rest of her husband's assets. But in such a situation, either the father of 
the widow or her legal representative, if  her father was dead, had to apply 
to the state for the restitution of  the dowry of  the widow (Lys.19.32). 
It is evident, nevertheless, that Athenian sentimental feelings for 
children  and  wives  might  have  restrained  the  hands  of the  laws  in 
confiscation matters, so that the wives and children of  executed men may 
at least be left something to live on.  Contrasting the leniency of the jury 
with the mercilessness of  his guardians, Demosthenes observes in his first 
speech against his guardians: 
"  They  have  done  away  with  the  will,  thinking  to  avoid 
discovery, their own estates they have administered from the income, and 
have greatly increased their capital by drawing upon my funds, while, as 
for my own estate, they have destroyed my entire capital, as if  in requital 
for some grievous wrong we had done them. You, on your part, do not act 
212  Lys.7.4;19.3l,32,38; M.B.Walbank, , The Confiscation and Sale by the Poletai  in 40211  B.C.ofthe 
157 thus even towards those who sin against you: when you give jUdgement 
against any of them, you do not take away all that they have, but in pity 
for their wives and children you leave something even to these.,,213 
The point of emphasis here is that even when the property of an 
executed husband had been confiscated, some portion of it was left for 
the maintenance of his widow and his orphans. However, a question that 
demands  consideration  is  whether  a  brother  or  a  father  was  legally 
obliged to maintain and support a widowed sister or a widowed daughter. 
Evidence is,  in fact,  lacking in the sources on any father having been 
prosecuted  for  not providing maintenance  and  support  for  a  son  or  a 
daughter;  neither  is  there  any  evidence  of a  brother  sued  for  not 
maintaining and supporting his sister or sisters. 
Even  in  marriage,  a  father  or kyrios  was  under no  statutory 
obligation  to  dower  a  daughter  or  a  sister  in  order  to  guarantee  her 
maintenance. For that matter, the determination of the size of the dowry, 
as  already  noted,  was  within  the  discretion  of the  father  or the  legal 
representative, as a speaker in Demosthenes seems to tell the jury in his 
Against Spudias: 
" For, while he disputes my claim to this sum, he has received not 
less, but more, as will presently be made clear to you. Nay more, even if 
all these statements of his were indeed true, it is not just, I take it, if the 
Property of  the Thirty Tyrants' Hesperia 51(1982),74-98. 
158 la\ys  are  good  for  anything,  that  I  should  lose  the  dowry  which  was 
promised me, or that Polyeuktos, if he chose to give a smaller portion to 
one daughter and a larger to the other, should now be thwarted.,,214 
Isaios  in  his  On  the  Estate  of Kiron  also  informs  us  of the 
speaker's mother who was given a dowry of twenty-five minae including 
raiment  and jewelry by her  father  in  a  first  marriage.  But  when  her 
husband died and she was given in a second marriage, the father gave her 
a  dowry  of one  thousand  drachmae,  which was  less  than  half of the 
amount of  her earlier dowry in her first marriage (8.8-9). 
Thus in general, it would appear that a father or a brother was 
under no  legal  obligation to  support his  ward,  unless  in the  case of a 
brother, his ward was an heir himself. In fact, none of the indictments for 
ill-treatment which have come to us so far in the sources covers the case 
of a father or a brother for neglect of his ward. It stands to reason also 
that there was no express law obliging a father or a brother to maintain 
his widowed daughter or widowed sister. For that matter, there appears to 
be no evidence of a father or a brother prosecuted for not maintaining a 
widowed daughter or a widowed sister. 
Thus, the widow's right to support and maintenance by her kin 
derived  from  convention  or custom rather than  from  any  statute,  and 
213  Dem.27  .64-65. 
214  Dem.41.25-26. 
159 neglect was not penalised by law.  It would indeed appear that once the 
widow's dowry returned to her kyrios  at the  death of her husband  its  , 
legal existence seems to have been at an end.
215  Thus the responsibility of 
her k; 'rios for her maintenance now became independent of  her dowry. In 
this way, the responsibility of her kyrios does not seem to have differed 
from his responsibility before the marriage. Her maintenance, therefore, 
became a matter of  family ties rather than legal responsibilities. 
Nevertheless, if the  widow lived with her adult son,  failing  to 
maintain and support and to give the necessary protection to the widowed 
mother was socially censured or sanctioned. Whether or not the widow's 
dowry returned to him was beside the point. Such behaviour amounted to 
irresponsibility  and  lack  of  empathy  towards  one's  kindred.  The 
consequences could be socially and even politically damaging. It could so 
discredit  a  man in popular opinion that he  could be disqualified from 
speaking  at  the  Assembly or from  appearing  at  certain public  places. 
Furthermore, it could lead to his disqualification at the dokimasia  for  a 
public office in the state. For if one showed irresponsibility and lack of 
empathy  towards  one's own kin,  there  could be no guarantee  that  he 
would  conduct himself creditably  well  or behave responsibly  towards 
.  h  .  1£216  others in the state, and show commItment to testate Itse  . 
215  Cf. Schaps, Economic Rights, p.8l. 
216  Cf.Lys.31.23; Aeschn.l.28. 
160 Significantly, in their speeches litigants most often resorted to 
the  non-legal  argument of highlighting their support for,  and giving in 
marriage  of their sisters  and kinswomen with dowries,  to  demonstrate 
their  commitment  and consciousness  of their  social  responsibilities  to 
their womenkind, in the hope of  affecting the jury in this direction in their 
verdict.  And  although  the  jury was  not  legally  bound  to  accept  such 
arguments, the evidence added no small weight to the overall contention 
of a litigant.  And so  a speaker in Isaios, in order to justify his  and his 
brothers' claim to the estate of  Kleonymos, proclaims to the jury: 
"  If Polyarkhos, the  father of Kleonymos  and our grandfather, 
were  alive and lacked the necessities of life,  or if Kleonymos had died 
leaving  daughters  unprovided  for,  we  should  have  been  obliged  on 
grounds of affinity to support our grandfather, and either ourselves marry 
Kleonymos'  daughters or else provide dowries and find other husbands 
for them - the claims of kinship, the laws, and public opinion in Athens 
would  have  forced  us  to  do  this  or  else  become  liable  to  heavy 
punishment and extreme disgrace - but now that property has been left, 
h  ld '  h  .  . ?,,217  will you regard it as just that others, rather than we, s  ou  In  erIt It. 
Thus, in the case of  their grandfather, the law compelling sons to 
support their parents would have punished the speaker and his brothers if 
217  Is.1.39. 
161 the grandfather were alive and was not supported by them. But in the case 
of Kleonymos'  daughters  who  are  their  cousins,  the  natural  bond  of 
kinship and public opinion would have compelled him and his brothers 
either themselves to marry the daughters of Kleonymos or give them in 
marriage  with  dowries  if Kleonymos  had  died  leaving  the  daughters 
unprovided for. Another speaker in Isaios also shows his and his brother's 
moral duties to their sisters in the following words: 
..  My father, gentlemen, Eponymos of Achamae, was a friend and 
close acquaintance of  Menekles and lived on terms of  intimacy with him; 
there  were  four  of us  children,  two  sons  and two  daughters.  After my 
father's  death we married our elder sister, when she reached a suitable 
age,  to  Leukolophos, giving her a dowry of twenty minae. Four or five 
years  later,  when  our younger  sister was  almost  of marriageable  age, 
Menekles lost his first wife. When he had carried out the customary rites 
over her,  he  asked for  our sister in marriage, ...  we  gave  her to  him in 
marriage  - not  dowerless,  as  my  opponent  asserts  on  every  possible 
occasion,  but  with  the  same  portion  as  we  gave  to  our  elder 
sister ...  Having thus settled our sisters, gentlemen, and, being ourselves of 
military age, we adopted the career of  a soldier and went abroad" (2.3-6). 
Furthermore, in Lysias 19, the speaker refers not only to his care 
of  his widowed sister's daughters but also his support and maintenance of 
his sister as well (19.33). The atrocities of  the Thirty Tyrants are also said 
162 to have left some sisters unwedded (Lys.13.45). In fact, what the speaker 
implies  here  is  that  orphaned  sisters  whose  brothers  would  have 
demonstrated their moral obligations to them by giving them in marriage 
and dowering them remained unmarried because their brothers had either 
been forced into exile or executed by the Thirty Tyrants. The speaker of 
Isaios lIOn the Estate of  Hagnias also shows his avowed commitment to 
the  children of his deceased brother and his efficient administration of 
their estate in the following words: 
" Gentlemen, I would admit myself to be the basest of all men, 
if it could be shown that the affairs of Stratokles were left in a state of 
embarrassment  at  his  death  and  that  I,  being  myself  in  easy 
circumstances, gave not a thought to his children. But if he left them a 
fortune more considerable and better secured than my own and sufficient 
to  endow his daughters fittingly without sensibly diminishing his son's 
wealth,  and if I  am so managing the property as  greatly to  increase it, 
surely I cannot reasonably be blamed for not giving them my own money 
as well; I rather deserve to be praised for preserving and increasing their 
fortune" (11.38-39). 
Support for  a  sister is  also  reflected in cases  where we  find  a 
brother suing  on behalf of his  widowed sister,  as  in Lysias  19.8,9.  A 
brother  could  also  demonstrate  his  support  for  her sister by decrying 
hybristic behaviour in the form of either physical assault, sexual abuse or 
163 verbal abuse laced with sexual innuendo against his widowed sister and 
her daughters, or against his sister and widowed mother.  218 
Showing concern for  the material welfare of a  sister was  also 
another aspect of support that a brother could give to her. Demosthenes, 
in  his  Against  Onetor  contends  that  the  chief aim  in  contracting  a 
marriage  for  a  sister or daughter is  to  give her the  greatest amount of 
security: 
" No man, in concluding a transaction of such importance, I will 
not say with such a man as Aphobos, but with anybody whatever, would 
have  acted  without  a  witness.  This  is  the  reason  why  we  celebrate 
marriage-feasts  and  call  together  our  closest  friends  and  relations, 
because we are dealing with no little affair, but are entrusting to the care 
of others the lives of our sisters and daughters,  for whom we seek the 
greatest possible security" (30.21). 
On the basis of this concept of marriage, the orator laments that 
because Aphobos and his co-trustees have defrauded him and his sister, 
she would not have a good marriage apparently because he would not be 
able to give her a deserving dowry to guarantee her security and welfare 
on account of his limited resources.
219 We may also note the uneasiness 
evident in the speech of  the speaker of  Lysias 19 about the confiscation of 
218  Lys.3.6-7,29; Dem.21.78-79; 24.202-203; 25.55; 57.38-39. 
219  Cf. Dem.27.65; 28.21. 
164 his  widowed  sister's  dowry,  along  with  her  late  husband's  property, 
which was needed to care for her and her daughters (19.32-33). 
Fathers  are  also  seen  severally  extolled  for  demonstrating 
awareness of their filial duties to their sons and daughters by contracting 
marriages for them and giving attractive dowries to their daughters. The 
list of instances for such filial gestures could be inexhaustible?20 And in 
contracting  marriages  for  their wards,  we  are  informed that  particular 
concern was shown by fathers for their wards' welfare by marrying sons 
and  daughters  not  just  into  wealthy  families  but  into  well-behaved 
ones?21 
The moral or societal sanctions against maltreatment or neglect 
of support and maintenance for a ward or a sister were usually reflected 
in situations where litigants slandered their opponents for  irresponsible 
conduct towards their kindred; as can be seen in Isaios 11: 
" I notice, gentlemen, that most of his speech is taken up with a 
discussion  of my  fortune  and  that  of the  child;  he  represents  the 
circumstances of the  child as  embarrassed, while he attributes to  me a 
position of  wealth and accuses me of  baseness on the ground that I cannot 
bring myself to provide any of the four daughters of Stratokles with a 
220  See for instance, Is.8.7-8;11.39; Lys.19.14-15;32.6; Dem.27.5.28.15-16;29.43;40.6-7,20-22,56-57. 
221  Lys.19.15-17. 
165 dowry,  although,  according to  his  account,  I  am in possession of the 
child's property." 222 
Here,  we  see  the  obvious  reproach  in  the  account  of the 
speaker's opponent, as noted by the speaker himself, that the speaker is 
living  in wealth but sits unconcerned while his  deceased brother's son 
and  daughters are not only in destitution but also the  daughters remain 
unmarried  and  undowered.  This  is  the  charge  the  speaker  rebuts  in 
sections  38-39  quoted  above.  The  irresponsible  conduct  of Diokles 
against his sisters and their husbands as  told the jury by the speaker of 
Isaios 8 may also be noted: 
" If you understood the impudence of Diokles and his behaviour 
on all other occasions, you would have no difficulty in believing anything 
in my story. For the fortune which he makes such a brave show, is not 
really his; for when his three half-sisters, the children of  his mother, were 
left heiresses, he represented himself as the adopted son of their father, 
though the latter left no will to this effect. When the husbands of two of 
the  sisters tried to  obtain possession of their fortune, he imprisoned the 
husband of the elder of  them by walling him Up223  and by a plot deprived 
222  Is.ll.37. 
223  The meaning of  the expression' he imprisoned  ...  by walling him up' is not clear.  ~ut  Wys~, p.62.1, 
and Forster, !saeus, LeL, p.316-317, n.a, suggest that Diokles may possibly have forcIbly  ~etamed  hIS 
brother-in-law, making it impossible for him to perform some state duty and thus caused hIS 
disenfranchisement. 
166 him of  his civic rights, and though he was indicted for outrage he has not 
yet  been punished.  As for the husband of the next sister,  he  ordered a 
slave to kill him and smuggled away the murderer, and then threw the 
guilt upon his sister, and having terrified her by his abominable conduct 
he has robbed her son, whose guardian he became, of his property, and is 
still  in  possession  of his  land  and  has  only  given  him  some  stony 
ground.  ,,224 
It is  also  noteworthy to mention the  shameful behaviour of Diogeiton 
towards  his  widowed daughter and her children,  which the  speaker of 
L  ysias 32 recounts and uses to his advantage at the trial. 
It  becomes  apparent  from  the  foregoing  discussion  that, 
although fathers  and brothers were under no legal obligation to  support 
and maintain their daughters or sisters, whether or not they were widows, 
the  bond of kinship,  convention and  societal  reproach with damaging 
socio-political consequences were enough sanctions to compel Athenian 
fathers and brothers to maintain and support their unfortunate womenfolk. 
THE WIDOW AND HER REMARRIAGE 
It may be interesting to note that more than fifty instances of 
remarriage  can be cited in the orators and other literary sources in the 
fifth  and  fourth  centuries;  and that  there  are  many  examples  with  an 
224  8.40-42.Cf. also Lys.31.20-23. 
167 ·  .  b  f  I  225  ImpreSSIve num  er 0  c usters.  From Demosthenes 57, for instance, it 
is evident that no fewer than five of  the speaker's ancestors remarried: his 
grandfather,  his  mother,  his  mother's  first  husband,  his  father's 
grandfather. and his father's grandmother (57.20,37,40-41). The speaker 
of Isaios  8  also  mentions  to  the  jury three  instances  of a  remarriage 
cluster  (8.7-8,40).  In  fact,  several  clusters  and  other  examples  of 
remarriage can be found in the sources. 
Thus, remarriage was a  significant feature  in Athenian family 
life.  It  may  therefore  not be  surprising  that  several  Athenian  widows 
remarried after the decease of  their spouses. In modern Greece, Italy, and 
Spain, twice as many widowers marry as widows, but in ancient Athens, 
the  reverse  was  the  situation.
226  Among  the  Akans  in  Ghana,  it  is  a 
customary law that a widower or a widow must wear black clothes
227 for 
a period of one year after which the  clothes are discarded.  During this 
period  of one  year,  the  widow  is  expected  to  live  in  her  deceased 
husband's house and be maintained by his heir who may either be her 
husband's brother or his nephew. Of course, her son could playa role in 
her maintenance, but that has no legal  implications.  At the  end of the 
225  Cf. W. E Thompson, (a) 'The Prosopography of  Demosthenes, LVII' AJP 92(1971),89-91; 
(b) 'Athenian Marriage Patterns: Remarriage' CSCA 5(l972),211-225,esp.211. 
226  See Thompson, CSCA 5(l972),221,n.52,223,n.59. 
227  Cf. also 1s.4.7 where wearing black as a sign ofmouming is mentioned as a funeral practice in 
ancient Athens. 
168 year, annual and final funeral rites are observed for the deceased, and the 
widow is given a ritual bath and purification. 
To the Akans, as well as the other tribes of  Ghana, the death of a 
spouse  involves  religious  pollution  and  therefore  requires  expiation. 
Thus, one year after the decease and final funeral rites of  her husband  the  , 
Akan widow has not only to be purified of the pollution or abomination 
that has afflicted her as a result of the death of her husband, but she in 
tum has to purify her community of the pollution. After the purification 
rites the widow is expected to wear white clothes on that day.  She could 
also wear any kind of clothes for the rest of her life, unless of course on 
other  funeral  days when she might wear mourning clothes.  It is  worth 
noting  that  a  widower is  also  required to  undergo  the  same  rituals  to 
purify him of  the pollution of  death. 
At  a  family  council  of members  of her  natal  and  deceased 
husband's families after the final funeral rites, the Akan widow is given 
three options of decision regarding her future life. In the first place, she 
has the choice to remain in widowhood in her dead husband's house until 
she also dies. Secondly, unless otherwise constrained by a canon law, as 
in the  case of marriage in the church, or a legal rule as  with registered 
marriages, she could be remarried to the deceased husband's heir, who as 
noted already, may be the deceased's brother or nephew; but most often 
169 the nephew of  the deceased. She could, however, tum down remarriage to 
the deceased's heir, even if  the heir so wishes to marry her. 
Finally, the widow could decide to return to her natural family. If 
she decides to return to her kin, the marriage is formally terminated, and 
the widow leaves the dead spouse's house for that of her kin after which 
she  could  get  remarried.  As  to  when her  second  marriage  could  take 
place,  the  circumstances  vary  from  widow  to  widow;  and  the  waiting 
period  could  be longer or shorter.  In the  traditional  set-up  where  the 
majority of  the marriages are customary ones, all the four options apply. 
It may be interesting to note, however, that the family meeting 
and the widow's options seem to depend on the kind of ties between the 
wife and her husband's relatives. If there is cordial relationship between 
the woman and her husband's kindred, the widow is given the options to 
decide  as  she  wishes.  But if there  is  any kind of strained relationship 
between her and the husband's kindred, sometimes the widow is forced 
out  of her husband's house by his  relatives  in most Akan societies  in 
Ghana,  either immediately the  decease  takes  place,  or as  soon  as  the 
annual and final funeral rites are performed and the widow is purified. It 
is  only about a  decade ago  that widows in the  Ghanaian society were 
f  h  1  '1'  ,228  given some kind of  protection by a law 0  t  east mI Itary regIme. 
170 With regard to the ancient Athenian widow, however, it appears 
that she had no such widowhood rites to go through. She could, in fact, 
leave her defunct husband's house for her kin's household as soon as her 
husband  was  dead.  But like  her Ghanaian  counterpart,  several  factors 
could  prolong  or  shorten  her  period  in  transition,  and  much remains 
uncertain about the precise time  she had to  wait until  she  got married 
again  after  going  back to  her kindred.  The  Athenian  widower's  case 
appears  definite.  A  speaker of Isaios informs us  that a  widower could 
remarry as soon as the customary rites of  his deceased wife were over: 
" After my father's death we married our sister, when she had 
reached a  suitable age,  to  Leukolophos,  giving her a  dowry of twenty 
minae.  Four or five years later, when our younger sister was almost of 
marriageable age, Menekles lost his first wife. When he had carried out 
the  customary  rites  over  her,  he  asked  for  our  sister  in  marriage, ... 
Knowing  that our father would have given her to  no one with greater 
pleasure, we gave her to him in marriage "  (2.4-5).  It is most probable 
also that the remarriage of  the speaker's grandfather in Isaios 8 may have 
taken place not long after the death of his wife,  since the woman died 
leaving her husband with a young daughter (8.7). The Athenian widower 
could therefore terminate his widowhood soon after the death of  his wife. 
228  Intestate Succession Law, PNDC Law 111, 1985. Some of  the issues raised in this law concerning 
the widow will be discussed in the chapter on the Athenian widow and ownership of  property. 
171 But the case of the widow seems different. Like her Ghanaian 
counterpart, the interval between death of husband and remarriage could 
be  longer  or shortec  but unlike  the  Ghanaian  situation,  the  Athenian 
widow was not constrained by custom to  remain in widowhood in her 
deceased husband's household for a year before deciding about her future 
married life. The remarriage of  the Athenian widow was also conditioned 
by  three  main  circumstances.  In  the  first  place,  her  early  or  late 
remarriage was influenced in no small way by the age of  the widow at the 
time  of her  husband's  death.  There  is  also  the  question  of  what 
provisions, if any, had been made by the widow's deceased husband in 
his  will regarding her future  marriage life.  The widow's own financial 
background  also  could  either  attract  or  deter  a  prospective  second 
husband. In fact, there is evidence suggesting that in general, women with 
very  wealthy backgrounds  could be very  competitive  on the  marriage 
market, and attracted prospective husbands; though it was not every man 
who made financial consideration a priority in his choice of  a wife?29 
The  case  of  Kleoboule  comes  to  mind  again  regarding 
testamentary arrangements made by husbands about the future marriage 
life  of their widows.  It is most probable that if Aphobos to  whom the 
elder Demosthenes had betrothed his wife in a second marriage after his 
death (Dem.27.5,28.16), had lived up to his responsibilities (Dem.27.15), 
172 her  remarriage  to  Aphobos  would  have  materialised  in  no  time,  as 
arranged  for  her  by  her  deceased  husband,  since,  according  to 
Demosthenes  the  orator,  Aphobos  moved  to  live  in  their  house 
immediately after the death of  the elder Demosthenes (Dem.27 .13,16). 
We may also cite the case of the widow of Pasion noted above. 
Pasion,  as  we  know,  had  betrothed  his  wife  Arkhippe  in  a  second 
marriage after his death to Phormion, with a substantial amount of dowry 
of three  talents  and fifty  minae, partly derived from  a tenement house 
(Dem.36.8;45.28).  The sources indicate that Arkhippe  got remarried to 
Phormion a year after the death of  Pasion and bore him two sons.230 Even 
so,  the  available  evidence  seems  to  suggest  that  the  remarriage  of 
Arkhippe  to  Phormion would have taken place soon after the death of 
Pasion  but  for  the  attitude  of her  son  Apollodoros  who  persistently 
objected to the arranged marriage for his mother (Dem.36.8-9;45.3;53.9). 
It is  not  surprising,  that  the  remarriage  could  take  place  only  when 
Apollodoros was away on an expedition to Sicily (Dem.45.3 ;46.20-1). 
Age as a determining factor for the early or late remarriage of a 
widow  is  reflected  in  a  speech  of Demosthenes,(Dem.30),  where  the 
orator himself sues Onetor, the brother-in-law of Aphobos, and seeks to 
eject him from a piece of land. In this speech, Demosthenes implies in a 
passage that a young widow could be remarried so quickly that her kyrios 
229 
Lys.19.14. 
173 might not have time to amass her dowry for immediate payment (30.11). 
Then  elsewhere  in  the  same  speech,(30.33),  the  orator  implies  that  a 
young  woman,  whether widowed or divorced,  would not remain  long 
before getting remarried if  she was a wealthy woman: 
" Besides all  this, men of the jury, there is  strong evidence from 
which it is  easy to see that the woman in reality continued to  live with 
Aphobos  and even up to the present day has not separated from him. In 
fact, this woman, before she came to Aphobos, was not unwedded for one 
single  day,  but  left  her  husband  Timokrates,  to  come  and  live  with 
Aphobos;  and now during  the  space  of three years  she  has  manifestly 
married no one else. Can anyone believe that she then went directly from 
husband to husband, in order to  avoid living as  a widow, but that now, 
supposing  she has really left her husband,  she  would have  endured to 
remain a widow for so long when she might have married someone else, 
seeing that her brother possessed so large a fortune, and she herself was 
so young?"(30.33). 
We may compare the following also in his Against Stephanos I : 
" If Phormion had been poor, and it had been our fortune to be 
wealthy, and if, in the course of  nature, anything had happened to me, this 
fellow's  (Phormion's)  sons  would  have  claimed  my  daughters  in 
marriage ...  for they are their uncles since the man married my mother; but 
230  Dem.45.75; Davies,  APF, p.435. 
174 seeing that it is we who are poor, he will not help to portion them off.,,231 
And in his speech against Neaera, Demosthenes observes: 
" For the property of Apollodoros did not amount to as much as 
three talents to enable him to pay in full a fine of  such magnitude, yet if  it 
were not paid by the ninth prytany the fine would have been doubled and 
Apollodoros  would have been inscribed  as  owing  thirty  talents  to  the 
treasury,  all  the  property  that  he  has  would  have  been  scheduled  as 
belonging to the state, and upon its being sold Apollodoros himself and 
his  children  and  his  wife  and  all  of us  would have  been  reduced  to 
extremest  distress. And more than this, his other daughter would never 
have been given in marriage; for who would ever have taken to  wife a 
portionless  girl  from  a  father  who  was  a  debtor  to  the  treasury  and 
without resources? "(59.7-8). 
Thus,  it is  apparent that  where provision had been made  for  a 
second marriage for her in the deceased husband's will, the widow under 
normal circumstances would not need to join the  queue for remarriage. 
She could get remarried as soon as the husband was dead, as arranged for 
her in his will. And if she was a young widow, or she had a very strong 
financial background, she might not need to remain unmarried for a long 
231  Dem. 45.75. Cf. also Lys.19.14. 
175 period of time in the marriage market at the death of her husband before 
she got married again to another man. 
COULD THE WIDOW PLAY  A ROLE IN HER REMARRIAGE? 
A law in Demosthenes states categorically who in the Athenian 
family  had the legal right to  give a  woman in marriage,  or who could 
legally take a woman for his wife.  The law reads: " Hv a €yyurl<Jl]  €nt 
8tKUlotC;  bUf.lap'ta El vat 1'\  na't1lP 11  dbEA<pOC;  6f.lonu'tcop  l1nunnoc; 6 
npoc;  na'tp6c;,  €K  'taD'tllC;  Elvat na1bac;  YVll<J10UC;.  €UV  bE  f.lllbEtC;  lj 
10D1COV,  €UV  f.lEV  €n1KAllP6C;  'ttC;  lj,  'tOY  KDptOV  ~XEtV, €UV  bE  f.l1l  lj, 
01~ dv €nt'tpE\Vl], 'toO'tOV KDptoV Elvat. 
" If a woman is betrothed for a lawful marriage by her father or 
by a brother born of  the same father or by her grandfather on her father's 
side,  her children shall be legitimate. But in case there is none of these 
relatives, if the woman is an heiress, her guardian shall take her to wife, 
and if  she is not, that man shall be her guardian to whom he entrusts her." 
(Dem.46.18) 
This law, as noted above, states which persons in the Athenian 
family should be guardians and therefore have the right to give a woman 
in marriage. None the less, it is argued by Wolff that there seems to be no 
statutory definition of  lawful marriage in Athens, and that this law which 
176 puts  a  distinguishing  mark  on  marital  unions  established  with  the 
observance  of the  formalities,  does  not  deal  with  the  conception  of 
marriage, but with the status of  sons.
232 That the law deals with the status 
of sons  is very certain.  On the question of legal marriage,  however,  it 
seems  to  me that Wolff fails  to  realise the full  impact of the law.  The 
legal concept of marriage is, in fact, implicit in the law; as the following 
phrase testifies: "Hv dv EYYUrlO"lJ  E1tt  8tKatOt~ 8uJ.lap-ra Elvat': " If a 
woman is betrothed for a lawful marriage." 
I therefore think that the established legal union is the antecedent 
of the status of sons. For it is on the basis of the legality of the marital 
union, established through the recognised formal procedures of marriage 
preceded by EYYDll  (betrothal), that the sons shall be legitimate. This is 
what Demosthenes means in a passage where he distinguishes between a 
man's own children and an adopted son. He says to the jury: 
"  Surely, when he says  'lawfully born and rightfully established 
according to the statute,' he is quibbling and defying the laws.  For the 
'lawfully born'  exists,  when it is born of the body;  and the  law bears 
testimony to this, when it says,  'Lawfully born are children of a woman 
whom her father or brother or grandfather has given in marriage' (llv  uv 
232  See Wolff, Traditio 2(1944),75. 
177 ')'V1lO"LOUS).  But  'rightfully  established'  the  lawgiver  understood  of 
adoptions, considering that when a man, being childless and master of  his 
property, adopts a son, this action ought to be rightful" (Dem.44.49). We 
may  cite  also  Isaios  6.64-65  where  marriage  is  given  as  an  essential 
indicator of  legitimacy. 
Thus  by  extension,  the  lack  or  absence  of the  recognised 
formalities by the procedure of  E)')'U1l renders any cohabitation unlawful, 
or  illegitimate,  and  therefore  makes  children  born  in  the  union 
illegitimate. Lacey233  is right on the ambiguity posed by the phrase, O'T4> 
dv f:1tl'tPE\VlJ,  'toO'tOV  KOptOV  Elvat; and his views on the  translation 
given  are  noteworthy.  But I  think that  this  law in its  entirety  defines 
clearly  what was  a  legal  marriage.  The  status of sons  is  therefore  the 
corollary  of the  established legal  union.  One  other law that  seems  to 
complement Dem.46.18, and to reaffirm the legal concept of marriage is 
the one on intestate succession cited in Dem.43.51. It is quoted in Isaios 
6.47,  seeking  to  exclude  a  son  of an  unlawful  marriage  from  any 
succession in his father's family either directly or collaterally, and barring 
him from any other family rights. The relevant section of  the law reads: 
233  See Family,p.283,note 21. 
178 "  But no illegitimate  son or daughter  shall  enjoy the  rights  of 
legitimate kinship, neither with respect to matters of public religion nor 
with respect to domestic relations, from the time of  the archon Euklides." 
We may note also Isaios 3.8-10 that seeks to define a legal marriage and 
its implications. 
It is agreed that the Greek language did not do much to clarify 
the  definition of marriage, as admitted by Aristotle in his discussion of 
the composition of the household (Pol. 1253b9). But as Just rightly points 
out (Women, p.43), an institutionalised relationship does not depend on a 
term for  its  definition or its  existence. Of course,  there could be some 
degree  of ambiguity  or  uncertainty  about  the  precise  nature  of the 
implications  of £yy011.  Furthermore,  we find  no evidence of any legal 
action to compel either the family of the bride or that of the bridegroom 
to  go through the procedure of £yy011.  Moreover, it is not easy to define 
which  further  step  was  needed  to  convert  £YY011  into  full  marriage 
(Harrison,  Law,  p.6-7).  Nevertheless,  the  importance  of marriage  by 
8yy011 within the social structure of  Athens is obvious. 
Significantly, the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate 
children, and their rights of  citizenship and inheritance in the city and the 
family  is  based on marriage by  E'Y'YU'T)  as  is  manifest  in Dem.46.18; 
43.51; and Is.6.47, noted above. Moreover, it appears that strict standards 
179 of propriety were attached to marriage by £YYU11  which did not apply to 
other forms of relationship, to underline the moral as well as  the legal 
distinction between a legitimate wife and other women. This distinction is 
clear in the words of  the speaker of  Isaios 3: 
" That the woman, whom the defendant has deposed that he gave 
in legal marriage to our uncle (ou'toe; 8yyul1(jat 8KEt  v~), was a courtesan 
(t-ralpa liv) who gave herself to anyone and not his wife (Kat 00 yuvll), 
has  been  testified  to  you  by  the  other  acquaintances  and  by  the 
neighbours of Pyrrhos, who have given evidence of quarrels, serenades, 
and frequent scenes of disorder which the defendant's sister occasioned 
whenever  she  was  at  Pyrrhos'  house.  Yet no  one,  I  presume,  would 
serenade a married woman (Kat  'tOt 00 8rl1toU yE  81tt yaf.!E'tUe; yuvctlKae; 
o08Ete; d v Kill f.!ct~Et  v lOAf.! rl (jEtEV ." (3.13 -14) 
The same distinction is echoed in 3.39, where the speaker says: 
" Even those who give their women to others as mistresses make 
stipulations in advance as to the benefits which such women are to enjoy. 
And was Nikodemos, when, according to his own account, he was going 
to  give  his  sister  in  marriage,  content  with  simply  securing  the 
requirements of  a legal marriage?" 
With regards to the second marriage of the widow at the death of 
her husband, Lacey claims that the woman could make a  choice as  to 
180 \vhom she would like to be married to if  her husband died: "In the choice 
of their  second  husbands  widows  were  certainly  sometimes  able  to 
exercise some element of choice.,,234 Lacey's view is given credence by 
Andersen in his examination of  Perikles' funeral speech, and he uses it to 
establish his own thesis that" widows were not so smoothly adapted to 
Athenian norms and ideals for women.  ,,235 
Lacey's  view  certainly  seems  to  undercut  the  principle  and 
procedures of betrothing and giving in marriage of the Athenian woman, 
or  contracting marriage for  her by her father or legal representative.  It 
also  seeks  to  take  away  the  right  or  authority  of the  father  or  legal 
representative  given to  him by the law in Dem.46.18  to  exercise  such 
authority by marrying off  his female ward, just as a father would look for 
a wife for his son.236  If the widow had a choice in her second marriage, 
she  could  as  well  exercise  the  same  element  of choice  in  her  first 
marriage.  But as we know, an Athenian woman did not marry but was 
given in marriage; and her consent was not necessarily required, neither 
did she know that she was going to get married. 
Also, she was not necessarily expected by law to be present when 
the  actual  marriage  contract  was  taking  place.237  Thus,  like  her  first 
marriage, the widow had no active part to play in the contraction of her 
234  Lacey, Family, p.108. 
235  Andersen, SO 62(1987),43. 
236 
Cf. Is.2.18. 
181 second  marriage.  What  she  did  was  to  move  into  her new  husband's 
household after the contraction of her marriage by her father or whoever 
had the legal authority over her, and begin to exercise her role as a wife. 
It is  instructive that this used to be the practice in Ghana, but now the 
consent of the Ghanaian woman is  always sought by her parents before 
the  marriage rites  about her are  performed, though her presence is  not 
necessarily required when the rites are taking place. 
The alleged attitude of the widow cited by Lacey in Hyperides 
sits oddly with the idea of choice. The evidence is that in the indictment 
against  Lykophron  for  an  alleged  adultery  with  the  woman,  the 
prosecutors  argue  that the woman had sworn that she  would refuse  to 
have intercourse with her husband to whom her brother had given her in 
marriage because she had promised herself to her alleged lover (Lyk,1.7). 
It is  important to note that the widow's refusal to have coition with her 
second husband to whom she had been given in marriage is not quite the 
same thing as refusal to marry, which would imply her making a choice 
of her own. As is evident, the second marriage of the young widow had 
certainly been contracted for her already by her brother. But the woman 
would not carry out her marital obligation of  coition with her husband. 
It may be possible that at the private level the widow may have 
expressed  some  reservations  about  her  marriage;  for,  as  noted  by 
237  Sealey, Women, p.25; MacDowell, Law, p.86. 
182 Harrison,23S  at  the  private  level  the  woman  could  try  to  play  on  the 
feelings  of her kyrios if she  found the proposed match distasteful.  The 
alleged refusal of  the woman to play her marital role, which in fact might 
give cause for suspicion of adultery, may therefore have been a calculated 
pressure  from  the  woman to  demonstrate her distaste  for  the  marriage 
despite the consequences of her action.239  As Cox has recently noted,240 
the chastity of a woman in Athens was indispensable to the honour of  her 
family of  marriage, and, therefore, she could gain leverage by threatening 
to trespass against chastity. 
But this was at the private level of her husband's household, and 
would not imply a choice of  husband in her marriage. The marriage after 
all  had  already  been  arranged  and  formalised  for  her  by  the  person 
exercising legal authority over her. However, if this is taken as a choice, 
then  it  is  indeed  an  unprecedented  choice.  And how  many  Athenian 
widows would want to use this procedure as  a means to make a choice 
between husbands, anyway? I would rather hold that this widow's case is 
an obvious instance of  a widow given in marriage against her will. 
Kleoboule's case, which Lacey cites, also appears problematic. I 
have argued elsewhere in the section on The Classical Athenian Widow in 
Law  and  Society,  against  Hunter's  imputation  that  Kleoboule's 
238  Law (i),p.12. 
239  On the consequences of  adultery to a wife, see Dem.59.87. 
240 
Household, p.69. 
183 \vidowhood  in  her husband's house  came  as  a  default.  Hunter  argues 
against the general opinion that at the death of  her husband a woman had 
the  choice of remaining in her husband's oikos , or of returning to  her 
natal family; and claims that there is not a single example of a widow of 
childbearing age who chose or was allowed to  choose to  remain in her 
husband's  house,  and  that  even  Kleoboule' s  case  came  by  default 
(JFHJ 989,p.298). My point is that Hunter fails  to  state whether it was 
Aphobos who defaulted on Kleoboule or vice versa, and that whether or 
not  it  was  by  default  the  conventional  right  of choice  between  the 
husband's  household in  widowhood and  the  natal  family  must not be 
ruled out. I would further hold that this conventional right of choice does 
not imply a choice between husbands in the woman's marriage. 
Demosthenes'  statement about his mother (Dem.29.26) which 
Lacey  takes  to  be  her right  of choice  in  her  second  marriage  makes 
Kleoboule's  case  even  more  curious  and  paradoxical.  Lacey's  own 
presentation of the case reflects the paradox.
241  Of course, Demosthenes 
creates the impression in 29.26 that it was his mother who decided to live 
in  widowhood.  But  throughout  all  his  three  speeches  against  his 
guardians Demosthenes persistently claims that Aphobos rather did not 
live up to his responsibilities to Kleoboule, but had married the daughter 
241  Family, p.l08. 
184 of Philonides of Melite.242  The paradox is even made more complex by 
the  spat  between  Kleoboule  and  Aphobos.  But,  as  rightly  noted  by 
Hunter, it is difficult to say what the precise nature of this quarrel was, 
and  any  reconstruction  of  the  evidence  regarding  the  quarrel  is 
complicated by the  fact  that the  whole  family  appeared to  have  come 
together  to  protect Demosthenes'  patrimony from  state  confiscation to 
defray the debt owed to the state by his grandfather Gylon.243 
In any case, it would appear that the  onus of blame lay with 
Aphobos.  For the  evidence  seems to  suggest that,  if Aphobos had not 
been  the  rapacious  man  that  he  became,  and  had  lived  up  to  his 
responsibilities  to  Kleoboule  by  providing  for  her  support  and 
maintenance,  their  marriage  would  certainly  have  materialised  as 
arranged for them by Demosthenes' father in his will. Kleoboule would 
have had no option but to acquiesce to the marriage. Her case does not 
therefore give a definite evidence for a widow exercising some element 
of choice in her second marriage. 
The case of  Diodotos' widow in Lysias 32 comes to mind again. 
The widow, as we are informed, got remarried (32.8) and thus moved to a 
new oikos and a  second family.  But under what circumstances was the 
second  marriage  contracted?  In  point  of  fact,  the  subsequent 
developments after her husband's death seem to suggest that, but for the 
242  Dem.27.l5,56;28.l1;29.48. Cf. also Hunter, EMC 33(1989),40-41; Cox, Household, p.l47. 
185 dubious motives of her father she would most probably have chosen to 
live in her husband's household with her children until she also died. 
The husband's wealth and the provisions he had made for her 
and  the  children  would  have  been  enough  to  sustain  them  in  his 
household. According to the sources, Diodotos had amassed considerable 
wealth by trade,  and his  property on his  death totalled  approximately 
fifteen talents, twenty-eight minae?44 Before he set out on his campaign, 
Diodotos had charged his brother Diogeiton to  support his family from 
his  estate, and to provide a dowry of a talent each for his wife and her 
daughter,  and also  to  give  to  his  wife the  contents  of the  room if he 
should perish in the expedition?45 In addition, Diodotos bequeathed to his 
wife twenty minae and thirty Cyzicus staters (32.6-7); and Demosthenes 
2.+6  informs us that the Cyzicene stater was worth there twenty-eight Attic 
drachmai. These were the arrangements Diodotos made for the support of 
his  wife  and children before setting out on his expedition in which he 
perished. 
But the  account given by the  speaker reveals  that Diogeiton 
plotted mischief and actually executed it against his brother's widow (his 
243  On Gylon's debt see Dem.27.4;28.1-4;Davies,op.cit.p.122; Hunter, ibid. 41,note12. 
244  32.5-6,15. See also Davies, APF, p.152-153; C. Carey, Lysias: Selected Speeches 
(London, 1989),p.205. 
245  32.6. Lamb, LeL, translates Tn  E.V  T<{l  8WI-LUTl.CV as  ' the contents of  the room.' I would have 
preferred ' the things in their bed-chamber', since "the room" makes the location appear rather t~o 
general. But Prof. MacDowell has drawn my attention to the fact that this will be the room inhabIted by 
the wife, as is the situation in Lys.1.9. Cf.also Morgan, , Euphiletos' House: Lys.1' TAPA 
112(1982),115-123,esp.116-117. 
186 own daughter) and her orphaned children of whom he was the uncle and 
grandfather. The speaker informs the jury that when Diogeiton got news 
of  his brother' s death he for a time concealed from his daughter the death 
of her husband,  and took possession of the  legal  documents which the 
deceased had left under seal, alleging that the documents were needed for 
recovering the debts owed to Diodotos (32.7). Then when eventually he 
broke  the  sad  news  to  his  daughter,  and  all  the  funeral  rites  for  the 
deceased had been performed, he let the widow and her children live in 
the  husband's  house  in the  Peiraieus  for  one  year.  But after  the  year 
Diogeiton sent away the children to  live with him in the city, and gave 
their mother in a second marriage when times became hard for them. 
We have no knowledge of how much dowry Diodotos received 
from his brother on the marriage of  his brother's daughter, but we know 
from Diodotos' will that if  he should die in the expedition his wife should 
be dowered with one talent (32.6). None the less, the speaker informs the 
jury that the dowry given to Diodotos' widow in her second marriage was 
a thousand drachmas less than her husband had given her (32.8-9). This 
could be viewed as a kind of injustice done to the widow. For although a 
father had the discretion in deciding how much dowry he would wish to 
give to a daughter on giving her in marriage, at least the widow's dowry 
246  Dem.34.23. Lamb in a footnote to Lys.12.l1,LCL,p.231, states that a stater ofCyzicus was equal to 
28 Attic drachmae. See also Murray's note to Dem.34.23, LCL,p.252. 
187 should have been equal to what her deceased husband had given her in 
his will. 
The circumstances under which she was given in the  second 
marriage too appear suspicious.  Of course, we know that Diogeiton also 
had a wife and children (32.17), though the sources are silent on the state 
of affairs regarding his first wife with whom he had the daughter whom 
he  gave in marriage to Diodotos. Therefore, it would presumably appear 
financially  difficult  for  him  to  maintain  the  three  orphans  and  their 
widowed mother together with his own wife and children. This also might 
probably explain why the widow and her children continued to live in the 
deceased Diodotos' house in the Peiraieus, as Diogeiton may not have got 
adequate accommodation for all of  them in his house in the city. 
These  arguments  of  pressures  of  financial  support  and 
accommodation  for  the  widow and her children on Diogeiton may be 
plausible but not quite convincing. It is significant that if Diogeiton had 
good intentions for his brother's wife and children, and had managed the 
estate in their interest, the vast wealth of Diodotos and the provisions he 
made for his family could certainly have sustained them until the eldest 
son  had reached his majority to take over the  assets left behind by his 
father, and the responsibilities of  maintenance and support for his mother 
and  the  other two children. And as for the question of accommodation, 
one wonders whether the widow and her children could not conveniently 
188 have lived in her husband's oikos in the Peiraieus. And, in any case, what 
happened to Diodotos' house after the children had been taken to the city 
and their mother had been given in the second marriage? 
An interesting feature of the case of Diodotos' widow and her 
father is the manifest sour relationship between father and daughter. Even 
the  main  reason  the  speaker  alleges  to  have  been behind  Diogeiton's 
decision to eventually take the children away to live with him in the city 
and  remarry  off their mother reflects  a  lukewarm attitude  towards  the 
widow and her children: " When at length he informed them of the death, 
and they had done what is customary, they lived for the first year in the 
Peiraieus,  as  all  their provisions  had been left  there.  But when  these 
began  to  give  out,  he  sent up  the  children to  the  city,  and  gave  their 
mother in marriage with a dowry of  five thousand drachmai"(32.8). 
The  situation  suggests  apparent  neglect  of  care  and 
maintenance  for the widow and her children.  The indications therefore, 
are  that,  the  widow  would  probably  have  decided  to  remain  in  her 
husband's oikos and perhaps reared her children there until she also died, 
but for the decision of her father to remarry her. This contention may be 
supported  by the  fact  that  her  deceased  hus  band  betrothed  her  to  no 
particular man in his will, as in the case of Kleoboule and other widows 
in similar situations. But since by Athenian marriage custom and practice 
it  would have been inconceivable for  her as  a  woman to  tum down a 
189 marriage contracted for her by her father, she had to abide by the decision 
of her father, even if  she found the marriage completely against her wish. 
From these  three  cases,  we  notice  a  significant  aspect  of the 
social position of  the Athenian widow. In the organisation of  her own life, 
even  as  an  adult person in the  society,  the  widow as  a  woman by all 
indications  appears  to  be  a  passive  participant,  though  in  certain 
situations she could have the opportunity to make her own choice. This 
social  inertia was particularly reflected in matters of marriage. But this 
culture of passivity might probably have revolved around a fundamental 
family or social concept. That is, just as a wife was expected to obey her 
husband in silence while the children held him in awe and respect/
47  so 
also  was  she  obliged  to  accord  the  same  obedience  in  humility  and 
submissiveness to her father who had the legal power and authority over 
her,248 albeit this legal power might in certain circumstances appear to be 
inherent with overtones of  rigid control and absolute compulsion. 
WHY WOULD THE ATHENIAN WIDOW GET  REMARRIED? 
In Isaios, we learn that public opinion in Athens was against 
the marriage of a man if he was thought to be too old to sire children.  249 
But there appears to be no evidence of a woman who gave offence by 
~7  18  See Dem.59.50-51; Is.2.  . 
248  Cf. T.R. Stevenson, , The Ideal Benefactor and the Father Analogy in Greek and Roman 
Thought' CQ 42( 1992),421-436,esp.428. 
190 getting married when she was considered too old, nor do  we have any 
general warnings nor implied remonstrations about it.  She would in fact, 
be  considered  lucky  if she  got  married  at  an  advanced  age,  because 
naturally her old age would be a disadvantage since many younger girls 
\yould always be on the marriage market. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that  evidence  of older  widows  remarrying  is  yet  to  be  found  in  the 
sources, if  any exists at all. 
However,  in  spite  of the  fact  that  social  pressures  morally 
compelled  Athenian  kinsmen  to  maintain  and  support  their  widowed 
daughters  and  sisters,  the  sources  point  to  several  cases  of younger 
widows who got remarried; some of them more than once as in the case 
of the  widow in Lysias 19.  For instance, of forty-eight widows noted in 
the orators, eighteen out of twenty-five who appear to be still young and 
capable  of  bearing  children  got  remarried  at  the  death  of  their 
husbands?50  The  social  role  of the  woman may have  been one  of the 
factors  for  the  high incidence of remarriage  among  Athenian  widows. 
This social role is evident in the following words of a speaker of Isaios, 
on the alleged intrigues employed by Diokles and his sister to continue to 
keep possession of  the estate of  Kiron: 
249  1s.6.22-24. 
250  Cf.Hunter, JFH 14(1989),294. See also Thompson, CSCA  5(1972),211-225; Golden, Phoenix 
35(1981),316-331; Andersen, SO  62(1987),33-49; Isager, CetM33(1981-82),81-96. 
191 ,- It was to obtain this property that Diokles,  together with his 
sister, carried on his plots for a long time, ever since the death of  Kiron's 
son. For he did not try to find another husband for her, although she was 
still capable of  bearing children for another man" (8.36). 
Here,  the  speaker highlights the  authority and responsibility of 
the father of a woman or her kyrios.  Although we are not told anything 
about the father of Diokles and his sister, this evidence seems to suggest 
that at the time of  his sister's marriage to Kiron, their father was probably 
dead, leaving them as orphans, and Diokles as guardian and kyrios of  his 
sister. And as kyrios he had the authority or power not only to look for a 
husband for his sister, but also to terminate her marriage and give her in a 
second marriage to another man to bear children for him when he realised 
that, though still very young she was not getting children by Kiron after 
the death of  their two sons?51 
But more importantly, the speaker in fact emphasises also what 
was considered as the fundamental virtue and social duty of a woman in 
the  Athenian society; that is, to produce children for her husband. It is 
this  social role of the woman that the  speaker of Demosthenes 59  re-
echoes and re-emphasises when he tells the jury: 
" For this is what living with a woman as one's wife means - to 
have children by her and to introduce the sons to the members of  the clan 
192 and of the deme,  and to betroth the daughters to husbands as one's own. 
Mistresses we keep for the sake of  pleasure, concubines for the daily care 
of our persons, but wives to bear us legitimate children and to be faithful 
guardians of our households" (59.122). Thus, for the basic social role or 
virtue of a woman to bear children for her husband, a widow who was 
still of childbearing age at the death of her husband was expected to get 
married to fulfil her social responsibility to her husband and society. 
Of  equal importance also is the Attic law of succession, which in 
a way made the woman play a dual role in her marriage life.  As noted 
above, though as a daughter of  her father, or as a woman, she herself was 
deprived of the right to receive inheritances, she could in law transmit a 
right  of succession in her own  family  through her  sons  who  were  of 
course  members  of her  husband's  family.  The  Athenian  woman  in 
marriage, therefore fulfilled the dual responsibility of  bearing children for 
her husband to maintain his family, and also for her own natal kin for the 
purpose  of succession in her own family;  thereby meeting  also  family 
expectations since her lineage was also important. This is why, as rightly 
noted by Wolff,252 even after having given birth to a son, the widow was 
not  definitely  bound  to  her  husband's  family  group;  and  it  was  in 
251  For authority of  father or kyrios to tenninate marriage, and grounds for the action see Harrison, 
Law (i), p.38-44; L.Cohn-Haft, , Divorce in Classical Athens' JHS 115(1995),1-14. 
252  Traditio 2(1944),50. 
193 deference of  ethical demands that in the event of  death of  the husband the 
decision to remain or leave his oikos was left to her. 
It is significant that widowhood itself as a condition of life was 
dreaded  in  ancient  Athens;  and  even  those  who  were  alleged  to  have 
chosen the life of a widow, appear to have done so on pain of hardships 
and considerable self-denials and sacrifices. It is not surprising then, that 
whenever a speaker wanted to pull the heartstrings he could revert to the 
topic of  widowhood of  his female kindred. So Demosthenes speaks of  his 
mother  accepting  the  life  of widowhood  for  the  sake  of her  children 
(29.26). In the same vein, Khairestratos the speaker of  Isaios 6, expresses 
fear  that  if his  unworthy  opponents  are  awarded  the  property  of 
Philoktemon, the widow of Khaireas, sister of Philoktemon, might be left 
to  grow  old in widowhood (6.51).  Demosthenes also informs us  that a 
woman could go from husband to husband for the fear that she might be 
left a widow if  she lived permanently with one husband: 
" Can anyone believe that although then she went directly from 
husband to husband, in order to  avoid living as a widow, but that now, 
supposing  she has really left her husband,  she  would have  endured to 
remain a widow for so long when she might have married someone else, 
seeing that her brother possessed so large a fortune,  and she herself was 
so young?" (30.33) 
194 It does appear, therefore, that once an Athenian woman was widowed the 
prospect of growing old unmarried could be an essential factor to raise 
her expectations for remarriage. 
It is not easy to know whether many Athenian women remained 
unmarried in classical Athens.  Not much is  told about  spinsters in the 
sources  probably  because  Athenian  males  lacked  interest  in  non-
reproducing  females.  However,  the  few  references  to  the  plight  of 
unmarried women seem to suggest that spinsterhood was viewed by men 
in Athens as  a disastrous and humiliating fate.  A  speaker of Lysias for 
instance, maintains that one of  the evil consequences of  the reign of  terror 
instituted by the Thirty Tyrants at the end of the Peloponnesian War was 
that women had been robbed of  potential husbands: 
" For they sent many of the citizens into exile with the enemy; 
they  unjustly  put many of them to  death,  and then  deprived  them  of 
burial; many who had full civic rights they excluded from the citizenship; 
and the daughters of  many they debarred from intended marriage"( 12.21). 
We may compare also what the speaker of Lysias  13  says about 
the  atrocities  of the  Thirty,  which  caused  so  much  discomfort  and 
deprivation to both the aged and the youth: 
" You remember also our people here who were haled to prison on 
account of private enmities; and who, having done no harm to the city, 
were  compelled to perish by the most shameful, the most infamous, of 
195 deaths. Some left elderly parents behind them, who were expecting to be 
supported in their old age by their own children and, when they should 
end their days, to be laid by them in their grave;  others left sisters not 
\vedded, and others little children who still required much attention.,,253 
Apollodoros  in  a  speech  of Demosthenes  also  laments  that 
because  of his  poverty  his  daughters  are  doomed  to  grow  old  In 
maidenhood  with  no  one  to  dower  them  (45.74-75).254  And  In 
Aristophanes, the heroine of  Lysistrata who is trying to put an end to war 
also  expresses  the  sorrow  she  feels  for  "  maidens  growing  old in the 
bridal  chambers,,255  because  of the  persistent  wars  which  are  causing 
acute shortage of men in the city. It would thus appear that not only the 
prospect  of growing  old unmarried was  greatly  dreaded,  but  also  the 
general Athenian attitude to  spinsterhood was averse and discouraging. 
The majority of Athenian widows therefore got remarried to avoid living 
the  life  of a  spinster  and  growing  old in  widowhood.  This  situation, 
however, would probably not be the case of  a widow with adult sons. 
Financial  consideration  may  also  have  been  a  factor  for  the 
remarriage of  the Athenian widow. An unmarried woman would certainly 
have been financially dependent on her kin, and one whose relatives were 
253  13.44-46. 
254  d  b  Cf. also Is.6.51 note  a  ave. 
255  Ar. Lys.493. 
196 poor could face destitution and be driven into prostitution, as the jury is 
informed in a speech of  Demosthenes: 
" For as things are now, even if  a girl is poor, the law provides for 
her an  adequate dowry, if nature has endowed her with even moderate 
comeliness; but if through the acquittal of this woman you drag the law 
through the mire and make it of  no effect, then the trade of  the harlot will 
absolutely make its way to the daughters of  citizens, who through poverty 
are unable to marry, and the dignity of free-born women will descend to 
the courtesans, if they are given licence to bear children to whomsoever 
they please, and still share in all the rights and ceremonies and honours in 
the state" (59.113). 
It is a fact that some work was available to women in Athens, it 
was probably scarce and certainly not remunerative, and opportunities for 
paid work within one's own home must have been very limited.
256 At any 
rate,  it is informative that some women did some work to  contribute to 
the family budget. In Xenophon' s Memorabilia, Aristarkhos complains to 
Socrates  that  as  a  result of the  political  turmoil  brought  about by the 
oligarchic  revolution in Athens  several homeless female  relatives have 
moved into his house, and consequently he has to maintain no less than 
fourteen  people.  But  as  a  solution  to  this  financial  strain,  Socrates 
suggests that these relatives must be put to work to make clothes. Though 
197 Aristarkhos,as we are told, is at first reluctant, he subsequently sets his 
womenfolk up in a  wool-working business,  and in the  end they make 
clothes  for  their  own  maintenance  and  also  achieve  great  job 
satisfaction.
257 
It is not possible to assess what proportion of Athenian women 
undertook paid work, or how easy it was for them to find it. Moreover, it 
is  obvious that in the fourth century there was still a stigma attached to 
the  working  woman,  implying  that  any  such  woman  was  an  alien.258 
However, the economic stress which Athens experienced as a result of  the 
Peloponnesian War, and her subsequent loss of empire, would, without 
doubt,  have  caused  an  increase  in  the  number  of women  seeking 
employment of any kind, and some of them, like Aristarkhos' relatives, 
may  have  been  relatively  well-born.  The  situation  is  evident  in  the 
account of  the speaker of  Demosthenes 57: 
" For even if  a nurse is a lowly thing, I do not shun the truth. For 
it is not our being poor that would mark us as wrongdoers, but our not 
being citizens; and the present trial has to do, not with our fortune or our 
money, but with our descent. Many are the servile acts which free  men 
256  Cf.Lacey, Family, p.170-172; Schaps, Economic Rights ,p.18-20; Blundell, Women, p.145; Cox, 
Household, p.152-155. 
257 
Xen. Mem.2.7.1-12. 
258 Dem.57.31. 
198 are  compelled to perform, and for  these they should be pitied, men of 
Athens, rather than be brought also to ruin. For, as I am informed, many 
\yomen have become nurses and labourers at the 100m or in the vineyards 
owing to the misfortunes of the city in those days, women of civic birth, 
too; and many who were poor then are now rich" (57.45). 
Thus, on the strength of the prevailing circumstances, it is not 
surprising that some widows would have taken up some kind of job as 
their contribution to their care and maintenance. Incidentally, at the time 
Demosthenes  57  was  delivered,  the  speaker's mother had been left  a 
\yido\\"  and  was  still  seen  selling  ribbons  in  the  agora  (57.34). 
Aristophanes also informs us of a widowed mother said to be producing 
garments  in great  quantity  and  taking  orders  in advance.
259  However, 
such  economic  ventures  as  a  widow  might  engage  in  may  not  be 
financially rewarding to enable her to live on her own without marrying 
agaIn. 
The  situation of widows  whose  husbands  died  leaving  them 
with children in their minority, as in the case of  Kleoboule in Dem.27-29, 
or the widow of  Euthykrates in Is.9, or Diodotos' widow in Lys.32, could 
be a factor for remarriage. The sons who would still be in their minority 
would certainly not be in a position to support their widowed mothers. 
259  Ar.  Thesm.457-458. 
199 And  a widow's kyrios, if he was married and also had children, might 
certainly find it a heavy sponge on the family's resources if he should 
continue to keep the widow in the house. Therefore, for most kinsmen of 
such widows, the most prudent action would have been to give them in 
second marriages to relieve them of the financial pressures on their own 
families. 
The socio-political aims of marriage in Athens could also urge 
the  father of a widowed daughter, or the brother of a widowed sister to 
give  her  in  a  second  marriage.  For  beside  the  fundamental  aim  of 
marriage  to  produce children, marriage in Athens was  considered as  a 
form of alliance with socio-political groups, and a harmonising agent for 
bringing together acquaintances and feuding families. As Isaios says: 
"  A  convincing proof of their enmity is  the  fact  that,  though 
Eupolis had two daughters and was descended from the same ancestors 
and saw that Apollodoros was possessed of  money, yet he gave neither of 
them to him in marriage. Yet it is generally held that marriages reconcile 
serious animosities not only between relatives but also between ordinary 
acquaintances,  when  they  entrust  one  another  with  what  they  value 
most.,,260 
260  Is.7.l2. 
200 Here.  not only do we see  that  certain marriages  could be  arranged to 
strengthen family bonds and promote the general welfare of the families , 
but  also  the principle of socio-political alliances by marriages  is  quite 
eyident. 
It is significant also that the marriage of Diogeiton'  s daughter 
to  his  brother in Lysias  (32.4-7),  as  well  as  the  intended marriage  of 
Meidylides' daughter to his own brother Arkhiades in (Dem.44.l0), was 
in fact,  also meant to  ally the oikoi of the brothers concerned who held 
joint  property,  and  to  concentrate  the  family  estate  within  the 
households.
261  Thus, the young and childbearing Athenian widow,  like 
any other Athenian female of  marriageable age, was obviously an asset to 
her natal kin for the necessary socio-political links and the deterence of 
feuds.  She would thus in no time be given in marriage by her father or 
nearest adult male relative whenever the occasion arose. 
Above all, a woman's legal and economic rights were severely 
constrained by Athenian custom and law, as noted above. By and large it 
was  her  father,  and  then  her  husband  or  legal  representative  who 
represented  her  in  law  and  in  any  large-scale  economic  venture.  In 
economic transaction for instance, a speaker of  Isaios informs us of  a law 
that seems to forbid a woman to engage in any economic activity beyond 
a certain limit: 
201 ...  Again, if  they declare that Demokhares adopted Aristarkhos(II) 
after the death of Aristarkhos(I), they will likewise be lying. For a minor 
is not allowed to make a will; for the law expressly forbids any child, or 
woman,  to  contract  for  the  disposal  of more  than  a  medimnos  of 
barley"( 1  0.9-1 0). 
It would appear that although we have evidence of women engaging in 
economic transactions,262  technically,  the  law seeks to  forbid  a woman 
from  all  transactions involving large sums. In such ventures she would 
have to be represented by her kyrios. 
The early age at which women married in Athens also certainly 
contributed to maintain and justify her dependence on a man, although as 
a wife  she  had  certain  responsibilities  in  her husband's  household.263 
And, if the woman was of the poorer class, she herself was responsible 
for  domestic production, or worked in the market.264  Thus, although she 
certainly did what her husband told her,  she must no doubt have some 
sense of  her own capabilities. And at the death of  her husband, she might 
probably wish for more independence by living on her own. 
But  there  was  also  the  suspicion  hanging  on  her  head,  or  the 
societal scrutiny of her conduct as a widow. As Perikles' address to the 
261  Cf. Davies, APF, p.195; Cox, Household, p.35. For further discussion on socio-political reasons for 
marriage, see Thompson in Phoenix 21(1967),273-282,esp.280; Wevers, !saeus, p.l05-106  .. 
262  Lys.31.21; Dem.36.14-15; 41.8-9. For information from inscriptions on women transactIng 
economic ventures apparently above the limit set by the law see Schaps, Economic Rights, p.52-
53,133,notes 49-51. 
263  See Dem.59.122; Xen. Oec.7.19,35-39. 
202 widows  of fallen  wamors  (Thucy.2.45.2)  is  interpreted/65  the  widow 
could  trespass  the  bounds  of morality,  as  well  as  become  sexually 
predatory  towards  young  men,  and  was  therefore  considered  sexually 
dangerous. A kinsman may therefore expect his young and childbearing 
widowed daughter or sister to  get remarried and perhaps to  avoid being 
under societal scrutiny. 
Furthermore, if her husband died, the widow's father might also 
be dead, and if she had an adult son or a brother he could hardly exercise 
the  same authority as kyrios in certain circumstances as a husband. And 
her situation became even more vulnerable if she was childless.  In the 
circumstances, it would not be surprising for such a widow to be given in 
marriage again by whoever would be exercising legal authority over her. 
The remarriage of the widow who was not an heiress followed 
the same procedure as her first marriage. But the position is not very clear 
with that of a widow who was already an heiress. It is, however, most 
probable  that her remarriage  followed  the  same procedure  as  her  first 
marriage,  in  conformity with the  line  of succession in  the  dYXl.<J'tElu 
according  to  the  Athenian  law  and by the  judgement of the  court.
266 
Certain passages in Demosthenes also seem to imply that even if  a widow 
who  was an heiress had been betrothed by her husband in his will to  a 
264  Cf.  Dem.57.33-35; Schaps, Economic Rights, p.61-63; Golden, Phoenix 33(1981),329. 
265  Walcot, G&R 20(1973),111-121; Andersen, SO 62(1987),33-49. 
203 second husband, the prospective second husband could lay claim to her as 
would have been the case with an heiress who was not a widow.267 
The  examination  above  attempted  to  establish,  among  other 
things, that in her widowhood during the transitional period until she got 
remarried, the Athenian widow came under the guardianship and care of 
her father if he was still alive, or her nearest adult male relative(  s), most 
often her brother(s), if the father was dead at the time her husband died. 
In  law  she  was  represented  by her  father  or whoever  exercised  legal 
power over her, and who had the authority to give her in marriage. Her 
maintenance  also became the responsibility of her father  or brother(s). 
And although kinsmen were not legally obliged to maintain and support 
their  women  who  became  widowed,  social  sanctions  and  possible 
damaging  political  consequences  compelled  kinsmen  to  maintain  and 
support their unfortunate womenfolk. 
It is  also  evident that the majority of young and childbearing 
widows  got remarried after the  death of their husbands.  And,  although 
even among this category of  widows, some of them who had got children 
would  probably have  wished to  remain  in widowhood,  they  could be 
given in marriage against their will.  This is because Athenian marriage 
custom  and  practice  gave  the  woman  no  voice  in  the  choice  of her 
husband, or any part to play in the contraction of her marriage. Also, the 
266 18.3.58; 6.51-52; Dem.43.16,51;46.22; MacDowell, Law, p.l03. 
204 remarriage of the Athenian widow was not only conditioned by her age, 
financial  background,  and the  provisions made by the  husband in that 
respect in his will, but also motivated by prevailing social, economic, and 
political circumstances, and the general legal restrictions on women. 
But once she got remarried, she certainly went out of the class 
of widows, and the condition of widowhood. Now her legal duties, care 
and maintenance, and everything else became the responsibilities of her 
new husband who was expected dutifully to perform them, as a speaker in 
Demosthenes seems to imply in the following words: 
"  My father,  then having thus married my mother, maintained 
her as his wife in his own house; and he brought me up and showed me a 
father's  affection  such as  you  also  all  show  to  your  children"  (40.8). 
Thus, while an orphan would still remain an orphan, a widow could cease 
to be a widow by getting remarried after the death of  her husband. 
267  3  Dem.45.3-7;46.18-2  . 
205 CHAPTER 4 
PREGNANT WIDOWS 
The ancient sources on pregnant widows in classical Athens are 
indeed slender. None the less, it appears from the scrappy and incidental 
references to them in the orators that the pregnant widow was one of the 
two  categories of women who, together with male orphans, enjoyed the 
special protection of law in Athens. The other was the heiress. The legal 
protection  of the  pregnant  widow  is  derived  from  a  law  quoted  in 
Demosthenes, Against Makartatos.  The relevant section of the  law,  the 
full text of  which is quoted elsewhere reads as follows: 
't<uv  otKCOV  't<DV  E~EprHlOUJ.lEVCOV Kat 't<DV  yuVatK<DV,  6crat J.lEVoucrtV 
8V 'tote; OtKOtC; 1<DV dvop<DV 1<DV 1E8VllK61cov ~dcrKoucrat  KUElV ... 
"The archon shall take care of orphans, heiresses, houses which are left 
empty,  and those women who remain in the  houses of their  deceased 
husbands, saying that they are pregnant. ..  ,,268 
The law is not dated, as noted by MacDowell;269 and as far as we 
can  tell,  the  laws  to  be administered by the  archon  came  first  in the 
Solonian  code.270  It thus  seems  clear that the  archon's  office  was  the 
268  Dem.43.75. The full text of  the law has been quoted above in the discussion on ' The Archon and 
Administration of  Justice in Matters Concerning Widows and Orphans.' 
269  CQ 39(1989),19. 
270  ef.R Stroud, Drakon,p.32-33. 
206 h  .  .  h  .  271  greatest aut  onty In t  e sIxth century.  Since we have no knowledge of 
any existing laws about the heiress before the time of Solon, and this law 
has its concern for the care of the heiress as well as the male orphan and 
the  pregnant  widow,  and  since  Solon had assigned  to  the  archon  the 
responsibility  to  administer the  entire  law affecting the  family  and its 
property, the law may most probably be ascribed to Solon.
272 
The occurrence of OLKOS  twice in the text of the law, however, 
appears problematic. Particularly, it is not very clear what the referential 
of'tcov  O'tKCOV  is in the law;  and so the phrase appears  intrusive.  But 
MacDowell,  in his  article  in the  CQ  cited above  has  offered possible 
interpretations of it (19-20), that I  think resolve the issue.  In fact,  'tCOV 
O'tKCOV connotes economic and social implications. In the economic sense, 
it implies property of  all kinds, as noted by MacDowell. In social context, 
it implies  locative places of residence  (houses),  for  social interactions 
among the inmates. But as rightly pointed out by MacDowell, OLKOS  in 
the  text of the law does not imply  'family'  in the  legal  sense.  It had 
indeed  acquired the  sense of 'family'  by the  late  fifth  and the  fourth 
centuries, when the orators used it in that sense in their arguments.
273 
But  Pomeroy(Xen.  p.213-214,n.2),  and  Patterson(Family, 
p.241,n.8),  reject  MacDowell's  claim.  They  rest  their  criticisms  on 
271 
See AP,13.2; Thucy.6.54.6. 
272  Cf.Lacey, Family,p.90; MacDowell, see n.2 above. 
207 Aristotle  and Xenophon'  s  concepts of the nuclear family of which the 
slave was a member. What then, do the orators mean by  OLKOS? If  Isaios 
or  Demsothenes  says  that the  OIKOS  of an Athenian is  left desolate  or 
empty, he means that the person has no direct male descendant, though 
the collateral family is still in existence. And if  an Athenian has no direct 
male descendant, then he has no heir?74 It is evident that the language is 
technical,  with  legal  implications.  But  that  could  not  have  been  the 
context in which 10JV O'iKo)V is used in the law. As MacDowell has noted, 
it refers to 'properties' under the control of  no man, or empty houses with 
no male inhabitant. 
Thus, if MacDowell argues that OtKOS in the law is not a legal 
term for 'family' he means family in the sense of  rightful membership or 
right of inheritance in the household. He does not mean the literal and 
later  Aristotelian  oikos,  of which  the  slave  was  a  member,275  or  the 
Xenophontean nuclear family?76  This was a later concept resulting from 
the  social  and po  Ii tical  trends of the  late  fifth  and the  fourth  centuries 
when  self-conscious  attention  to  lineage  and  ancestors  became  more 
typical  of the  elite  families  who were striving for  pre-eminence in the 
273  Cf. also Rhodes, Comm. AP,p.633-4. 
274  Cf.Dem.44.2; MacDowell, CQ 39(1989),20. 
275  Arist. Pol., 1252a25ff. 
276  Xen.Oikon.,7.21. 
208 increasingly  democratic Athenian society than of earlier archaic  Greek 
society in general. 
It  seems  to  me,  therefore,  that  Pomeroy's  and  Patterson's 
rejection  of  MacDowell's  claim  is  particularly  hypercritical.  It  is 
noteworthy that Aristotle and Xenophon are classical writers, and wrote 
at a time when olKos had either completely imbibed, or was in the rapid 
process of  assimilating the extended technical meaning of 'family', which 
in fact was not originally implied in the law in Demosthenes 43.75. 
RESIDENTIAL STATUS 
One other aspect of the law, which also requires attention, is the 
expression:  Kat  'tcDV  yuVatKcDV,  (5crat  J.lEvoUcrtv  EV  'tole;  OlKOte;  't<DV 
dVDP<DV  't<DV  'tE8VllK6'tcov <pacrKoucrat KUEtV:  " and those women who 
remain  in the houses of their deceased husbands,  saying that they are 
pregnant." Does it imply that all pregnant widows were bound to remain 
in the houses of their deceased husbands, or some left to live with their 
kindred?  If the  latter  situation  also  applied,  does  it  mean  that  such 
widows were not to be taken care of  by the archon? What did Solon mean 
by this statement when he enacted his law? And what did Demosthenes 
think that Solon meant when he quoted the law for his client? These are 
by  no  means  very  easy  questions  to  answer.  To  the  contemporary 
209 Athenian there would have been no ambiguity. For us the indication in 
the  law  is  not  decisive  enough  to  enable  us  to  know  clearly  the 
implications  and what exactly the  residential  position of the  expectant 
widows  was at the  death of their husbands.  Hence,  commentators have 
had  to  approach  the  issue  not  only  guardedly,  but also  with  seeming 
inconsistency  and  much  hesitation?77  In  seeking  the  most  probable 
implications of the statement, therefore, we must examine evidence from 
Lysias and Hyperides from which we may hopefully be able to establish 
the pregnant widow's residential status. 
In a speech in which the defendant, Agoratos, is accused of the 
murder of Dionysodoros, one of the victims of the Thirty Tyrants whose 
atrocities had such damaging consequences on Athenian family life at the 
time,  Lysias'  client recounts a meeting between a group of condemned 
men waiting to be executed and their womenfolk in the following light: 
"  Now, when sentence of death,  gentlemen,  had been passed on 
them, and they had to die, each of them sent for his sister, or his mother, 
or his wife, or any female relative that he had, to see them in the prison, 
in order that they might take the last farewell of their people before they 
should end their days. In particular, Dionysodoros sent for my sister (she 
was  his  wife)  to  see him in the prison.  On receiving the message  she 
277  See Harrison, Law (i), p.38-39,n.9 on 39, also 44,111; Rhodes, Commentary, p.633; Davies, APF, 
p.265; Boer, Morality, p.35; MacDowell, Law, p.88; Gould, JHS 100(1980),43; Thompson, De 
Hagniae, p.l03. 
210 came, dressed in a black cloak ...  278  as was natural in view of  the sad fate 
that had befallen her husband. In the presence of  my sister, Dionysodoros, 
after disposing of his personal property as he thought fit,  referred to this 
man Agoratos as responsible for his death, and charged me and Dionysios 
his  brother  here,  and  all  his  friends  to  execute  his  vengeance  upon 
Agoratos; and he charged his wife, believing her to be pregnant by him, 
that if she should bear a son she should tell the child that Agoratos had 
taken his father's life, and should bid him execute his father's vengeance 
on the man for his murder.  ,,279 
We  cannot  tell  exactly  why  the  victims  invited  only  their 
womenfolk to this farewell meeting. None the less,  the passage is very 
significant,  particularly  with  its  emphasis  on  the  meeting  between 
Dionysodoros and his wife. Here, we are informed of the wife's presence 
when her husband made his will.  There is  no doubt that this  gave  the 
woman the opportunity to know the contents of the husband's will and 
how  his  property had been disposed of by him.  But more importantly, 
Lysias  informs  us  of a  pregnant  woman  whose  husband  had  been 
executed by the state, making her a pregnant widow. From this passage 
also we may be able to establish the residential status of  pregnant widows 
in the situation of  the widowed wife of  Dionysodoros. 
278  There is a lacuna here in the text; but Lamb in a footnote,p.30 1  ,note c, suggests that there might be 
some words describing another sign of  mourning. 
279 
Lys.13.39-42. 
211 We are not in a  position to  know the  contents of the  will  of 
Dionysodoros regarding his pregnant widow. But it is most probable that 
both his brother, and his brother-in-law the speaker, were given a joint 
oversight  responsibility  over  the  woman.  Alternatively,  Dionysios  his 
brother. most likely to have been appointed guardian of the posthumous 
child, would probably have had to act as guardian of  the woman as well. 
And  although  the  passage  does  not  say  precisely  where  the 
woman  should  stay,  it  appears  from  the  tone  that  under  normal 
circumstances,  Dionysodoros'  pregnant  widow  would  certainly  have 
remained in his  house.  But we  also  know that  the  property of a  man 
executed by the state was confiscated and sold out to people who wanted 
to buy them. In the circumstances, a pregnant widow, like the widow of 
Dionysodoros, was bound to vacate the otKOS of  her deceased husband to 
live  with  either  her kin,  or a  brother of the  husband.  Thus,  if some 
pregnant  widows  did  not  so  remain  in  the  houses  of their  deceased 
husbands,  it  was  pregnant  widows  in  the  category  of the  widow  of 
Dionysodoros. 
With  regard  to  the  position  of pregnant  widows  not  in  the 
situation of  that of  the widow of  Dionysodoros, the fragmentary speeches 
of  Hype  rides in defence of  Lykophron provide valuable information.
280 
In 
280  On the background of  L  ykophron and the circumstances leading to his indictment, see the editorial 
introduction to the speeches by Burtt, Minor Attic Orators II,p.370-374. Burtt seems to doubt the 
212 the  first  speech  for  the  defence,  the  orator  informs  the  jury that  the 
woman's husband died leaving her pregnant by him.281  Like several other 
Athenian  women,  her  name  is  not  mentioned.  This  should  not  be 
surprising;  Athenian  women  were  scarcely  identified  by  their  own 
names.
282 
However, she is identified as the sister of Dioxippos.283  What 
seems  a bit strange is that the husband's name is  not mentioned either, 
except  that he  was  disabled.  We have no  idea of what provisions  the 
husband made for his widow. But we do know from the two speeches that 
he had made certain arrangements for the posthumous child in his will. 
In the husband's will, a certain Euphemos284  had been appointed 
as  guardian of the posthumous child to be responsible for its nurture and 
care, and for the management of its property until his age of majority. If 
the child should die, at birth or later, certain relatives should inherit the 
property (l.frag.4(5).47). The relationship of Euphemos to  the deceased 
does not seem quite clear. It has been suggested that he was a brother to 
the  deceased.285  But this  is  not  likely.  First,  the  speaker  indicates  in 
l.frag.4b.5  that  the  brother Dioxippos,  in  fact,  attended  the  woman's 
wedding  for her second marriage because he was  giving the widow in 
authenticity of  the second speech,p.398-399. But since he does not prove his claim wi!h certainty, and 
appears to be the only dissenting voice, we may assume that the speech was by Hypendes. 
281  1. Frag.4(5).47. 
282  Cf. Schaps, CQ 27(1977),323-330; Gould, JHS 100(1980),45. 
283  1. Frag.4(b  ).6. On Dioxippos see Diodor.17.1 00-1 0 1. 
284  Probably the Euphemos whose daughter the speaker of  Dem.40 married. See 40.12. 
285  Blass, noted by Burtt, n.280 above,p.327,n.b. 
213 mamage.  This  implies  that  he  was  the  only  brother  of the  bride.286 
Secondly, the speaker informs the jury in the preceding section that the 
nearest  relatives  of the  deceased  tried  to  eject  Euphemos  from  the 
property  of the  deceased, but others of them prevented those  relatives 
from  ejecting  him(1.frag.4(5).47).  It  would  seem  therefore,  that 
Euphemos could not have been a brother of the woman, or a relative of 
the deceased but most probably his trusted friend. 
A few seeming obscurities in the evidence need to be addressed. It 
IS  noteworthy  that  Euphemos'  appointment  as  guardian  of  the 
posthumous  child naturally implies  that  he  had been  given immediate 
responsibility to  be guardian of the  woman as  well.  The widow would 
thus live under his legal authority until she gave birth to the child. We are 
also informed that in her second marriage it was Euphemos who dowered 
the woman to the tune of one talent of silver.
287 But as already noted, the 
speaker  informs  us  of Dioxippos'  presence  at  the  sister's  wedding 
because he was giving the widow away in marriage. 
Significantly,  the  Greek  text  is  emphatic  on  his  presence: 
~tc6~t1t1tov.  Kat  yap  ou'tO~ 'liKoAOueEt  bta  'to  Xllpav  EKbtboaeat 
286  Cf.Burtt, ibid. 
287  1.Frag.4b.13. 
214 aO'tr)v:  HAnd then her escort of  boys, and also Dioxippos. For he was in 
attendance, too, since she was a widow being given away in marriage." 
However, in the second speech, the speaker indicates that when he 
was about to marry his sister to Kharippos the second husband, Dioxippos 
\vent  away to  Olympia where he won a crown for  his city.  288  So under 
whose authority was the woman living at her second marriage? And was 
it usual in Athenian marriage custom for one person to betroth and give a 
woman  in  marriage  and  another  to  dower  her?  Again,  how  do  we 
reconcile  the  evidence  regarding  Dioxippos'  presence  at  his  sister's 
wedding and his absence to Olympia at the same time? 
In  the  first  place,  we  should dismiss  forthwith  any  idea that 
Euphemos'  attempted ej ection by the deceased's relatives was meant to 
make him vacate the deceased's house. For as we know, being appointed 
as guardian did not imply that the person so appointed should necessarily 
move into the residence of the deceased, unless otherwise stated by the 
testator himself, especially if  he betrothed his widow to the guardian in a 
second marriage.
289 Thus, Euphemos' guardianship of the woman did not 
imply  that  he  moved into  the  house  of the  deceased.  With  regard  to 
Dioxippos' presence at the wedding and absence to Olympia, the simple 
explanation is that his sister's wedding did not take place until his return 
288 
2.frag.13. 
289 
Cf. Dem.27.5,13. 
215 from  Olympia. But the question is, why is it that it was Euphemos who 
provided the dowry in her second marriage, and not Dioxippos? 
By Athenian marriage custom and practice, it was a woman's 
kin  or her legal representative like her husband,  or appointed guardian 
who  dowered her in marriage. And since Euphemos seems to have held 
her dowry (we do not know how much dowry she went with in her first 
marriage)  until her second marriage when he dowered her,  it could be 
assumed  that  the  woman  remained  in  her  deceased  husband's  house 
though under the legal authority of Euphemos until she gave birth to the 
child. It is most probable that even after the child was born she continued 
to  liYe  in the  deceased husband's household until her second marriage 
when she left to take up residence with her second husband. 
A  second  and  weightier  evidence  for  the  woman's  continued 
residence in her husband's house until the child was born is the orator's 
refutation of the prosecutor's allegation that Lykophron had dug through 
the wall of the deceased's house to have intercourse with his wife when 
he was alive. The speaker argues to the jury in the second speech: 
" As for his digging through the wall to have intercourse with the 
woman: that is quite incredible. For the accuser has not shown either that 
he  fell  out with the people who had previously been serving him and 
readily submitting to any orders he gave them, or that they had a quarrel 
with him and so refused their services, thus inducing Lykophron to dig 
216 through  the  wall, ...  Besides,  it  is  almost  out  of the  question  for  her 
seryants  to  have quarrelled with him.  Which one  of them could have 
grown so rash as to withhold either his messages to her or hers to him for 
reasons of personal spite? For the danger was imminent. . .In actual fact 
they  saw  their  master  in  an  extremely  weak  condition  and  had  their 
mistress, the future ruler of  the household, constantly before their eyes as 
a reminder, if  he died, they would be punished in return for what they had 
done  against  her wishes.  It is  therefore  incredible that Lykophron dug 
through  the  wall;  nor  was  he  accustomed,  as  the  accuser  claims,  to 
converse with the servants" (2frag.1.1-3). 
It  is  noteworthy  that  the  slaves'  acknowledgement  of  their 
mistress'  status as the future ruler of the household at the death of her 
husband, as told to the jury in this passage, emphasises three aspects of 
the woman's position in her husband's house. First, it shows the woman's 
power and authority to punish or reward any of the slaves as she thought 
fit  in  the  deceased  husband's  house.  The  passage  indicates  also  the 
widow's  administrative role  in the  household until  the  husband's heir 
took  over  the  administration  of the  household  from  her.  But  most 
importantly,  it  underscores  the  widow's  continued  residence  in  her 
husband's house, hence the slaves'  fear of punitive measures from her 
after the death of her husband if they should incur her displeasure when 
their master was alive. 
217 I  therefore  give  the  following  interpretations  to;  " ...  and  those 
women  who  remain  in  the  houses  of their  husbands  who  have  died  , 
saying that they are pregnant": At the death of  their husbands: 
(i)  some  non-pregnant  widows,  exercising  their  customary  right  of 
choice,  left  their  deceased  husbands'  households  to  live  with  their 
kindred;  (ii)  some  pregnant  widows,  because  of  some  special 
circumstances applying in their case or situation necessarily had to vacate 
their husbands' households also to live with either their kindred or their 
husbands'  kindred;  (iii)  some  others,  although  not  pregnant,  but  on 
grounds  of age,  and of the  fact  that they had adult sons living in their 
fathers'  houses,  also  exercised  their  customary  right  of choice  and 
decided to remain in their husbands' houses with their adult sons;  (iv) 
then  there  was  another  category  of  widows  who,  under  normal 
circumstances, had to remain in their husbands' houses. These, no doubt, 
were pregnant widows. 
In  fact,  but  for  any  disruptive  situation,  like  the  case  of the 
pregnant widow of  Dionysodoros, which would necessitate the immediate 
vacation of the husband's house by the widow as soon as confiscation of 
property  was  announced,  this  category  of widows  remained  in  their 
deceased  husbands'  households  under the  authority  of their  appointed 
guardians.  They were placed under the special protection of the archon, 
as  the  law directs, until they gave birth to  their children.  For pregnant 
218 widows, therefore, the customary right of choice for a widow whether to 
remain in her deceased husband's household or leave for that of her kin 
was just notional and not practically effective. 
What is not clear is whether expectant widows whose husbands 
\\'ere  executed  by  the  state  were  not  covered  by  the  law  cited  in 
Dem.43.75.  It in  fact  seems  most  probable  that  the  archon's  special 
protection  did not stretch  over them.  This  may not be surprising.  An 
Athenian son inherited from his father not only his property and debts, 
but also his enmities.z
90  It would appear, therefore, that the state had no 
concern for the families of men who were considered as  criminals, and 
executed by the state, but would even punish the sons of  such men for the 
offences committed by their deceased fathers or ancestors.
291 
And since it was for the sake of the child a pregnant widow was 
bearing that she came under the protection of the archon, if the husband 
of a pregnant woman was considered a criminal and therefore put to death 
by  the  state,  it would imply that  she  and  the  posthumous  child  most 
probably became disqualified from coming under the special protection 
of the archon. There is no evidence for that to enable us draw a definite 
conclusion, though; but that appears to  be the most logical corollary of 
the  situation. Naturally, it seems that no one would want to protect and 
290  Is.1.11; 9.16-20; Lys.13.42; 17.3. 
291  19  Lys.  14.39-42; 18.11,22;  . 
219 preserve the family of a criminal, let alone the Athenians who visited the 
offences of  fathers and ancestors unto their sons or descendants. 
MAINTENANCE AND SUPPORT 
The fact seems to be stressed by Stroud that widows and orphans 
were  supported  by  the  Athenian  state  in  the  form  of grain  or  food 
distribution, and that the archon was to see to this kind of state support. 
The basis for this state support for widows and orphans is derived from 
the lexicon of Harpokration under the word aL  10C;. The reference is made 
to  Demosthenes  Against Aphobos (I)  (Dem.27.15),  in which the  word 
occurs.  The citation further implies that it was, according to Aristotle, a 
provision  with  regard  to  maintenance  of women  and  orphans;  and 
attributes its institution to Solon as in his first axon.
292 The same evidence 
and  ascription  of the  rule  to  Solon  is  found  in  Dindorf  s  edition  of 
H  kr ·  'L'  293  arpo  atlon s  eXlcon. 
On  the  basis  of this  evidence,  Stroud  cites  a  Harpokration 
mention  of a  Solonian  law  sanctioning  state  distribution  of food  to 
widows  and  orphans.
294  He  reinforces  his  confirmation  of  the 
Harpokration evidence in an article in the following words:  "In view of 
Solon's concern for the preservation of  the Athenian OLKOL and the certain 
292  See Bekker, 1833,p. 166. 
293  Cf.Dindorf, Harpocrationis Lexicon, 1  (1969),p274. 
294  Cf. R. Stroud, Drakon 's Law on Homicide (Berkeley, 1968),p.32. 
220 evidence  that his  first  axon  instructed  the  archon  to  provide  food  for 
widows and orphans, excessive scepticism is unjustified.,,295 
It is quite evident that Stroud has pieced together the first part of 
the law cited in Dem.43.75, and the first and last bits of the summary of 
the  same law in the AP 56.7. As far as we know, the Solonian law that 
puts orphans, heiresses, and widows under the care of the archon is what 
we have in these references. A few questions must therefore be addressed 
regarding  this law vis-a-vis  support for  widows and orphans.  Does the 
evidence  in Dem.43.75  and AP 56.7 necessarily imply maintenance of 
widows  and  orphans  by  the  state?  And  which  category  of widows, 
granted that, that is the implication? 
But " The archon shall take care of  orphans, and heiresses, and of 
all  widows ...  "  in Dem. 43.75  does not indicate that the  archon should 
provide food for orphans, heiresses, and pregnant widows. And none of 
the  cases  in  which  the  law  is  cited  in  the  sources  does  imply  state 
provision of support to these people through the archon. Furthermore, the 
evidence in AP 56.7 that editors refer to does not say that the archon was 
expected to distribute food provided by the state to those under his care. 
Or is that what. .. 'Tots  'ITULO"L v  'tov aL'tOV  oO'tOC;  Eicrnpct't'tEt: "he exacts 
295  Stroud, Hesperia 40(1971),288. See also n.18, where he cites several other references in support of 
his claim. 
221 maintenance for children"  points to? And so the archon was expected to 
take the state to task if  it failed to meet this commitment. 
This statement in AP 56.7 has technical implications at the state 
level.  I  think  that  it  implies  the  enforcement  of a  duty  by  a  legal 
procedure  administered by the archon against a guardian who failed to 
provide for his ward or wards. It does not point to the fact that the archon 
should see to the provision of maintenance for orphans by the state.  So 
the alleged scepticism that Stroud tries to discard becomes deepened. 
Even  the  archon's  preservation  of  the  Athenian  OiKOl,  as 
contained in the law appears to raise questions. For instance, in what way 
was  the  archon  expected  to  prevent  an  Athenian  household  from 
becoming  extinct?  As  noted  in  the  section  on  '  The  Archon  and 
Administration of  Justice in Matters Concerning Widows and Orphans,' it 
is not quite clear what was the nature of  the archon's role in this task. For 
it  does  seem  that  he  could  exercise  his  authority  of maintaining  the 
continuity of  a family only through the settlement of  inheritance disputes, 
and claims to inheritance and heiresses. For the sources indicate that all 
such  disputes,  claims,  and  other  legal  matters  concerning  orphans, 
widows, and parents fell under his jurisdiction.
296 
296  See AP,43.4;56.6; Andok.1.117-121; Aeschn.1.158; Is.3.46-7; Lys.26.12-13; Dem.35.47-
48;37.46;43.54;46.22;48.23-26; Hyp.4.6. 
222 I  think,  therefore,  that,  to  take  the  reference  to  crt'tO<;  In 
Demosthenes  Against  Aphobos  (a)  (Dem.27.15)  to  imply  state 
distribution  of  food  to  widows  could  be  misleading.  Demosthenes 
certainly uses the word in this speech. But throughout the 69 sections of 
the  speech,  the  orator uses  the  word  once  (27.15),  in  the  context  of 
general maintenance: he says that though his guardian Aphobos has the 
widow's dowry he did not care for the woman. Here, Demosthenes says 
that  Aphobos  has  failed  to  provide  for  the  general  maintenance  and 
support of the widow. He expresses the same sentiment, using the word 
o'1'to<;,  in speech 28.11, and then in 29.33. But in all these instances, the 
orator,  in  fact,  uses  the  word  from  a  financial  point  of view.  The 
evidence can therefore not imply any kind of  state support for the widow. 
That the practice of state support for orphans was known as far 
back as  478-462B.C. is certain, as the author of the AP tells us, writing 
about this period: " Furthermore the prytaneion, orphans, and warders of 
prisoners - for all of these had their maintenance from public funds.,,297 
But  even  here,  the  orphans  mentioned  were  war-orphans,  as  editors 
rightly identify, and on which I  totally agree with Stroud.298  It was this 
category  of orphans  who  were  supported  at  public  expense,  and  not 
orphans in general, let alone widows. 
297  AP,24.3. 
298  Hesperia,op.cit.288. 
223 It is  significant  that  soon  after  his  Seisachtheia  in  594/3B.C., 
Solon made a law forbidding the export of natural products except olive 
oil (Plut.S%n,24.1). It would appear that this law had the objectives not 
just to encourage the cultivation of  olives as the increased output of  olives 
would  take  a  generation  to  become  effective,299  but  particularly  to 
promote the export of  olive-oil in which there was already a surplus. And 
more importantly for our purpose, Solon passed this law in order to retain 
all  food  supplies for the feeding of the great number of liberated slaves 
and  repatriated  slaves  and  exiles  which  may  have  caused  a  sudden 
increase in the population of  Attica as a result of  his Seisachtheia. 
The  law regarding the  care  of orphans,  heiresses,  and  widows, 
cited in Dem.43.75, and AP,56.7, may most probably also belong to this 
period of social upheaval. Possibly, the law punishing a son by stripping 
him of  his franchise for failing to maintain his parents also belongs to this 
period.
300 However, there is no evidence that even in Solonian Athens the 
archon's  care  of orphans  and  widows  included  provision  of food  to 
widows.  And for his obligation to  care for these people, it is not quite 
clear whether his duties went beyond bringing cases about them to court 
and presiding over their hearing and implementing the court's decision. 
299  Cf. Hammond, JHS 60(  1940),80. 
300  Cf.Diog. Laert.1 S%n,55. 
224 Of course, it is hard to ignore the fact that state support for war-
orphans  may  have  been  one  of the  Solonian  laws,  as  evidence  from 
Diogenes Laertios seems to point to: 
" He curtailed the honours of athletes who took part in the games, 
fixing the allowance for an Olympic victor at five hundred drachmae, .. .It 
was in bad taste, he urged, to increase the reward of these victors, and to 
ignore the exclusive claims of those who had fallen in battle, whose sons 
ought,  moreover,  to  be maintained and educated by the  state. ,,301  It is 
significant,  however,  that  only  orphans  of those  killed  in  war  were 
maintained by the state, and that neither ordinary orphans and widows, 
nor war-widows were covered by the law. 
From this  rather lengthy and seemingly digressive  discussion, 
the  following  conclusions clearly emerge:  (i)  Demosthenes  27.15  does 
not imply state distribution of  grain to widows; 
(ii)  public  support for  widows  cannot have been part of Solon's first 
axon;  (iii) AP, 56.7 does not mean the archon was to distribute grain to 
widows on behalf of  the state. He was to be responsible for legal matters 
concerning orphans in general and pregnant widows, and to see to it that 
they were maintained by their guardians; 
(iv) similarly, Dem.43.75 instructs the archon to see to the legal affairs of 
all orphans and pregnant widows, and to punish anyone who commits any 
225 unlawful act against any of them; (v) widows were not supported in any 
way by the state even if  they were war-widows. 
It would therefore seem erroneous to regard the reference to  oL'tOe; in the 
lexicon of Harpokration as evidence for state support for widows in the 
form of  grain or food distribution by the archon. 
Concerning the maintenance and support of pregnant widows, 
then,  Lysias  13, Against Agoratos, and Hyperides  land 2, In Defence of 
Lykophron, which have already been cited, are again valuable in that they 
present us with information, both implicit and explicit, about the care and 
support of the pregnant widow. The difficulty of  knowing the contents of 
the  will of Dionysodoros in Lysias(13.41) has been already noted.  The 
most probable residential status of  such a widow has also been stated. For 
special  circumstances  applying  in  the  case  of a  pregnant  wife  of a 
husband  executed by the  state,  the  widow  would be  expected  to  live 
under the authority of either her kin, or the nearest adult relative of the 
deceased  husband.  He  became  her  guardian,  maintained her,  and  was 
responsible for all matters concerning her until she gave birth to the child. 
As  already  noted,  Euphemos'  appointment  by  the  unnamed 
deceased  as  guardian  of his  posthumous  child  in  Hyperides  naturally 
implies that the widow also came under his guardianship. It is a common 
knowledge  of Athenian law of maintenance of a  woman that whoever 
301  Ibid. 
226 supported  a  divorced  woman,  or  a  widow  who  left  her  deceased 
husband's  house received her dowry.  But if a  widow remained in her 
husband's house, her dowry was kept by her grown-up sones), if she had 
any.  or her guardian for her support.
302 And since it was Euphemos who 
dowered the  widow in her second marriage,  it logically follows  that it 
was  Euphemos who provided for her needs, and was responsible for all 
other matters concerning the woman until she gave birth to the child. It 
could even be assumed that he maintained her until her second marriage 
when her second husband received her dowry for her maintenance, since 
it is at this stage that we hear about her dowry. 
THE PREGNANT WIDOW AND HER HUSBAND'S OIKOS 
As the law quoted in Dem.43.  7  5 clearly indicates, it is their role, like 
heiresses,  as  transmitters of their husbands'  property and  continuity of 
their  families  that  the  Athenian  society  displayed  concern  for  and 
extended  protection  to  pregnant  widows  in  their  deceased  husbands' 
households  through  the  jurisdiction  of the  archon.  For  although  the 
mention of the woman's person in the law seems to be incidental and an 
afterthought,  it  would  appear  that  the  pregnant  widow  served  as  the 
taproot  for  the  future  growth and continuity of her defunct husband's 
302  Dem.27.17;42.27;59.52; Is.3.35. See also Harrison, Law (i),p.56-57; MacDowell, Law,p.88. 
227 household. This is so because it was through her that a male heir could be 
supplied for a household that was temporarily left without an heir. 
If the woman gave birth to a girl it became an epikleros; and on 
reaching the marriageable age, was married by her father's next-of-kin. 
The  children of the epikleros,  in tum, were regarded as  descendants of 
their grandfather and heir of the property. They became members of his 
oikos  and continued his family line.  And if there was a son among the 
children  of the  epikleros  he  inherited the  estate  of the  grandfather on 
attaining  his majority and continued his  lineage.
303  Thus,  although she 
could not provide the desired continuity of  her father's oikos by her own 
person,  the  posthumous  heiress  through  the  mother  as  agent  was 
nevertheless a potential supplier of a male heir to her father.  This would 
also  naturally be the  situation if the  pregnant widow was  an  epikleros 
herself,  and she gave birth to  a girl who also happened to  be the  only 
child of the deceased father.  She herself as an epikleros merely served to 
mediate the inheritance for the claimant next in succession. 
But if the  pregnant  widow  gave  birth  to  a  son,  he  would  on 
reaching his  age of majority directly succeed to  his  father's household 
and inherit its wealth/o4 as well as its family cult, thereby maintaining the 
continuity of  the oikos of  his father. For in point of fact, the main concern 
303  Dem. 46.20.Cf. also D. Schaps, , Women in Greek Inheritance Law' CQ 69(1975),53-57; Asheri , 
Historia  12(1963),1-21,esp.16-17; Just ,Women,p.31-32; Pomeroy, Families,p.123. 
304 
Hyp.Lyk.lfrag.4(5).47. 
228 of the law in this matter of succession and continuity of the aikas was to 
ensure  the  correct  or proper transmission of property and of religious 
rights  and  duties  through  direct  male  descent.  305  Thus,  whether  the 
pregnant widow gave birth to a girl or a son, she served as the life-line of 
her  deceased  husband's household  for  the  proper  transmission  of her 
husband's property and religious responsibilities. 
The pregnant widow's position seems to  extend beyond being 
the  live-wire of her husband's household.  She was indeed the principal 
determinant  of the  fate  or  future  position  of her  husband's  estate  in 
relation to his kinsmen; and for a period, played the role of postponing 
any  litigation  and  portioning  out  of the  husband's  property  by  his 
kinsmen.  This could be seen from two fundamental principles. Whether 
her deceased husband's estate would be inherited directly by his own son 
or  indirectly  by  his  grandson  depended  upon  her.  Moreover,  if the 
husband died without an issue, his estate in any case, would devolve on 
his next-of-kin in the a:Y,),La1'ELu.
306 But for all we know from the orators, 
inheritance by kinsmen in the d')'')'La1'ELU was not quite an easy matter in 
Athens;  and in the  majority of cases  the  issue  had resulted in almost 
endless litigation with the estate passing from kinsman to kinsman.
307 
305 Cf.1s.2.46;7.30. 
306 
Dem.43.51. 
307  Dem.43, and the speeches of  1saios are excellent illustrations. 
229 And  the  case  of  Mantitheos  and  Boiotos  (Dem.39;40),  is 
illustrative of how lengthy and persistent litigation could be even where 
there were direct descendants. We learn also from Hyperides' speech for 
the  defence  of Lykophron the  concerted efforts  of the  kinsmen of the 
deceased  brother-in-law  of Dioxippos  to  prove  his  posthumous  child 
illegitimate to deprive him of his patrimony. The situation appears even 
more complex and irritating in cases like that of Nikostratos in Isaios 4, 
where no direct adult descendants were readily available to  defend their 
right to their patrimony. 
Such a situation would naturally seem to present an open invitation 
to  those  ready  to  construct  fictive  genealogies,  or  exaggerate  the 
closeness  of existing  kin relations  in order  to  inherit  the  estate.  The 
pregnant widow therefore served as a brake on claims to her husband's 
estate by his kinsmen, and postponed some of  the inheritance disputes. In 
the  majority of cases also,  she served as  a  deterrent to relatives of the 
deceased who would otherwise have litigated for his estate at his death. 
In  the  two  cases  of pregnant  widows  cited  in  Lysias  and 
Hyperides, the indication is that the widows' pregnancies were the first in 
their  marriages.  It  would  seem  that  under  normal  circumstances,  a 
pregnant  widow of this  status - with no living children - became the 
immediate  occupier  of the  otherwise  desolate  house  of her  deceased 
husband.  This  seems  to  explain  further  'tCUY  O'LKWV  in  Dem.43.75 
230 implying  the  sense  of houses,  as  pointed  out  by  MacDowell  (  CQ 
39(1989),20); and with reference to pregnant wives who remain EV  'tote; 
o'lKOte;  of their dead husbands.  At the  man's death,  his  house became 
temporarily desolate without a male inhabitant; and it was his pregnant 
widow who became the immediate occupier and de facto administrator of 
the otherwise desolate house of  the husband (Hyp.Lyk. 2,frag.l.3). 
It is significant that the law's concern with regard to the archon's 
protection for pregnant widows in their defunct husbands' households has 
also a political dimension. Aristotle informs us that the household was the 
fundamental  unit of the polis.
308  And, as Just rightly points out/
09  in a 
society  still  expressing  its  unity  through  the  medium  of kinship  and 
family,  any  interference  with  the  correct  or  right  succession  of the 
constitutive houses of the polis amounted to a threat to  the  state itself. 
The  pregnant  widow,  therefore,  served  as  a  regulator  for  the  right 
succession in her husband's house as  a unit of the composite houses of 
the polis. In this way, she played the important role of contributing to the 
maintenance of a continuing social and political order in the husband's 
community to ensure the stability of  the general fabric of  the state. 
308  Pol.l.1.3-6. 
309 
Women,p.32. 
231 CONCLUSION 
To  summarise then.  In this  attempt,  some  of the  issues  raised 
regarding  the  status  of pregnant  widows  may  seem  inferential;  but 
although inferences ex silentio may always be suspect,  in this  exercise 
they are hard to resist. It is noted that the pregnant widow enjoyed special 
protection not extended to ordinary widows in the society in general. This 
special protection under the jurisdiction of the archon, however, appears 
to be conditioned by two important circumstances. First and foremost, the 
protection was given to them because of the children they were bearing. 
Secondly, it seems that it was pregnant widows living in their husbands' 
houses who were covered by the law. 
OIKos  in the law quoted in Dem.43.75 did not originally imply 
'family'; it acquired that technically extended meaning in the orators in 
their law court speeches during the classical period when self-conscious 
attention  to  lineage  and ancestry became very typical  of the  Athenian 
intelligentsia  who were  striving  for  pre-eminence in  the  fast-growing 
democratic Athenian society  . Normally, a pregnant widow was expected 
to remain in the deceased husband's house under the guardianship of the 
man appointed to be guardian of the posthumous child when it was born, 
until  she  gave  birth  to  the  child.  Because  of special  circumstances 
applying in the case of  pregnant wives of  men executed by the state, such 
232 widows  were bound to vacate their husbands' houses to  live with their 
relatives or their husbands' kin. 
There was no kind of state support in the form of provision of 
graIn  or  food  to  any  group  of widows  in  classical  Athens,  as  the 
impression seems to be created by some commentators. Even with war-
orphans,  it  is  not  certain  whether  the  state  distributed  grain  to  them, 
besides the grant of an obol a day each that was given. The archon's care 
for  orphans,  heiresses  and  widows  as  authorised  by the  law  cited  in 
Dem.43.75, and summarised in the AP,56.7,was a directive to the archon 
to ensure that these people, deprived of their masters, were provided for 
by their  guardians;  and to  take  legal  action  against  any  guardian who 
failed to do so, or committed any unlawful act against any of  them. 
It  would  therefore  appear  misleading  to  regard  the 
lexicographer's citation of  O'1:to<; as state provision of  food to widows and 
orphans.  The  lexicographer  is  certainly  showing  awareness  of two 
entirely different facts: (i) a material fact; that is, maintenance for women 
and  orphans  as  part of Solon's  laws,  as  is  evident  in  the  AP;  (ii)  a 
linguistic  fact,  indicating  the  occurrence  of the  word  in  the  orator's 
speech.  In these  two instances,  the  lexicographer does  not imply state 
provision of food to widows instituted by Solon. For classical Athens we 
have  far more sources in which such evidence ought to appear, if there 
were any reason for its existence; but it seems to be entirely absent. 
233 It  is  noticeable  that  the  pregnant  widow  became  the  agent 
through whom her deceased husband could be avenged by his son if his 
death was intentionally caused by a fellow  citizen.  She also played the 
role  of the  posthumous  child's  first  tutor  or  instructor  regarding  the 
family  history of its  father.  This is  evident in Lysias  13.42, where the 
condemned  Dionysodoros enjoins his  pregnant wife  that if she  should 
bear a son,  she should inform him of who caused his father's death for 
him to execute his father's vengeance on the person. 
It has also been noted that the Athenian society demonstrated 
concern for and extended protection to pregnant widows in their deceased 
husbands' households for two main reasons. First, they acted as taproots 
for  the  future  growth and continuity of their husbands'  lineal  descent. 
They also became regulators for the correct or right succession in their 
husbands'  households in order to maintain a stable  social  and political 
order  in  the  community  or  the  state.  This  civic  responsibility  of 
contributing  to  maintain  a  stable  social  and  political  order  in  the 
community and the state at large certainly gives the pregnant widow an 
essential role to play in the politics of  the state. 
The political duty of the pregnant widow runs rather contrary to 
the traditionally held view by commentators that women had no political 
role to play in the politics of Athens. I consider this orthodox opinion of 
commentators as groundless. Marriage in Athens was closely linked with 
234 the  political  life  of the  state,  in  that  it  was  through  marrIage  that 
legitimate offspring were produced for the husband and for the state. But 
the  woman's own citizenship, in the first instance, and her marriage by 
E')'')'tn"), in the second instance as an Athenian woman, became a sine qua 
non of, and an essential evidence for the citizenship of  her children and in 
any political suit regarding their status. 
The  pregnant widow  would  certainly have  passed through  the 
various customary and political processes as  an Athenian woman before 
the  death of her husband.  Thus  she,  like her ordinary married woman 
counterpart in the society, had a dual political role to play deriving from 
her  status:  (i)  at  the state level, to produce legitimate offspring for  the 
state; (ii) at the local level she had the civic duty to help maintain a social 
and political order in the community by producing citizen children. This 
dual political role of the pregnant widow as a woman implies, therefore, 
that  the  Athenian woman was not completely excluded from  Athenian 
politics. But that, although she could not vote or be voted for, or speak at 
the Assembly, she in fact, had an essential role to play in the political life 
of the state; unless bearing citizen sons by the Athenian woman and using 
her citizenship to prove that of  her children in a political suit had nothing 
to do with the politics of  Athens. 
235 CHAPTER 5 
THE WIDOW AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Attic  lawsuits  provide  a  number  of significant  examples  of 
women  holding  property  inherited  from  a  brother,  a  cousin,  or  an 
uncle.  310  We also  find  some of such women claiming or contesting an 
inheritance  in  court,  though  not  in  their  capacity  as  mothers.311 
Significantly, the court recognised such claims, and the speakers refer to 
the women who brought them as active disputants, though in each case a 
kyrios  \yas  the  woman's  representative  in  court.  And  by  and  large, 
ownership seems to be in theory, for in practice the property was always 
under the control and management of  the woman's kyrios. 
However,  the  rules  of intestate  succession  in  Athens  did  not 
provide  for  a  widow  to  have  a  title  to  any  portion  of her  deceased 
husband's estate.
312  In fact,  Athenian women in general had no title  to 
their  husbands'  estate.  One  might  therefore  think  that  because  of the 
system of  inheritance which gave the legitimate son all the property of  his 
father,  the totality of the deceased's estate would pass into the hands of 
his  son  or sons  or his next-of-kin if there were no children, while the  , 
widow  got nothing from  her late  husband.  But it is  evident that  some 
Athenian husbands, provided for the future needs and sustenance of their 
310  Is.5.6,27;7.31; 11.9,49; Dem.43.3-6. 
3II  Is.3.3;7.2;11.17. 
236 \yidows in their wills. They not only gave substantial amount of money 
for their dowries in second marriages, but in fact also bequeathed part of 
their  property  to  them,  and  indeed  fulfilled  their  social  obligation  by 
choosing their widows' husbands. A few examples may suffice. 
In Lysias, we are told that before Diodotos set off for his military 
campaign in which he was killed, he gave a will to his brother, Diogeiton, 
instructing  him that  if he  should perish  in  the  campaign,  his  brother 
should  give  his wife  away in a  second marriage with a  dowry of one 
talent.  He further charged Diogeiton to give to his wife all the personal 
effects in the room. Besides these arrangements, Diodotos bequeathed to 
his wife twenty minae and thirty staters ofCyzicus.
313 
Kleoboule  also  happens  to  be one  of the  fortunate  widows  whose 
husbands  provided for  their  future.  In his  will,  Demosthenes  (I.),  her 
husband, had betrothed her to his nephew, Aphobos. Her dowry in this 
arranged second marriage was eighty minae;  fifty minae of it made up 
from  her jewelry and some cups or plates,  and the  other thirty minae 
derived  from  the  sale  of some  slaves.  In  addition  to  the  financial 
arrangements, the elder Demosthenes had left the house and its furniture 
312 
See Dem.43.51.  .  dr d 
313  Lys.32.5-6. For the particular room referred to in the will see above, , The Widow and Her Km  e 
in Her Transitional State,' n. 245. For the value of  the staters of  Cyzicus see Dem.34.23; and cf. 
Lamb's note to Lys.12.11,LCL,p.252. 
237 for  the  use  of Kleoboule  and  her  children,  and  her  future  husband 
~ 14  Aphobos.-
We  are  told  in  Demosthenes  45  also  that  under  Pasion's  will  , 
Arkhippe, his widow, was left a tenement house valued at a substantial 
amount  of one  hundred minae,  and two  talents  in cash as  part of her 
dowry  in  a  second arranged marriage  to  Phormion.  Moreover,  Pasion 
bequeathed to Arkhippe some female slaves, jewelry, and everything else 
that the woman had in the house.  315 
Furthermore, the allegation by Aphobos against Kleoboule is also 
worth noting. As narrated by Demosthenes, Aphobos had alleged that his 
uncle,  Demosthenes  (I. )had left the  younger Demosthenes  four  talents 
buried  in the  house,  and had put Kleoboule  in  charge  of that  amount 
(Dem.27.53).  Aphobos did not give the  source of his information;  and 
quite naturally, Demosthenes denies the allegation in no uncertain terms, 
and  rejects outright any clue that it was his  father who may have told 
Aphobos about the allegedly buried money (27.55-57). But the allegation 
and the denial indicate that a woman, or a widow could be put in control 
of a large sum of  money by her husband. 
We notice, therefore, the various types or categories of  property a 
widow could have and their sources. There could be a bequest to her by 
314  Dem.27.5,10,13,16;28.16,19;29.44. 
315  Dem.45.28. See also Wolff, Traditio 2(1944),57; Davies,APF,p.431; Whitehead,CQ 36(1986),12; 
Hunter, Policing,p.21; Lacey, Family,p.132. 
238 her husband at his death. This category of property could comprise cash, 
female  slaves,  articles  of clothing  and  jewels,  and  household  items 
(Dem.45.28; Lys.32.6-7). A widow could also be given a dowry by her 
deceased  husband  as  a  kind  of property  for  a  second  marriage.  It is 
important to note, however, that since the husband would have received 
his  wife  with a  dowry  from  her kindred which he  would have  had to 
return  in the  event of death or divorce  of the  wife,  the  woman's new 
dowry was usually a composite of her original dowry and an additional 
sum  of money as  would have been directed by her deceased husband. 
And her new dowry might comprise cash, as was usually the case, plates, 
clothes, jewelry, and a tenement house, all of which were valued as part 
of the dowry (Dem.27.5,13-14; 45.28; Lys.32.6). 
There  could also  be property owned by the  widow  in her  own 
right.  Such property of the widow could most probably be articles given 
to her by her kindred at her marriage before the decease of her husband, 
as the case of Kiron's daughter (ls.8.8). It is also evident that Kleoboule 
had  a very wealthy  family  background,316  and thus  may have  entered 
marriage with a lot of  property like clothes, jewels, and cash as gifts from 
her parents which she owned in her own right at the death of  her husband. 
The status of the epikleros and her patrimony will be examined in 
chapter 8 below. One significant thing to note here about her, however, is 
239 that if she were a widowed epikleros who had no son, she would have to 
be claimed again by the next-of-kin according to the rules of succession 
in  the  family.  Her patrimony  would  then  transfer  to  him who  would 
manage and hold it in trust for her future son. But it seems that she could 
also be left with property by her deceased husband for her son, as is said 
to  have been alleged by Aphobos (Dem.27.53,55-57). It is important to 
note  also  that  the  house  with  its  furniture  that  Demosthenes'  father 
instructed in his will that his widow should live in with her new proposed 
husband and the children (Dem.27.5), was also left for her son when he 
came of  age. 
The question is, how much of such property as might be given to 
the widow did she own, manage, or control with rights to dispose of it? 
Could  the  Athenian  widow  dispose  of her  own property  in the  legal 
sense? For talking of ownership of  property has the technical meaning of 
property  rights  which embody the  right of the  individual  to  own and 
dispose of  his or her own property. 
THE BRITISH  AND GHANAIAN EXPERIENCE 
In modem Europe and elsewhere including the United States, it is 
common knowledge that a widow has a title to her husband's estate. In 
1925,  the  United Kingdom for  instance, as  part of her reforms for  her 
316  Dem.27.4; Pluto Dem.4.2; Aeschn.3.172. Cf. also Davies, APF, 121-122; Hunter, Policing, p.30; 
240 welfare  society,  introduced  the  first  national  scheme  of contributory 
pensions  for  widows  and  orphans  in  British  society.  By this  scheme, 
widows and orphans were to receive a kind of  support from the state. For 
several years the rate of benefit remained at  10 shillings a week. By and 
large, British widows of  all categories were entitled to this benefit. And in 
1946,  the  National  Insurance  Act  was  passed.  The  Act  retained  the 
benefit  for  widowed  mothers,  but  restricted  entitlement  of childless 
widows to those over 50 years. Younger widows were expected to find a 
paid job to support themselves after a few months on benefits. 
Then according to reforms of the bereavement benefits in  1998, 
instead of an existing lump sum of £1,000.00 to the widow within four 
days at the decease of  her husband to defray immediate funeral expenses 
and unpaid bills, the British widow would now be entitled to £2,000.00 
for  funeral  expenses  and unpaid bills.  But this  is  besides her and  any 
children's  exclusive  entitlement  to  her  deceased  husband's  property. 
Furthermore, the British widow is entitled to a pension of £85.00 a week, 
that is, £340.00 a month drawn on her late husband's contributions to the 
National  Insurance  scheme  until  her  youngest  child  leaves  full-time 
further education.
317  The British widow, together with her children, thus 
becomes the automatic heiress or inheritor of  her deceased husband. 
Gemet  'Notes sur les parents de Demosthenes,' REG 31(1918),185-96, noted by Hunter, ibid. 
317  Cf.' The Herald, Thursday, 19 November, 1998,p.6, 17; The Guardian, 19 November, 1998,p: 15. See 
also Understanding Your Tax Code, 1998,p.11,15; 1999,p.12; Finance Act, 1(1998),p.1, pubhshed by 
241 But like the 1946 Act, the new scheme restricted to six months the 
bereavement benefits for those over 45 years with no children, the policy 
designed "to ensure benefits go to those for whom they were intended. 
All  these reforms are driven by our central objective - work for  those 
who can and security for those who cannot.  ,,318 This implies that the grant 
for  a childless widow ceases six months after the death of her husband. 
Furthermore, it is obvious that younger widows are expected to find paid 
jobs to maintain themselves after six months of  receiving the benefits. 
Putting the British experience and the Athenian situation side by 
side, there is one thing in the British experience that reflects the widow's 
protection law in Demosthenes 43.75. That is, the emphasis for support 
appears  to  be on the  orphaned child but not on the  widow's personal 
welfare.  In Demosthenes 43.75, it is because of the  child the pregnant 
widow is bearing that she is given special legal protection. But for the 
pregnancy,  she  would,  like  her  counterparts,  have  had  no  special 
protection  by  society.  With  the  British policy  too,  it  appears  mainly 
because of the orphaned child that the widow with a child is given the 
benefit.  None the  less,  it is  significant that the  British widow with or 
the United Kingdom Inland Revenue Department. In the Tax Code and Finance Act documents, a 
widow's bereavement allowance of  £1830 for the tax year 1997-98 was increased to £1900 for the tax 
year ending 5 April 1999, and from 6 April 1999 to 5 April 2000. It is presumed that this amount of 
£  1900 which is less than £200 a month is what has now been increased to £340 per month, based on the 
deceased husband's contributions to the scheme. On the establishment of  the National Insurance 
Scheme and support for widows and orphans, see House o/Commons Oificial Rep~rt, Vol. 1, 19.47-48: 
Standing Committee C: National Assistance Bill; Vo1.3,  1955-56: Standmg CommIttee E: FamIly 
Allowance and National Insurance Bill. 
318  Mr. Alistair Darling, Secretary for Social Benefits. The Herald, Thursday 19 November, 1998,p.17. 
242 without a child is entitled to her deceased husband's property which she 
controls, manages, and could dispose of  at will. 
In  most African societies  where  lineage  is  traced  through the 
matrilineal line, the issue of inheritance and ownership of property is not 
quite  such  an  easy  matter.  Even  where  succession  is  patrilineal,  the 
pattern does not transmit easily and straight from father to son, and the 
real  situation appears much more  complex than the  superficial picture 
patrilineality presents to the ordinary African.  Either way, however, the 
widow appears to be at a great disadvantage. 
In Ghana, for instance, neither spouse has a right to the property 
of the other. Even children from the marriage have no automatic right to 
their  father's  estate;  and  the  children  and  the  widow's  continued 
residence in her deceased husband's house is subject to good behaviour, 
or  they  are  thrown  out  of the  matrimonial  home  by  the  husband's 
relatives. And in the majority of cases they are ejected on the whims and 
caprices of the deceased relatives with no provocation by the widow and 
her  children.  It was just recently in 1985, that some kind of protection 
was  given to the widow and her children by a law enacted by the then 
military regime. The relevant portions of  the law read as follows: 
" Where the intestate is survived by a spouse or child or both, the 
spouse  or child or both of them,  as  the  case may be,  shall be entitled 
absolutely to the household chattels of  the intestate. And where the estate 
243 includes only one house the surviving spouse or child or both of  them, as 
the case may be, shall be entitled to that house, and where it devolves to 
both spouse and child, they shall hold it as tenants-in-common.,,319 
The law provides also that where the estate includes more than one 
house, the surviving spouse or child or both shall decide which of those 
houses  shall devolve to  either or both of them.  And the residue of the 
estate  is  to  be  divided  by  specific  fractional  proportions  among  the 
surviving  widow  and  her  child  or  children,  and  relatives  of  the 
deceased.320 
Notwithstanding the provisions of the law, intestate succession in 
Ghana is still a thorny and murky issue. For it appears that the widow and 
her  children  continue  to  be  at  the  mercy  of the  deceased  husband's 
relatives.  One case in point. Just after the promulgation of the law, one 
Emmanuel Kofi Sefah died intestate leaving a widow and eight children. 
When the [mal funeral rites had been observed a year after his decease, 
the  elders of his family ignored the law and decided to share his estate 
according to Akan custom.321  Consequently, the widow and her children 
were forcefully ejected from the deceased Sefah's house by his relatives. 
They also took possession of  his saloon car and a truck, and all household 
properties.  This resulted in a lengthy and squalid litigation between the 
319  PNDC Law 111: Intestate Succession Law, 1985,p.2, Section 3-4. 
320  Ibid.,p.2-3, sections 5&6.  .  .  . . 
321  The Akans in Ghana trace their kinship through the female, and therefore inhent matrdmeally. 
244 widow and her children on one hand, and the relatives of  the deceased on 
the other hand.
322 
None the less, it is noteworthy that if  a husband feels that his wife 
has been good or helpful to him, he could make a formal gift of a house 
or  a farmland,  or some such valuable property to  her inter vivos.  This 
normally  takes  place  in  the  presence  of members  of his  family  and 
witnesses,  including members of the  woman's family.  And the  wife's 
family  is  customarily  obliged  to  show  appreciation  of the  gift,  and 
gratitude  to  the  husband by presenting to  him a bottle of schnapps  or 
whisky, or any such drink as certified by custom, also in the presence of 
witnesses including members of  the man's family. 
Failing  these  customary  formalities,  the  property  may  be 
incorporated  into  the  general pool of the  estate of the  husband by his 
relatives  at  his  death  and  shared  according  to  custom.  But  any  such 
property as shall be generally recognised or attested as  a gift of deed to 
the wife certainly remains her own property, administered, and controlled 
by her at the death of  her husband. 
Putting  the  three  cultures  (the  British,  the  Ghanaian,  and  the 
Athenian), side by side, the classical Athenian widow seems to have no 
comparable  status with the modern British widow.  With her Ghanaian 
counterpart,  however, her situation does not seem quite  so  different in 
245 certain respects. Particularly, just as the Ghanaian widow has no stake in 
her husband's property, so did the Athenian widow have no title to her 
husband's estate. However, unlike the Athenian widow, it is definite that 
whatever property the Ghanaian widow would have entered her marriage 
with remained her bona fide property while in marriage and at the death 
of her husband. But there seems to be no clear evidence of the Athenian 
widow's  ownership  of not  only  property  bequeathed  to  her  by  her 
deceased husband, but even property with which she entered marriage. 
DOWRY  AND ARTICLES OF TROUSSEAU 
The  question  as  to  whether  the  Athenian  widow  could  own 
property,  and  what  kinds  of property  she  could  own  seems  to  be 
embedded in the whole issue of women's property rights in Athens. But 
this  branch  of the  Athenian  legal  system  is  disputed  among  modem 
commentators who do not agree on whether the Athenian woman, and for 
that matter the widow, could own property of  any kind.
323 
The basis for the conflicting opinions appears to be grounded on 
the  general juridical status of women in Athens that seems to place the 
322  Cf. The Mirror, 9 June, 1990,p.3, published by The New Times Corporation, Ghana. 
323  The most extensive work as at now on women's economic rights in Athens is that of  David 
Schaps,  Economic Rights of  Women in Ancient Greece (Edinburgh, 1979). But see Wolff, Traditio 
2(1944),53-65; Harrison, Law i ,p.73 n.3,108-109,112-114,236; L.J.TH. Kuenen-Janssens, ' Some 
Notes  Upon the Competence of  the Athenian Women to Conduct a Transaction' Mnemosyne 9(1940-
41),199-214; Croix, ' Some Observations on the Property Rights of  Athenian Women' CR 
84(1970),273-278; Lin Foxhall, ' Household, Gender and Property in Classical Athens' CQ 
39(1989),122-144; Hunter, Policing, p.19-33. 
246 \voman in perpetual minority.324 On this principle, it is even claimed by 
Schaps that Athenian law never permitted a woman to acquire and own 
any property at all: 
"  If the law could afford to  treat Athenian women as  having no 
property, it was because they had, in fact, no real way of acquiring it.,,325 
The diversity of views notwithstanding, the status of the widow's dowry 
is very certain. 
It is generally acknowledged that the wife was the beneficiary of 
the dowry transaction between her kyrios and her husband. But since she 
was  always  subject to  the  head of the  family,  her husband,  who  then 
became  her  kyrios  had  control  of it.  Significantly,  by  the  general 
principles of  the dowry law, the husband might administer, use and utilise 
it for  his own interest and at his own discretion. None the less, he was 
subject to certain limitations consequent upon future obligation to return 
its  full  value, either on divorce or on the woman's return to her natural 
kyrios at her husband's death. She thus does seem to have no right of  her 
.  .  h  d  326  own In any way In t  e  owry. 
However, commenting on the inheritance rights of the Athenian 
woman,  Schaps  claims that the  dowry was  the  woman's share  of her 
324  The best full discussion of  this subject is in Harrison, noted above and passim. But cf. also the lucid 
treatment by MacDowell, Law, p.84-108. See also Gould, JHS 100(1980),38-59. 
325  Schaps, Economic Rights,p.17. For his views that Athenian legal structure refused to see a woman 
as kyria of  property see ibid, p.14-16. 
326  Cf. Wolff, Traditio 2(1944),63; Harrison, Law (i), p.45-60; de Ste Croix, CR 84(1970),275; 
MacDowell, Law, p.87-89. 
247 father's  property set aside  for  her maintenance,  to  compensate  for  her 
disability  to  share  the  patrimony  equally  with  her  brothers.  Schaps' 
argument  seems  to  be  reinforced  by  Foxhall  who  maintains  that  a 
woman's dowry belonged to her alone and that it was her share of the 
patrimony of  her original household.(cf.n.330 below) 
That the dowry was meant for a woman's maintenance in marriage 
cannot be disputed.  But the  view that it was  her share of her father's 
estate and that it belonged to her alone because she could not have equal 
share of the patrimony with her brother(s) is not completely convincing. 
It is  a fact  that the dowry is referred to in the sources as the woman's 
dowry.327  But this is so because it was for her sake that the dowry was 
given to secure her maintenance. This, however, does not imply that she 
technically owned the dowry. The language of  the texts in which dowries 
for women are mentioned clearly illustrates the position - the dowry was 
given along with the woman to the husband but not to her.328 
If her husband  died  and  she  left  his  household,  his  heir  was 
obliged to return the full value of her dowry to him who had given her 
away  in marriage.  He might then decide  to  give  her away again in a 
second marriage with a  greater or smaller amount of dowry or with no 
dowry at all.329  Also, as is evident in Isaios 8 On  the Estate of  Kiron,  a 
327  See Dem.27.15; 40.25; 47.57; Lys. 19.32. 
328  Cf. Dem. 27.5 28.15-16; 45.28; Is. 2.9; Lys. 32.6. 
329  Cf. Is. 8.8-9; Dem.41.26; Lys. 19.14; 32.15. 
248 father  or legal representative might decide not to  sue  for  his  woman's 
dowry  if her marriage became terminated (8.8).  This,  I believe,  would 
normally not be the case if  the dowry was her share of her patrimony and 
thus belonged to her. Furthermore, giving a dowry was optional and not 
mandatory as it was the case with paternal inheritance by the sones) of a 
father. A woman's father, or legal representative was therefore not legally 
obliged to dower her in marriage (unless of course she was an epikleros), 
though it was usual to do so. This implies that the woman did not have an 
inalienable right to the dowry as the sones) of a father had to inherit from 
the  father.  Thus there could be no means by which a widow could keep 
the  dowry on her in her possession since it was not a separate sum of 
money set apart for her. Schaps and Foxhall therefore seem to have over-
stretched the property rights of  the woman.
330 
The  issue  that  seems  to  generate  much  controversy  among 
commentators is that of personal effects given to women by their natural 
kin,  or  their  ex-husbands  at  their  marriage,  and  bequests  from  the 
deceased  husbands  to  their  widows.  Sometimes  we  find  mention  of 
lJ.ld:na Kat xpucrla (garments and ornaments) given by either the father 
of the woman at her marriage (ls.8.8; Dem.41.27), or a deceased husband 
in his will for the second marriage of  his widow (Dem.27.13,16; 45.28). 
330  See for instance, Schaps, Economic Rights, p.23; Foxhall, CQ 39(1989),35. 
249 Two schools of thought express different views about the status of 
these  items given to the woman at her marriage. One argues that these 
items  could either be reckoned in the value of the  dowry,  or set apart 
from  the  dowry.  331  But  the  other  maintains  strongly  that  the  wife's 
trousseau was never included in the value of  the dowry;332 both resting on 
Isaios 2.9;8.8 and Demosthenes 41.27 as the basis for their claims. Since 
the  issue  borders  on  what  categories  of property  a  widow  could,  in 
practice, own personally, we may go into the matter again in spite of  what 
has so far been said. 
The passage in Isaios 8.8 reads as follows: 
"He gave her in marriage to Nausimenes of  Kholargos giving with 
her  a  dowry  of twenty-five  minai  besides  garments  and  jewelry." 
(
'  ~I  ~  '"  ~  I  ,  I  I  '"  "  EKOLOWO"l  v  UUTllV  ••• auv  l1-1U  TlOlS  KUl  xpuaLOLS  1TE.VTE.  KUl  ELKoaL  1-1 vus 
E1TL8ous). 
I refrain from the analysis of the use of auv in the orators.333  I 
would  however  submit that auv  with the dative  LII.UTLOlS  KUt  xpuaLoLs  ,  ,  r-
here in this passage could also be used adverbially and translated as  'in 
addition  to'  or besides'  garments  and jewelry.  This  implies  that  apart 
from  giving  for  her  a  dowry  of  twenty-five  minai,  the  speaker's 
331  See Schaps, ibid.p.lOl,150, Appendix III,n.2; Wyse, p.245-246,595. 
332  See Wolff,53-57. 
333  See Wyse, p.523 on Is. 6.33; Schaps, Economic Rights, p.l02. 
250 grandfather gave his daughter clothes and jewels. These articles were not 
meant as part of  her dowry, but for her own personal use. 
Two  things  make  the  distinction  clearer.  In  the  first  place,  the 
articles of  clothing and jewelry were not qualified or valued as part of  her 
dowry.  Secondly, in subsequent statements to the jury, the speaker says 
that when the woman became widowed and left to live with her father , 
the father did not recover her dowry from the heir to N ausimenes because 
of the  deceased's  financial  straits.  Nevertheless,  the  man  gave  his 
daughter  away  in  a  second  marriage  with  a  dowry  of one  thousand 
drachmai (8.8-9), which was far less than what she previously got. 
Here,  there is no mention of the  articles of clothing and jewelry 
again.  The  presumption  is  that  the  woman  still  had  her  clothes  and 
jewelry given to  her at her first  marriage in her possession.  What the 
daughter  needed  in  her  second  marriage  was  another  dowry  as  her 
contribution to her second husband's estate for her maintenance, which 
her  father provided.  In this passage of Isaios,  therefore,  the  articles of 
clothing and jewelry did not form part of the woman's dowry. It would 
thus  be  too  tempting  for  commentators  to  cite  it  as  an instance  of a 
woman's  articles  forming  part  of her  dowry.  They  would  be  over-
stretching the boundaries of  the law or the customary practice of giving a 
dowry to a woman at her marriage, and assume that she always entered 
marriage with virtually nothing for her own use. 
251 Even  the  citing of Isaios  2.9  by Wyse  (p.595),  as  evidence  of 
clothes  and trinkets reckoned in the  dowry  appears  presumptious.  The 
speaker tells the jury: 
K '  ~  M  \ ....,  ....,~,  ~ 
aL  0  EVEKI\T)S  'TT)V  'TE  1TpOLKa  E1TLOLOWO"LV  aU'T4>, •••  KaL  'To.  l  \-1 a.'T La  , 
Menekles  handed  over  her  dowry  to  him, ...  and  he  gave  to  her  the 
garments which she had brought with her to his house and the jewelry 
which was there." 
It is noteworthy that the statement, KaL  'To.  )(puO"La  a.  ~v,  'and the 
jewelry which was there',  seems prima facie  ambiguous,  and  open to 
interpretation as either the woman brought the jewelry, like she brought 
her clothes, to Menekles' house at her marriage to him, or it was bought 
for  her by Menekles in her marriage. Either way, there is no indication 
that these were a dowry in kind to the woman's second husband. 
Secondly, the status of  the woman's clothes is definite. The clothes 
were personal effects given to her by her brothers for her own use.  For 
there is no hint in the preceding sections where giving her in marriage is 
discussed (2.3-5) that her clothes were a dowry in kind in addition to her 
dowry cash of  twenty-five minai given to Menekles on her behalf (2.5). 
Furthermore, the recipients of the dowry and the items given by 
Menekles  indicate two categories of property for  different purposes.  In 
the  first place, it seems that it was the same amount of dowry of twenty 
252 minai  at  her  first  mamage  that  Menekles  handed  over  to  Elios,  the 
woman's  second husband.  But because  it  was  to  become  part  of the 
husband's household estate, it was given on behalf of the woman to him  , 
E1TLOLOWO"LV  o.tyr4>.  But because the  clothes and trinkets  were  a  separate 
category  of property  for  a  different  purpose  (the  personal  use  of the 
woman),  they were given to her:  OLOWO"LV  UU'T'U  with no qualification or 
value put on them. The articles of garments and jewelry in Isaios 2.9 and 
2.8 can therefore not be taken as always included in the woman's dowry. 
Of  course, a dowry was a sign of  legitimate marriage, as attested in 
Isaios 3.8-9,35-39, and rightly noted by Schaps.334 But I think that it was 
not a large amount of  dowry that certified the legitimacy of  a marriage, as 
Schaps  would  want  us  to  believe.  I  believe  that  once  the  generally 
accepted marriage procedures of  Eyyul1  and giving of  the dowry had been 
followed,  the  marriage was  accepted  as  legitimate  whether or not the 
dowry  was  small,  although  a  substantial  amount  of dowry  certainly 
enhanced the social status of  the woman and her family of  origin. 
But perhaps  the  most  irritating  passage  regarding  dowry  and 
trousseau is Demosthenes 41.27. The plaintiff tells the jury: 
n ,..  ';'  ,  ~ ,  "'\  "  ,.k  1  ""  Ta.1S  ws  OUV  ouoEV  EI\UTTOV  EXEL,  ~l1o"EL  TLS,  EL  TOUTtp  j.1EV  EV 
,  ,,,  ~  1  ,..  ,\1  "0' 
TETTUpUKOV'To.  l-Lva.1s  EVETLj.1UTO  TO.  XPUO"LU  KUL  Lj.1UTLU  TWV  XLI\LWV,  Ej.10L 
253 ,  L  8'  ,;,,,  ~  ~  ,  , 
ya.p  1TOU  LUS.  W  UVOpES  OLKUO'TUL,  1TUpU  TOU  AEWKPUTOUS  EXOUO'UV  Tel. 
xpUO"LU  KUt  tj.1UTLU  T-ilV  'VUVUl.K'  EAuQEV,  ti)v  0  IloAUEUK""'Oc- ' 
. I  i  tJ  I  ~  1Tp0O'U  1TETELO"E 
,  rl'"  ,  '"  ~ 8'  ,  1TpOLKOS.  00'  EXW  j.10VOV,  1TpOS  TU  TOUTtp  00  EVT  , ,  '8""  ~  , 
EUV  UVTL  11  TLS,  EUp'T)o"EL 
" How can he not have received less, someone may say, if with 
respect  to  him  the  jewelry  and  apparel,  worth  1000  drachmas,  were 
included in the valuation set at 40 minas, while with respect to me the 10 
minas were paid in addition and separately? This is precisely what I am 
going to  explain. For Spudias, men of the jury, took over his wife from 
Leocrates  with  the  jewelry  and  clothing  for  which  Polyeuctus  paid 
Leocrates more than 1000 drachmas. I, however - if one compares what 
he  sent to  me apart from the dowry,  that is  to say,  so  much as  I have 
really received, with what was given to him, he will find it of  about equal 
value, apart from what was mortgaged for the 1000 drachmas.,,335 
336  d S  h  337  The passage has been ably analysed by Wolff  an  caps, 
either  version  of which  is  possible.  On  the  whole,  it  presents  two 
inevitable ambiguities which Wolff and Schaps have rightly noted. There 
is  the  bizarre  computation of all  the  values  of what was  received by 
Spoudias in relation to what the plaintiff received for his wife. As can be 
334 Economic Rights, p.102. 
335  I follow here the translation given by Wolff, Traditio 2(1944), 55. 
336  Ibid, 55-57. 
254 noticed, the logic of  the plaintiff  s mathematics involves a combination of 
words  like  U1TEP,  1TPOS,  1TAELV,  and  1Tapa1TA1]O'La  which  could  be used 
either  adverbially,  adjectivally,  or comparatively.  But all  these  verbal 
complexities tend to obscure the relationship between the values of items 
each person received. 
There is also the structure of  the last sentence of  the passage. This 
begins  as  if it  were  to  compare  the  trousseau  of the  two  wives,  but 
changes into a comparison of  the total amounts received by Spoudias and 
his rival. So the reader is at a loss as to what exactly the plaintiff intends 
to put across. 
The crucial focus of conflict among commentators, however,  is 
whether the articles of clothing and the jewelry of Spoudias' wife were 
valued in her dowry. The confused state of affairs seems to be wrapped 
up  in  the  plaintiffs strange  computation.  Nevertheless,  it  does  appear 
from the passage as a whole that the articles of clothing and jewelry were, 
in  fact,  reckoned in the dowry of Spoudias' wife.  On this,  I  side with 
Schaps; though I differ from him that the items in Isaios 8.8 are included 
in the woman's dowry. (Economic Rights, p.103-104) 
It is significant that €Verq..LUTO,  1TpoO'a1TETELO'E  and a1ToTL~1")eEVTWV 
in  the  passage  here  denote  the  concept of valuation;  and  the  speaker 
himself adverts to this when he says that Polyeuktos had charged (valued) 
337  Economic Rights, p.103-104. 
255 the  items  against  Leokrates,  the  former  husband of the  woman,  who 
handed  over the  dowry to  Spoudias,  the  new husband.  Thus  from  the 
\yoman's items together with her dowry, Spoudias received 40 minai.  I 
think,  therefore, that Wyse must be in error that the  objects were apart 
from  the  dowry  and  not  technically  valued  (Wyse,  p.55).  In  general, 
however, I am inclined to believe that whether the woman's garments and 
trinkets should be reckoned and valued in her dowry or not appears to be 
at the discretion of  her kyrios. 
At any rate, one thing seems very certain. That is, if  garments and 
trinkets,  slaves,  or any such property was reckoned in the  value of the 
dowry  for  a woman, it went under the control and management of her 
husband, and the full value of such items could be retrieved at his death 
by the woman's natural kin.  This position is corroborated elsewhere by 
evidence  from  other passages  in Demosthenes  and  Isaios.  In the  first 
speech of his suit against Stephanos for perjury, Apollodoros laments at 
the  apparent authoritative and assertive tendency of Phormion regarding 
property in their house. In his protest the status of items valued as part of 
the dowry clearly comes out: 
" Of the effects in the house he made himself master by the will, 
. h  h  ,,338 
on the ground that they had been given as  a dowry WIt  my mot er. 
We may compare also the following passage of Isaios on the position of 
256 property given to a woman that was not included in the evaluation of the 
dowry: 
"If a  man  gives  with  a  woman  a  sum not  duly  assessed  in  a 
contract, and if  the wife leaves the husband or the husband puts away his 
wife,  the man who gave money cannot, as  far as  the law is concerned  , 
demand back what he gave but did not assess in a contract.,,339 
It stands to reason then, that any kind of property given to the 
woman either by her natural kyrios or by her deceased husband in his will 
that  was not reckoned in the value of the  dowry belonged to her.  The 
essential question is whether articles listed in a deceased husband's will 
for his widow already belonged to the woman before her husband's death, 
or they belonged to the husband until his death. In order to address this 
issue I shall take the case of Arkhippe and pose the question again: Did 
the  items  listed  in  Pasion's  will  already  belong  to  Arkhippe  before 
Pasion's death, or did they belong to Pasion before he died? 
First, about the items valued in her dowry. We do not know how 
much dowry Arkhippe brought to Pasion on her marriage to him. We thus 
do not know the nature of  her dowry, as to whether it was only cash, or it 
was a combination of cash and other properties in kind valued as part of 
the  dowry.  But it is definite from the will that the two talents  and the 
tenement house belonged to Pasion until he died. 
338  Dem.45.30. Cf. also Dem.50.60. 
257 Now the slaves, jewelry, and the other items in the house.  We 
have no knowledge of  the composition of the items that Arkhippe had in 
the house (certainly her quarters). It is, however, fair to presume that they 
included chattels like utensils, clothes, and most probably furniture.34o  It 
is evident from the last sentence of the will that these items - the slaves  , 
ornaments,  and  all  the  other  unmentioned  personal  effects  - were 
supposed to be bequests to Arkhippe for her personal use. This is denoted 
by the words: 'ArXt1T1Tll  8t8w1-LL,  in the will and that they did not form part 
of her  dOwry.341  But the  question  as  to  whether these  articles  already 
belonged to Arkhippe before Pasion's death, or they belonged to Pasion 
before he died could be difficult to answer. 
It certainly cannot be conceived that Arkhippe entered marriage 
with  nothing  in  her  hands  from  her  kyrios  or  kin  who  gave  her  in 
marriage to Pasion. For it does seem from Demosthenes 46 that Arkhippe 
must  have  entered marriage  with  some  amount of property including 
personal effects, to which Pasion must have added more and bequeathed 
to her. 
In Demosthenes 46.20, Apollodoros cites the law regarding the 
take over of the estate of an epikleros by her son, apparently repudiating 
the guardianship of  Phormion over his mother, and for that matter control 
339  Is.3.35. Cf. also Dem.59.35,46.  . 
340  Cf.Lys.19 .31; 32.6. It  is interesting to note that in Ghana, a husband could collect everything that he 
had bought for his wife on divorce. 
258 over her property, and maintaining that he must be his mother's guardian. 
And in 46.22, he calls for a reading of  the law requiring the assignment of 
epikleroi, citizen and alien - the former by the archon, the latter by the 
polemarch. After the law has been read out, he then goes on to say that if 
Phormion  had wanted to  proceed properly he  should have  entered his 
claim for Arkhippe as an epikleros before the archon if  he claimed her as 
a citizen, and before the polemarch, if  as an alien (Dem.46.23). 
Imperatively,  Apollodoros  is  telling  the  jury  in  these  three 
sections  of his  speech  that  his  mother  was  an  epikleros.  Thus  as  an 
epikleros,  Arkhippe  must  most  probably  have  entered  marriage  with 
Pasion  with her own personal  effects  apart  from  her dowry  to  which 
Pasion  had  certainly  added.  It is  therefore  possible  that  some  of the 
slaves, and some amount of  the articles of  clothing and jewelry, as well as 
some  chattels  already  belonged  to  Arkhippe  before  Pasion's  death; 
although  we  have no means of knowing  which categories of personal 
effects  these  would have been.  And with the  will  of Pasion,  all  these 
carne into the possession of  Arkhippe. 
Thus  in  general,  it  would  appear  that  legally  all  such  items 
including strictly personal effects as had not been expressively qualified 
as  valued  together  with  the  dowry  but  considered  as  bequests  were 
regarded as  the woman's personal property.  The contents of the  room, 
341  Cf. Wolff, Traditio 2(1944),57. Whitehead, CQ 36(1986),112, creates the impression that all the 
259 like  those  in the  house of Arkhippe,  and the  twenty minai  and  thirty 
staters  of Cyzicus which Diodotos bequeathed to  his  wife  (Lys.32.6), 
were therefore meant to be kept by her as her personal property. 
It is  also  most probable  that  some  of the  wealth  with  which 
Kleoboule  entered marriage remained in her hands at the  death of her 
husband.  And,  as  rightly  noted  by  Harrison,  any  interference  with  a 
woman's or a  widow's title to  such personal effects would have to be 
defended  on her behalf,  if necessary by proceedings  in  court,  by her 
guardian  against that third party.  But if the  guardian himself chose to 
interfere  with her possession of them in his  own interests,  or proved 
unwilling  to  take action against third parties on her behalf,  she  would 
have little hope of redress if she were not an heiress. In such a case the 
archon would have to intervene.
342 It may not therefore be surprising that 
the  spat between Kleoboule and Aphobos over her trinkets could not be 
resolved effectively by Demokhares until Demosthenes came of age and 
sued Aphobos to retrieve his and his mother's property. 
WOMEN'S ECONOMIC CAPACITY  AND TRADING WIDOWS 
I  now tum to  the  subject of the  widow's rights  in relation  to 
economic ventures. In general, the Athenian woman was restricted from 
items listed in the will constituted Arkhippe's dowry, but, like Wolff, I think that is not the case. 
342  Cf. Harrison, Law (i), p.112; AP.56.6; Schaps, Economic Rights, p.9-12. 
260 transacting business beyond a bushel of  barley. The limitation rests on the 
rule cited by the speaker of  Isaios 10: 
1tatbOC;  yap  OUK  ~~Ecr'tt  bta81lKll  YEvEcr8at·  6  yap  v6f.l0C; 
8tappi}bllv KIDAOEl 1tatb\ f.l1l  f;~tlvat crUf.lPUAAEtV f.lllb8 YUVUtKt 1tEPU 
~E8tf.lVOU Kpt8OJv:  "  For a minor is not allowed to make a will; for the 
law expressly forbids any child - or woman- to contract for the disposal 
of  more than a bushel of  barley " (ls.I0.l0).343 
Some scholars including Kuenen-lanssens and Harrison344 take the 
la\v to mean that an Athenian woman could not legally contract above the 
limit set without the consent of her kyrios;  but that with his permission 
she  could  dispose  of,  and therefore,  acquire  property of any value.  It 
seems to me that this arbitrary interpretation does not fit into the context 
of the passage, where the woman's situation is made analogous to that of 
the  child,  who,  in any case,  cannot make  a  will  at  all.  Similarly,  the 
Athenian woman could not make a will either. 
But  as  can be noticed  from  the  text,  the  language  of the  law 
implies that a woman could make transactions for less or up to the value 
of  a medimnos (bushel). The law seems to forbid women from transacting 
business  for  larger  sums;  but  it  does  not  mention  anything  about 
situations in which such transactions may be permitted. Moreover, there 
3~  ~,  Cf.also Harp. sv. ()'tt nutUL. 
261 IS  no  suggestion,  either explicit or implicit,  in the  law that  a  woman 
needed the consent of  her kyrios to transact business beyond the limit set; 
and  there seems to be no evidence in the sources to that effect. By all 
indications, the Athenian woman was, by law, not permitted to undertake 
any business transaction beyond the set value of  a bushel of  barley. And I 
think that Croix
345 
is right in rejecting the assumption of  Kuenen-Janssens 
and Harrison. 
It is  noteworthy  that  the  general  term  crUJ.l~ctAAEtV in  the  law 
comprises every kind of contract, including purchase and sale (trading), 
letting  and  hiring,  lending  and  borrowing,  bailment,  exchange, 
partnership,  suretyship,  and  any  such  related  transactions.346  Wyse347 
believes  that 1tEpa  J.lE81J.lvou  Kpt8cuv:  "more than a bushel of barley," 
does not apply only to the woman, but to the child as well. But I believe 
that the object of  this section of  the law is only the woman, and that Wyse 
is  probably over-stretching the arm of the law.  For in every manner of 
transaction regarding the child, it is his guardian who would undertake to 
do everything on his behalf and be legally answerable for the conduct of 
business.
348  I  do  not therefore  see  how the  same law could allow the 
344  See Kuenen-Janssens, Mnemosyne 9(1940-41),199-214; Harrison, Law,i,p.236. See also Hunter, 
JFH 14(1989),294. 
345  Croix, CR 84(1970),274. 
346  Cf. Wyse, p.659; Kuenen-Janssens, 200. On bailment see also .Isocrates 21.2,7tapaK~'tae~Kll, 
noted by Wyse, ibid. Significantly, in Ghana it is not legally pernutted of  a woman to ball a pnsoner, or 
act as surety. 
347  Ibid. 
348  ,  .  .  't 200  4  Cf. also Kuenen-Janssens' views on Wyse s pOSItIOn, Op.CI .  ,n .. 
262 minor  child to undertake economic ventures even within the minimum 
amount of  bushel of  barley. 
It appears that no ancient author mentions the reason for the law  , 
though  there  must  certainly  have  been  a  cause  for  it;  otherwise  the 
Athenians  would never have taken  the  trouble  to  define  the  margin of 
women's competence.  For, as it seems to me, a law does not presume a 
hypothetical  foresight  of a  future  crime.  It  is  enacted  to  deal  with  a 
present situation, event, or crime in order to forestall a future recurrence 
of the  situation  and  other  related  acts.  I  thus  find  Kuenen-l  anssens' 
suppositions for the probable cause of  the law quite feasible: 
"In the most ancient times there was probably no need for it at all; 
only  later,  when  human  intercourse  became  more  complicated  and 
difficulties might arise between a woman and her kyrios - the appearance 
of trade  women  in  the  market  may  have  contributed  to  it  - it  was 
advisable  to  make  a  definite  regulation  of  the  competence  of  a 
woman.,,349  Thus,  the  law was  probably enacted to  avert  any  possible 
conflict of interests, either financial or social, between a woman and her 
kyrios. 
A medimnos of  barley is calculated by Kuenen-lanssen and Wyse 
to be the amount of money that could provide food for a family of five 
people  for not less than six days in Athens at the time.  This obviously 
263 represents a considerable amount of value in food.  In money value, it is 
agreed that although there were great variations and great differences in 
the  normal  price  at  different  periods,  the  minimum  price  of  one 
medimnos  of barley  was  three  drachmae.
350  By  law  therefore,  the 
Athenian woman was not permitted to undertake any transaction beyond 
the ceiling value of  three drachmae. 
But laws  are  one  thing,  life  another.  And whether the  legal  rule 
reflected what was actually in practice is quite another matter. For in spite 
of the restriction, we quite often come across widows engaged in trading 
activities and other forms of financial transactions which could involve 
sums  of money  over  and  above  what  their  legal  capacity  as  women 
allowed them. 
In Aristophanes, a widow tells the Athenian audience about her 
life in the following words: 
"My husband died in Cyprus, leaving me with five children. I had a 
hard  time  feeding  them,  working  in  the  myrtle  market  making 
garlands.  ,,351 
In this situation, we have what seems to be a highly articulate and 
prominent presentation of a helpless widow and her life in society. But it 
is  most probable that the widow's business activities must be involving 
349  Ibid. 208. 
350  Kuenen-Janssens, op.cit. 206,210-211; Wyse,p.659. 
351  Thesm. 446-48. 
264 money above the ceiling set by the law for women. For she is said to be 
producing  a  great  number  of garlands  and  taking  orders  in  advance 
(Thesm.457-458).  The widow's situation might perhaps be taken as mere 
fiction.  Nevertheless,  it is  important to  note that" the  extant plays of 
Aristophanes are firmly rooted in the present, and each of them explores 
the  possibilities of a  fantasy constructed out of the present.,,352  At any 
rate. the comic widow has her real-life counterpart in Attic oratory. 
In Demosthenes 57 in which Euxitheos, the speaker, defends his 
status  as  citizen,  we  are  told  that  when  Nikarete,  the  mother  of the 
speaker, was much younger and a mother of two, she used to work as a 
wet-nurse because of her financial straits when the husband was abroad 
on  a military campaign (57.42). And when she later became widowed, 
now with five children to feed, we find her selling ribbons in the Agora 
(57.30-34);  a trade which might also involve a working capital of more 
than three drachmae to sustain the continuity of  the business. 
We know also that the widow of  Polyeuktos granted a loan of 1800 
drachmae to Spoudias, one of her two sons-in-law, leaving papers under 
seals on the loan at her death. The same widow is said also to have taken 
a bowl and some pieces of ornaments as  security for money borrowed 
from  her by  the  defendants  in  the  speech.  The  speaker  alleges  that 
although his defendants later collected the bowl and the ornaments from 
352  KJ.Dover, 'Aristophanes' Speech in Plato's Symposium', JHS 86(1966),41-50,esp.41. 
265 the widow, they had not as yet paid back the money they borrowed from 
h ·  h  .  353  her  at  t  e tIme t  e  case went to tnal.  The speaker does not mention 
how  much  the  items  were  pawned  for;  but  the  grants  indicate  the 
substantial financial resources of the widow from which she could make 
these loans. 
Lysias  also  informs us of the  widowed mother of Philon  who  ,  , 
embittered by the irresponsible behaviour of  her son, gave three minas to 
a trusted acquaintance to pay for her funeral expenses (31.21). We may 
note  also  the  gift  of 2000  drachmae  given  by  Arkhippe  to  her  two 
children from her marriage to Phormion (Dem.36.14). 
What is not very clear is the sources of the money for the loans 
and  donations  made  by  the  widows.  Even  though  the  loans  and 
dispositions may legally be considered as non-commercial, and therefore 
on friendly basis, as it is maintained,354 it is most probable that they may 
have  come out of the considerable personal property bequeathed to the 
widows, or from money accumulated in some other way.355 
In point of fact, the granting of loans and monetary gifts, and the 
trading activities of some widows seem to suggest a kind of independent 
life of such widows in the society. This makes one begin to re-examine 
the orthodox view about the social position of women that the Athenian 
353  See Dem.41.8-9,11-12, 17,21-22. For the significance of  the papers on the loan see Hunter, JFH 
14(1989),302. 
354  See Croix, CR 20(1970),274; Hunter, JFH, ibid. 
266 woman long remained in tutelage. For although we find clearly expressed 
in  a  law  a  definite  limitation  of the  competence  of the  woman  for 
independent action, we might not be justified in drawing conclusions on 
legal  grounds  regarding  her position  in practice,  as  the  case  of these 
widows  shows.  One  might  thus  assume  that  presumably,  either  an 
exception  was made regarding trading  women,  or widows  were  given 
some kind of latitude, or the act of Isaios  10.10 lapsed later on; thereby 
making widows and some women have the liberty to operate beyond the 
legal limit. 
In overall terms, the picture we get regarding the property rights 
of widows is that the Athenian widow could own considerable gifts and 
bequests from a devoted father or husband.  She could, moreover, have 
money of her own that she could use in any way as she wished. And as 
the  sources  seem to  indicate,  it  would  appear  that  she  retained  such 
ownership rights so long as she remained as an independent widow.
356 
In fact, there certainly was no rule which obliged a widow to hand 
over  to  her new husband such property as  her deceased husband had 
bequeathed to her. None the less, her rights of ownership seem to have 
lapsed in theory as soon as she got remarried to another man. 
We may take up again the case of the widow of Polyeuktos who 
granted the loan to her son-in-law (Dem.41.9). Here in this matter, there 
355  Cf. Dem.36.32,38; Croix, ibid; Hunter, ibid; Policing,p.28. 
267 is  no  mention of a kyrios of the woman.  But we are  informed that the 
brothers of the woman were present at all  times and questioned her on 
every point of  the transaction. It might be argued that these brothers were 
kyrioi of  their sister after the decease of  her husband. However, I suppose 
that  the  brothers'  presence was just conventional  and nominal but not 
mandatory.  They were not there to  sanction the  loan as  kyrioi  of their 
widowed sister. The loan, as it seems to me, had apparently been agreed 
upon  already  by the  woman on her own  and  acting  independently  as 
creditor, and her son-in-law as debtor. The brothers were therefore called 
only  as  witnesses  so  that  Spoudias  could  not  in  any  way  deny  the 
transaction at any time in the future. 
And, at any rate, in the event of a legal matter arising out of the 
loan transaction between Spoudias and the widow, it would have been her 
brothers who should have to represent her in court. Thus their presence 
was  essential as  witnesses but not to  grant their auctoritas  to the loan. 
The widow who was not married but lived independently, therefore, was 
mistress, kyria, of  her own property, and could dispose of  it as she would. 
But once the widow got remarried and is no more living on her own, she 
seems to have lost her rights of ownership to her new husband, now her 
kyrios. Demosthenes provides evidence for this apparent lapse of  rights of 
356  Cf. Schaps, Economic Rights, p.4; Hunter, JFH 14(1989),301-302. 
268 ownership.  In  Demosthenes  45.30,  Apollodoros  tells  the  jury  about 
Phormion, his mother's new husband: 
" He has made himself master of the possessions in the house by 
the  will,  on the ground that they had been given as  a  dowry with my 
mother." 
Then further in 45.74 Apollodoros indignantly declares: 
" But for himself he has not scrupled to marry his mistress, and 
he  lives  as  husband with her, ...  nor to  write  a  clause  giving himself a 
dowry of five talents in addition to the large sums of which he became 
master, inasmuch as they were in the custody of  my mother - for why do 
you suppose he wrote in the will the clause, 'and all else which she has I 
give to Arkhippe'?" 
As  will  be  noticed,  €1Tl  Til  l1'llTPl  808e.VTWV  (Dem.45.30)  and 
,  APXL  1T1T1J  8L8wl1L  (45.74)  have  two  different  connotations,  the  former 
implying items as part of the dowry for his mother, the latter, connoting 
articles  given to Arkhippe personally.357  The significant point from  the 
two passages, however, is that either way, Arkhippe had lost her rights of 
ownership to her property to her husband, and that Phormion had become 
the  new  master  of not  only  her  dowry  but  also  her  other  property 
including her personal effects. Thus besides her dowry, it appears that an 
357  Cf. Wolff, Traditio 2(1944),57; Harrison, Law (i), p.47,112,n.3; Schaps, Economic Rights, p.10-11; 
Hunter, EMC 8(1989),43,n.22. 
269 Athenian widow's remarriage made her husband have virtual control over 
her property. 
But this apparent loss of the widow's rights of ownership to her 
new husband on the one hand and the husband's control over her property 
on the other appears to be only theoretical, and just in conformity with the 
usual norms. For there is evidence that with regard to her own personal 
property that was not part of her dowry, the ex-widow in remarriage had 
practical control of  her property and could dispose of it. In Demosthenes 
36.14-15,  the speaker informs the jury that before her death,  Arkhippe 
had  given  two  thousand  drachmai  to  the  children  she  had  borne  to 
Phormion.  And in 50.60, Apollodoros tells the jury about his  financial 
straits and his mother's inability to help him because of  her ill-health and 
subsequent death in the following words: 
"My mother lay sick, and was at the point of death while I was 
abroad,  so that she was unable to help in the depletion of my resources 
save to  a slight extent. I had been but six days at home, when, after she 
had seen and greeted me, she breathed her last, being no longer (OUKETL) 
mistress  of her property,  so  as  to  give  me  as  much  as  she  wished" 
(Dem.50.60). 
The  statement  that  Arkhippe  was  no  longer  mistress  of her 
property might be construed that it was because she was then in marriage 
to  Phormion. But that does not seem to be the situation; it was because 
270 she was seriously ill and could therefore not do anything. Apollodoros' 
own words imply that the mother gave him some help; and although she 
was  in marriage, she controlled her own property and could have given 
her son some of  her own money to prevent depletion of  his resources but 
for  her  deplorable  condition of health.  It is  clear then,  that before her 
death,  Arkhippe's  personal  property  was  practically  in  her  own 
possession, and under her control. 
Thus  when  she  was  not remarried,  the  Athenian  widow  was 
mistress, kyria, of the property her late husband had bequeathed to her. 
But when she was in a second marriage, and no more a widow living on 
her own, she seems to have lost her rights of ownership to her husband, 
now  her  kyrios.  358  But  this  loss  of rights  appears  theoretical,  for  in 
practice  she controlled her own property and could dispose of it as  she 
wished. 
358  See Dem.27.56;45.30,74. Cf.also  de Ste Croix, CR 84(1970),277; Hunter, EMC 33(1989),39-
48,esp.43; Policing, p.31-32; David Whitehead, CQ 36(1986),1 09-114,esp.112-113. 
271 SECTION B:  ORPHANS IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 
CHAPTER 6 
GUARDIANS OF ORPHANS 
It is  impossible  to  know the  number of children who became 
orphaned during the classical period. One reason for this is the composite 
causes of widowhood and orphanage in the fifth and the fourth centuries 
B.C.
359  In some situations, we are not in a position to  know whether a 
deceased  man had a  wife  and children.  For instance,  in  cases  of men 
executed  by  the  state,  we  are  most  often  not  informed  of  the 
prosopographical background of the executed men in sufficient detail for 
us to know how many of  them were survived by wives and children. 
The Attic orators also, our principal sources of information for the 
position  of orphans,  themselves  typically  members  of the  social  elite, 
exhibit necessarily a bias towards the upper class in the Athenian society 
who  had  the  means  to  employ  the  services  of orators  in  their  suits. 
Consequently, not much light is thrown on the less privileged class, thus 
making it not very easy for us to know more about the family background 
of the underprivileged in the society.36o In any case, if one considers the 
359  See the section on 'Demography, Widowhood and Orphanage in  Athens.' For my defmition of 
0:;phan, see Introduction, p.l  0 above. 
3  F  our possible exceptions of  speeches which do not depict the world of  the Athenia? rich are 
Antiphon, 1: Prosecution for Poisoning;  Demosthenes, 55: Against Kallikles and Lyslas, 1 On  ~he 
Murder of  Eratothenes ; 24: For the Invalid. Cf. Stephen Todd, , The Use and Abuse of  the AttIc 
Orators' G&R 37(1990),159-l78,esp.168. 
272 omnipresence of  widows in the Athenian society,361  one cannot fail to be 
struck  by  a  corresponding  ubiquity  of  orphans  in  many  Athenian 
households. 
APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIANS 
It is presumed that all children lived under the guardianship of the 
father  until  they reached their age  of majority.362  Naturally,  the  father 
exercised his authority over his wards until he died. But the death of the 
man affects not only the members of the kin group but also naturally the 
widow  and  the  children  of  the  deceased  in  various  ways,  both 
immediately and afterwards. 
If a  man  died  leaving  behind  a  widow  with  children  in  their 
minority, his death gave rise to certain basic familial duties; particularly: 
(i)  the nurture and support of  the orphaned children, 
(ii)  the management of  the estate left behind for the children, and 
(iii)  the maintenance and care for his widow. 
In most cases, the widows were given away in marriage again to second 
or  third  husbands  who  then  assumed  responsibilities  for  their 
maintenance and support. Thus, the majority of  bereaved wives ceased to 
be  widows  on  getting  remarried.  The  orphan's  status,  however,  was 
36)  Mark Golden, ' Demography and the Exposure of Girls at Athens " Phoenix 35( 1981 ),316-
331,esp.329; Virginia Hunter, ' The Athenian Widow and Her Kin ' JFH 14(1989), 291-311, esp.291. 
362  On the age of  majority in Athens, see n.187 above. 
273 completely different from that of the widow. For it is a fact that while a 
widow could cease to be a widow, an orphan could not cease to be an 
orphan. 
In  certain  situations,  the  father  appointed  guardians  either  inter 
"h  'os,  or named them in his will to take charge of the children and the 
management of their property in the event of his death.
363  But in many 
cases people died intestate without making any provisions for their wives 
or minor children. In any case, it is essential to note that regarding the 
rules  of guardianship  and  the  extent  of their  application,  the  law  of 
guardianship  (and,  in  fact,  of infants  in  general)  appears  to  have  one 
peculiarity which is not always noticed. That is,  it is only required in a 
minority  of cases.  For  it  would  appear  that  on  the  death  of a  man 
intestate, if the families were reasonably united, even after the death of 
one  or both parents of a child, they would often manage without much 
regard to  the law.  It is only when there is much property involved that 
some definite legal arrangement becomes imperative. But otherwise, one 
relative or another, in conformity with an established order, would in fact, 
take  charge.  This  order  would  certainly  be  the  same  as  the  order  of 
363 Dem.27.4-6; 28.15-16; 36; Lys.32.5-7; Hyp. Lyk.1.4. 
274 succession  in the family,  as  in Demosthenes 43.51.  And if the  orphan 
\"ere old enough, he would look after himself.364 
In an inheritance case regarding the property of  Kleonymos in Isaios 
for instance, there seems to be not much property involved, and we have 
glimpses of good will between the orphans' uncles and their mother. For 
it  is  evident  that  the  plaintiffs,  as  orphans,  had  first  come  under  the 
guardianship of their paternal uncle, Deinias, in their minority, though it 
is  not known whether they did so under their father's will or not.  And 
when  Deinias  died  they  went to  live  with Kleonymos,  probably their 
mother's brother, who as their guardian brought them up and looked after 
their affairs as if they were his own children,365  reflecting a situation of 
good will between him and his sister. 
A  speaker in one of the  speeches in the  Demosthenic corpus  also 
describes  a  similar situation.  He  informs us  that  when his  father  was 
made  a prisoner of war and enslaved for a very long time, his paternal 
uncles kept intact his father's share in the property which derived from 
their deceased father's entitlement. Moreover, they collectively supported 
their  brother's  wife  (the  speaker's  mother),  and  looked  after  his  two 
366  children in their minority during their brother's long absence overseas. 
364  Cf. H.F.Jolowicz, , The Wicked Guardian' JRS 37(1947),82-90,esp.83; Harrison, ~aw  i ,~.99-100. 
See also the section on ' The Archon and Administration of  Justice in Matters Concemmg WIdows and 
Orphans.' 
365  Is.1.9,12. See also Wyse, p.176. 
366  Dem.57.19-21. Cfalso Lacey, 'The Family of  Euxitheus (Demosthenes LVII) , CQ 74(1980),57-
61,esp.58-60. 
275 The  conduct of these uncles of the  speaker thus  certainly represents  a 
remarkable example of family solidarity, and there is no doubt that in the 
lack of  any other determination they would be guardians of  their brother's 
children without any formal legal requirement. 
A  comment by a  speaker in  L  ysias  is  interpreted by Harrison  to 
imply an imposition of guardianship on the  speaker by the archon.  The 
speaker informs the jury of  the following among other things: 
" Moreover we, deprived of our kinsfolk, deprived of the dowry, and 
compelled  to  rear  three  small  children,  are  attacked  besides  by  base 
informers. and are in danger of losing what our ancestors bequeathed to 
us after they had acquired it by honest means." (Lys.19.9). 
Harrison  takes  this  statement  as  a  "probable  instance  of  a 
guardianship  compulsorily laid upon a  man,"  and in a  footnote  to  his 
presumption he rej ects Lipsius' suggestion that this obligation related to 
something other than guardianship.  367  The fact that Harrison appears to 
establish is  that in certain situations the  duty of guardianship  could be 
imposed on a man. It seems to me, however, that Harrison's presumption 
and Lipsius' suggestion are both beside the point. 
I take first the suggestion by Lipsius, whom I believe Harrison has 
reported correctly, that the speaker's liability was something other than 
guardianship.  Rather  contrarily,  the  speaker's  compulsion  certainly 
276 concerns the guardianship of  his sister's children and no other thing else. 
The predicament of  the young children resulting from all the privations as 
narrated  by  the  speaker  (19.7-9)  is  enough  evidence  for  the  call  of 
guardianship for the children, and the need for their uncle to take up the 
responsibility.  This position will  probably be clearer from  the  reasons 
why I think that Harrison's opinion of  compulsory guardianship too is not 
quite tenable. 
It would appear from the will of Aristotle,368 that Athenian practice 
of guardianship required that the consent of an appointed guardian was 
sought before the duties were conferred on him, though there is, in fact, 
no evidence of a legal rule to this requirement. In Demosthenes 28.14-15 
also, Aphobos is said to have claimed that he did not enter the house of 
the  elder  Demosthenes  who  had  sent  for  him,  nor  entered  into  any 
agreement with him regarding matters in his will. 
But the younger Demosthenes refutes Aphobos' claim by telling the 
jury that Aphobos in fact met the elder Demosthenes before he died, and 
had agreed with him to carry out in all respects precisely what he wrote in 
his will. In both claim and rebuttal, I think that consent to guardianship 
with its attendant responsibilities is implicit.  Thus, a guardian appointed 
367  Harrison, Law (i ),p.101, n.3 to 101, on Lips., AR 525,n.22. Cf. also Harrison, ibid.~p.103-104  .. 
368  See Diog. Laert. 5.11-13. It  is common knowledge that Aristotle was not an Atheman. B~t  he. hved 
much of  his time in Athens as a metic. It is therefore most probable that he may have made hIS WIll 
according to Athenian laws. 
277 by a testator could decline to act as such, as Harrison rightly notes.369 It 
would therefore seem a bit hard to conjecture how a reluctant man could 
be  compelled  to  be  the  guardian  of a  ward,  let  alone  be  expected  to 
perform his  duties  satisfactorily.  As  regards  the  case of the  speaker of 
Lysias  19.  there is no doubt that he  is  the  guardian of the  three minor 
children of his sister. But his duty does not appear to have been a legal 
imposition  implemented  by  the  archon,  as  Harrison  seems  to  imply, 
apparently  on the basis of the  authority given to  the  archon in the  law 
quoted in Demosthenes 43.75. 
In the fIrst place, an imposition of guardianship by the archon would 
have meant a kind of state involvement in maintaining and preserving the 
family of the executed Aristophanes whom the Athenians regarded as  a 
treasonable felon (19.7-8). But it appears that the Athenian state had no 
concern  for  the  maintenance  and  preservation  of the  families  of men 
executed by the  state  for  criminal  offences.  They would rather punish 
sons for the crimes committed by their fathers and ancestors, as the case 
of Lysias  19  itself illustrates.  We  may  note  also  what  a  speaker  in 
Demosthenes says about visiting ancestral crimes on sons: 
" For all men the end of  life is death; and with whatever wrongdoings 
a man may be charged during his lifetime, it is  right that for  these his 
children  should forever be held accountable; but in matters  concerning 
369  Law (i ),p.104,n.1. 
278 \\'hich no man ever made accusation against him while he lived, is it not 
outrageous that anyone so wishing should bring his children to trial?,,370 
Under the circumstances, therefore, an imposition of guardianship on 
the  speaker of Lysias  19  by the  archon,  which indeed implies  a  state 
concern  for  the  family  of  Aristophanes,  would  be  unlikely.  The 
compulsion of guardianship mentioned by the  speaker is  therefore  the 
consequence of factors such as the circumstances of his brother-in-law's 
death,  and lack of resources to  maintain his  sister's children and their 
mother,  as  recounted  by  the  speaker  himself  (19.7-9,31-33).  Quite 
obviously the children of  Aristophanes had suffered loss of their parental 
care and support, and their patrimony.  These situations of  privation made 
it  morally  obligatory  for  their  uncle  (the  speaker)  to  take  up  the 
responsibility of  guardianship. 
The speaker's obligation may also have been reinforced by the ties of 
kinship  and  Athenian  public  opinion,  both  of  which  could  bring 
compelling pressures on him to undertake to look after the children.
371 
It 
may therefore be presumed that the gesture of the speaker regarding his 
guardianship  of his  sister's  three  children  in  Lysias  19,  was  another 
instance of guardianship undertaken on the basis of cordial relationship 
and family solidarity rather than an imposition executed by the archon as 
supposed by Harrison. 
370  Dem. 57.27. Cf. also Lys.18.11,22, and see the chapter on ' Pregnant Widows,'p.215-216. 
279 With regard to statutory guardianship, the Attic orators from whom 
we  get  considerable information on family issues do not tell us  exactly 
when the institution arose in Athens whereby ifno other guardian existed 
it  became  necessary  for  the  authorities  to  appoint  one.  We  are  not 
informed also of the degree of the archon's involvement and what form 
the  appointment should take.  Significantly, the text of a law on widows 
and  orphans quoted in Demosthenes makes the archon a very important 
agent of  statutory guardianship in Athens.
372 
The  law  most  probably  dates  back  to  the  period  of Solon's 
Seisachtheia in 594/3  B.C.,  and obviously illustrates the  circumscribed 
power  of  the  archon  and  prescribing  protective  measures  against 
maltreatment  of orphans.  Certain  sources  also  seem  to  suggest  rules 
whereby,  failing  appointment  inter  vivos  or by testament,  the  archon 
should intervene to appoint guardians for orphans in such a situation. For 
instance,  there  are  implicit legal  rules  in the  actions  or powers  of the 
archon eponymous listed in AP, 56: 
Ei<;  E1tt'tP01tll<;  KU'tacr'tuo'l  v;  Et<;  E1tt'tP01t1j<;  8tu8tKUcriuv: 
"Actions  for  the  institution of guardianship:  actions  for  deciding rival 
claims for guardianship. "CAP, 56.6) 
371 
Cf.Is.1.39.  d  11'  thO 
372  See Dem. 43.75. Cf. Arist. AP, 56.7. Various sections of  the law have been quote  severa  y m  IS 
work. 
280 We may note also Isaios 3.58, and Demosthenes 43.16,54, which provide 
eyidence  for  rules to claim inheritance in the  event of a  person dying 
intestate. 
Nevertheless, the law quoted in Demosthenes 43.75 does not tell us 
exactly what the nature or the extent of the archon's involvement in the 
appointment of guardians should be in the case of a child who needed 
one.  With regard to AP,56.6,  Wyse is  certainly right that whether the 
parties to the 8tu8t  Kuotu are considered as willing to shift a burden or 
competing to win a privilege, the suit is suggestive of a law defining the 
conditions  under  which  persons  were  called  upon  to  take  up 
guardianship.373 
But it seems to me that AP, 56.6, and the sources noted in Isaios 3 and 
Demosthenes 43 point to rules for the confirmation of already appointed 
or nominated guardians, situations of  claims to inheritance in the event of 
a  man  dying  intestate  and  without  children,  and  rules  for  claim  to 
heiresses, who were only a category of orphans in the society. Thus, the 
sources do not suggest general rules for the appointment of guardians for 
orphans whose fathers died intestate, and the exact role of the archon in 
the exercise. 
373  Wyse, p.191. For a detailed account of  OtUOtKUcnU see MacDowell, Law, p.58,103-8,145-7, 163-
4,166,218,249. 
281 However,  although  direct  evidence  is  lacking,  it  appears  that 
Athenian laws provided for the appointment of  a guardian or guardians in 
contingent situations. Some of the  situations could be when a father of 
minors had not left a will, or had not nominated a guardian; or when a 
guardian appointed by testament declined or was unable to serve. It seems 
also that provisions were made either for an interim guardian in the event 
of the  absence of the one appointed by the testator, or a co-guardian to 
take  charge of affairs in the circumstances. This guardian would act in 
that  capacity until the principal guardian returned if he happened to  be 
a\vay and the testator made provisions for more guardians.
374 
There  is  one  other  situation  for  which  evidence  also  seems 
lacking. That is, if  the appointed guardian died while the male orphan was 
still  in  his  minority.  In  a  modem  society  where  the  institution  of 
guardianship is also practised, it appears that the child could live under 
the guardianship of  either a paternal uncle or a maternal one. But he could 
also be adopted into a different family. A member of  the British House of 
Commons  narrates  his  personal  experience  as  a  minor  orphan  to  his 
colleagues  in a  debate on state support for widows and orphans in the 
following words which show what could be done in the circumstances: 
"In  supporting  the  Amendment,  I  shall  not  use  statistical 
approach. Nor shall I talk about comfortable standards, because the term 
374  Cf. Aristotle's will, Diog. Laert. 5.11-12. 
282 is not applicable in any shape or form.  I can make my case in a single 
sentence.  Having twice seen the struggle that takes place in a working-
class home when the breadwinner dies I say that there is nobody who is 
left with children who has sufficient money - nobody. It happens that I 
\"as  sufficiently unfortunate  to  lose both my parents before  I  was  ten 
years of age. Before I was eleven years of age I lost my guardian, and I 
was then the subj ect of  negotiation between two workhouses as to which 
one I shall enter, but I was adopted through another channel.,,375 
The speaker does not tell his colleagues through what channel he 
was adopted, and into whose family he was eventually adopted. But there 
is no doubt that the negotiation about his tutelage after the death of his 
guardian would have been going on between his paternal and maternal 
uncles. The Athenian male orphan in such a situation would certainly not 
pass through adoption to get a new guardian, though evidence is lacking 
as to what could be done to appoint a new guardian for him. 
The position of the epikleros who lost her guardian while in her 
minority is definite. The situation called for a fresh claim to her and her 
patrimony,  a  diadikasia,  in  conformity  with  the  laid  down  rules  for 
succession in the family, as discussed in chapter 7 below. With regard to 
the  male  orphan in such a  situation,  however,  it is not evident in the 
375 Mr. H. Boardman, Member of  Parliament for Leigh, The House o/Commons Official Report.  st 
Vol.III(1955-56): Standing Committee E, p.1-129: Family Allowance and National Insurance Bzll,  31 
May_7th June,  1956, esp. p.29. 
283 sources as to what procedure to follow to appoint him a new guardian if 
the  designated  one  died  during  the  child's minority.  It would  appear, 
however, that: (i) he could also be the subject of  negotiation between his 
paternal and maternal uncles as to whose authority he should live under 
until  he  reached  his  majority;  (ii)  either  his  paternal  uncles,  or  both 
families could, in consultation with the archon, appoint a new guardian to 
be responsible for his general welfare and the administration of  his estate. 
It is  noteworthy  that  although  there  appear  to  be  no  specific 
general  rules  regarding  the  appointment  of guardians,  the  available 
sources  on  guardianship  point  to  a  particular  pattern  in  appointing 
guardians for orphans. Kharondas of  Katane is said to have made laws for 
other Greek cities of Sicily and Italy as well as for his own city.376  And 
among  the  laws  made  by  Kharondas  was  one  that  sought  to  protect 
orphans  in  the  Katane  society.  According  to  Diodoros,  Kharondas 
legislated that the orphan's estate should be managed and controlled by 
his paternal uncles, while his maternal uncles took charge of his nurture 
and care.377 
The primary reasons for Kharondas' division of responsibilities to 
the orphan, as reported by Diodoros, seem quite ingenious. The maternal 
uncles, having no share in the orphan's inheritance, will not plot against 
376  See Arist. Po!. 2.9.5. Also R. Sealey, The Justice of  the Greeks (Michigan, 1994),p.25; M  ..  Gag~rin, 
Early Greek Law (Berkeley, 1986),p.51ff.; A. Szegedy-Maszak, ' Legends of  the Greek LawgIvers 
284 him;  and the paternal uncles who have a share in his fortune, would not 
have the opportunity to plot against his life, since he is not entrusted into 
their care. Moreover, since the paternal uncles could inherit the orphan's 
estate in the event of his death, they will manage his estate with greater 
care, hoping that they would succeed him ifhe died.378 
The  Athenians,  however,  did  not  separate  the  custody  of an 
orphan's person from the administration of his fortune. But their practice 
of guardianship seems to reflect the principle of  appointing close relatives 
as  guardians  of their orphans, which the  rules  of Kharondas  appear to 
emphasise. In 376/5 the dying Demosthenes (I) for instance, made a will 
in which he appointed three guardians for his son and daughter. Two of 
them  were  his  close  relatives  - his  nephews.  Aphobos,  the  principal 
guardian, was his sister's son, to whom also he bequeathed the children's 
mother.  The  other,  Demophon,  to  whom  also  the  elder  Demosthenes 
betrothed his daughter, was the son of  his brother, Demon.
379 
In  the  third  speech  of his  suit  against  his  guardian  Aphobos, 
Demosthenes  describes  Demon  as  Aphobos'  fellow-guardian 
(crUVE1tl"CP01tO<;,  29.56).  This  has  been  taken  by  some  scholars  as 
contradictory, implying that there were four guardians, not three; as noted 
GRBS 19(1974),199-209; Adcock, , Literary Tradition and Early Greek Code-makers' CHJ 
2(1927),95ff. 
377  Diod. Sic. 12.15.  Kh  d 
378  Cf. also lolowicz, JRS  73( 1947),82, though he is suspicious of  the reason attributed to  .  aron  as 
that the separation of personal custody from the administration of  a ward's property was motJvated by 
fears for his safety. 
285 by the  orator in Dem.  27  and 28,  and  that the  third speech was not by 
Demosthenes.  But  these  presumptions  have  been  ably  dismissed  by 
MacDowell, who convincingly establishes that Demosthenes 29 was by 
the  orator himself, and that there were in fact, three guardians, not four; 
as  maintained by the sceptics.
380  Thus, Demon was certainly not one of 
the guardians of  the younger Demosthenes. 
Davies may probably be right in pointing out the seeming oddity in 
the failure of  the elder Demosthenes to appoint his brother Demon as one 
of the  guardians  for  his  children.
381  Burke  shares  in Davies'  apparent 
surprise, which idea I am also inclined to entertain. But he speculates in a 
footnote  that  the  elder  Demosthenes'  failure  to  appoint  Demon  as  a 
guardian may have been the consequence of some animosity between the 
two brothers, though this may have been played down during the critical 
moments of  the illness of  the elder Demosthenes.382 
It would, indeed, appear difficult to suggest any strained relationship 
between the elder Demosthenes and his brother. It is quite certain that the 
younger Demosthenes accuses Demon of complicity with Aphobos in the 
rape of  his patrimony (29.20), and that Demon was himself  prosecuted by 
379  Dem.27.4-5; 28.15. See also Davies, APF, p.116,118. 
380  See MacDowell, , The Authenticity of  Demosthenes 29 (Against Aphobos III) As a Source of, 
Infonnation About Athenian Law' Symposion, (1985),253-262). Davies, APF, p.115 shares the VIew 
that Demon was not one of  the guardians of  the orator. For holders of the contrary views see 
MacDowell, ibid. n.1,2,3,4,13,16. 
381 
APF, p.l15.  5 65  47 
382  E. M. Burke, , The Looting of  the Estate of  the Elder Demosthenes ' CetMIL(1998),4  - , esp.  , 
n.6,on 47. 
286 the orator (29.20,52,56). These events could be tempting enough for one 
to  conceive of earlier tensions between the two brothers that may have 
spilled  into  the  maladministration  of  the  estate  of  the  younger 
Dernosthenes. However, there is no evidence, either direct or oblique, for 
the  existence  of any  ill-feeling  between  the  two  brothers.  We  may 
therefore presume that the failure of Demosthenes (I) to appoint Demon 
as a guardian of  his children was by discretion and choice rather than the 
consequence of  any existing animosity between them. 
It is  the  prosecution of Demon by the  orator  (29.20,52,56),  that 
obviously makes Burke suggest a  sort of bitterness between the  elder 
Demosthenes and his brother. However, it should be noted that it was not 
probably a separate case from the proceedings against Demophon (27.12) 
but a single action
383  and on a different legal basis as the father and legal 
representative  of  the  under-aged  Demophon,  as  maintained  by 
MacDowell.
384 1 shall expand this point later in chapter 10 of this work. 
The  question  of an  existing  enmity  or  strained  relationship  between 
Demosthenes the elder and his brother Demon does not therefore come 
In. 
To return to the issue of appointing close relatives as  guardians of 
orphans, we are informed in Lysias 32, that the sole guardian appointed 
by Diodotos for his children was his own brother, Diogeiton (32.4-5). The 
287 appointment of  Diogeiton as guardian of  his brother's children exhibits an 
intricate and interesting kind of  relationship that easily attracts notice: 
.. When Diodotos was enrolled for infantry service, he summoned his 
nannov 8t ,[cOV  nat8tffiv Kat BElov,:  and her father,  who was also his 
father-in-law  and  his  brother,  and  grandfather  and  uncle  of the  little 
ones"(32.5). 
As recounted by the speaker, Diodotos and Diogeiton were brothers 
born  of the  same  father  and  mother.  The  two  brothers  held  the  real 
property  bequeathed  them  by  their  father  in  partnership.  And  when 
Diodotos was ready to marry, Diogeiton induced him to marry the one 
daughter that he had,  and two  sons and a  daughter were born to  them 
(32.4-5).  The relationship between Diogeiton and his brother's children 
therefore shows an intricate network of  close bonds which appears unique 
to all the situations of  kinship ties in Athenian guardianship. 
Quite  a  number of guardianship  cases  in other surviving  speeches 
also show the same pattern of appointing close relatives as guardians of 
orphans. In Isaios On the Estate of  Kleonymos, Deinias is guardian of  his 
brother's  sons  (1.9);  and even when Deinias  dies  it is  Kleonymos  the 
children's maternal uncle who takes  over the  sons  and cares  for  them 
383  Cf. MacDowell, Symposion (1985),257,n.21. 
384  Ibid.,257. 
288 (1.12,28). In the same speech, and in Demosthenes 46, the orators inform 
us that on the death of  the father of  an heiress (epikleros), a brother of  the 
same father, or a paternal grandfather was appointed guardian of the girl. 
But if none of these  was  alive,  then the  nearest of kin was  made  her 
guardian, to whom she was entrusted in marriage (Is.l.39; Dem.46.18). 
Moreover, in Isaios 7, Eupolis is guardian of  his brother's son (7.5-6); 
and in his On  the Estate of  Kiron, Diokles is guardian of his half-sister's 
son  (Is.8.41-42).  In  the  famous  case  of the  estate  of Hagnias  too, 
Theopompos is guardian of his brother's son (11.1 Off).  Other cases may 
also be noted. The speaker of Lysias 19 is guardian of his sister's three 
children (19.8-9).  The two elder brothers in Isaios 2 were guardians of 
their  two  sisters  whom  they  later  married  off to  Leukolophos  and 
Menekles (2.3-5). 
It is  also  most probable  that  in  Demosthenes  40,  Menexenos  and 
Bathyllos became guardians not only of their brother Periander and their 
sister whom they later gave away in marriage, but also the four children 
of their sister (Dem.40.6-7). And in Lysias 13, although we do not know 
the  contents  of the  will  of Dionysodoros  (13.41-42),  it  is  also  most 
probable that either his brother Dionysios might have been appointed as 
sole guardian of  his posthumous child. Alternatively, both Dionysios and 
the  speaker, Dionysodoros' brother-in-law, might have been designated 
as joint-guardians. 
289 It is to be noted, however, that it was not only close relatives who 
were  appointed  as  guardians  but  also  friends  or  colleagues  were 
appointed  either as  sole  guardians  or as  co-guardians  of orphans.  For 
instance, Demosthenes informs us that his father appointed Therippides 
\vho was not his father's relative, but had been his friend from boyhood 
as one of their guardians (Dem.27.4-5). And in Demosthenes 36 and 45, 
Pasion is  said to have appointed Phormion his freedman and colleague, 
and an unknown Nikokles who was also probably not a relative as joint-
guardians of  his son Pasikles (36.9; 45.37).385 
It appears  also  from  the  will  of Aristotle  (Diog.Laert.5 .12-13)  that 
neither of the guardians of his two children had any kinship ties with the 
philosopher.  For  instance,  Theophrastos  was  his  colleague,  and 
subsequently  successor of his  philosophical  school,  the  Lykeion.  And 
although Nikanor, to whom Aristotle betrothed his daughter in marriage, 
was  a native of Stagira, he was not a family relation. And in one of the 
fragmentary speeches of Hyperides, the deceased husband of the sister of 
Dioxippos had appointed Euphemos, not a relation but most probably a 
trusted friend as sole guardian of  his posthumous child.
386 
Two cases, one in Lysias, the other in Demosthenes, seem to suggest 
that the appointment of  guardians inter vivos was usually done at a family 
gathering,  on  which  occasion  the  testator  made  his  intentions  or 
385  Cf. also Harrison, Law, (i ), p.99, n.4; Davies, APF, p.435. 
290 arrangements regarding his wife and child or children known. And that 
naturally, as would be expected, the meeting was usually on the initiative 
of the  testator.
387 
The former case may look unlikely,  especially in the 
case of a  documentary will,  since the testator would have prepared his 
document before calling the family meeting to make his intentions known 
to  the gathering. This would help to prevent the genuineness of the will 
being disputed after his death. But he could make a verbal declaration of 
his  \vishes at a meeting at which he nominated a guardian or guardians 
for  his children. The verbal declaration may then be confirmed later by 
..  .  '11  388  prOVIsIons m a WI  . 
The  latter  case  may,  however  be  very  plausible.  Thus,  it  was 
Diodotos who summoned his wife and his brother to the meeting at which 
he  gave him his will and the related instructions regarding the wife and 
the children (Lys.32.5-6). And when the elder Demosthenes realised that 
he  would not recover  from  his  illness,  it  was  he  who  summoned his 
brother and the guardians he had appointed for his wife and his children. 
And at this meeting, he told them the provisions he had made for their 
care and support in the event of  his death (Dem.27.14-16). 
386  Lyk. 1 frag.4 (5).47. 
387  See Lys.32.5-6; Dem.28.14-16. 
388  Cf. Harrison, Law (i ), p.99. 
291 The  appointment  of  Demophon  as  one  of  the  guardians  of 
Demosthenes  and his  sister389  raises  the  question of age  in appointing 
guardians  of orphans  in  Athens.  We  do  not  know  the  exact  age  of 
Demophon  when his  uncle  died  in  376/5  B.C.  Davies  speculates  that 
Demophon "  must have been born by 400  or very soon after.,,390  If this 
conjecture  is  accepted, Demophon would have been about twenty-four 
years  at  the  time  his  uncle  died,  or  perhaps  twenty-two  years 
(accommodating Davies' uncertain period of " very soon after "). At this 
age, he would have been old enough to manage his own affairs, and as a 
co-guardian, help manage the affairs of Demosthenes and his sister, his 
future wife ten years later ( Dem.29  .43). 
But  in  his  article  on  the  authenticity  of Demosthenes  29  in  the 
Symposion already referred to, Prof. MacDowell asserts that Demophon 
was  probably young, possibly fifteen or sixteen years of age,  when his 
uncle  chose  him  as  guardian  and  betrothed  his  daughter  to  him.
391 
MacDowell is most probably right. And if  Demophon was not yet adult at 
the beginning of  the period of  guardianship, then his case is an instance of 
a man appointed as a guardian before he himself attained adulthood. 
The  question  that  readily  comes  to  mind  is  whether  the  case  of 
Demophon  illustrates  a  regular practice  of guardianship  in Athens  or 
389  Dem. 27.4-5,42-5,65; 28.15,19; 29.43. 
390  APF, p.l16. 
391  b  See p.278 n.379 a  ove. 
292 occurred only rarely. It is unfortunate that lack of information does not 
permit further investigation of the matter. As MacDowell rightly points 
out no other sources mention any other Athenian example of a guardian 
below  the  age  of majority.  In  the  absence  of any  certain  evidence, 
therefore~ we can only speculate that if there were any other instances, it 
probably would have been only girls betrothed to young men appointed at 
the same time as co-guardians. This might be done on the assumption of 
the girls' fathers that the fathers of the young men would, together with 
other  appointed  guardians,  care  for  the  girls  until  the  sons  and  the 
betrothed reached their majority and got married. 
One  other  thing  that  emerges  from  the  pattern  of  appointing 
guardians  of orphans  is  the  number  of guardians  that  a  father  could 
appoint for his child or children. The orphans in Isaios 1 on the estate of 
Kleonymos lived under two guardians, though one at a time, as minors: 
first, Deinias, then Kleonymos on the death of  Deinias (1.12). In Isaios 11 
on  the  estate  of Hagnias,  the  son  of Stratokles  was  appointed  two 
guardians,  Theopompos and a co-guardian who prosecuted Theopompos 
for misappropriating the money of  their ward. We know from Lysias also 
that Diodotos appointed only one guardian for his children (Lys.32.5-6). 
293 Pasion  is  said  to  have  appointed  two  guardians,  Phormion  and 
Nikokles,  as  guardians  of his  son  Pasikles.392  And  although  Aristotle 
provided for seven guardians for his two children,393  we are told that the 
elder Demosthenes appointed three men to be the guardian of  his children 
d  h  .  394 Th  h·  an  t  elf property.  e sources t  us pOInt to the fact that there were no 
constraints  on the number of guardians a  father should appoint for  his 
orphans. Any number of  men could be appointed as guardians, perhaps to 
forestall  cases of death of the principal guardian, or as  a check against 
squabbles  either  between  relatives  of the  deceased  and  the  principal 
guardian or between the guardian and the orphan at his age of  majority. 
NEAREST RELATIVES AS GUARDIANS 
While  scholars  of Athenian  law  and  social  history  have  always 
recognised that the pattern of appointing nearest relatives as guardians of 
orphans was quite typical a feature of Athenian family life, we are yet to 
determine  the  fundamental  principles  or  motives  for  this  striking 
phenomenon. 
It is significant that in many patriarchal and patrilineal societies like 
that of Athens, a special relationship exists between a young man and his 
392  See Dem. 36.8; 45.37. Cf. also Harrison, Law (i ), p.99,n.4; Davies, APF , p.435. 
393  Diog. Laert. 5.11-16. 
394  Dem. 27.4-5; 28.15. 
294 maternal  uncle  or  grandfather.  395  The  same  kind  of relationship  IS 
expected to exist with a paternal uncle or the paternal grandfather. When 
Herodotus  relates  the  story of Periander's sons  and their reception by 
their mother's father, he adds that they were treated very kindly, " as was 
only natural, they being the sons of  his own daughter.,,396 Nearly the same 
expression  can be found in Isaios  in his  On  the  Estate of Kiron.  The 
young men who claim to be the sons of Kiron's daughter relate the many 
activities their supposed grandfather shared with them, " as was natural, 
seeing that we were the sons of his own daughter.,,397 And in Lysias 32, 
the speaker reproaches Diogeiton with the maltreatment of  his daughter's 
children (32.16,24,27). 
Furthermore, in Isaios  11  Theopompos is indicted for defrauding 
his  brother's  children of whom he  is  their  guardian.  But he  offers  a 
defence  in which his  kindly  feelings  as  well  as  his  moral  obligations 
towards  the  children are  evident.  The  deceased Stratokles was closely 
related to him, both being the sons of the same father and mother (11.8). 
Stratokles' son and daughters are therefore his own nephews and nieces. 
If Stratokles is dead and he is  guardian of his  children,  he would not 
mismanage affairs of his own brother at his death, live in wealth and sit 
395  Cf. Luc de Reusch, , The Debt of  the Maternal Uncle: Contribution to the Study of Complex 
Structures of  Kinship , Man 9(1974),609-619; Jan Bremmer, , The Importance of  the Maternal Uncle 
and Grandfather in Archaic and Classical Greece and Early Byzantium' ZPE 50(1983),173-186; J. 
Goody, , The Mother's Brother and the Sister's Son in West Africa' J.  Royal Anthrop. Soc. 
89(1959),61-88. 
396  Hdt. 3.50. 
295 unconcerned  while  his  brother's  children  live  in  abject  poverty.  He 
should, therefore, be considered the most wicked (KUKlO'toe;) man among 
men if  it is proved beyond doubt that he has mismanaged the affairs of  his 
deceased  brother  and  left  his  orphans  with  whom  he  has  blood  ties 
without caring for them (11.37-39). 
It is  the  same  kinship  sentiments  and  familial  touch  that  are 
emphasised in Demosthenes 27.4-6,65; 28.15-16, in Isaios 11.37-39, and 
in Lysias 32.4-5,12-13,16-18,24, and 27.398  As can be noticed in Lysias 
32. and rightly noted by Carey399 regarding the nature of the kinship ties, 
the  expression" father. .. father-in-law  and brother. ..  grandfather ...  and 
uncle  of the  little  ones"(32.5),  stresses  the  intricate  network  of close 
relationships,  and therefore the closeness of the bonds which Diogeiton 
the guardian has betrayed. Here the closeness is implicit and factual as in 
32.4 where the fact of  the affinity is stated: " they were brothers ...  bom of 
the same father and mother;" and in 32.12, it is explicit and emotive.40o 
The sources thus make it very obvious that kinship relationships 
were  of crucial  importance  in  the  Athenian  social  structure,  defining 
significant  rights,  and  duties  and  sentiments  of the  individual.  40 
1  And 
397 
Is.8.15. 
398  See also Diog. Laert. 5.12 on Aristotle's will. 
399  C. Carey, Lysias Selected Speeches (Cambridge, 1989),p.213.  .  . 
400  Cf. Lys.32.5 aVU'YKU(OTllTUS  - ties of  kinship: Dem.28.15 1rapuKUTUe~KllV -as a depOSIt, m trust. 
401  See W. E. Thompson, , The Marriage of  First Cousins in Athenian Society' Phoenix ~1(l9.67)~273-
282; Robert 1. Littman, , Kinship in Athens' AS 10(1979),5-31; C.A.Cox, , Sibling Rela.t1onshlps ~ 
Classical Athens: Brother-Sister Ties' JFH 13(1983),377-395; S.C.Humphreys, , KinshIP Patterns ill 
the Athenian Courts' GRBS 27(1986),57-91. 
296 because  the  Athenians  were  so  family-conscious,  the  laws  and  public 
opinion had also carefully defined the duties of kinship. This is shown in 
what the nephew of  Kleonymos and grandson of Polyarkhos tells the jury 
in Isaios on the estate of  Kleonymos: 
" If Polyarkhos, the father of Kleonymos and our grandfather, were 
alive and lacked the necessities of life, or if Kleonymos had died leaving 
daughters  unprovided for,  we should have been obliged on grounds of 
affinity  to  support  our  grandfather,  and  either  ourselves  marry 
Kleonymos'  daughters or else provide dowries and find other husbands 
for them - the claims of kinship, the laws, and public opinion in Athens 
would  have  forced  us  to  do  this  or  else  become  liable  to  heavy 
punishment and extreme disgrace.,,402 
It is  significant  that  even  in  other  cases  which  do  not  relate  to 
guardianship,  kinship  relationship  was  considered  paramount  above 
everything  else.  And so  it  was  regarded  as  a  shameful  act  to  take  a 
kinsman to court (Is.1.5-7; Lys.32.1), and even more discreditable to treat 
a relative unkindly or to do any harm to him even in defending yourself 
against him in court (Is. 1.6,29). 
In Demosthenes' Against Olympiodoros, Kallistratos would not come 
into court and risk a trial with the fellow, " who is a relative, and to say 
unpleasant things of  one who is a brother of  my wife and the uncle of  my 
297 children. and hear disagreeable things from him."(Dem.48.8) In Against 
Neaira,  Theomnestos  relates  how  he  was  reproached  for  not  seeking 
vengeance  for  the  injuries  done  to  his  sister  and her sister's children. 
(Dem.59.l2) And in Isaios'  On  the Estate of  Pyrrhos,  all  the  maternal 
uncles declare that they were witnesses to his wedding with the sister of 
Nikodemos  and  at  the  naming  ceremony  when  the  child  was 
born.(Is.3.26,29-30) It should therefore be regrettable for one to do wrong 
against one's kin: 
"All other men afterwards repent of wrongs which they have done to 
their relatives in moments of  anger." (Is.1.19) 
And it was not only shocking but also painful to notice that a relative 
who should naturally be well-disposed towards his kin had turned against 
him as an enemy: 
"  Nothing  is  more  painful,  men of the  jury,  than  when  a  man  is 
addressed  by name  as  '  brother  'of certain  persons,  when  in  fact  he 
regards them as enemies." (Dem.40.1) 
Thus,  although  litigation  among  kin  frequently  occurred  in 
Athens,403  it  did  not  accord  well  with  social  expectations  of proper 
disputing  conduct;  and so  litigating  kinsmen  seem to  be under strong 
.  l'  .  t 404  social pressure to  explain why they were opposIng re atIves In  cour. 
402  Is.1.39. 
403  Cf. Matthew R.  Christ, The Litigious Athenian (Baltimore and London, 1998),p.169. 
404  See Is. 1.6; Dem.39.1 ,6; 40.1-2; 48.1-2; Antiphon, 1.2. 
298 But  then,  litigants also claim that if relatives are  the  last persons with 
whom  one  should  quarrel,  they  are  also  the  last  persons  who  should 
wrong their kin and act as enemies; for this misfortune compels them to 
405  go to court. 
It is interesting to note also that every time opponents in Isaios use a 
\vill to bolster their claim, the jury is asked to put no faith in such a claim 
but  to  consider blood ties as  the basis for their judgement, although in 
every  respect the  will  seems  completely legitimate.
406  Thus,  a  speaker 
tells the jury: 
" It is  only right, gentlemen, that you should give your verdicts on 
grounds of affinity and the true facts of the case in favour of those who 
claim by right of  kinship rather than of those who rely on a will. For you 
all know surely what a family relationship is; one cannot misrepresent it 
to you. ,,407 
It  is  evident  that  kinship  sentiments  and  attachment  were 
demonstrated not only in the  appointment of guardians of orphans but 
also  in other areas of Athenian life  outside matters of guardianship.  It 
would  therefore not seem surprising that the  appointment of guardians 
was  based on social and humane considerations resulting from kinship 
ties. 
405  Dem.27.65; 48.1; Lys. 32.1,10; Is.1.5-8; 5.9-10. Cf. also Christ, ibid.p.168-169. 
406  Cf. Richard Weyers, [saeus, p.107. 
407  Is. 1.41. See also Is.1.3,4,12,13,17,27; 4.14-16,21,22. 
299 It is not clear why friends and colleagues with no kinship ties were 
also appointed either as sole guardians or as co-guardians of  orphans. The 
reasons could be various; though the evidence we have does not allow us 
to follow up this theme in detail. It is reasonable, however, to suggest that 
a reason for the choice of friends and colleagues was probably to protect 
the business interests of  the testator even after his death. 
The choice and protection may have different motivating factors. A 
non-kinsman could be appointed as a guardian by the testator so that the 
business  he  had established might not suffer mismanagement,  and his 
property dissipated by unscrupulous relatives or a direct heir, resulting in 
the  collapse of the business and his orphan living in destitution.  Such a 
tum of events after his death would certainly tend to  tarnish the  good 
memory of him as a noble man, and bring disgrace upon himself and his 
ascendants. 
Secondly,  and  particularly  if  the  non-kinsman  appointed  as 
guardian is given a stake in the business, he would be compelled by his 
interests in the business to run it with devoted efficiency, to be able to 
pay the rent regularly and also to keep the business going in order to reap 
returns  from his management. And for  the testator to  establish a closer 
attachment  between  the  guardian  and  his  household,  the  testator 
300 sometimes betrothed his widow in marriage to the non-relative guardian 
of  his orphan(s), as Pasion did.
408 
Lack of close relatives may also have been a factor.  For it  appears 
that  if a  father  had no  near  relatives  ready  at  hand,  he  would  most 
probably have to designate friends and colleagues to be guardians of his 
orphans, as perhaps was the case of Aristotle who most probably had no 
kinship ties, nor did his children with the guardians he appointed for them 
(Diog.Laert.5 .12-13). 
One  other  possible  reason  for  appointing  non-relatives  may  have 
been apparent intrigues by the close relatives of a father to defraud the 
child, or to deprive him completely of  his patrimony. A father who could 
foresee  such a  situation would most likely bypass his  family  members 
and designate an outsider as the guardian of the child. This seems to be 
the  case  in Hyperides'  In  Defence of Lykophron  where  all  the  close 
relatives of the deceased seem to have united not long after the death of 
the  husband  of the  sister  of Dioxippos  to  prove  his  young  orphan 
illegitimate and take away his patrimony from him. 
The motives for appointing nearest kinsmen as guardians of orphans 
seem  to  have  been  rooted  in  Athenian  cultural  practice.  In  Katane, 
Kharondas,  as  noted  above,  had  ruled  for  the  separation  of personal 
custody  from  the  management of a  ward's  estate  by his  paternal  and 
408  51  See Dem.36.30-31,  . 
301 maternal uncles because of fears for his safety. While there may be some 
grounds  for this motive, it seems that plotting against the ward may be 
possible only in a minority of  cases, especially if  there was only one child 
of the deceased. But where there were two or three orphans living with a 
paternal uncle it would seem hardly possible for him to plot against them 
all.  He  would easily fall  under suspicion of plotting their murder,  and 
would not find it quite so  easy to  escape prosecution.  And if the  child 
happened to be an heiress, it may be unlikely for a paternal uncle to plot 
against her life. This is because her death, at any rate, would not make 
him an automatic inheritor of the property if it was not very obvious that 
he was the nearest relative; and that would rather necessitate claims to the 
estate by the father's other collateral relatives. 
The  Athenians, however,  entrusted the  administration of the  estate 
and the upbringing of  the orphan to the same person, whether the paternal 
or  maternal  uncle,  and  had  more  positive  social  and  humane 
considerations for their choice of guardians. It may be presumed that the 
maternal uncle had an active hand in the overall education of his sister's 
son,  and that for the young nephew, his mother's brother functioned as 
the  model par excellence for imitation.  This relationship  also  seems to 
.  409·  +: 
have been a factor in the lives of some celebrated men. DaVIes  Inlorms 
us that the orator Demokhares was the sister's son of Demosthenes. We 
302 are  told  also  that  Speusippos  succeeded his  mother's  brother Plato  as 
head of the Academy.41o The same consideration also goes for the role of 
the  paternal uncle. And if it was natural that the maternal uncle or the 
paternal  uncle  served  as  the  model  for  the  boy  during  his  youth  and 
apparently had an active hand in his education, it is understandable that 
this role could reflect itself in laws concerning guardianship. 
Kinship  considerations  were  also  meant  to  ensure  that  the  man 
appointed as  guardian was a reliable person whose reliability would be 
reinforced by the ties of kinship.  So, just as  for marriage, whenever an 
Athenian  father  sought a  worthy guardian  for  his  son  or daughter,  he 
would  often  turn to  a  relative  whose  qualities  he  knew  firsthand,  and 
whose  loyalty he could expect. This was to  ensure that such a guardian 
would feel  morally obliged to watch the interest of the ward and justly 
render duties to him. And there is no doubt that the ward would also have 
the natural rights of  protection by the paternal or maternal uncle. 
It would appear that the Athenians considered maltreatment of,  or 
injustice to kin as an offence against humanity and the gods, for which 
the  gods might send retribution onto the offender against the  ethics of 
kinship. Thus, although quite a few relatives are alleged to have suffered 
injustice  at  the  hands  of their  kinsmen,  perhaps  reflecting  changed 
religious views in the fourth century, it was generally felt that sentiments 
409  APF, p.l42. 
303 of affinity with the attendant religious connotations would make kinsmen 
\\'ho \vere guardians refrain from perfidious acts against their wards. The 
widow  of Diodotos  therefore  emphasises  in  her  evidence  against  her 
father  that the  fear of the  gods  should have restrained his hands  from 
mistreating  the  children  and  mismanaging  their  estate  because  of the 
nearness of  their relationship. 
And  in  his  second  speech  against  Aphobos,  Demosthenes  brands 
Aphobos as " the most impious of men." (28.16) Aphobos, his uncle and 
the one who should least have had evil thoughts about him, let alone treat 
him unkindly or cruelly, has,  together with his  co-guardians,  allegedly 
defiled  the  sacred  ties  of kinship  (the  "sacred  deposit":28.15),  and 
defrauded him of all his fortune bequeathed him by his father.  In overall 
terms,  the  strong  moral  bond  from  natural  affinity  is  an  important 
behavioural  phenomenon  regarding  the  nurture  and  maintenance  of 
orphans, and the management of  their property. This is because it tends to 
imply a certain rejection of wickedness or lack of concern for the orphan 
of a  nearest  kin,  and  invokes  a  kinship  relationship  that  is  naturally 
characterised  by special  attitudes  of mind reflected  in  filial  duties  or 
gestures to kin. 
It  is  indeed  evident  that  the  moral  intent  underlying  the 
appointment of  nearest relatives as guardians suggests a promising focal 
410  Plut. M.I0D; Diog. Laert.3.4. 
304 point.  This is based on the one main reason that once the guardian was 
closely related to the orphan by kinship or blood, he would morally feel 
restrained from mismanaging the affairs of the ward, let alone physically 
harming him or her. This is what Theopompos implies in Isaios 11.38; it 
is the same theme that is expressed in Lysias 32.4-7, especially in 32. 5: " 
as he felt that owing to these connections there was nobody more bound 
to act justly by his children." 
Demosthenes'  account  in his  first  two  speeches  against  Aphobos 
emphasises the same moral intent which his father had in appointing his 
own nephews as guardians of his children (Dem.27.5;28.15). But" they 
(the guardians) have thought nothing of  kinship, as though they had been 
left to us, not as friends and kinsmen, but as bitterest enemies." (27.65) 
ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITIES AS GUARDIAN 
Given  the  ubiquity  of orphans  in  the  Athenian  society,  and  the 
general practice of guardianship, what evidence do we have that points to 
when the designated guardian assumed his duties? If we tum to what we 
would consider as the rules on guardianship, particularly the law quoted 
in Demosthenes 43.75 on the legal protection for orphans by the archon, 
we do not get much help from it. Neither is it overt or implicit in AP 56.6 
where  certain actions that the archon was empowered to take regarding 
guardianship are listed. For none of them indicates exactly at what point 
305 in  time  after  the  death  of the  father  a  guardian  should  assume  his 
responsibilities, whether he was appointed inter vivos or by testament, or 
by a joint action of  the family and the archon. 
In  spite  of the  lack of the  evidence  in  the  supposed  rules  on 
guardianship, a passage in Demosthenes' first speech in his suit against 
Aphobos  throws  some  light  on this  important  event in  the  life  of the 
orphan. It will be recalled that in the will of the elder Demosthenes, he 
had  arranged for a second marriage of his wife, Kleoboule, to  his  own 
nephew, Aphobos. Besides, he had left the house and its furnishings for 
the  use  of the  same  Aphobos  and his  future  wife  and her children.
411 
Kleoboule's dowry in this projected second marriage was eighty minae, 
fifty of it made up from her jewelry and some cups, and the thirty minae 
derived from the sale of  some slaves (27.5,10,16). 
We are informed, however, that although Aphobos took the dowry, 
this  second  arranged  marriage  did  not  take  place  (27.15-17).  And, 
informing the jury of how Aphobos got the widow's dowry and kept it, 
but  would  neither  marry  her  nor  provide  for  her  maintenance, 
Demosthenes asserts: 
OU'toc;  yap  EUSUC;  fJ,E'ta  'tOY  'toO  na'tpoc;  Sctva'tov  ~KEt 'tytv 
otKtav EicrEASffiv Ka'ta 'tytv EKEtVOU  btaSrlKllV, Kat AafJ,~ctvEt 'tct  'tE 
xpucrtu  't11c;  fJ,ll'tPOC;  Kat  'ta  EKnc6fJ,u'tu  'ta  Ku'taAEt~SEv'ta. 
306 "Immediately after my father's death the defendant came and dwelt in the 
house  according  to  the  terms  of the  will,  and  took  possession  of my 
mother's jewels and the cups left behind." (27.13) 
A commonplace of stylistic criticism in Demosthenes as  an orator 
noted by a critic, is that style in his speeches is always functional, that it 
always  clarifies a point which he  wants to  make,  or reinforces an idea 
\vhich  he  wants  to  convey  to  his  audience.
412  There  is  no  doubt  that 
Demosthenes' statement in 27.13 quoted above fits in this feature of his 
style.  For quite apart from the dramatic connotation and effect of E08u<; 
JlE1U  in the  statement,  we easily notice also  a  dramatic  shift from  the 
imperfect tense d)KEt to the historic present AUf.lPdvEt. 
And although we have no way of  judging the exact force of E08u<; 
JlE1U  (it  may  mean  a  few  days  later  or  on  the  day  of the  elder 
Demosthenes' death), the style certainly reflects the thought of speed or 
promptness  with  which  Aphobos  acted.  Golden,  a  disputant  in  a 
controversy over the orator's age of majority, pooh-poohs the statement, 
and,  considering the evidence as of less importance, brushes it aside and 
presumes that the statement " need be no more than an attempt (by the 
.  ,  h  d  d ,,413  H  orator)  to  emphasIse Aphobos  unseemly  urry an  gree.  owever 
411 
Dem.27.5. 
412  Cf. C.A.Wooten, , A Few Observations on Form and Content in Demosthenes ' Phoenix 
31(1977),258-261, esp.258. 
413  Mark Golden, Phoenix 33(1979),25-38,esp.34. 
307 that may be, it seems to me that if  the statement is taken in its entirety and 
examined carefully without prejudice, we would realise that it illustrates 
also  two important facts about the guardianship of Demosthenes. In the 
first place, it points to the guardian's sense of duty and concern for the 
orphans and their mother. For the decease of the elder Demosthenes had 
left  a  social  vacuum regarding  the  administration  of the  oikos  which 
needed  to  be  filled  in  no  time.  Secondly,  and  more  importantly,  the 
statement highlights the fact that Aphobos assumed his duties as guardian 
of the orphans and the widow with immediate effect at the death of his 
uncle. 
This immediate assumption of responsibilities is evident in a later 
statement by Demosthenes to the jury. According to  the orator, when it 
became obvious and certain that Aphobos had got the widow's dowry and 
yet  would  not  marry  her  or  provide  for  her  maintenance,  he  was 
challenged by Demokhares, the husband of the orator's aunt.  Aphobos, 
Demosthenes says, admitted having received the dowry, but offered the 
excuse that he and the widow were having a little spat about some gold 
trinkets' and that  as soon as that matter was settled, he would comply in  ,  , 
the  matter of her maintenance and in other ways as  well such that he, 
Demosthenes  would  have  no  cause  to  complain  (27.15).414  And  , 
illustrating  the  proofs  of Aphobos'  admissions  of the  facts  about  the 
308 events  during  Demokhares'  remonstration  with  him,  Demosthenes 
observes rhetorically: 
" If it is shown that he made these admissions before Demokhares 
and  the  others  who  were  present; ...  and  that  he  occupied  the  house 
immediately after the death of my father; will it not be clear, the matter 
being admitted by everybody, that he has received the dowry ...  "? (27.16) 
This rhetorical question evidently suggests that Aphobos moved into 
his  uncle's  oikos  no  sooner  than  he  had  died,  obviously  to  begin  to 
perform his role and duties as guardian of  the orphans and their mother. If 
on the basis of  the orator's account, it is agreed that Aphobos assumed his 
duties as guardian of Demosthenes and his sister and mother, it  follows 
that this assumption of  responsibilities would have taken place before the 
burial  and  all  other  immediate  rites  of the  elder  Demosthenes  were 
performed.  Certain  passages  in  Isaios,  and  other  sources  concerning 
funeral  ceremonies  in  Athens  seem  to  corroborate  the  Demosthenic 
evidence. 
In an inheritance dispute in Isaios, the speaker tells the jury: 
" The conduct of Diokles on the occasion of our grandfather's death 
clearly shows that we were acknowledged as the grandchildren of Kiron. 
I presented myself, accompanied by one of my relatives, a cousin of my 
father,  to  convey away the  body with the  intention of conducting the 
414  Cf. also Hunter, EMC/CR 33(1989),41. 
309 funeral  from my own house. I did not find Diokles in the house, and I 
entered and was prepared to remove the body, having bearers with me for 
this purpose. When, however, my grandfather's widow requested that the 
funeral  should take place from that house, and declared that she would 
like herself to help us to layout and deck the corpse, and entreated me 
and wept, I acceded to her request and went to my opponent and told him 
in  the presence of witnesses that I would conduct the  funeral  from  the 
house  of the  deceased, since Diokles' sister had begged me to  do  so." 
(8.21-22) 
In the next section of  the same speech, the speaker goes on: 
" DiokIes, on hearing this, made no objection, but asserting that he 
had actually bought some of  the requisites for the funeral and had himself 
paid a deposit for the rest, demanded that I should pay him for these, and 
arranged  to  recover  from  me  the  costs  of the  objects  which  he  had 
purchased  and to  produce  those  who had received the  deposit  for  the 
objects for which he alleged that he had paid a deposit." (8.23) 
These  passages  here  no  doubt  emphasise  the  intensive  funeral 
preparations which require immediate attention before the burial of the 
deceased. The following passages may as well be considered. In a dispute 
over the estate of  Nikostratos in Isaios, the speaker rhetorically complains 
to the jury: 
310 ..  Whereas he (Khariades) neither took up the body of his  adopted 
father nor committed it to the flames nor collected the bones, but left all 
these duties to be done by complete strangers, should he not be regarded 
as  most  impious  in  claiming  to  inherit  the  property  of the  deceased, 
though he never performed any of the customary rites over him? Shall I 
be told that, after having performed none of these duties, he administered 
Nikostratos' property?" (4.19-20) 
On the estate of Astyphilos, also in Isaios, where the half-brother of 
the deceased claims his property, the plaintiff asserts: 
" So confident, indeed, has Kleon here always been, and still is, that 
no  one  but himself is  to  have the  estate,  that,  as  soon as  the  news  of 
Astyphilos' death was reported  ...  he entered into possession of  the landed 
estate and declared that anything else which Astyphilos left belonged to 
his own son, without ever giving you the opportunity to decide the matter. 
When,  however, my brother's remains were brought home,  the  person 
who claims to have been long ago adopted as his son did not lay them out 
or  bury  them,  but Astyphilos'  friends  and  companions-in-arms,  seeing 
that my father was ill and I was abroad, themselves laid out the remains 
and carried out all the other customary rites." (9.3-4) 
Here in these two passages, we are not interested in the inheritance 
disputes between the speakers and the defendants. What concerns us is 
what  actually goes into the performance of the deceased's funeral rites. 
311 The  urgency of these rites is attested by a law on funeral procedure in 
Athens  attributed  to  Solon,  and  preserved  for  us  in  a  speech  of 
Demosthenes, the relevant section of  which reads as follows: 
" The deceased shall be laid out in the house in any way one chooses, 
and they (the relatives) shall carry out the deceased on the day after that 
on which they layout, before the sun rises.,,415 
These sources are quoted not just for the purpose of dwelling longer 
on funeral ceremony in Athens. On the contrary, they are to offer further 
illustrations in which the evidence, in its detail and rigour, is the equal of 
the  Demosthenic evidence provided in his  statements to  the jury. It is 
quite noticeable from the passages cited so far that great importance was 
attached to funeral celebration in Athens, and also that funeral ceremony 
involved a great deal of  organisation and financial costs. 
In a  situation where  a  man died leaving  an  adult  son,  natural  or 
adopted, who then became the automatic heir, such a son shouldered all 
the  funeral  responsibilities of the  deceased  father.  These  were  special 
conventional  filial  duties of the  son towards his  father.  If he  failed  to 
perform them, there could be very damaging consequences for the son. 
F  or  one  thing,  the  general  conventional  opinions  and  attitudes  of the 
Athenians, and in fact, Greeks in general, viewed the performance by the 
son of the funeral rites of a parent as the crowning glory in the life of a 
312 parent who has lived a happy life. This, in part, is what Plato implies in 
one  of his  works where,  when Socrates  questions  Hippias  about  what 
constitutes 'the beautiful'  , Hippias answers that it includes a man arriving 
at  old  age  and  "  having  buried  his  parents  beautifully,  to  be buried 
beautifully and fittingly by his own offspring.,,416 
Against  this  background  of  happy  life,  the  Athenian  parent 
considered it a very terrible and incurable misfortune to survive a son.417 
And  at  the  dokimasia(  the  vetting  procedure  partly  charged  with  the 
screening of people for public office)  in Athens, the city's concern for 
the  cults of the families was reflected in a question which required the 
person being vetted to demonstrate his care for his parents and knowledge 
of the tombs of his ancestors. If a man did not look after his parents, or 
perform the funeral and other customary rites of  his deceased parents, he 
failed the scrutiny, and was disqualified from the post he was aspiring to 
get.418  On the other hand, if a man died without legitimate offspring, his 
next-of-kin carried out all the funeral  duties with the hope of inheriting 
from the deceased after all the funeral toil.419 
415  Dem.43.62. 
416  Hippias Major, 291d-e. Euripides also echoes the same sentiment. Cf. Med.  12:-134; Supp.  168-
75,538-41; Troades, 387-90. For modem references to the notion, see Lacey, Famzly, p.16; Rush 
Rehm, Marriage to Death: The Conflation of  Wedding and Funeral Rituals in Greek Tragedy 
(Princeton 1994),p.21. 
417 
Is.7.14; Lys.2.73.  G b . I 
418  See Xen. Mem. 2.2.13; Arist. AP, 55.3; Lys.31.20-23. Also MacDowell, Law, p.167-69;  a  ne 
Adeleye, ' The Purpose of  the Dokimasia ' GRBS 24(1983),295-306. 
419  Cf. the passages cited above in the inheritance disputes in Isaios. Also Wevers, [saeus, p.101. 
313 But if a man died leaving an orphan in his minority, as in the case of 
Demosthenes,  and  Diodotos'  orphans  in  Lysias  32,  the  practice,  both 
customary and legal, was that the guardian of the orphan, though not the 
heir,  carried out all the funeral responsibilities and bore all the financial 
costs involved on behalf of the orphan. The expenses were then charged 
on the ward's estate.
420 One may consider also the immediate filial needs 
of the  orphan - his or her comfort and emotional disposition- until the 
funeral rites were over. 
It would imply, therefore, that, the guardian, if appointed inter vivos 
or by testament, would begin performing his duties on the very day of the 
death of the father. And if  a guardian was not appointed either inter vivos 
before the decease occurred, or by testament, it would seem that one was 
immediately  appointed  or nominated  on  the  day  the  person  died.  He 
would  then  assume  immediate  responsibility  to  see  to  not  only  the 
celebration of  the funeral of  the deceased, but also the care as well as the 
administration of  the estate of  the orphan. It is possible that there could be 
rival  claimants to the estate of the deceased. This would imply that the 
appointment of a  guardian by the  archon and legal process might take 
some time. But this situation could arise in the case of an epikleros, and 
not that of a surviving minor son. And even in the case of an epikleros, 
the  presumption is that if there were rival claimants, the most possible 
420  See Lys.32.21. 
314 nearest relative of  the deceased would be nominated to assume immediate 
responsibilities until the claims had been decided by court. 
It stands  to  reason also  that,  as  it has  been noted already,  if the 
guardian appointed inter vivos or by testament happened to be away on 
the death of  the testator, the family in consultation with the archon would 
nominate a deputy guardian, in conformity with the line of succession, to 
act in place of  the formally appointed guardian until he was back home to 
take  over  his  duties.  We  would  presume  then,  that  Aphobos, 
Demosthenes'  guardian, began exercising his role and functions  on the 
very  day  the  elder Demostnenes died.  In the  same vein,  in  a  situation 
whereby  guardianship  informally  devolved  on family  members  on  the 
death of a father, it could well be maintained that such relatives assumed 
responsibilities as guardians immediately the person died. 
Two passages in Isaios  seem to  suggest that a  guardian appointed 
inter vivos or by testament had to get himself registered as  guardian by 
the archon before he could act as guardian.
421  This would also mean that a 
guardian nominated by the family in consultation with the archon had to 
get registered before he could begin to perform his duties. However, the 
situation described in these two passages may be regarded as  peculiar. 
They,  in fact,  relate to disputes about the property some time after the 
death  and  burial  rites  of the  deceased,  and not  immediately  after  his 
315 death,  at  which  time  the  residential  status  of the  orphan  would  most 
probably also have been in dispute. 
Besides that, the circumstances are such that we cannot be certain 
whether or not the status of the people as the guardians they profess to be 
is  genuine.  And even if it is  genuine, their registration with the  archon 
seems quite remote from the time their alleged testators had died. It may 
be  probable  that  registration  of the  guardian  may have  been  required, 
\yithout which the general protection of the interests of the orphan could 
not  have  been nominally discharged by the  archon.422  In  any  case,  the 
passages do not even suggest what point in time the guardian should get 
registered, ifhe really had to. 
I  would  maintain  that  if any  registration  with  the  archon  was 
required, which probably it was, that would be done before the testator's 
death,  so  that he could assume immediate responsibility as  soon as  the 
testator died.  The presumed registration would therefore not take  place 
years later as  the situations presented in the two passages of Isaios seem 
to  suggest.  This  immediate  assumption  of responsibilities  becomes 
equally  incumbent  in  a  situation  where  the  man  died  leaving  a 
posthumous child, as in the situations in Lysias 13.39-42 and Hyperides' 
In Defence of  Lykophron. Although the child would not yet be born, his 
421 
See 18.4.8; 6.36. 
316 appointed guardian would have begun performing his role by managing 
its property as soon as the decease occurred before the child was born. 
Demosthenes'  statement  about  Aphobos  should  therefore  not  be 
brushed  aside  as  a  mere  oratorical  art  to  embellish  and  emphasise 
Aphobos'  unseemly  haste  and  greed  to  misappropriate  Demosthenes' 
estate.  Rather,  taking  it  from  the  most  positive  point  of view,  the 
statement  marks  the  immediate  assumption  of the  responsibilities  of 
Aphobos as required of  him as guardian on the death of  his uncle, and the 
beginning of the orphan's tutelage under his guardianship. I believe that 
this,  as  far as the sources go, would have been the general practice and 
situation for all guardians and orphans in classical Athens. 
422  Cf H·  Law (i ) p.l  03. The view that guardians had to register with the archon is in dispute. 
See  wys:,r;:.~o2~; Jolowi~z, JRS 37(1947),83,n.14; Robin Osbo~e, Chiron  18(1~88),~05. But see 
Dem.43.75, and Arist. AP,56.6-7 which are likely to prompt an inference for registratton. 
317 CHAPTER 7 
THE GUARDIAN FOR THE 
HEIRESS (EPIKLEROS) 
It is  generally  recognised  that  the  Athenian  epikleros  was  the 
daughter,  granddaughter,  or  great-granddaughter  of a  man  who  died 
leaving behind him no legitimate son or grandson or great-grandson.423  A 
few  basic  facts  need  be  noted  first  in  discussing  the  question  of a 
guardian for the epikleros. The position of the epikleros seems to differ 
from that of  the male orphan in three fundamental respects. 
In the first place, the male orphan was appointed a guardian at the 
death of his father but the epikleros had to be claimed at the court by her 
prospective guardian. This could be the result of  one of two conditions: if 
her father died without adopting a son, or appointing a guardian for her 
inter vivos. At the death of the father, if the only daughter had not been 
married  already  to  one whom her father  had adopted  as  his  son,  she 
became  assignable  or  liable  to  adjudication  (epidikos  ),424  and  was 
assigned  or adjudicated by the  archon.  The  adjudication was based on 
claims submitted to him, to the nearest male kinsman of  the deceased in a 
fixed  order  of precedence.  This  fixed  order  of precedence  obviously 
423  On the epikleros see MacDowell, Law, p.95-108; Andokides, p.145-6; J.E.Kamezis,' H E1tlKA llPOC; 
(1972); E.Karabelias in Symposion (ed. H.J.Wolff,1975),215-54, noted by MacDowell, Law, 
p.266,n.207; Harrison, Law (i), p.132-8; Lacey,Family,p.139-45; D.Schaps, in CQ 25(1975),53-7; 
Economic Rights,p.25-42; Cox, Household,p.94-99,95,n.109; C.B.Patterson, Family,p.91-101; Sealey, 
Justice, p.16-21. 
318 reflected the same pattern as the one for claiming the inheritance of  a man 
who died without any issue, as set out in Demosthenes 43.51.425 
Second,  an  adult  male  orphan  did  not  need  to  be  appointed  a 
guardian to provide for him and manage his estate but the adult epikleros 
necessarily needed to have a  guardian to maintain and support her and 
administer her property until her adult son took over her property and 
maintenance:~26 Furthermore, while the young male orphan, like all other 
young  boys,  was  expected  to  emerge  from  his  period of tutelage  to 
adulthood at the age of eighteen not only to manage his own affairs but 
also to participate in the affairs of  the state,427 the epikleros, like any other 
female,  continued to  live  under tutelage  throughout  her life  from  the 
period of  minority to death. 
The  other notable fact  about the epikleros  is  that the  situation in 
which an epikleros was a minor or unmarried at the time of her father's 
death seems rather rare in the sources. Two instances that readily come to 
mind  are  the  daughters  of  Epilykos428  and  the  second  wife  of 
Protomakhos  because of whom he  divorced his  first  wife.
429 
It  seems 
most probable also that Philomakhe II, daughter of  Euboulides II, became 
epikleros  while  still  an  infant  during  which  time  she  was  probably 
424  See Is.2.2;6.4;7.3; Dem.44.46; and cf. Harrison,Law (i ),p.95,156,n.2and3; John Gould inJHS 
100(1980),43.  .  . 
425  For the full order of  precedence see  Dem.43.51. Cf. Hamson, Law (1 ),p.l44-146. 
426  Dem.46.20; Is. frag.26; Hyper. Frag.B,39. 
427  Arist. AP,42.1. 
428  Andok.l.11 7-119. 
319 awarded to Sositheos, the speaker of  Demosthenes 43.430 However, in the 
majority of cases where the epikleros is  mentioned, it appears to  have 
been  the  adult  and  married  epikleros  who  features  in  the  situations 
described. It would seem therefore, that most of the laws concerning the 
epikleros tend to have the adult epikleros in mind.431 
In  Demosthenes Against Pan  tain etos  ,  the  defendant  Pantainetos, 
alleges,  as reported by Nikoboulos,432  that Evagoras had gone into his 
home  in the  country,  and  "made his  way  into  the  apartments  of his 
daughters,  who were heiresses" (Dem.37.35). The mention of heiresses 
(epikleroi)  by Pantainetos, however, cannot be taken seriously to  mean 
that his daughters were in fact epikleroi, and unmarried. It is noteworthy 
that an only daughter whose father was still alive was not referred to as an 
epikleros.  It  appears  most  probable  that  Pantainetos  was  just  being 
metaphorical if  not rhetorical - that his daughters were potential epikleroi, 
believing that he would most probably not be able to  sire a male child 
before his death; or he said that in anticipation of what was probable. It 
seems to me that the sarcastic comment by the speaker that Pantainetos 
had not as yet had the case tried by the archon, the protector of  heiresses, 
illustrates  the falsity of the reference.  In fact,  if Pantainetos secured a 
429  Dem.57.41. 
430  Dem.43.12-13,15. Cf. Davies APF, p.78; Thompson, De Hagniae, p.14.  . 
431  For instance, Plut. Solon,20.2-3. For the rarity of  the true epikleros in the sources see lE.Karnezls, 
The Epikleros, p.206-12, noted by Cox, Household, p.95,n.ll0. 
432  Dem.37.45-46. 
320 verdict for two talents for his charges, it was most probably for unlawful 
entry into his house but not for anything against his "heiresses." 
With regard to the appointment or selection of a guardian for the 
epikleros.  three  surviving  speeches433  together with a  few  independent 
references yield considerable information on the procedure. In his second 
speech in his suit against Stephanos, Apollodoros the plaintiff cites the 
following law to establish that his mother Arkhippe is an epikleros: 
" If a woman is betrothed for lawful marriage by her father or by a 
brother born of  the same father or by her grandfather on her father's side, 
her children shall be legitimate. In case there is none of these relatives, if 
the woman is an heiress, her guardian shall take her to wife, and if she is 
not,  that  man  shall  be  her  guardian  to  whom  he  entrusts  her." 
(Dem.46.18)434 
The same law is partly quoted and explained in Demosthenes 44.49 
and Hyperides, Against Athenogenes, 16. As can be noticed from the law, 
and from the explanations given to it by the speaker of Demosthenes 44, 
and by Hyperides, the law has three main objectives. In the first place, it 
fundamentally  defines  the  requisite  for  a  woman  to  be  considered  as 
lawfully married for the purpose of  bearing legitimate children. Secondly, 
it clearly states, on the principle of closeness of  kin to the woman, which 
people could be her guardian and therefore could legally give her away in 
321 marriage. But the law indicates also a specific duty of the guardian of an 
epikleros: if  the woman is an epikleros, her guardian is required to marry 
her.  And  in  another  section  of the  same  speech,  Apollodoros  quotes 
another law that requires that the son of  an epikleros who has reached his 
age of majority should be the guardian of his mother and provide for her 
maintenance: 
" If anyone is born the  son of an heiress, two years after he has 
reached the age of manhood he shall assume control of  the estate, and he 
shall make due provision for his mother's maintenance." (Dem.46.20)435 
As  has  been  discussed  on page  417  below,  it does  appear  that 
Apollodoros  is  exploiting  this  law  to  suit  his  own  argument  and 
convenience.  For  the  application  of  the  law  regarding  the  legal 
representation  of the  epikleros  seems  to  be  different  in  a  situation 
whereby the woman was a married epikleros either to her guardian or to 
someone  else.  But we may note  also  the  law quoted in Demosthenes 
43.54  that talks about the marriage of the poor epikleros and how this 
should be done: 
" With regard to all heiresses who are classified as  Thetes, if the 
nearest of kin does not wish to marry one, he shall give her in marriage 
with  a  dowry  of five  hundred  drachmai,  if he  is  of the  class  of 
433 
Dem.43;46; Is.3. 
434  cr. Harrison, Law (i ), p.11 O. 
435  cr. Is.8.31;10.12;frag.26; Hyper. frag.B,39. 
322 Pentakosiomedimni, if of the  class of Knights,  with  a  dowry of three 
hundred,  and if of the class of Zeugitai, with one hundred and fifty,  in 
addition  to  what is her own.  If there  are  several kinsmen in the  same 
degree of relationship, each one of them shall contribute to the dowry of 
the heiress according to his due share. And if there are several heiresses  , 
it  shall not be necessary for a single kinsman to give in marriage more 
than one, but the next-of-kin shall in each case give her in marriage or 
marry her himself. And if the next-of-kin does not marry her or give her 
in marriage, the archon shall compel him either to marry her himself or 
give her in marriage ....  " 
The texts of these laws clearly show that the epikleros whom the 
three  laws have in mind is the  adult epikleros.  This  situation becomes 
more evident in Apollodoros' explanatory note to the law in Dem. 46.18 
in section 19. Thus it is assumed that the now adult epikleros would, then 
in  her  minority,  have  lived  under  a  designated  guardian  until  the 
marriageable age when she should either be married by her father's next-
of-kin himself or given in marriage by him according to the laws. 
The  selection  of a  guardian  for  the  epikleros  may  take  vanous 
forms.  While still alive, if  a father realised that the daughter would be his 
only child, he might, if she had reached puberty, attempt to marry her off 
to  his  brother or anybody of his  choice.  Demosthenes 44 provides  an 
instance.  When Meidylides realised that Kleitomakhe would be his only 
323 child,  he wished to marry her off to his brother Arkhiades.  Arkhiades, 
however,  turned  down  the  match because  he  did  not  wish  to  marry. 
Consequently,  Meidylides gave his  daughter in marriage to  Aristoteles 
who was probably not a close relative.(Dem.44.1 0) Giving away an only 
daughter in marriage to  a non-kinsman whom a father had not adopted 
could, however, create a problem later in the family. This is because if  the 
children of  the epikleros later claim the estate of  her father there could be 
fierce rivalry between them and their grandfather's patriline.436 
But the  father  could adopt  a  son  inter  vivos,  or by testament,  or 
appoint a guardian for the girl before his death.437 If the father adopted a 
son  inter vivos,  the adopted son had the right of immediate entry into 
possession  of the  estate  at  the  death  of his  adoptive  father.438  His 
immediate responsibility, if  the epikleros were an infant, would then be to 
be  her  guardian  responsible  for  her nurture  and  care  as  well  as  the 
management of  the estate until she reached puberty. He may then take her 
to wife, or else give her away in marriage and dower her accordingly.439 
There is evidence that seems to suggest that the father of an only 
daughter  may  also  appoint  a  guardian  inter  vivos  for  his  infant  or 
unmarried daughter, though the designated guardian may not necessarily 
be  a relative.  In Isaios, Pistoxenos is  alleged to  have died in battle in 
436  Cf. Cox, Household, p.99. 
~7  6  Dem.20.102;41.3-4;46.1  . 
438  Harrison, Law (i ),p.93,95; (ii ),p.l25; MacDowell, Law, p.lOO; Todd, Law, p.220,223. 
324 Sicily, leaving his only daughter, Kallippe, in the house of Euktemon as 
her  guardian.(Is.6.13.14)  We  are  not  in  a  position  to  know  whether 
Euktemon was a relative of the deceased Pistoxenos. It is most probable 
that he was a friend whom he trusted. But it is certain that Pistoxenos had 
appointed  Euktemon as  guardian of Kallippe,  who  was  most probably 
still young, before the Sicilian expedition in which he perished. 
It is also not stated by what marriage procedure Euktemon took 
Kallippe  to  wife,  from  which  marriage  the  two  alleged  sons  were 
bom.(6.14)  But,  as  Wyse  notes,440  if their  alleged  marriage  had  been 
illegal,  the  speaker  would  not  have  passed  over  the  point  without 
commenting  on it.  One thing,  however,  is  obvious.  The  legitimacy of 
Kallippe  and  her  sons  is  the  subject of dispute  at  the  court.  But  the 
situation described throws light on the fact  that if the father of an only 
daughter did not adopt a son, he might appoint a guardian for her while 
he was alive to take charge of  the daughter in the event of  his death. 
In absence of an adoption of a son, or appointment of a guardian 
inter vivos by the father before he died, the epikleros had to be claimed 
by her prospective guardian, and was adjudicated to him by the procedure 
of epidikasia  administered  by the  court presided  over by the  archon. 
Demosthenes and Isaios give us some information about the procedure 
for  the  epidikasia.  In his  suit against Stephanos, Apollodoros cites  the 
439  Dem.43.54;46.18; Is.6.14. Cf. also Just, Women, p.95. 
325 following law to establish the irregularity of the alleged marriage of his 
mother to Phormion, and therefore the illegality of  the marriage: 
"  The  archon  shall  assign  by lot  days  for  the  trial  of claims  to 
inheritances or heiresses in every month except Skirophorion; and no one 
shall obtain an inheritance without adjudication.,,441 
And a speaker in Isaios also tells the jury: 
"  Now  the  law  ordains  that  a  petition  for  the  adjudication  of an 
inheritance must be presented within five  years of the death of the last 
heir.,,442 
It  would  appear  that  Demosthenes  46.22  and  Isaios  3.58 
complement  each  other.  In  Demosthenes  46.22,  the  law  sets  out  the 
procedure  for  claims:  the  archon advertises  any vacant inheritances or 
available heiresses every month except the last month of  the Attic year. In 
Isaios  3.58, it is allowed of anyone who felt that he was entitled to an 
inheritance or to an epikleros to put in his claim within five years of the 
death of  the last heir. 
It appears from what the speaker of  Demosthenes 43 says also that 
there  was  a  wider  publicity  after  the  advertisement  by  the  archon 
declaring  an estate vacant,  or an epikleros  assignable before claimants 
came forward with their claims: 
440 
Wyse, p.499.  .  .  M 
441  Dem.46.22. Cf. Harrison, Law (i), p.9-12; MacDowell, Law, p.103. On Skrrophonon see  urray, 
Demosthenes V, LeL, p.260, note a. 
326 "  Theopompos, the father of Makartatos here,  although he was in 
town when the herald asked by proclamation whether anyone wished to 
lay claim to the estate of Hagnias by virtue of kinship or under a will, or 
to deposit security for the costs of  such claim, yet did not venture to make 
a deposit, but by his own act gave judgement against himself that he had 
no conceivable claim on the estate of  Hagnias."(Dem.43.4-5) 
As  noted  by  Thompson,443  there  is  no  other  reference  In  the 
sources to a herald's invitation to contest an estate or an epikleros. But we 
learn from Aristotle that during the main assembly of each month " it is 
necessary to read out the claims on the estates and the heiresses so that it 
will not go unnoticed that one has become vacant.  ,,444 It is therefore most 
probable that Aristotle is referring to an aspect of the archon's functions 
as  conferred  on him by the  law  in Demosthenes  46.22,  and  that  the 
reading of the available claims by the archon and the proclamation by the 
herald probably took place at the same meeting of  the assembly. 
Demosthenes 43.4-5 and 46.23 define two bases for claims to an 
inheritance or to an epikleros. An epikleros could be claimed either on 
grounds of kinship or by a will. But the circumstances for the epidikasia 
appear various. If  the claim for the epikleros was by virtue of  kinship, the 
order for those who were best qualified to claim her and be her guardian 
442  Is.3.58. 
443  De Hagniae, p.16,65. 
444  AP,43.4. 
327 \vas  the  same  order  of precedence  as  set  out  in  the  law  quoted  in 
Demosthenes 43.51. This was the situation in the majority of cases. It is, 
in fact,  on the basis of Demosthenes 43.51  that the archon exercises his 
functions  conferred  on  him  by  the  law  in  Demosthenes  46.22.  The 
epikleros  becomes assignable or claimable in Demosthenes 43.51.  The 
archon  declares her status to the people at the assembly as  directed by 
Demosthenes 46.22;445  then anyone who qualifies to claim her submits 
his  claims  to  the  archon within the  specified period of time  stated  in 
Isaios 3.58 for the adjudication. 
Once she is awarded to him by court presided over by the archon, 
he becomes her guardian, and responsible for everything about her. But if 
anyone later  feels  that the  first  adjudication was made  to  the  wrong 
person  and he is  better qualified than that person,  he  petitions  to  the 
archon  and puts in his claim for her.  The petitioner's claim should be 
based on the rules set out in Demosthenes 43.16 and in conformity with 
the time limit in Isaios 3.58 for a diadikasia.
446 
It would appear that Demosthenes 46.22 and Isaios 3.58 assume 
four possible situations with regard to the status of  the epikleros. The first 
situation  would probably  be  if the  adopted  son  inter  vivos  who  had 
already  entered  into  possession  of  the  estate  and  taken  over  the 
guardianship of  the epikleros had died. As the last heir to the property and 
445  Cf. Arist. AP, 43.4. 
328 guardian of the epikleros, his death without a son would make the estate 
yacant  again.  The epikleros once more became liable to  claim by other 
collateral relatives who would then sue for both of  them. 
Second, is  the situation of an epikleros in her minority.  At the 
death of her father, the minor epikleros had been claimed by her father's 
next-of-kin under whose guardianship she had lived. But the next-of-kin 
and  guardian of the epikleros dies while she is  still in her minority.  In 
such  a  situation,  the  deceased  would  have  been  the  last  heir  to  the 
property and guardian of the minor epikleros. There would therefore be 
the need for a fresh epidikasia to claim the property and her. 
There could also be the situation of the adult epikleros living with 
her  husband.  If the  husband  died  leaving  no  son,  his  death  would 
necessitate a fresh claim to the property and the epikleros. Furthermore, 
there appears to be the case of a female orphan with a brother born of  the 
same  father  and  mother  who  inherited  their  father's  property,  and 
therefore became guardian of his sister. If the brother died without a son 
his death would thus leave her an epikleros. This situation would then call 
for new claims to the estate and for the epikleros by the father's next-of-
kin  in the  family.447  This is the situation believed to  have arisen at the 
beginning of  Menander's Shield. 
446  Cf. MacDowell, Law, p.l03,217-218. 
447  See Is.  10.4,7,8,10,14,26. 
329 There is one other situation that called for  an epidikasia.  If the 
father of an only daughter adopted a son by testament; or ifhe adopted a 
girl  or  a  woman, the  death of her adoptive  father  would make  her  an 
epikleros.  448 The adoption of females, however, appears quite rare in the 
sources. It is significant that a son adopted inter vivos and duly admitted 
to the pbratry and deme of  his adoptive father was on the same footing as 
a  son  born  in  lawful  wedlock.  He  could  therefore  enter  into  direct 
possession of the estate like a natural son, and have the epikleros under 
his guardianship without court authorisation. No such privilege, however, 
was allowed to a son adopted by testament.
449  Thus no rights for claims 
to  the  estate  or the epikleros  existed for  such a  son until  he had been 
certified by a court that he was the rightful heir to the deceased. 
Todd
450 claims that it is nowhere made explicit in the sources the 
reason  for  the  distinction  that  a  son  adopted  by will  needed judicial 
ratification  but the  one duly  adopted inter vivos  did not require  to  go 
through that procedure. His view, however, seems to lack credibility. It is 
generally acknowledged that adoption by testament is the same as a will 
bequeathing property. And Isaios tells us in 3.59-61  that adoption inter 
vivos  made the adoptee a legally recognised son of the  adopted father, 
and therefore barred other claimants from disputing the legitimacy of the 
448  Is.7.9; 11.41. Cf. MacDowell, Law, p.l00-l01. 
449  Is.6.3;9.3;10.9; Dem.44.19. Cf. MacDowell, Andokides, p.147-148. 
450  Athenian Law, p.224. 
330 adoptee or the relationship that he professed to the deceased. But adopted 
sons  by testament should apply to  the  court  for  adjudication not only 
because collateral relatives were always zealous to dispute a bequest to an 
adopted  son by will, but also because most claims of some collaterals 
were suspect. Thus, the genuineness of their claims required certification 
by the COurt.
451 
This is a very striking piece of  evidence for the distinction 
that Todd ignores. 
He  is,  none  the  less,  certainly  right,  following  Wyse452  and 
Harrison  453  on the contractual nature of adoption inter vivos between the 
adoptive father and his adopted son-to-be. And Isaios further informs us 
that the consent of a widow living with her son in her defunct husband's 
household might be obtained before her son could be adopted,454 though 
there is no evidence that the permission was a legal requirement. 
Isaios and Demosthenes provide information that implies that the 
position of  the epikleros could be quite unstable both in marriage and her 
residential  status regarding the selection of her guardian. In Isaios 3.64, 
the speaker refers to a law stating that if a man died leaving no sons but 
only a daughter who was married but childless, his nearest male relative 
could take her away from her husband and marry her himself. The same 
law  seems to have been the grounds for  the  threat to  the  father of the 
451  For Athenians' reservations about the authenticity of  the documents tendered for probate, see Is. 
1.38,41;4.12,23;7.2;9.7-8. Then cf. Thompson, Prudentia 13 i (1981),13-23. 
452  See Wyse, p.249. But for a hint to the contract see, Dem.46.14. 
331 speaker of Isaios  10  by Aristomenes (10.19) regarding the property of 
Aristarkhos.  And  in  Demosthenes  43,  the  speaker  cites  a  law  that 
emphasises the fact that the award of an estate or an epikleros was not 
final  provided  a  new  contestant  came  forward  with  a  better  claim. 
(43.16)455 
The  laws  could have  three  major effects  on  the  position of the 
epikleros.  In the  first  place, she could be transferred from  guardian to 
guardian, if she was a minor epikleros, as new contestants came forward 
\\ith  apparently  better  claims.  Secondly,  if there  were  two  or  more 
collateral relatives of the deceased father who wished to claim her,  she 
might become an object of rivalry and competition among them,456  and 
was  awarded to the claimant who best qualified.  In the third place, the 
married  epikleros might have her marriage  terminated resulting  in her 
transfer  from  one husband to  another,  especially if a  large  estate  was 
involved,  thereby creating an unstable married life for her if claims for 
her by new contestants happened to be successful. And Isaios notes that 
"indeed it has frequently happened that husbands have been thus deprived 
of  their own wives." (3.64) The effects of  subsequent claims and transfers 
on her residential status are indeed obvious. 
453  Law (i ),p.20,n.1, and p.71,88-89. 
454 
Is. 7.14. 
455  Cf. Is.11. 7; MacDowell, Law, p.l  03. 
456  9  See Andok. 1.117-11  . 
332 Forster
457 
notes that in practice the law did not apply to  all  cases 
indiscriminately, and that an epikleros could, even if she had no children, 
renounce her rights, to remain with her husband. But I doubt if Forster is 
correct here. For the patriarchal nature of  the Athenian society as well as 
the status of  women was such that it would seem both socially and legally 
disadvantageous  for  a  woman  in  the  circumstances  to  renounce  her 
paternal rights, even if  she had no children, in order to remain in marriage 
\yith  her husband if the  court ruled that  she  had been awarded to  the 
wrong person in the family.458 
The question that Demosthenes 46.22 on the procedure for claims to 
an epikleros does not answer is what happened in the interim between the 
decease of an epikleros' father or guardian (whether she was young or an 
adult)  and the time the archon advertised the vacant inheritance and the 
assignable  status  of  the  epikleros.  Did  prospective  claimants  and 
guardians have to wait until the archon's declaration was out,  or could 
they  submit their claims  as  soon as  the  father  or the  guardian of the 
epikleros  died,  and wait until the  official declaration by the  archon by 
which a claim was certified and confirmed? 
The  law cited in Isaios  3.58  certainly  gives  a  long  span of time, 
presumably  to  give  claimants  the  opportunity to  examine  their  claims 
carefully before attempting to claim the adjudication. However, it appears 
~7  15  Isaeus,  LCL,p.114-1  ,note a. 
333 that claims could be made immediately after the death of  the father of the 
epikleros  or the last heir,459  or shortly after the vacant inheritances had 
been  declared by the  archon.  Thus,  although there  was  a  deadline  for 
claims,  an  action  to  claim  an  inheritance  or  an  epikleros  appears 
circumstantial.  But an urgent claim would seem more feasible than any 
other situation especially if an infant epikleros,  whose nurture and care 
required immediate attention, was involved. 
The foregoing discussion is hoped to settle the apparent uncertainties 
expressed in scholarly circles as to whether an epikleros could be claimed 
before she reached puberty at the death of her father or how her guardian 
was  selected.460  It is certainly right that AP 56.7 mentions the archon's 
authority  to  grant  leases  of the  estates  of epikleroi  until  they  were 
fourteen  years  of age.  This  implies  that  at  the  death  of the  infant 
epikleros' father, a guardian (he might or might not be the father's next-
of-kin) might be designated to take charge of  the girl and the management 
of the  estate  until  she  reached  the  marriageable  age  before  she  was 
claimed  together  with  the  estate  by  the  father's  next-of-kin.  This 
reasoning may be plausible. But the problem with this procedure is that it 
leaves  the  heir-apparent  (the  next-of-kin)  kicking  his  heels  for  an 
uncomfortably  long period of time  between the  decease  of the  young 
458  See Harrison, Law (i ),p.309-311 for various opinions on the application of  the law. 
459 
See Is.3.57-58.  25 
460  See Harrison, Law (i ), p.138; MacDowell, Law, p.98; Thompson, De Hagniae, p.16,n.  . 
334 epikZeros . father and the age at which the property with which she goes 
could be claimed. This waiting period would be particularly awkward if a 
large estate was involved. But more importantly, the time limit for claims 
in Isaios, 3.58, seems to make the situation not quite feasible, unless some 
other special latitudes were allowed in the case of  infant epikleroi. 
It seems to me that the law cited at Demosthenes 43.51  caters for 
both minor and adult epikleroi. Besides, it is the accepted view that this 
la,\", cited also at Isaios 3.42,68-69,72-73, and 10.13, makes the epikleros 
practically  inseparable  from  her  father's  estate,  and  that  the  two  are 
claimed together.
461  It is of  course a fact, that appointing a guardian for an 
epikleros and putting him in charge of the estate bequeathed to her does 
not imply separation of her from the estate. For at any rate, her father's 
next-of-kin  would claim both of them anyway.  But most importantly, 
Demosthenes  43.51;46.22;  and  Isaios  3.58,74-75,  appear  to  make  the 
epikleros  (whether young or an adult)  subject to  claim by her father's 
next-of-kin as soon as the father was dead.  Thus, appointing a guardian 
to  take  charge  of her and  the  estate  during  her age  of minority,  and 
awarding  her  later  to  a  husband  at  her  puberty  may  seem  a  remote 
situation. 
With regard to the lease of the estates as mentioned by AP, 56.7, 
the  number  'tE't'tUPUKUt8EK€'rt<;  is  certainly  feminine  and  must  refer 
335 specifically to epikleroi, as pointed out by Rhodes.462  This would imply 
that the young epikleros was appointed a guardian (like the male orphan) 
who took responsibility of  the estate as well. And exercising his authority 
as  guardian,  he  either  let  it  out  or  administered  it  himself until  she 
reached  the  marriageable age of fourteen  when the  estate  was  handed 
over to her to be managed by whoever later claimed her hand in marriage. 
If this  is  what the AP wrote  and intended,  I  would maintain that the 
evidence  appears misleading, taking account of Demosthenes 43.51,54; 
46.22, and Isaios 3.58 concerning the limitation on the time within which 
claims could be registered with the archon. 
I  should  believe  that  Demosthenes  43.54  is  the  corollary  of 
Demosthenes  43.51,  whether the  epikleros  involved "is of the  thetie" 
class or a wealthy one. She was claimed as a minor epikleros at the death 
of her father by his next-of-kin in conformity with Demosthenes 43.51, 
which as noted already, caters for both minor and adult epikleroi. At her 
puberty,  her guardian and father's inheritor might decide either to  take 
her  to  wife himself or else  give  her away in marriage  and dower her 
accordingly,  as  directed  by  Demosthenes  43.54.  It seems  conclusive, 
therefore,  that the epikleros could be claimed in advance of puberty by 
her father's next-of-kin at his death. 
461  Cf. Todd, Law. p.221; Just, Women, p.95; Lacey, Family, p.140; Finley, Studies,p.83; Sealey, 
Justice p.16-17; Asheri, Historia 12(1963),1-21,esp.16. 
462 
Comm.  AP, p.635. 
336 CHAPTER 8 
NURTURE AND TENDANCE OF ORPHANS 
TERMINOLOGY 
The  Greek word for  guardianship,  E1TLTP01TTt,  has  a  variety of 
connotations.  According  to  Liddell  and  Scott,  it  means  protection, 
overseeIng,  trusteeship,  guardianship,  or  arbitration.463  The  word, 
e:rrvrp01TELU,  guardianship,  may  be  used;  but  it  seems  to  be  of rare 
occurrence.464  The person who performed such role  and functions  was 
called  E1TLTP01TOS:  a  protector,  trustee,  overseer,  or guardian.465  And  so 
Demosthenes calls Demophon and Therippides <TUVE1TLTP01TOL,  co-trustees 
or co-guardians.466  But because of the variety of his responsibilities, he 
may be called E1TLj-LEAT)TTtS:  one who has charge of a thing or a person, a 
manager, or superintendent.467  However, 'manager', as  suggested,468  has 
a general sense having no legal significance. 
The guardian may also be called 1TpO<TTaTT)s:  a champion. But this 
may  have  the  more political  sense  of 'leader'  than the  legal  sense  of 
'guardian;' although it may have the sense of guardian of minors. Thus 
the  person championed the course of his ward(s) in legal matters.  The 
guardian  may  also  be  called  KUPLOS:  master,  frequently  used  for  the 
463  See also Dem. 27.39;30.8. 
464  Cf. Harrison, Law (i), p. 98. 
~  0  Dem.38.7,10; Lys.l0.5; Is.1.9,1  . 
466  Dem.27.14, 16,49,51,57;28.14, 16;29.3,33,49,59. 
467  Dem.27.19;43.75; AP,56.7. 
468  See MacDowell, Symposion (1985),256, and his note 10, ibid. 
337 guardian of a woman after her age of puberty.469 opcpavLO'TT)s;  a tender of 
orphans, a guardian, may as well be used for the person; or K1l0Ej.1WV;  one 
who has charge of  a person, a trustee, protector, guardian. 
It is  not  possible  to  say  exactly  in  which  circumstance  this 
terminology  or that  one may be used.  The  Attic  orators  who  give  us 
considerable information about guardianship seem to be eclectic in their 
choice of  usage. By and large, however, €1TlTP01TOS  and KUPLOS  seem to be 
the  most common terminologies as  far as  guardianship of orphans was 
concerned.  Thus in Isaios,  On  the  Estate of Dikaiogenes,  Dikaiogenes 
(III),  alleged to have defrauded his wards, is described as  the guardian 
and legal representative (€1TlTP01TOS  Kat  KUpLOS)  and the legal adversary of 
the orphaned children of  Theopompos.470 
It is  significant,  however,  that no matter which terminology is 
used in the orators, it implies guardianship of a minor or other person not 
legally qualified to manage his or her own affairs. This certainly means 
that his or her guardian had certain specific duties to perform on his or 
her  behalf.  These  functions  may  be  classified  under  two  basic 
headings:(I)  responsibilities  to  the  orphaned person;  that is,  his  or her 
physical maintenance and general care;(II) management of the property 
469  Cf. Harrison, Law (i ), p.98.  . 
470  Is.5.l0. Cf. also Aeschn.1.13,18; Is.l.I0; Dem.27.55;36.22;38.6; Lys.32.18. See also DIOg. Laert. 
5.12 on the will of  Aristotle, and cf. Harrison, Law (i ), p.98 and his note 3. 
338 b  th  d  t  h"  h  471  Th  "  equea  e  0  1m  or  er.  ese  dutIes  constituted,  as  may  be 
presumed, inalienable rights of the orphan under his or her guardian, and 
the  infringement  of anyone  of them  could  have  very  serious  and 
damaging social and political consequences for the guardian. 
DUTIES OF GUARDIANS 
A  responsibility  of  the  guardian  was  the  prOVISIon  of 
accommodation and shelter for his ward. He was also to make sure that 
furniture  and any such personal effects  as  might be bequeathed to  the 
ward  were carefully kept and handed over to him or her at the age of 
majority.  If the guardian failed in these duties he attracted censure and 
social condemnation.
472 
But the residential position of  the orphan does not seem to be laid 
down by law. In Lysias 32, the speaker tells the jury that when Diodotos 
died,  his  children and their mother lived in their father's house  in the 
Peiraieus for a year while their guardian lived in the city. But when their 
provisions began to  dwindle, their guardian sent up the  children to  the 
city to live with him, and gave their mother in marriage.
473 
In Isaios, On the Estate of  Kleonymos, the orphaned plaintiffs are 
said  to  have  lived first  under the  guardianship of their paternal uncle, 
471  For a brief discussion of  the duties of  the guardian see MacDowell, Law, p.93-94. See also 
Harrison  Law (i), p.104-108,111-115. 
472  ' 
Lys.32.16, 17. 
473  32.8. 
339 Deinias  (1.9).  And  when  Deinias  died  Kleonymos  took  over  their 
guardianship. The speaker does not tell us about Kleonymos' relationship 
to  the  orphans.  But it  does  seem that  he  was  probably their mother's 
brother, and therefore their maternal uncle, who, it is in their own interest 
to say that he was kind to them (1.12). 
The  status  of Kleonymos  is  also  not  stated  by  the  speaker; 
probably  ~  there being no rift at that time, no one bothered about his exact 
legal  position.  But it is  assumed,  though  with some  hesitation,474  that 
Kleonymos  was  most  probably  their  guardian.  The  suggestion  seems 
quite plausible since in the absence of paternal uncles, maternal cognates 
haye  had  to  be  guardians  of their  sisters'  orphaned  children  in  the 
majority  of cases.  At any rate,  it appears  that the  orphans lived in the 
house  of Kleonymos who tendered them and effectively managed their 
property for them.(1.12-l3) 
Plato  also  informs  US475  that Perikles,  the  guardian of Kleinias, 
sent his ward to live with Ariphron to be educated in order to remove him 
from the corrupting influence of his elder brother Alkibiades, also under 
the  guardianship of Perikles. And in Isaios 9,  the  speaker recounts that 
Euthykrates  died leaving his widow with two  children;  a daughter and 
Astyphilos whose estate is in dispute. 
474  See Jolowicz, JRS  37(1947),83. 
475  Pro tag. 320A. 
340 We have no evidence of a formal  appointment of a guardian for 
Astyphilos  and his sister, neither are we told explicitly about their new 
residence after the death of their father. But since their mother lived with 
Hierokles, her brother, until she was later given in a second marriage to 
Theophrastos  by him (9.3-4,23,27),  it  is  implied  that  they  lived  with 
Hierokles their maternal uncle, until the remarriage of their mother. We 
are  informed,  however,  that  when  the  widow  was  remarried  to 
Theophrastos,  she  took  to  her  new  marital  home  her  two  children, 
Astyphilos  and the daughter who was later given in marriage to  a man 
whose identity we do not know (9.27,29). Thus the orphans lived together 
with their mother in the house of Theophrastos, the  second husband of 
their mother.  -+ 76 
One  may wonder about  the  residential  status  of the  orphans  of 
Stratokles  in Isaios  11  in view of the  litigation.  In fact,  a  situation in 
which more than one guardian was designated for an orphan or orphans 
raises certain fundamental questions regarding the duties of  the guardians 
to their ward(s). Particularly, where was or were the orphan(s) expected 
to  live? Who of the guardians should be personally responsible for  the 
physical  support and maintenance of the orphan(s)? Who managed and 
controlled the estate of  the ward(  s), let alone representing him or them in 
legal matters and business transactions? 
476  Cf. also Is.7.5-7; DemAO.6-7; 58.22,30-32. 
341 These are pertinent questions to which our sources do not provide 
definite  answers.  Perhaps  the  only  clear  case  is  that  of Demosthenes 
whereby  his deceased father  seems to have prescribed definite role  for 
each of the three guardians. The elder Demosthenes stated categorically 
that Demosthenes and his sister should live together with their mother in 
the  house  bequeathed  to  them  with  Aphobos,  who  was  to  be  their 
stepfather.(27.4,5;28.15,16) Thus it is manifest from the will of the elder 
Demosthenes  and  throughout  the  speeches  of the  orator  against  his 
guardians that Aphobos was their principal guardian, and responsible for 
their maintenance and general care. It is also clear that Aphobos was in 
charge of the general administration of their property; though Demophon 
and  Therippides  also  had  important  roles  to  play,  apparently  as 
complementary hands in the management of  the estate. 
In the case of the orphans of Stratokles in Isaios 11, it is certainly 
not likely that they were living with Theopompos' prosecutor, the other 
guardian,  since he had no control over their estate. It is therefore likely 
that they were living with Theopompos, as is implied in his own words, 
(11.37).  But  in  general,  although  wards  sometimes  lived  with  their 
guardians  it became a  common practice for  them to  remain with their 
mother unless or until she got remarried. And even in some cases when 
their mothers got remarried, orphaned children were taken along by their 
mothers to their new marital households. It is not evident in the sources 
342 regarding  the procedure for  the maintenance of wards who  lived with 
their mothers in second marital homes. It is possible, however, that some 
kind  of arrangements  could  be  made  between  the  guardians  of such 
wards,  who would still control the fortune of the orphans, and the new 
husbands of  the children's mothers. 
The  various  responsibilities  of the  guardian  to  his  ward  are 
summed up by Isaios in his On the Estate of  Astyphilos. The speaker tells 
the jury in four sections of  his speech: 
"When my father Theophrastos received my mother (who was also 
the mother of Astyphilos) in marriage from Hierokles, she brought with 
her  Astyphilos,  then a  young child,  and he lived continuously in  our 
house, and was brought up by my father. When I was born and was of an 
age  to  be instructed,  I  was educated with him.  My father,  gentlemen, 
planted the paternal estate of  Astyphilos and continued to cultivate it and 
doubled its value."(9.27-28) 
"When my brother came of  age, he received all his possessions in 
so correct and regular a manner that he never had any complaint to make 
against my father. After this my father gave Astyphilos' sister in marriage 
to  a  man  of his  choice  and  managed  everything  else  to  Astyphilos' 
complete  satisfaction;  for  the  latter thought he had received  an ample 
proof from my father of  his goodwill towards him in the fact that he had 
been brought up by him from early childhood." (9.29) 
343 "My father took Astyphilos with him when he was a child, as also 
he  took  me,  to  the  religious  ceremonies  on  every  occasion;  he  also 
introduced him to  the  confraternity of Herakles in order that he  might 
become a member of  this association."(9.30) 
We  may compare also  what another speaker of Isaios  says  in a 
passage where the plaintiff props up their arguments for their nearness of 
kin to the deceased Kleonymos which was reflected in his care for them 
as orphans, and their entitlement to his property as his natural heirs: 
"After Deinias' death, when things were going badly with us,  he 
(Kleonymos)  would not allow us to lack anything, but took us into his 
house and brought us up, and saved our property when our creditors were 
scheming against it, and looked after our interests as though they were his 
own." (1.12-13) 
These  passages  of Isaios  highlight  eight  basic  duties  of the 
guardian  to  his  warde  s),  though  these  do  not  exhaust  all  his 
responsibilities:(i)  accommodating  the  ward;(ii)  bringing  him  or  her 
up;(iii)  provision  of formal  education;(iv)  management  of the  ward's 
estate;(v)  making accounts of the  general  management of the  property 
and  handing  everything over to  him or her at the  age  of majority;(vi) 
contracting  marriage  for  the  female  ward;(vii)  provision  of religious 
education  to  the  male  orphan;(viii)  protection  of the  ward's  fortune 
344 against  scheming  creditors  and  any  intruders  on  the  orphan's  landed 
property. 
Bringing up the orphan in fact involves giving him or her the 
emotional  touch  and  feeling  that  he  or  she  is  also  part  of the  new 
household  as  illustrated  in  the  passages  quoted  above.  But  more 
importantly, the orphan had the right to provision for his or her personal 
needs.  Some of the items for his needs are listed and quantified by the 
speaker of  Lysias 32 after a denunciatory preamble against the defendant: 
"So gross is his impudence that, not knowing under what headings 
to enter the sums spent, he reckoned for the viands of  the two young boys 
and  their sister five obols a day;  for shoes, laundry and hairdressing he 
kept no monthly or yearly account, but he shows it inclusively, for  the 
whole period, as more than a talent of  silver." (32.20) 
Provision for the physical maintenance and all the necessities of 
life as is implied in Isaios 1.12 and 9.27-30, and itemised in Lysias 32.20 
comprised food,  clothes, shoes, bedding, laundry, and hairdressing. The 
overall  expenses on these until the orphan reached his or her majority 
were charged to the property bequeathed to him or her.477 
The orphan's right to support for his or her body and general welfare was 
protected by law,478  the breach of which could result in not only a social 
477 
See Lys.32.20-29. 
478  See Dem. 43.75; Is. 1.39; AP 56.7. 
345 stigma but also a legal action (8LKll  O"LTOU)  against the guardian.479  This 
important duty of personal support for the ward is what Theopompos, a 
defendant in Isaios, is accused of having neglected to perform.480  So the 
orphaned  son  of Stratokles  is  alleged  to  be  living  in  embarrassed 
circumstances while Theopompos his guardian who has his estate under 
his  management is living in opulence and does not care about the boy, 
neither does he dower the boy's four sisters. 
It is the same charge levelled against Diogeiton in Lysias 32 where 
it  is  alleged  that he had thrown his  wards  out of their own house  in 
tattered clothes, without shoes or bedding or cloaks, while he is bringing 
up his own children in all the comforts of  affluence.
481  There seems to be 
some  element of jealousy in the  widow's statement,  as  she  feels  that 
Diogeiton is using her children's fortune to look after his own wife and 
children.  But it nevertheless emphasises the importance of maintenance 
and general care of the orphans, and Diogeiton's lack of concern for the 
young orphans. 
Besides the physical maintenance of the  ward,  the  orphan was 
entitled also to an attendant or a maid as an aspect of his or her right to 
support, and it was the duty of the guardian to provide him or her with 
these  helping  hands  (Lys.32.16,28;Dem.27.46).  The  male  attendant 
m  67  Is. 1.39; Dem.43.75; AP,5  .. 
480  Is.11.37. 
481  Lys.32.16-17. Cf. Is.5.10. 
346 accompanied the boy to and from school, and, with the assistance of the 
guardian,  supervised the child's upbringing from his minutest act to his 
general  conduct in society.482  Although specific duties of the maid are 
not detailed, it is likely that she would also assist in the general domestic 
training  and  any  nursing  duties  concerning  the  care  of the  female 
orphan.
483 
It  is  notable  that  quite  apart  from  supporting  the  orphan 
himself or herself, it was also a responsibility of  the guardian to maintain 
on behalf of  his ward or wards any number of  attendants as well as slaves 
appropriate  to  the property of his ward(s).  In fact,  there  could be two 
categories of  slaves, though in some cases there might be no slaves at all. 
In his first speech against Aphobos, Demosthenes informs us that 
besides  the house and thirty silver minai, his guardians handed over to 
him fourteen slaves (27.6). And elsewhere in the same speech, he argues 
that  his  father  had  about  thirty-three  slaves  working  in  his  sword-
manufactory, and twenty slaves working in his sofa-manufactory (27.9); 
but  argues  later that one-half of the  slaves had been sold by Aphobos 
(27.18).  Furthermore,  in  his  second  speech  against  Aphobos, 
Demosthenes makes three complaints about some slaves that his father 
bequeathed to him. He asserts that Aphobos has taken away the slaves. 
We are not in a position to know the fate or status of  the slaves. It 
is possible that Aphobos has either sold the slaves or hired them out to 
482  See Plato, Pro  tag. 325C-D; Symp.183C-D; Rep. 4.425A; Laws,3.700C; Alk. 1.122; Xen. Symp.1.8. 
347 someone elsewhere, and is receiving revenues on them. But he maintains 
also  that  the  defendant  has  recorded  a  heavy  expenditure  for  the 
maintenance of the slaves, and further laments that in spite of the heavy 
expenditure for the maintenance of the slaves, he has been given nothing 
as profits accruing from their services.(28.12) 
It is  important to  note  that  the  fourteen  slaves  handed  over to 
Demosthenes  at  his  majority,  those  who  had  been  taken  away  by 
Aphobos,  and those sold by him were all  part of the  fifty-three  slaves 
Demosthenes'  father left working in his two factories  at his  death.  As 
guardian of  the orphans, it was also Aphobos' additional duty to maintain 
all  these  slaves of the  orphans,  and harmonise their services  to  derive 
profits  for  them.  But  these  were  workshop  slaves  whose  services,  if 
properly harnessed, would in tum pay for their maintenance. 
The  other category of slaves  an orphan could have  was  that of 
domestic  attendants  or maids.  In Lysias  32.16,  among  the  allegations 
levelled against the defendant is the non-provision of  an attendant. But in 
32.28,  the  speaker  argues  that  Diogeiton's  annual  expenditure  on  the 
three  orphans (two boys and their sister), an attendant and a maid must 
have been one thousand drachmai. It appears difficult to reconcile the two 
statements  of non-provision  of an  attendant  and  the  expenses  on  an 
attendant and a maid. But it would seem that the orphans had an attendant 
483 
Cf. Dem.47.56. 
348 and a maid who were not handed over to the elder of the boys when he 
reached manhood. And in Dem.27.46, the orator alleges that Aphobos has 
taken possession of the female slaves besides holding on to his mother's 
dowry.  This shows that there were also domestic slaves in the household 
when the elder Demosthenes died. In general, however, where there were 
slaves  of the  orphan, whether workshop slaves or domestic  slaves,  the 
guardian had the added responsibility not only to monitor their services 
but also to look after their welfare as he would do for his wards. 
Demosthenes and Isaios inform us also that the  orphan had the 
right to education, and it was the guardian'S duty to employ an instructor 
for  him.  In this respect also, it was the guardian'S obligation to pay all 
expenditures  involved,  including  tuition  fees  for  the  instructors.  Thus 
against  this  background,  Demosthenes  complains  that  Aphobos,  his 
guardian, is so grasping that he has cheated his tutors of their fees for his 
education although he charges him with the amounts. And in Isaios 9, the 
speaker tells the jury that when he was born and was at the school-going 
age,  he  was  educated  together  with  his  orphaned  half-brother 
(Dem.27.46;  Is.9.28).  But the  education of the  orphan,  like  any  other 
Athenian youth, went hand in hand with religious training at  both the 
domestic  and  civic  levels.  This  seems  to  have  been  the  personal 
responsibility  of the  guardian  as  demonstrated  by  Theophrastos,  the 
stepfather  of Astyphilos  in  Isaios  9.  In  this  speech  of Isaios,  it  is 
349 recounted  that  Astyphilos  was  taken  to  all  religious  functions  by his 
stepfather, and introduced to the religious cult of  Herakles (9.30). 
It is noteworthy that the religious training of the orphaned boy, 
like any other male child, meant more than being taught to pay honours to 
the  gods and to sacrifice to them in adulthood. For, such acts, as rightly 
pointed out by Golden,484 solemn and significant as they must have been, 
naturally  united  children  who  shared  in  them;  and  by  making  sons 
worship together as a realisation of a common purpose, Athenian fathers 
strengthened bonds and unity among their sons.  The orphan's religious 
career with his guardian thus reflects one obvious way in which heads of 
households  fostered  a  sense  of identity  in  the  children  under  their 
authority. This cultivation of  sense of  selfhood and identity might perhaps 
not be possible if a guardian lacked that sense of filial devotion towards 
his ward. 
Like the male orphan,  a  female  orphan was  equally entitled to 
general  physical  support,  education,  and  accommodation.  But  her 
guardian had other specific social duties to perform. At puberty, she had 
the right to marriage. If  she was not an epikleros, her guardian had to give 
her away in marriage and dower her.485  But if the female orphan was an 
epikleros,  she  was awarded to  the  next-of-kin of her father,  or to  his 
adopted  son  by  testament  at  the  same  time  as  the  property  was 
350 adjudicated to him.486 This dual adjudication to the father's next-of-kin or 
adopted son by will had two fundamental reasons. 
First,  it  was  expected  that  the  estate  be  administered  for  the 
maintenance and support of  the epikleros. Second, and more importantly, 
it was through the epikleros that the deceased's line could be continued as 
her  son  or sons  had to  take  over the  property as  heir or heirs  to  the 
grandfather to perpetuate his line (Dem.46.20). Thus having been claimed 
by her father's next-of-kin, or the testamentary adopted son, the epikleros 
at  puberty had the right to marriage and regular sexual intercourse by 
him, or else to be given away in marriage and dowered appropriately.  487 
In fact, the married epikleros' sexual rights were also protected by 
law,  attributed to  Solon (Plutarch, Solon, 20.3). According to  Diogenes 
Laertios,488 Solon legislated that a guardian must not marry the mother of 
his ward, and that the person who would inherit from the ward must not 
be his guardian. But this alleged law of Solon must certainly be spurious. 
If it ever existed, it would not be thinkable that the very practice which 
was forbidden, that is, marriage between the mother of an orphan and his 
guardian,  should have become so  common a  thing  for  many Athenian 
testators  to  prescribe  in  their  wills  as  it  was  in  historical  times  in 
484  Golden, Children, p.31-32. 
485  Lys.32.20-29; Dem.27.36;44.17; Is.2.3-5;3.4,8,26;6.14..  ., 
486  Is.3.40-41; Dem.43.51. See also the discussion on  'The GuardIan for the Epikleros. 
487  Dem.43.54;46.18; Is.1.39; Pluto Solon, 20.2-3. 
488  Diog. Laert. 1.56. 
351 489  h  Athens.  T  e second part of the law also seems to have no roots. For a 
d £  .  D  h  490  .  law preserve  or us In  emost  enes  categoncally states that if  a son is 
born of an epikleros, he must take over the property of his mother after 
attaining  his majority and be her guardian.  And in the  case  of a male 
orphan, it is not conceivable how the law would be operative, since in the 
majority of cases the child was under the care of his father's next-of-kin 
who, in the event of  the death of  the child would inherit the property. 
The functions of the guardian involved juridical matters also.  In 
general,  there  was  express  legal  limitation  of the  competence  of the 
Athenian youth for independent action in business transactions. Until he 
acquired the full rights of citizenship at the age of eighteen on admission 
into his father's deme after the appropriate scrutiny, the Attic youth was 
incapable  of entering  into  any  contract.
491  Furthermore,  until  he  had 
attained  his majority,  the young Athenian could not sue  or be  sued in 
court. And in the case of  the female orphan, her guardianship, like that of 
any other female, appears to have had no termination, thereby making her 
a perpetual  minor throughout her life.  Thus  in  all  legal  and  business 
transactions, procedural before a court or in matters of  contract, it was his 
or her guardian who represented him or her at the law courts. 
489  See Dem.27.5;28.16;36.8;45.28. 
490 
Dem.46.20. 
491  Arist .AP, 42.1; Is.I0.I0; Harrison, Law (i ),p.73, and n.3, ibid. 
352 The  majority  of the  legal  duties  of the  guardian  concern  the 
management  of  the  orphan's  property,  which  will  be  discussed 
extensively in a later chapter.  However, we may note about the  female 
orphan  that  besides  her  guardian's  duty  to  protect  her  interests  and 
guarantee  her rights,  social  or economic,  it  was  incumbent  on him to 
institute action to recover her dowry in the event of  the termination of  her 
marriage or the death of  her husband. And if  the dowry was not refunded, 
he could prosecute the holder of it, either compelling him to maintain the 
ward, or to pay back the dowry with interest on it.
492 
According  to  Lysias  (32.24)  and  the  author  of the  AP (42.5), 
orphans  in their minority were exempt from performing and contributing 
to\vards  state  religious  rites  or festivals  and  sacrifices.  They were  not 
required also to pay property tax (€LO"<popa),  or perform any public duties 
during their minority and a year after their majority. But it is evident that 
during the time of  Demosthenes, rich orphans did have to pay €LO"<popa.
493 
I find no evidence in the sources pointing to a rule effecting a change of 
policy  on minors'  exemption from property tax.  But it does  seem that 
there had been a change in the law on €LO"<popa  in Demo  sthene  s ' days, so 
that minor orphans, if  rich enough, were required to pay tax according to 
the value of their patrimony. On religious festivals, however, they were 
492  Is.3.3-4,8-9,11-12,78; Lys.19.32-33; Dem.59.52. 
493  Cf. the case of  Demosthenes in Dem. 21.157; 27.7; 28.4,8. 
353 exempt  and  it  appears  surpnslng  that  Diogeiton  should  charge 
expenditures  on lamb  for  the  Dionysia  and  other public  festivals  and 
sacrifices to the orphans' estate. (Lys.32.21-22). 
In  a  speech  of Demosthenes,  however,  the  orator  makes  the 
performance of customary rites for  a deceased parent a legal obligation 
for his children.
494 The Athenians, like the Akans in Ghana, required that 
minors  provided a  coffin,  or bore the  cost of it  for  a  deceased  father. 
However, in the Akan society it is the maternal uncles of the minors who 
provide the coffin or shoulder the cost of it.  But in the Athenian family 
this  was  the responsibility of the  guardian.  Thus if a man died leaving 
behind an orphan in his minority, it was his guardian who performed all 
the  funeral  responsibilities  and  bore  all  the  expenditures  involved  on 
behalf of  the orphan, and charged the expenses to the ward's estate.
495 
STATE SUPPORT OF WAR-ORPHANS 
Some Athenians who had families but had to  face the dangers of 
military campaign made provisions by testament for their families before 
going away. A warrior could appoint a guardian to take care of  his family 
in the event of  his death. He could provide also a dowry for his wife in a 
494 
Dem.24.107.  62 
495  Is.1.10; Lys.32.21. For the specific funeral rites see Iso4.19-21; 9.3-4; Demo43.  . 
354 second marriage, or a daughter, and make other arrangements regarding 
the management of  his property. 
F or  instance,  Lysias  informs  us  that  Diodotos  made  similar 
provisions  in a will for his wife and children before embarking on the 
Sicilian  expedition in which he perished.
496  It is  also  most certain that 
Kleinias  (II.)  might  have  prepared  his  will  in  which  he  sufficiently 
provided  for  the  guardianship  and  maintenance  of  his  two  sons, 
Alkibiades  (later the famous Athenian politician) and his brother before 
leaving  for the campaign to Koroneia in which he fell  in 447/6 B.C.
497 
Even  if a  young man still  capable of siring  a  son had to  enrol  for  a 
campaign  abroad,  he  could make  provisions  for  a  contingent  heir  by 
adoption.  If he  should  perish,  the  adoption  went  into  effect;  if he 
survived, it did not.
498 
But  in  certain  circumstances,  wamors  could  not  make  the 
necessary arrangements for the care of their families before going away 
on  campaigns  in which they perished.  However,  it is  not clear in the 
sources whether it was the state that appointed guardians for the orphans 
of such fallen warriors who did not have any guardians; and even where 
496 
See Lys. 32.6.  d  I 
497  See Plato, Alk.(I) 104B; Protag. 320A. Cf.also H.T.Wade-Gery, CQ 25(1931),82ff; E. Van  erpoo, 
Hesperia 21(1952),1-8; Davies, APF , p.l6-21.  .  . 
498  On adoption for a contingent heir, see Is.7.9. It does seem that Apollo~oros adopted hIS homometnc 
sister with the hope that she would bear a son in the future to succeed to hlffi. If  the young testa~or 
survived and returned from the campaign, he could revoke his will or allow it to stay. On revokmg a 
will see, Is.1.14. 
355 there were guardians, whether the state provided additional guardians in 
view of  the public concern for such children. 
In  the  absence  of  evidence  of  a  definite  state  intervention 
regarding the children of deceased warriors who did not have guardians, 
we may assume that such orphans lived under either the guardianship of 
paternal uncles or maternal kinsmen. The archon, however, exercised his 
usual supervisory role over their legal matters and general welfare.499 For 
instance, in a speech of  Isaios, we are informed that Thrasyllos, the father 
of Apollodoros, perished in battle in Sicily (7.5). We have no information 
of a will  appointing a  guardian for  the  young Apollodoros.  But Isaios 
informs  us  that  at  the  death  of Thrasyllos,  Eupolis,  his  brother  and 
therefore  the  paternal  uncle  of Apollodoros,  became  guardian  of the 
young boy. However, he "so administered the affairs of Apollodoros that 
he was convicted to restore three talents to him."(7.6) 
What is certain about the  care of war-orphans, however,  is  that 
from  early  times  the  state  had  been  accustomed  to  care  for  war-
orphans.50o In compensation for the devotion and courage of  their fathers, 
the orphans were to receive from the state a grant for food.  This practice 
of maintenance of war-orphans at public expense was known in 478-462 
B.C.  Although literary evidence for the exact amount of grant when the 
499 
See Dem.43.75; AP, 56.7.  032. 
soo  Thucy.2.46.1; Plato, Menex.,248C-249A; Diog. Laert.1 Soion,55; Lys.2,71,72; Dem.6.  , 
AP,24.3. 
356 custom was first  started is lacking, it appears that the regular payment 
\\'as  an obol per day for every orphan. This was equivalent to the daily 
allotment to the disabled at the end of the fifth century. It would appear, 
however,  that there might have been war-orphans who  did not collect 
their daily grant. This may have been true of Alkibiades whose wealthy 
father  seems  to  have  sufficiently  provided  for  him  in  his  will.  The 
orphans of  Diodotos also seem not to have collected it; for in the detailed 
accounts for their upkeep no mention is made of  state support.501 
Against the background of  this ancient custom of state support for 
war-orphans, Theozotides, as already noted,502 is said to have proposed a 
decree  in 403/2  seeking public  support  for  the  orphans  of those  who 
suffered violent death during the period of the preceding oligarchy. The 
orphans were to be compensated at the rate of an obol a day each from 
the state as a grant for food in appreciation of the courage and loyalty of 
their deceased fathers who fought for the democracy. 
It  does  seem,  however,  that  the  decree  of Theozotides  was  as 
discriminatory and vindictive as it was characterised by political bias. For 
the  decree restricted state support to citizen-orphans only, and excluded 
adopted  sons and bastards, who at the time of the  decree  enj oyed full 
501 
See Lys.32.19-29. 
502  See p.l13-114 above. Cf.Stroud, Hesperia 40(1970),280-301. 
357 · .  h'  503  Furth  CItIzens  Ip  status.  ermore,  the  sons  of fallen  members  of the 
oligarchy  were also excluded from the benefits of public maintenance, 
though  such  fathers  may  also  have  perished  in  similar  circumstances 
defending their regime as those fighting in defence of  the democracy. The 
decree of  Theozotides therefore, may not be taken as representative of  the 
general Athenian practice of  state support of  war-orphans. 
N  one the less, in making arrangements for the sons of those who 
died in the oligarchy, Theozotides seems to have referred to the orphans 
of the war-dead, perhaps as a model. The beneficiaries of  his decree were 
to receive an obol per day just as the war-orphans were paid their obo!. 
The  question  as  to  whether  female  orphans  also  benefited  from  the 
general  grant has no answer to  it in the  sources.  And since there is  no 
mention of  female beneficiaries in the sources, it is likely that they had no 
share  in the state's support of their male counterparts.  Such a situation 
would  appear rather unfair, especially in the case of females  who were 
the  only children of their fallen fathers.  But it is possible they received 
some kind of  consideration that perhaps did not receive official publicity. 
It is not definite as to which magistrate was responsible for war-
orphans. Plato in his Menexenos 249A notes that "the highest authority in 
the state is instructed to watch over them beyond all other citizens." But 
the  Scholiast on Demosthenes 24.20 names the polemarch as the officer 
503 Diod.,13.98.I; Aristoph., Frogs, 190-191,693-694; Stroud, Hesperia 40(1970),280-301; MacDowell, 
358 in charge of  them. And in Xenophon's Poroi 2.7, the author mentions the 
institution of  op<pav0<puAaK€S  as responsible for orphans, which should be 
the  model  for a  suggested board of guardians of aliens  ~ETOLKO<pUAuKES: 
Ko1 
, 
EL  "IE 
fl 
WO"1TEP 
KaeLo"TUL~EV  ...  "And if we appoint a board of guardians of aliens like that 
of the guardians of  orphans." 
These testimonies have triggered off several arguments regarding 
the particular magistrate who was in charge of  war-orphans and therefore 
saw  to  the  issue of their dole.504  It would appear that by "the highest 
authority  in the  state," Plato  seems to  have  in mind the  archon under 
whose  general care and supervision the  Solonian law (Dem.43.75) had 
placed all orphans and heiresses. For the law, in part, makes it imperative 
for the archon to take charge of all legal matters concerning orphans and 
heiresses,  and  to  make  sure  that  their  guardians  provided  them  with 
maintenance  and  support.505But whether his jurisdiction embodied  the 
social responsibility of seeing to the payment of the dole to war-orphans 
is quite another matter. 
At any rate, as suggested by J.  H.  Thiel and noted by Stroud,506 
the guardians of  orphans (op<pavo<puAUK€S) referred to by Xenophon in his 
Parai 2.7 must have been the magistrates responsible for the dole of  war-
CQ 70(1976),88-9l. 
504  See Stroud, Hesperia 40(1970),289-290. 
505  Cf. AP,56.7; Aeschn.1.158; Dem.26.12;35.47-48;37.46;46.22. 
359 orphans.  These  magistrates  may  have  played  an  intermediate  role 
between  the  archon and their guardians  as  disbursing  officials,  and to 
make  sure that the grant was properly used for the support of the war-
orphans.  This role of the 0P<PUV0<pUAUKES  becomes very plausible in that 
there is no reference to the officials later than 355 B.C. when Xenophon 
wrote  his Poroi,  as the office would have become defunct when public 
support of war-orphans had apparently been stopped by the middle of  the 
fourth century. 
The ancient sources inform us that the public support extended as 
far  as  to  the  age of majority of the  orphans.
507  It is important to  note, 
however, that public support did not imply a complete take-over by the 
state of the general nurture and care as well as the general administration 
of the patrimonies of  the affected orphans. The grant, as noted above, was 
a subsidiary  benefit to  the  children  in recognition  of the  loyalty  and 
patriotism of  their fathers who had died fighting for the state. 
When  the  male  orphans  came  of age  they  were,  after  the 
appropriate  scrutiny,  presented  to  the  assembled  Athenians  and  their 
allies  in the theatre at the Great Dionysia, were supplied with a suit of 
armour by the state, and sent home as full citizens with political and legal 
506  Stroud, ibid.,290. 
507  Thucy.2.46; Plato, Menex.248E; Aeschn.3.154. 
360 rights.
50S 
It is most likely that there must have been an initial scrutiny to 
determine that an orphan's father had, in fact, died in war and that he had 
been  an  Athenian  citizen to  qualify  for  the  dole.  It is  not  clear what 
requirements the war-orphans were expected to satisfy before they were 
adjudged matured, and which magistrate or body carried out the scrutiny. 
But since normal orphans went through a dokimasia on attaining the age 
of  maj ority  to  certify  that  they  were  capable  of  taking  up  their 
patrimony,509  war-orphans,  as  suggested  by  Stroud,510  underwent  a 
similar screening before they were given their war outfit. 
It is significant that by the middle of the fourth century, the grant 
for  the  disabled  had been increased  to  two  obols  a  day.  511  However, 
public support of war-orphans seems to have been a thing of the past by 
the  time  when the author of the AP described the state of the Athenian 
Constitution  apparently  because  of Athens'  economic  straits  after  the 
Peloponnesian  War.  The  city's  change  of policy  on  support  for  state 
orphans  is  explicit  in  Aeschines  3,  and  implicit  in  Isokrates  and 
Hyperides.512  It is  therefore not altogether surprising that in listing the 
508  Plato, Menex.,248E; Isokrates, 8.82; Aeschn.3.153-155; Stroud, Hesperia 40(1971),288-28.9); 
Bryant,  'Boyhood and Youth in the Days of  Aristophanes' HSCP 18(1907),78,87-88; S.GoldhIll, JHS 
107(1987),58-76. 
509 
Lys.32.24. 
510  Ibid.,291. 
511 
Lys.24.26; AP 49.4.  (1907) 87  88. 
512  See Aeschn.,3.153-155; Isokrates,8.82; Hyper. Epitaphios, 42. Cf.Bryant, HSCP 18  ,  - , 
Stroud, Hesperia 40(1970),289-290. 
361 functions of the polemarch in AP,58 during the period, the author makes 
no mention of  maintenance of  war-orphans as one of  his duties. 
In general terms, it need be stressed in conclusion that, apart from 
the  marriage of the epikleros with the attendant rule of sexual duties to 
her by the father's next-of-kin to  prevent the possibility of her father's 
oikos  becoming extinct, and matters regarding the administration of the 
orphan's  patrimony,  it  would  appear  that  the  majority  of  the 
responsibilities  a  guardian had to  render to  his  ward  or wards  would  , 
under normal circumstances, have been filial duties that every Athenian 
father would have rendered to his own children. 
However,  all  the  responsibilities  became  special  duties  for  the 
guardian. This is because the ward's patrimony had been formally placed 
under the control and management of the guardian, and also because of 
the legal implications involved if some of the duties were not performed 
by him. But the legal rules and censure were also the fruits of the special 
position of the orphan in the society. He or she as  an orphan, had been 
deprived  of his  or her natural  prop  in  society,  and  thus  had  become 
unprotected  and  vulnerable.  And  once  he  or  she  had  been  entrusted 
together  with the  patrimony into  the  hands  of a  guardian,  the  orphan 
became  a  sacred trust or deposit in the  hands of the  guardian.  Such a 
status  did not only have social and religious implications but also legal 
rules regarding his or her personal welfare and the management of his or 
362 her  patrimony.  This  unIque  position  and  the  sacredness  of  it  are 
emphasised by Demosthenes in his second speech against Aphobos: 
"My  father,  when  he  saw  that  he  was  not  to  recover  from  his 
illness ...  placed our persons in their hands (their guardians), calling us a 
sacred deposit."(28.15) 
Thus  with the  situation of deprivation of the  natural  kyrios  and 
source  of livelihood and protection,  all  responsibilities which a natural 
father  would otherwise render to his own children, and which he might 
not be prosecuted for failing to perform, became legally obligatory on the 
guardian, and he could be indicted for failing to perform any of  them. 
363 CHAPTER 9 
MANAGING THE ESTATE OF THE ORPHAN 
THE NATURE OF THE RULES FOR MANAGEMENT 
There  can  be  no  doubt  that  an  extension  of the  law 
paraphrased in Isaios 10.1 0 precluding a minor from making a will is a 
limitation on the orphan to manage his patrimony. As a minor, the law 
does not only prevent him from disposing his property by testament but 
also  delimits the orphan's right to administer the patrimony bequeathed 
to him.  Isaios does not provide reasons for the limitations on the minor 
orphan.  But I would believe that the  fundamental  objective of the  law 
was  to  protect the orphan against any exploitation of his inexperience, 
either in will making or in business transaction. The minor orphan could 
make a bad deal, or there could be trickery or genuine exploitation of his 
inexperience in life by anybody in the society regarding his patrimony. 
But it seems that the Athenians had no definite remedy or law 
for revocation of a transaction by which the minor child could at some 
future  point challenge and revoke what seems to have been an invalid 
transaction  he  may  have  undertaken  during  his  minority.  The  only 
reasonable  course, I think, can have been to prevent any dealings with 
those  who were minors so  that advantage would not be taken of their 
naivety or inexperience to exploit them. The law, therefore, is not just a 
364 mere  imposition on the minor child's legal capacity, but establishes an 
inherent counter protection for him. In the same vein with regard to will 
making,  the minor orphan was protected against wrong disposition and 
apparent dissipation of  his patrimony. Thus with the administration of  his 
patrimony,  the  law in Isaios  10.10 transfers  the  orphan's estate  to  his 
guardian who managed it on his behalf during the period of  his tutelage. 
Of the  several guardianship cases in the  surviving speeches of 
the  Attic  orators,  the  case  of Demosthenes  is  the  best known.  As  an 
orphan,  his  estate  is  the  most  fully  documented  orphan  estate  in  the 
period.
513  His lawsuit against his guardians thus  throws  a considerable 
amount  of light  on  the  administration  of an  orphan's  patrimony  in 
classical  Athens.  However,  more  than  a  century  ago,  Westermann 
pronounced  the  third  of Demosthenes'  speeches  in  his  suit  against 
Aphobos,  his principal guardian, spurioUS.
514  This triggered off several 
arguments,  pro and con,  for  decades regarding  the  authenticity of the 
speech until the convincing examination of the issues involved by Prof. 
MacDowe1l515  settled the matter and established that the speech was an 
authentic work of  Demosthenes. A bone of  contention in the disputations 
513  Davies, APF,p.126.  .  ((  . .  h 
514  A. Westermann, Quaestionum Demosthenicarum particuia tertia,  De lztzbus quas I?emost  enes 
oravit ipse" (Leipzig, 1834),5-18; reprinted in Dindorf, Demosthenes (Oxford, 1846), vll,1045-1053, 
noted by Calhoun TAPA 65(1934),8. 
515 See MacDowell, 'The Authenticity of  Demosthenes 29 (Against Aphobos III) as a Source of 
Information about Athenian Law,' Symposion (1985),253-262. 
365 is  a passage in the speech in connection with the administration of the 
estate of  the younger Demosthenes. The orator complains to the jury: 
EV  1"1J  ~>t,ae-ftK1J  )'pa.tPav1"o~. "He did not lease the estate, although the laws 
order that and my father wrote it in his will."516 
Demosthenes does not quote the laws that he argues that Aphobos 
had not complied with. But he certainly may have got the basis for his 
argument  from the power vested in the archon,  as  Aristotle tells  US,517 
and  against  the  background  of which  he  accuses  his  guardian.  The 
guardians, however, in tum, deny the allegation, and claim that the will, 
in  fact,  left  instructions  that  the  estate  should  not  be  leased  out 
(Dem.27.42;  28.1,7).  But  Demosthenes  persists  in  his  claim.  He 
maintains that Aphobos could have avoided all the trouble if he had let 
out  the  estate  according  to  the  laws,  and  refers  to  the  terminology 
~L(j8U)(TL~  O'LKOU  in different verb and noun forms in the context of letting 
out  his  estate,  at  least  eleven  times  in  his  second  speech  (27.15,40-
41,42,43,58{3x},59{2x},60,64),  five  times  in  the  second  speech 
(28.1,5,6,7,15), and six times in the third speech (29.29,42,43,57,59,60). 
In  all  these  instances,  the  orator  obviously  accuses  his  guardians  of 
516  Dem.29.29, tr. MacDowell, Symposion (1985),257. 
5I7S eeAP,56.7. 
366 breaking  the  laws  as  well  as  ignoring  the  wishes  of his  father,  and 
laments the great loss that his guardians had caused him. 
In the face of the accusation and denial, various interpretations, 
both contextual and philological, were put to the passage in speech 29.29 
quoted  above.  Contextually,  it  was  argued  in  the  disputes  about  the 
authenticity of  the speech that it was mandatory to lease out the orphan's 
estate. None the less, it is generally recognised that the law on leasing an 
orphan's estate was permissive, not obligatory.sI8  It would in fact appear 
that  if the law made it mandatory for  an orphan's estate to  be leased, 
Demosthenes most probably would not have claimed also that his father 
had  directed in his will that his patrimony must be leased.  He  would 
surely have been only too keen, in absence of his father's will, now lost, 
to refer to that law which made it compulsory for his guardians to lease 
his property. And in any case, his father would not find the need to give 
instructions in his will to that effect. 
Significantly,  the  speaker of Lysias  32  confirms  the  permissive 
nature of  the rule regarding the lease of  an orphan's estate in a passage to 
the jury: 
Kal.1"Ol  El,  E.~OUAE1"O  81.KalOS  Elval  11'Ept  1"OUS  11'aL8as,  E.~llv  aUT~ 
KUTU  TOUS  v0(.10US,  ot  K€l.V1"al  11'Ept  1"WV  opcpavwv  Kat  1"olS  d8uvaTols  T<l>V 
€'1TLTP011'WV  Kat  1"olS  8uva(.1EvolS,  (.1l<T8w<Tal  1"OV  olKov  d11'llAAa'Yl-LEvov 
367 1TOAAWV  1TpU  YjJ.U  TWV,  11  YTJV  1TPLUII.€VOV  EK  TWV  '  , 
r  1TP0<TLOVTWV  TOU~  1Tul.8u~ 
IJ..  '~I  '"  ,~ 
TP€'f€LV·  KUL  01TOT€PU  TOUTWV  €1TOLT)<T€V,  OUO€VO~  o.V  ~TTOV  ' A8T)vULWV 
" However, if he had wished to be just about the children, it was 
possible  (€~TJv) for  him to  act  according to  the  laws  which  deal  with 
orphans  for the guidance of incapable as well as  capable guardians:  he 
might  have leased the estate and so got rid of a load of cares, or have 
purchased  land  and  used  the  income  for  the  children's  support; 
whichever course he had taken, they would have been as rich as anyone 
in Athens."s19 
It is important to note that  TOl.~  a.OUVUTOL~ TWV  €1TLTP01TWV  KUL  TOl.S 
8uva~EVOL~ here in the passage implies guardians who thought they could 
not administer their wards' estates themselves as well as those who felt 
that they would be able themselves to manage their wards' estates. The 
import of the passage, therefore, is that a guardian might decide either to 
lease his ward's patrimony or manage it himself. However, although the 
lease  of an  orphan's  estate  was  not  a  legal  obligation,  a  speaker  of 
another Demosthenic speech informs us that if  a guardian did not want to 
lease  the estate of his ward during the period of guardianship, he could 
518  See Finley, Land,p.42-43; Harrison, Law,p.105-108; MacDowell, Symposion(1985),257-259; 
Osborne, Chiron 18( 1988),305-31 0; Cox, Household,p.145-146. 
519  Lys.32.23. Cf. also Dem.27.58. 
368 be  denounced  for  mismanagement  by  anyone  who  wished  and  be 
compelled by court to lease the estate.520 
Furthermore,  it  is  evident  that  whether  a  guardian  should 
administer  the  estate  of  his  ward  himself  or  lease  it  could  be 
predetermined  by  the  father's  will.  Thus  Demosthenes  accuses  his 
guardians  of failing  to  carry out such a provision of his  father's  will, 
though  his guardians deny that the will left instructions that the  estate 
should be leased.
521  Thus if  the father gave instructions in his will that his 
orphan's  estate should be leased, or if the guardian decided to  put the 
estate up for lease, he could arrange for it to be leased. The lessee then 
managed the property, and the income from it was the amount that the 
lessee paid according to the terms of  the lease agreement. 
In any case, there is some evidence which suggests that even if a 
guardian had been instructed in the will of his ward's father to lease the 
ward's estate, or if  he was sued by anyone who wished, compelling him 
to proceed to a lease of the estate, he could decide not to lease the estate 
if he felt that it would be more profitable, and in the interest of his ward 
to  manage  it  himself.  Thus  Demosthenes  counteracts  this  possible 
argument by Aphobos that it was better not to lease his estate, by asking 
520  Dem.38.23. Cf. also Is.11.34-35, and Dem.27.15, though in Dem.27.15 Demokhares takes no legal 
action against Aphobos. Add Harp.s. v.  <po.(J"LS; Arist. AP.56.6. 
521  Dem.27.15,40,42; 28.1,7. See also Dem.30.6. 
369 him to prove that the mere principal of  his estate had been paid in full to 
him even if  there was no profit from his management.522 
And in Demosthenes Against Nausimakhos and Xenopeithes,  we 
learn  that a  guardian is taken to court for  failing  to  lease his orphans' 
estate that consists mainly of loans receivable. But he obtains permission 
from  the jury to  remain in control of the  money.  The  speaker further 
recounts that the guardian eventually bought multiple-dwellings with the 
money all of which he handed over to his wards at their majority.523  By 
and large, therefore, because of the permissive nature of the regulation, 
whether  or not an orphan's estate  should be  leased  depended  on  the 
mood and circumstances of the guardian rather than on a prescribed rule 
on  the  nature  of  the  property.  524  A  guardian'S  decision  to  retain 
administration  of the estate  in his hands thus  constituted a matter for 
reproach in case of  loss, not grounds for prosecution. 
One thing that is not completely clear is a definite pattern or line of 
reasoning that determined when a guardian decided to manage the estate 
himself and when he preferred to lease it. And what even compounds the 
problem  is  the  fact  that references  to  lease  of orphans'  estates  in the 
speeches where estates are discussed are a heap of allegations, charges, 
and counterclaims. It does seem, however, that although a guardian was 
522  D  em.27.59. 
523  D  em.38.7,23. 
524  Cf.Finley, Land,p.40. 
370 likely to retain landed or visible property and administer it himself and 
lease  the invisible or liquid one, there was a greater tendency to retain 
administration of  an orphan's invisible estate. 
This  brings  up  a  few  fundamental  questions  that  need  be 
addressed, even if  briefly. How many Athenian fathers died having sons 
and  daughters below the age of eighteen, or fourteen,  as in the case of 
daughters? What constituted the estate of an orphan? What proportion of 
an orphan's estate could have been leased?  And of the orphans' estates 
that could have been leased, how many of  them came under lease? 
An exact precision of the  number  of households  orphaned  in 
classical Athens would be impossible. But it is suggested
525 that allowing 
for  different demographic conditions and an earlier age of marriage for 
women  in Athens, not less than 20% of Athenian fathers  died leaving 
sons  below  the  age  of eighteen,  or  daughters  only  who  were  under 
thirteen,  and that it is  most likely that the  proportion may have been 
closer to a quarter or even a third. It is, therefore, not surprising that a 
considerable number of orphans was a  common sight in the  Athenian 
society.  And  it  would  seem  that  quite  a  great  number  of estates  in 
classical  Athens  would have become liable  to  be leased as  estates  of 
orphans. 
525  Golden, Phoenix 35(1981),316-331; W.E Thompson, Phoenix 21(1967),273-282; Osborne, Chiron 
33{l988),309; Richard P. Saller, CP 82(1987),21-34. 
371 Of what constituted an orphan's estate,  the  sources  indicate that 
such estates comprised both visible or immovable property and invisible 
or  movable  property.  These  were  liquid  holdings  or  cash,  personal 
effects, stock, seed, tools, slaves, agricultural lands and buildings.526 It is 
noteworthy,  however,  that  there  are  inherent  problems  regarding  the 
distinction between visible and invisible property. For Attic, and in fact, 
Greek writers in general, are not consistent in their distinction between 
visible  (4)UVEPa.)  and invisible (u4>uv1)s)  property. Land and buildings are 
always counted as visible. 
But the problem is with movable property like slaves,  animals, 
and household effects. In a speech of Isaios, these are counted as visible 
estate (8.35); but Harpokration on u4>uv"s  OU<TLU  KUL  4>UVEPa. regards them 
as  invisible,  citing Lysias  as  his  authority.  Concerning  liquid cash,  a 
man's  money  in  his  own  possession  is  regarded  by  Lysias  and 
Demosthenes as visible (Lys.12.83; Dem.Ep.3.41), but to Aristophanes, 
it is  invisible property (Ekkl.602).  Also, Demosthenes considers money 
deposited with a banker as a visible estate (48.12); but in Isokrates 17.7, 
it is invisible. Furthermore, money lent out on interest is visible property 
in one speech of Isaios (11.42-43), but invisible in another speech of the 
same author (8.35). 
526  See for instance, Is.11.41-43; Lys.32.5-6; Dem. 27-29 passim. For a defmitive outline of  the 
composite parts of  the patrimony of  Demosthenes, see Davies, APF,p.127-128. 
372 Thus the words visible (<t>avEpa.)  and invisible (a<f>avTJS)  cannot be 
regarded as technical terms of invariable application in that with regard 
to  different  forms  of wealth,  the  distinction  between  them  remained 
helplessly  fluid.  Consequently,  any  attempt to  explain these  words  in 
terms of  related pairs like immovable and movable assets turns out to be 
fallible,  and an author's precise meaning can be decided only from the 
context.  527  As to  the proportion of an orphan's estate  that  could have 
been leased, it is generally agreed that it was always the totality of the 
property as a whole that was leased.528 
With regard to how much of the proportion of orphan estates that 
could have been leased was leased, it does seem that not many orphans 
had much property to be leased; for it appears that not all  fathers who 
died leaving children in their minority had significant real property. And 
although the figure of five thousand Athenian citizens at the end of the 
fifth century mentioned in the hypothesis of Lysias 34 may not be quite 
reliable, it is a pointer that about 20% of  the people did not have  real or 
visible property.  529 
Furthermore,  evidence for  orphan estates discussed in the  Attic 
orators indicates that not all orphan estates that could be leased were, in 
527  Cf. MacDowell, Andokides, p.146-147; Finley, Land, p.54-55; Davies, APF,  p.15~-1~4;  Ha~ison, 
Law (i), p.230-232. MacDowell notes that the Ha~okr~tion  ~istincti~~ based o~  L~~taS IS  posslbl~:en 
a misunderstanding of  the author. For a more detaded dISCUSSIOn of  VISIble and mVlslble property, 
Vincent Gabrielsen, , <I>ANEPA and A<I>ANHL OYLIA in Classical Athens' C et M 37(1986),99.-114. 
528  Finley, Land, pAO-41,236,n.14; MacDowell, Law, p.94; CQ 39(1989),10-21, esp.11-15; Harnson, 
Law, p.294; Osborne Chiron 18( 1988),316; Fine Horoi, p.98. 
373 fact, leased. For it seems that where a father bequeathed to his orphaned 
children an estate consisting substantially of liquid holdings rather than 
visible  property,  guardians might  find  it more  attractive  to  manage  it 
personally  than  to  put  it  up  for  lease.  For  instance,  the  estate  of 
Demosthenes  (Dem.27-29),  that  of  Nausikrates  discussed  In 
Demosthenes 38, as well as the estate of Diodotos' orphans in Lysias 32, 
the  bulk  of which  comprised  invisible  property,  were  not  leased  but 
administered by the guardians themselves. 
It is very obvious also that the orphan estates mentioned in Isaios 
7.6;8.42;  and  11.34 were not leased.  And it is  most probable  that  the 
orphan's property mentioned in Isaios 5.10-11  was also not put up  for 
lease  but administered by the guardian himself.  As  far  as  the  evidence 
goes, only the estate of the sons of  Nikias in Isaios 2 (2.9,28-29) as well 
as that of Antidoros mentioned in Demosthenes 27.58 is known to have 
been leased. It is noteworthy, however, that the forensic speeches almost 
invariably  mention estates that were not leased,  and are  in fact  barely 
b  530 'f  adequate on those that were leased. For, as rightly noted by Os  orne,  I 
a guardian,  following  the  possibilities  created by the  law,  leased  his 
ward's  estate, cases of mismanagement and misappropriation would be 
529  Cf. Osborne, Chiron 18(1988),309. 
530  Ibid. 310. 
374 less  likely  to  come  up  than  when  he  decided  to  manage  the  estate 
himself. 
LEASING AN  ORPHAN'S ESTATE 
( M£a()WUIS  Op<paVLKof]  O'tKOU) 
The  device  whereby  an  orphan's  estate  during  his  or  her 
minority  was  transferred  from  the  guardian,  if he  did  not  manage  it 
himself, to a lessee to administer was called ~L(J"8w(J"LS  O'LKOU.  The device, 
as  pointed  out by Finley,  is  known solely from  the  horoi,  the AP of 
Aristotle, and the lawcourt speeches of  the Attic orators, with no sources 
of these  types  known  elsewhere  than  Athens,  though  the  institution 
cannot be said to be peculiar to Athens.531 
Among the  many and varied responsibilities  of the  archon  for 
ensuring smooth and fair succession to property in the family was also 
his role as the overseer in leasing the estate of an orphan. In listing the 
diverse  family  responsibilities  of the  archon,  Aristotle  tells  of the 
archon's superintending role: 
"He also leases out the estates of orphans and heiresses, until the 
heiress reaches the age of  fourteen, and takes securities for the lease.,,532 
531  Finley, Land,p.39. For a systematic treatment ofmisthosis oikou, see Otto ~chulthess, 
Vormundschaft nachattischem Recht (Freiburg, 1886),p.139-173,209-220; WeISS,  Untersuchungen I 
129-138, both noted by Finley, Land,p.234,n.6. See also Fine, Horoi, p.96-115.  . 
532  Arist. AP,56.7. Not only is H. Rackham's translation of  OLKOUS  as 'houses' .t?O  ~Iteral, but also 
(bToTlf1~f1aTa as 'rents' rather misleading. Following Liddell and Scott, 'secunties  for the plural, 
a.1ToTlf1~f1aTa appears more suitable. 
375 Harpocration gives us an expanded version of what Aristotle tells us in 
his description of  a.1TO'TLl-L"ll-LU: 
"Those  who  leased  the  estates  of orphans  from  the  archon 
provided securities for the lease. It was necessary for the archon to send 
out persons to evaluate the securities. Therefore the evaluated securities 
were called apotimetai, and the procedure apotiman.  "533 
These  two passages set out the procedure and the  archon's role in the 
procedure for the lease, though not the legal rule for the guardian to lease 
the  estate.  It  is  obvious  that  the  lease  was  conducted  under  the 
chairmanship and supervision of  the archon. Isaios gives us the outline of 
the  actual  procedure to  follow  and a  demonstration of it in his  sixth 
speech: 
"Seeing that Euktemon was very weak from old age and not even 
able to get up from his bed, they considered how his property could still 
be  kept  in their hands  after his  death.  And what  did  they  do?  They 
registered  these  two  boys  before  the  archon  as  adopted  sons  to  the 
deceased sons of Euktemon, putting themselves down as guardians; and 
they told the archon to put up the oikoi for lease, on the ground that the 
boys were orphans. Their purpose was that, in the names of these boys, 
part  of the  property  might  be  leased  and  part  of it  established  as 
533  G. Dindorf, ed. (GRONINGEN, 1965), tr. Finley, Land,p.38-39,234,n.4. Cf. Bekker, Anecdota 
Graeca, I,p.437, linesl5ff. noted by Fine, Horoi,p. 
376 securities  and marker-stones put in position while Euktemon was  still 
alive,  and that they themselves should become the lessees and get the 
income. On the first day when the court met, the archon put the lease up 
for  auction and they offered to lease the property. But certain persons 
who were present, denounced the plot to the relatives, and they came and 
informed the judges of the real state of affairs.  The result was that the 
judges voted against allowing the property to be leased."(Is.6.35-37) 
We may compare the following passage also: 
"  If he  contends  that  there  is  no  need  to  have  the  half-share 
adjudicated  or to go to law with me at all,  but that this  share already 
belongs  to  the child, let him make an application to  the archon for its 
inclusion in the lease of  the orphan's estate and let the lessee exact from 
me this portion as belonging to the child.,,534 
We notice from the  four passages quoted above  that leasing an 
orphan's property was not just a single-act transaction between the lessor 
and  the  lessee.  Guardians who wanted to  put up their wards'  estates 
applied to the archon to grant lease of the property. It is reasonable to 
assume that the guardian would provide an inventory of the property to 
be let in the application to the archon, though the sources do not mention 
that.  Evidence for inventories in wills regarding orphans' estates is not 
534  I  8.11.34-35. 
377 lacking;535  and it is most obvious that the  guardian would inform the 
archon of  the worth of  the property to be leased. Fine is therefore right in 
noting  that  "it  is  hardly  conceivable  that  the  archon  should  have 
supervised  the  leasing  without  having  an  accurate  knowledge  of the 
nature and value of  the property concemed.,,536 
Following the application to the archon, a public proclamation of 
the  lease was made by the archon,  after which lessees submitted their 
bids  including  their  securities  to  the  archon.  In  accordance  with  his 
responsibility as supervisor of the interests of orphans,537 the archon sent 
out  assessors to evaluate the security offered by each lessee in his bid. 
The  primary purpose of the evaluation was to  ensure that the  security 
was  at least equal in value to that of the property to be leased. And to 
show that the property provided as security was encumbered, some flat 
slabs of stones (horoi) were set up on the property. Finally, an auction of 
the  property to be leased was held in the presence of the jury presided 
over by the archon, and the property was leased obviously to the highest 
bidder.  It  is  significant  that  the  archon,  together  with  the  jury,  had 
authority to stop proceedings if  cause were shown.(Is.6.37) 
With regard to the period for the lease of  the property and the rates 
at which orphans' estates were leased, it would seem obvious that these 
535  See Dem.27.40;28.14; Is.11.41-43; Lys.32.5-6. 
536  Fine, Horoi, p.1 0 1  ,n.22. 
537  Arist. AP,56.7; Lys.26.12; Dem.35.48;43.75; Aeschn.1.158. 
378 differed from circumstance to circumstance; although normally, it would 
be  ideal  for  an  orphan's  estate  to  be  leased  until  his  or her  age  of 
majority. Two passages in Demosthenes, (Dem.27.58-59;29.60) seem to 
suggest  that  the  rental  rate  for  a  leased  property  was  fixed  by  law, 
probably  at  180/0.  But this  evidence is  dismissed by commentators as 
neither feasible nor representative. For the estate was leased at a public 
auction where the bids differed and the rates of interest could be high or 
low according to the nature and circumstances of the property being put 
up  for  lease. It is, however, suggested that the average rate was 12% of 
the total value of  the property leased.
538 
Concerning the lease of  the liquid estate of an orphan, we have no 
evidence which shows how that was done, though it is possible that there 
must have been some laid down procedure to follow. Demosthenes 27.58 
seems to indicate that the estate of Antidoros leased by his guardian was 
a liquid holding given out as a loan. All we know about the transaction is 
that at the end of the lease period of six years, Antidoros was repaid an 
amount of money at least twice as much as what was borrowed by the 
lessee. 
And in Isaios 2, the speaker informs us that Menekles had become 
part-lessee  of the  estate of the  orphans of Nikias  (2.9),  which by all 
538  See Schulthess, pI49-156; Beauchet, II,p.247-249, both noted by Fine, Horoi, p.IOI,n.24; 
Harrison, Law ( i ), p.l  06,n.l. 
379 indications  seems  to  be  liquid property.  But,  as  the  speaker recounts, 
when  Menekles had to repay the loan to  the orphans at  the  end of the 
lease  period he could not honour the  debt.  Meanwhile, interest on the 
loan  had  accumulated  during  the  period  until  Menekles  apparently 
became  insolvent;  and he  could only repay the  loan together with the 
accumulated interest after selling his piece of  land.(ls.2.28-29) 
In both cases (Dem.27.58; Is.2.9,28-29), we have no idea of how 
the orphans' liquid estates were leased to the lessees, or what procedures 
were  followed  in  the  transactions.  It  would,  none  the  less,  be  quite 
reasonable to presume that the procedures for leasing an orphan's liquid 
holdings  most probably followed  the  same  procedures  for  leasing  his 
landed  property.  A  typical  difference,  however,  is  that,  as  normally 
happens  in loan transaction,  the  loan,  that is,  the  lease,  was  definitely 
made in cash. But as in the procedures for a landed property, security in 
the  form  of landed  property  was  required,  though  it  could  also  be 
movable items.539 The creditor's (the orphan's) right to the security and 
the  debtor's  right  to  redeem  it  formed  part  of a  legally  enforceable 
agreement the terms of  which were often recorded in writing embodying 
h  .  .  11  t 540  the period for the lease and the interest on t  e prlnclpa  en. 
539  Cf. Harris, CQ 82(1988),379; 87(1993),73,80.  . 
540  See Dem.33.15;34.6;35.10-13 for written documents in loan transactIons. 
380 The methods of paying the interest may, however, vary. It does 
seem that the borrower might make periodic payments of the interest, as 
the case of  Menekles appears to indicate (Is.2.28-29), or he might make a 
lump  sum payment of the interest together with the principal at the end 
of the  lease  period,  as  Demosthenes  informs  us  about  the  estate  of 
Antidoros (27.58). It would appear also that the archon's role in leasing 
liquid estate of an orphan was limited. He could still possibly exercise 
his functions of  having the security provided evaluated, approve or reject 
the  adequacy  or otherwise of the  value of the  security.  However,  the 
actual handing over of the loan to the lessee might not necessarily take 
place at a public auction as in the case of  leasing a landed property. This 
might be done in his presence. But it is quite conjectural, as  there is no 
evidence for the situation just as there is none for the procedure. 
Isaios  6.36  quoted above is  again  significant for  another reason 
regarding the provision of security in leasing an orphan's estate. Various 
interpretations have been put to a section of it; particularly to the effect 
that the orphan whose estate was to be let had himself to provide security 
for  his  estate.  I  find  the  reasoning  as  confusing  as  it  is  illogical  in 
practice. The perplexing section reads as follows: 
E'  I  UKTlll-1°VOS, ... 
381 "Their purpose was that,  in the name of these boys, part of the 
property  might be  leased  and  part  of it  established  as  securities  and 
marker-stones put in position while Euktemon was still alive." 
KU1"uO"1"u8El:ll  with the  contrasting particles TO.  ~€V  ...  To.  8E  seems to be the 
crux of the matter.
541  But of the various interpretations given, the  ones 
offered  by MacDowell and Harris  appear most plausible  and  seem to 
reflect  the  practice  of providing  securities.  As  Harris  points  out,  the 
contrast  seems to  be a  general  one between two  actions rather than a 
narrow  one between two pieces of property. That is,  the  leasing of the 
orphan's  estate on one hand (  TO.  ~€V  ~LCT8w8EL'T)  TllS  oUO"Las),  and the 
furnishing  of  securities  by  the  lessee  on  the  other  hand  (TO.  8€ 
d.1T01"L~T]~UTU  KUTUO"TU8EL'T)).  Accompanying the furnishing of securities is 
the  placing of horoi on the property pledged (Kut  OPOL  TE8ELEV).  Thus, 
one property, that of the orphans is being leased; while the other, that of 
the lessees, is being provided as securities. 
Harris' thesis may be expanded by a simple logic. In leasing an 
orphan's estate, the lessee was expected to provide security for the period 
of the lease.  The adequacy of  the value of  the security vis-it-vis the value 
of the orphan's estate once established, marker-stones were placed on the 
541  For the various interpretations given to the phrases, see Wyse, p.525; P. Roussel, Isee: discours 
(Paris, 1922),p.104, noted by Harris CQ 87(1993),82; Harris, ibid.,82-83: Forster, Isaeus, 
(Loeb),p.225; Finley, Land, p.41-42; Fine, Horoi, p.100; MacDowell, CQ 39(1989),13-15. 
382 property pledged as security. The lessee was handed over the property 
being leased to administer and to pay the agreed rent on it.  The orphan 
whose  property was to be leased was not required by law or custom to 
provide  security for his own property being leased.  Naturally, nobody 
would want to lease his estate for a period of years only to relinquish 
another  property of the value or more as  security for  the  one  he  had 
leased. 
It  is  not very  definite  whether it  was  mandatory  for  a  lessee 
always to provide security for the lease of an orphan's estate. According 
to AP,  56.7, and Harpolaation, security was legally binding. But Isaios 
2.28-29 which throws some light on pledging of land as security for an 
orphan's estate in practice appears not only incoherent but also confusing 
in content regarding the issue. Commentators are therefore not agreed on 
what exactly the situation was.
542 The prelude to the confusion goes back 
to an early section of  the speech. 
According to the speaker, Menekles was able to provide a dowry 
for  his daughter because he had become j oint lessee of the property of 
the  children of Nikias  (l-LETU<T)«~>V  TOU  O'(KOU  TllS  l-LL<T8w<TEWS  TWV  'TTul8wv 
TWV  NLKlOU  ). (2.9) The statement indicates that Menekles received a sum 
of money (apparently a  secured loan) as  a  result of entering into this 
lease. This loan with its subsequent repayment crisis is what is confirmed 
383 later  in  a passage of the speech in 2.28-29, which does not lend itself 
easily to interpretation. The passage reads as follows: 
" When it became necessary to pay back the money to the orphan, 
and  Menekles  did  not  possess  the  requisite  sum,  and  interest  had 
accumulated against him over a long period, he was for selling the land. 
My  opponent,  seizing  the  opportunity  and  being  desirous  to  pick  a 
quarrel  with him because he had adopted me, tried to prevent the  land 
from  being  sold,  in order that it might be held as  a  pledge,  and  that 
Menekles might be obliged to cede the possession of  it to the orphan. My 
opponent,  therefore,  claimed  a  part  of the  property  from  Menekles, 
though  he  had  never  previously  made  any  such  claim,  and  tried  to 
prevent  the  purchasers  from  completing  the  purchase.  Menekles  was 
annoyed,  and was  obliged to  reserve  the  portion which my  opponent 
claimed;  the rest he sold to  Philippos of Pithos for  seventy minai and 
thus paid off  the orphan, giving him one talent and seven minai out of  the 
price  of the property; and he brought an action against his brother for 
restraining the sale." 
A  few  obscurities  occur  in  the  passage  which  need  to  be 
addressed;  for the account in general seems so  deliberately garbled by 
the speaker that he must probably have either omitted or distorted some 
essential details. It is not clear whether it was a portion of  the land or the 
542  For various works on the issue, see Fine, ibid. p.l09, n. 60. 
384 whole land that Menekles had apparently pledged as security for his loan. 
Neither  is  it clear whether it was  the  part of the  land Menekles  had 
apparently pledged as security or the whole land that he tried to sell. 
If  it was a portion of  the whole estate that he had attempted to sell, 
but the whole lot had been pledged as security for his loan and marked 
by mortgage pillars (horoi) for many years, a completely new claim to a 
portion of it for sale would mean that the representatives (the guardians) 
of the children ofNikias, and in fact, the archon himself who looked after 
the interests of orphans, or his deputies should have to go to the field to 
inspect and value the security offered.543  But this does not seem to be the 
situation. For normally, as MacDowell rightly points out,544 to avoid the 
risk of having all his property seized, or any part of it picked at random, 
it  was  convenient for  a  borrower to  earmark a  particular piece of his 
property which should become the creditor's ifhe could not pay his debt. 
The motives for the fracas between Menekles and his brother with 
the subsequent division of the land are also not clear. Their quarrel may 
have been the result of some other factors than the speaker's claim that it 
was because Menekles had adopted him that his brother tried to stop him 
from  selling  the  land.  It  is  most  probable  that  Menekles'  brother 
prevented  him from putting up the  land for  sale  because it was  their 
543  SeeAP, 56.7; Harp.s.v. a.1To'Tl.l-Lll'TaL  Cf. Wyse, p.259.  239 
544  Law, p.142-143. Cf. lW Jones, Law and Legal Theory a/the Greeks (Oxford, 1956 ),p.  . 
385 patrimony that they were holding in common. In that case, if Menekles 
were allowed to sell the whole land or an additional portion besides what 
had already been put under pledge, as it was risky to mortgage a whole 
property,  he  would  be  depriving  his  brother  of his  share  of their 
patrimony.  Their  joint  -ownership  of the  land  is  confirmed  by  the 
statement  that Menekles'  brother claimed a  part of the  property  from 
him, though he had never previously made any such claim. 
Confirmation of their joint-ownership is  further  reinforced by 
the  fact that Menekles was compelled to reserve the portion claimed by 
his brother, and sold the rest for  seventy minai from which he paid the 
orphan's  due  to  him.  (2.29)  Furthermore,  although  we  are  not  in  a 
position to know the legal relationship between Menekles and his brother 
vis-a-vis  the  land (except that it was  most probably their jointly-held 
patrimony),  and  their  respective  personal  obligations  on  grounds  of 
which Menekles indicted his brother for stopping the  sale,545  neither do 
we  know  what arguments  he  used in his  suit.  But it  does  seem  that 
Menekles sued his brother not just because he had restrained the sale. He 
in fact  sued for a formal division of  the land for him to take his share so  , 
that he might manage it independently. This is evident in the speaker's 
subsequent  remarks  that the  matter was  later  submitted  to  arbitration 
545  Wyse, p.259, conjectures that Menekles may probably have borrowed money from his brother on 
the land, hence his reaction. 
386 which  eventually resulted  in  the  formal  division  of the  land  between 
Menekles  and his brother, and the swearing of an oath as  a seal of the 
agreement (2.29-33). It is important to note that it is Menekles' share of 
the land that is the subject of  dispute in Isaios' second speech. Until then, 
it was a jointly held estate. 
One further crucial issue is the status of  the land proposed for sale 
by Menekles. According to the speaker, Menekles' brother tried to  stop 
him from selling the land so that it might be held as  a pledge, and that 
Menekles  might be obliged to  give up possession of it to  the  orphan: 
~  , \  '  ,  8  ......  'I  ,  ,  "  8  ...... 
OLEKWI\UE  TO  XWPLOV  'ITpU  T)VUL,  LVU  KUTOKWXLl-L0V  'YEVT)TUL  KUL  UVU'YKaa  11 
T4>  oP<pUV<{>  U'ITOO"TllVUL:  "  he tried to prevent the land from being sold, in 
order  that  it might be held as  a  pledge,  and that  Menekles  might  be 
obliged to cede the possession of it to the orphan."(2.28) This seems to 
be one of the most confusing sections of the passage as a whole. It is not 
clear whether the land was already under a pledge, or it was yet to  be 
pledged because of  Menekles' inability to pay the loan. 
If  the land was yet to be pledged as security, the senses of  the two 
main verbs following their introductory antecedent tva  would represent 
the normal sequence of events. Thus if his brother tried to prevent him 
from  selling the land in order to pay the  orphan,  it would be used as 
security until the loan was paid; but otherwise be seized if  Menekles was 
still unable to pay the loan together with the interest on it. In that case, it 
387 would  imply that Menekles had contracted the  loan without providing 
security for it. This case could then be an instance of a situation whereby 
an  orphan's  estate  had been  leased  without  security,  though  usually 
agreenlent on or certification of the security for an orphan's liquid estate 
preceded the granting of  the loan. 
But if the  land was already under a pledge, the  conjunction  KaL 
linking  the  two purpose clauses might seem intrusive.  Without the  KaL 
therefore, the' sense would then run thus: he tried to stop the land from 
being sold so that having come or since being under a pledge, Menekles 
might be obliged to cede the possession of it to the orphan. It does seem 
to me that this second interpretation better suits the situation and normal 
practice.  The  point here  is  that the  land had already been pledged  as 
security  for  the loan, though Menekles still held possession of it.  And, 
knowing  that property pledged under security could be seized if it was 
not redeemed, Menekles' brother tried to prevent him from  selling the 
land in order to pay his debts because of the enmity between them,  so 
that  the  law  would take  its  course.  This  also  seems  the  only  way  to 
explain  the  statement that the  land would be subj ect to  seizure  if the 
money were not paid to the orphans. It implies as well, that if the lessee 
failed to repay the principal at the proper time the orphan acquired a right 
to the whole security; and, ifhe wishes, to sell it in lieu of  repayment. 
388 That the whole subject of  real security for loans was already well 
developed  in the time of the orators may be inferred from a speech of 
Demosthenes.  In his Against Phormion  where  he  speaks  of the  death 
penalty  being inflicted for  obtaining large additional loans in  fraud  of 
earlier  creditors, the orator remarks that there were many rules for  the 
protection  of creditors  against  fraudulent  acts  of borrowers  who,  for 
instance, did not hand over to the lenders their securities and went on to 
obtain further loans. (Dem. 34.49-52) 
The  suggestion  by  Hitzig,  noted  by  Wyse  (p.258-259),  that 
Menekles'  brother was guardian of the orphans of Nikias is  reasonable 
but not quite convincing. If  only the portion of  the land proposed for sale 
by Menekles was under a pledge, his brother's reaction to his attempt to 
sell the land would have been unwarranted; for the orphans had a prior 
right  on it already.  The brother, as noted by Wyse, would have had to 
maintain  his  own rights  in the  other portion and  stop  Menekles  from 
putting the whole estate up for sale. 
And if the brother was a guardian of the orphans as suggested by 
Hitzig, and the piece of  land that Menekles eventually put up for sale was 
already  under mortgage to  the  orphans,  Menekles would have  had to 
consult his brother as guardian on his plans to sell the land in order to 
pay his loan. But he could not have sold the land without the approval of 
his brother as guardian of the children. However, it is most unlikely that 
389 his brother, the orphans' guardian, would have sanctioned the sale of the 
mortgaged  land.  And although  Menekles  himself also  seems  to  have 
been a guardian of the children (cf.Harrison, Law (i), p.291), agreement 
between him and his brother on the sale of the land would not seem very 
likely  to be reached on account of their strained relationship if both of 
them were guardians of  the children. 
Also, if the brother was guardian of the orphans he would most 
probably  not  have  sat  unconcerned  while  interest  on  the  loan  kept 
accumulating.  Judging from his uncompromising reaction to the sale of 
the  land,  he  would  certainly  have  pressurised Menekles  to  make  the 
periodic payments of  the interest on the loan, or he would have sued him 
for bad guardianship. It is therefore not likely that Menekles' brother was 
guardian of  the orphans of  Nikias. 
To  return to  the  issue of providing security for  the  lease  of an 
orphan's  estate,  it  is  implicit  in  Isaios  2.28-29  discussed  above  that 
security was always to be provided for the lease of an orphan's estate. 
However,  it  does  appear  that  in practice,  if the  estate  of the  orphan 
comprised largely landed property, a strict insistence on the provision of 
security equal in value to that of the orphan's estate was not adhered to, 
presumably on condition that the orphan's property would in no way be 
390 alienated or mortgaged.
546 
This apparent relaxation of the regulation had 
two  main advantages.  First, it would have enabled a guardian without 
much real property of his own to apply to lease the property to himself. 
Second, it would have made it also not too difficult to get a lessee if an 
orphan had a very large amount of  real property. 
The evidence from AP, 56.7 and Harpokration Cn.543  above), as 
well as Isaios 6.36-37 points strongly to the fact that a lessee always had 
to  furnish  security  for  the  orphan's property  which  he  had  to  lease, 
making the condition appear mandatory. The security was in the form of 
real  property.  But if the  estate  to  be leased itself was  land,  it would 
appear that land might not be provided for it. For it would not seem quite 
creditable or economically viable that a lessee would offer to obtain the 
management of  property on which he must pay rent, only to abandon all 
profits from an equivalent amount of his own property, unless of course 
his own land was far less productive. 
And in any case, if the guardian could not or would not manage 
his  ward's  estate,  he would have no particular desire  to  administer  a 
lessee's property under a pledge.547 However, it does seem that land had 
always to be provided as security, unless the leased estate was itself land. 
F  or instance, and as noted already, where the orphan's fortune comprised 
546  Cf. Harrison, Law (i), p.293. 
547  Cf. Finley, Land, p.237-238,n.23; Fine, Horoi, p.l08. 
391 mainly liquid assets to be leased, land or buildings would be required as 
security to protect the orphan's interests. None the less, it appears that 
there could be instances whereby this was not always the case. 
We  have  already  noted  the  case  of Menekles  whose  loan  he 
contracted from the children of Nikias that does not seem to have been 
secured by him. The case of Xenopeithes, the guardian of the orphans in 
Demosthenes  48,  may also  be noted.  We  are  informed that  on being 
prosecuted for not leasing the estate of his wards, Xenopeithes managed 
to  convince the court to grant him permission to  administer his wards' 
estate  himself.  (48.23) It is  very obvious  that he  was  not required to 
provide security for the orphans' fortune that appears to have comprised 
mainly  liquid  assets.  However,  although  there  could  be  instances  of 
situations  whereby  an  orphan's  fortune  rather  than  land  was  leased 
without  providing land or buildings as  security, there is not sufficient 
evidence to make this clear.
548 At any rate, it is recognised
549 that security 
was generally required to give the orphan whose estate was being leased 
protection against fraud, and also to underline official supervision of the 
procedure. 
The incident described in Isaios 2.35-37 illustrates the fact that a 
guardian could also take a lease of his ward's estate. Finley (Land, p.41) 
548  Cf, MacDowell, Law, p.144.  .  (')  295 
549  See Fine, Horoi, p.99,108-109; Finley, Land, p.42-43; Wyse, p.258-259; Hamson, Law  1, p.  . 
392 maintains  that a  guardian's decision to bid for his ward's estate might 
probably  be for the reason that the orphan's father may have failed to 
make  adequate arrangement to reward the guardian for his efforts. Thus 
to benefit from managing the estate, the latter decided to lease it thereby 
retaining  control and at the same time obtaining an income.  But Wyse 
(p.526-527) finds the practice rather suspicious. It may be true that if the 
guardian  himself  bid  for  his  ward's  property  it  presumably  raised 
suspicion that he might not render fair and honest accounts to the ward at 
the  end  of his  guardianship.  This  inherent  suspicion  thus  made  the 
practice  generally  rare;  and  perhaps  a  reason  why  the  family  of 
Euktemon protested, thereby causing the guardians' bid to be cancelled. 
But it does appear that the practice was good incentive for a guardian to 
manage his ward's estate efficiently. 
Without such a contract, the guardian could not legally profit from 
his  administration of his  ward's property,  and thus  had no  reason  to 
increase its productivity. As a lessee he could exploit the patrimony of 
the  orphan  for  his  own  profit  and  would  have  a  strong  motive  for 
increasing the revenue derived from it.  The practice would certainly be 
advantageous to the orphan also. For he would definitely be entitled to a 
393 share  of these  profits  through  the  lease  and  have  his  property  well 
maintained, if  not substantially improved by his guardian.  550 
Two questions that are not addressed by the sources are whether a 
guardian who decided to manage his ward's fortune himself had to apply 
to the court, and whether he also had to provide security as required by 
any  other lessee for  the lease.  We may search the  sources in vain  for 
evidence that a guardian who decided to administer his ward's property 
himself  had  to  apply  to  the  archon  before  he  could  assume  that 
responsibility. The evidence in Demosthenes 38.23 is circumstantial and 
cannot  be  taken  as  representative.  It would therefore  be  a reasonable 
presumption that a guardian did not need any administrative consent to 
manage his ward's estate himself. 
With regard to  the  provision of security,  unless  of course,  he 
decided to compete with other lessees for the estate at the public auction 
conducted by the archon (ls.6.36-37), it does appear certain that it was 
not required of the guardian to provide security for certain fundamental 
reasons.  In the first place, a concomitant of the application to the archon 
for  the  lease of an orphan's estate was the provision of security by the 
lessee before the lease was granted. And as the guardian did not need to 
apply to the archon before he could administer his ward's estate himself 
550  See Dem.27.64 which gives several instances of  orphans who profited handsomely from having 
their estates leased. 
394 if he  so wished, he was presumably not required to furnish security in 
that respect. Secondly, any suggestion that the guardian was expected to 
provide  security if he decided to manage his ward's property seems to 
negate the permissive nature of  the rules regarding the lease of  the estate. 
Furthermore, it would certainly have been impossible for a poor 
guardian to provide security equal in value to the property of an orphan 
much  richer than himself if he had to  furnish  security before he  was 
pennitted to administer his ward's property.55t  In any case, the orphan 
had  the  right to have his fortune invested to yield income. A guardian 
who decided to administer his ward's patrimony was therefore obliged to 
invest his ward's capital (if it is liquid assets) or put it to work (if it is a 
landed  property),  and by this  transaction the ward's fortune  might be 
expanded considerably.552  To protect the interests of the orphan and to 
keep proper accounts, however, the orphan was usually considered as the 
creditor. 
An issue that needs to be addressed is the problem of  the guardian 
who himself took the lease of the orphan's estate and then failed to pay 
the rents or interest on it. We have several cases of misappropriation by 
guardians  who  did  not  lease  their  wards'  estates  but  personally 
administered them. But we have no definite information on any case of a 
551  Cf. Harrison, Law (i), p.294, and ibid.n.1; Paoli, noted by Fine, Horoi, p.111,n.71. 
552  See Lys.32.23; Dem.27.60-61; Is.  11.39. 
395 guardian who officially took the lease of  his ward's property but failed to 
pay the rents or interest, neither is there any evidence in the sources of 
any action taken by the adult orphan against a lessee. 
The two cases, which, I think, but for their controversial nature , 
could perhaps be cited as evidence of guardians taking the lease of their 
wards'  estates  are  the  ones in Isaios 2.9,28-29,  and 6.35-36.  In Isaios 
6.35-36,  \ye  are told of an attempt by the two  guardians to  lease their 
wards'  estate  to  themselves,  which  allegedly  turned  out  to  be  a 
conspiracy  by  the  guardians  to  defraud  their  wards.  The  alleged 
conspuacy  was  later  foiled,  and  the  bid  to  lease  the  property  to 
themselves, cancelled. But otherwise we could have had a typical case of 
guardians  who  would have  officially  taken  the  lease  of their  wards' 
property,  though we cannot say that they would have failed to pay the 
rents  or interest. Their case can therefore not be taken as representative 
of the situation of failure to pay the rent, except that it points to the fact 
that a guardian could officially take the lease of  his ward's patrimony. 
And in Isaios 2.9,28-29, the status of Menekles in relation to the 
children ofNikias is not clearly defined. But Harrison is probably correct 
that Menekles was the guardian of the orphans.
553  Despite the indefinite 
nature  of his status, we could use his case as  an analogy of a guardian 
who took the lease of  his ward's estate but failed to pay the interest. 
396 In every contract regarding the lease of an orphan's estate, there 
must have been stated when the payment of rents or interest should be 
made.  Two  sources bear on this  time  stipulation,  one of which is  the 
passage  in Isaios under discussion.  The other is in Demosthenes'  first 
speech against Aphobos. The implication of  that passage in Demosthenes 
is that at the end of the contract period (apparently at the majority of the 
orphan), the principal and the total amount of income due to the orphan 
were  paid  at  the  same  time.(27.5 8)  And in  the  Isaios  passage,  when 
Menekles settled down with the orphan who had attained his majority, he 
paid back the principal and the interest which had accumulated for a long 
period.(2.28-29) In Demosthenes 27.58, it is not clear whether or not the 
terminal  six-year  period of the  lease  when  the  lessee  discharged  his 
obligations is what was stipulated in the contract regarding the payment 
of the  principal  and rents  or interest to the  orphan,  Antidoros.  But in 
Isaios  2.28-29,  it  is  obvious  that  the  interest  should  have  been  paid 
periodically  by  Menekles,  which  he  failed  to  do,  resulting  in  its 
accumulation until the orphan's majority. 
It does seem from these two passages in Demosthenes and Isaios 
that a lessee could defer payment of the rent or interest on the property 
leased to him until a later time. However, I think that if it were possible 
to postpone payment of all or a large part of the rents or interest on the 
553  Law (i ), p.291. 
397 lease  until  the  end of the  contract period,  the  practice  would  appear 
unusual.  This is because the guardian would need the periodic revenues 
on  the  estate  to  meet  the  expenses  of his  ward's  maintenance  and 
education, and to pay the eisphora, the only liturgy a male orphan was 
liable to pay.554 
It appears difficult to say whether a guardian who took the lease 
of his  ward's  estate  and  then  failed  to  pay the  rents  represented  the 
orphan's interest as well as his own. In any case, it is reasonable to say 
that if the guardian took the lease himself but failed to pay the rents or 
interest,  as  it  seems to  be the  case with Menekles,  the  orphan  seems 
worse  of in terms of revenue from his property, and on grounds of his 
minor status. A crafty guardian could argue that he had been using all the 
revenues  from the estate to foot expenditures on his ward's person and 
the  estate.555  This  argument  would  appear  plausible  and  logical, 
especially  if there  were  no  complaints  about  the  orphan's  general 
maintenance;  and the guardian handed over to him at his majority his 
original patrimony, even with no profits. After all, as guardian, although 
he  was  expected to invest his ward's property, he was obliged to  tum 
over the estate to the ward as the father left it, and render accounting to 
554  On the orphan's liability to pay the eisphora, see page 349 above. 
555  A parallel example of  this is Lys.32.9-10, where the guardian implies that he had spent. all the 
fortune the orphans' father left for them together with his own money for their general mamtenance. 
398 him,  but not necessarily to  declare profits. It would,  however,  denote 
good and creditable management if  any profits were declared. 
Nevertheless, it would appear that such an argument as would be 
advanced by the guardian would have no technical or legal extenuation 
regarding the terms of  the agreement for the lease. The guardian could, in 
all  probability, be liable to prosecution; and more so especially where, 
besides  failure to pay the rents or interest, there is evidence of lack of 
maintenance of the orphan, as is implied in Lysias 32.16-17. However, 
the  ward,  because of his minority, naturally could not engage in legal 
proceedings  himself  (AP,42.5).  And  his  guardian,  as  his  legal 
representative who would have taken the necessary steps to protect his 
interests when the estate had been leased is the one who has taken lease 
of the estate but failed to pay the rents or interest on it. It would therefore 
have been a concerned third party prosecutor, 0  ~ouA6l-LEVOS, who could 
bring  action  against  the  defaulting  guardian  for  failing  to  fulfil  his 
obligations. 
Some of the legal actions that could be initiated on behalf of a 
minor  orphan have been discussed on page 435  below.  But one other 
avenue that was also open to the orphan to be taken on his behalf if the 
guardian failed to carry out his duties satisfactorily was apparently the 
EVOLKLOU  OLKll  to  compel  the  guardian  to  pay  the  rents  or  interest. 
°  kO  d  f  °t  In his Against  Demosthenes provides the evidence for thIS  In  0  SUI  .. 
399 O/ympiodoros,  the  speaker  refers  to  the  action  which  Olympiodoros 
should  have  taken  against  him  for  failing  to  pay  the  rent  on 
Olympiodoros' house that had allegedly been leased to him. (48.45) The 
passage refers to an ordinary lease, but since it borders on failure to pay 
rent on a leased estate, it is fair to assume that the same action could be 
applied to the lease of  an orphan's estate. But if  no such action was taken 
against the guardian, and the orphan, at his majority, felt strongly that his 
guardian's  accounts to him regarding his general maintenance and the 
administration of  his patrimony fell short of expectations, he could bring 
suit against his guardian by the 8LK'l1  E'TTLTP01TllS.556 
Regarding the  arrears of rents  or interest on the  leased  estate, 
there  is no evidence, as noted above, for any action taken by an adult 
orphan against a lessee in that respect. But this is presumably because, as 
Isaios informs us about Menekles (2.28), if full payment of the principal 
and  rents  or interest was not made to  the  orphan,  he  could seize  the 
security provided by the lessee. However, as seems to be the case with 
Menekles,  an  orphan  who  wished  to  have  cash  rather  than  the  real 
property represented by the security, may permit the  lessee to  sell  the 
security and, in this way, discharge his obligation through the proceeds 
of the sale.557 
556  Various kinds of  actions against dishonest guardians will be discussed in Cha~ter 10 below.  h 
.  h  I  f th  secunty was greater t  an 
557  On the question as to what the position could be m case t  e va ue 0  e 
that of  the obligation, see Fine, Horoi, p.1 0 1-1 02. 
400 Concerning the lease of an orphan's estate in general, it may be 
noted that the archon's supervisory role in the lease procedure of a real 
estate  is probably the only case in which we have state interference in 
private  land leasing and administration. The transaction was publicised 
officially,  and the  archon saw to  it  that procedural requirements  were 
met.  This  apparent state interference must basically have been for  the 
purpose  of  preventing  fraudulent  administration  of  the  estate,  or 
forestalling  against any conspiracy by unscrupulous relatives to  deprive 
the  orphan of his rightful patrimony. However,  it may also have been 
against the background of two other related rationales. Socially, orphans 
were exceptionally vulnerable, and therefore merited extra protection by 
the state. Politically, many orphans were children of  deceased warriors. It 
was thus a basic tenet of civic ideology that the city should provide for 
them and protect the orphans of those who sacrificed their lives for the 
city.558 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF  MLaewaL~ OLKOU FOR THE ORPHAN 
Isaios 2.28-29 and Demosthenes 41.7-10 throw some light on the 
position  of the  orphan in leasing his patrimony.  The passages are  our 
principal  sources for  the much-vexed issue of real  security in Athens. 
Isaios  2.28-29  informs  us  of the  pledging  of real  security  with  its 
.  40  141· S D Goldhill  'The Great 
558  Cf. Todd, Law, p.250; MacDowell, Law, p.94; Lacey, Famziy, p.1  - ,..  , 
401 attendant  fate of seizure in the event of default in leasing an  orphan's 
estate.  And  Demosthenes  41.7-10  most  probably  stands  as  the  only 
extant  Athenian  statute  concerning  the  status  of property  pledged  as 
security in loans and lease agreements in classical Athens. 
The plaintiff in Demosthenes 41, Against Spoudias, does not quote 
the  law,  but gives a  short paraphrase of its  contents. According to  the 
speaker, the law explicitly forbids prosecution by lessees and their heirs 
against those in possession of  property that they had pledged as security. 
The question as to who possessed the property that had been pledged as 
security  is  the  subject  of what  seems  to  be  an  endless  controversy 
regarding pledging of  security in loans and leases in Athens. 
Fine559  maintains  that  the  debtor  retained  possession  and 
ownership of  the property pledged as security. But his view is rejected by 
Harris560  and Harrison.561  A defect of Fine's claim is the assumption that 
every  property pledged as security was landed property be it in a loan 
transaction or in leasing a landed estate. But among the items listed in 
Demosthenes' account of  his patrimony are twenty slaves engaged in the 
manufacture of  beds from which his father received an annual revenue of 
twenty  minai.  These slaves, he recounts, had been received as  security 
Dionysia and Civic Ideology' JHS 107(1987),58-76; Christ, Litigious, p.128. 
559  Horoi, p.67-69,94,107-109. 
560  CQ 82(1988),351-381. 
56)  Law (i), p.267,n.l. 
402 for a debt of  forty minai owed his father by a certain Moiriades (27.9,27). 
What does Fine say about this kind of  security? 
Fine  would  probably  differentiate  between  Demosthenes' 
possession of these slaves and the thirty-three others who were engaged 
in making knives, also included in the orator's inventory of his fortune. 
However, Demosthenes himself makes no distinction, but evaluates both 
categories of slaves as included in his patrimony.562 Furthermore, in his 
second speech against Aphobos, Demosthenes tells the jury that if he is 
conyicted he would be left in abject poverty because much of what he 
owned had been pledged as security for a loan, and thus belonged to his 
creditors. (Dem.28.18) 
We  notice that in the  first  instance,  movable property had been 
pledged  as  security, but in the second situation, the property provided 
was a landed property. And with regard to the possession of the property 
pledged as security, Demosthenes in 27.9-11,27, considers his father as 
the owner of the twenty slaves; and therefore assesses their capital value 
together  with his  patrimony.  But in 28.18,  he  regards  his  mortgaged 
property as property of his creditors if  he is condemned and is unable to 
redeem  it by repaying the loan for which he had pledged the security. 
The presumption, however, is that he continued to keep possession of  the 
562  Cf. Davies, APF, p.129-130; Harris, CQ 82(1988),363; Finley, Land, p.116. 
403 property  until  defaul  t  occurred  when  he  would  have  to  lose  his 
entitlement to it. 
It does  seem,  therefore,  that  in  certain  situations,  the  property 
pledged  as  security was regarded as  the  credit()r's property.  For if the 
Athenians thought that all encumbered property belonged to the debtor, 
and  that  the  creditor could not claim to  be the  owner of the  security, 
Demosthenes  would not have  maintained  that  the  slaves  in  the  beds 
factory had been pledged as security to his father; and therefore belonged 
to him. None the less, in other situations, especially in leasing a piece of 
land  whereby  real  property was  pledged,  it  appears  that  the  property 
pledged as security continued to be in the lessee's possession during the 
period of  the lease. 
Thus  the  question  as  to  who  possessed  property  pledged  as 
security  in  a  loan  or  a  lease  transaction  still  remains  a  matter  for 
controversy,  and does seem to have no definite answer to it.  For there 
appears  to  be  no  concrete  evidence  for  any  relevant  legislation  or 
regulations to guide the Athenians in the field of real security; and the 
question as to who owned property pledged as security in a loan or lease 
is not easy to answer. In a pledge or mortgage, the creditor loaned money 
to the borrower, or the lessor lent his property to the lessee who in tum 
pledged  some  of his  property  as  security.  By pledging  this  piece  of 
property, the borrower or the lessee temporarily lost his right to alienate 
404 it, and the creditor or the lessor gained the right to seize it if  default took 
place.
563 
But as to who owned or controlled the pledged property until it 
was  redeemed or until  default might take place is  an issue  which the 
h ·  H' h  564  At  enlans, as  ams  as noted,  seem to have had no definite criteria to 
resolve. And so the problem of  ownership of  the security appears to have 
remained  in a  legal limbo in which there reigned a sort of free-for-all 
with  everyone guided by his own self-interest, and not by any juristic 
precepts. 
So far, the available evidence points to certain reflections on the 
position  of the  orphan with regard to  the  administration of his  or her 
patrimony. These reflections may be noted against the background of the 
fact  that although in all situations the reference is to the orphan whose 
interest  is  the  fundamental  concern,  all  transactions  would have  been 
undertaken on his or her behalf by the guardian or legal representative 
because  of the  orphan's  own  legal  disabilities.  If an  orphan's  liquid 
estate is leased as a loan, the borrower receives the money to which he 
acquires full rights for the duration of  the lease agreement. 
After handing the money over to the borrower, the guardian or 
legal representative of the orphan, and for that matter the orphan, has no 
further obligations to the lessee under the terms of  the agreement. He has 
563  Cf. Finley, Land, p.115; Harris, CQ 82(1988),370; Harrison, Law (i), p.282-283. 
564  See CQ 82(1988),370. 
405 fulfilled  his part of the bargain and has received in turn a right to  the 
repayment  of the  loan.  The borrower,  that  is,  the  lessee,  on the  other 
hand, is in debt to the lessor (the orphan) the instant he receives the loan 
and has no rights against him (the lessor). He, as lessee, can exchange the 
money for goods and services; and does not, of course, have to repay the 
principal until the due date or the expiring time for the lease arrives. But 
his  full  obligation  under  the  agreement  remains  unfulfilled  until  he 
repays the lessor (the orphan). The risk for the orphan, therefore, is that 
the borrower might spend the entire principal, and then become insolvent 
before the time comes for him to repay the loan. 
Thus the orphan and the  lessee or the borrower are  not on the 
same footing. For while the orphan has a right against the borrower and 
no  further obligation, the borrower has an obligation to the orphan, but 
no  claim  against him.  This  apparent asymmetry puts  the  orphan  in  a 
vulnerable position. This vulnerable position is patent from the fact that 
he,  as  lender, must perform his part of the agreement immediately, and 
then  trust the  borrower to  perform his  obligation to  repay the  loan at 
some  time in the future.  At any rate, the security that should cover the 
interest  and  the  principal  protects  the  vulnerable  orphan  against  the 
possibility that the borrower reneges on his promise to repay the loan or 
become  insolvent.  In effect,  the  security  is  meant  to  ensure  that  the 
406 borrower does not alienate an amount of property equivalent in value to 
the principal. 
It is remarkable  that  an  obvious  implication of this  is  that  the 
lender  or the orphan acquires a  legal share in the property pledged as 
security,  and  this  property  can,  in  fact,  not  be  alienated  without  his 
consent.  Furthermore,  the  orphan  has  the  right  to  seize  the  pledged 
property if  the borrower should become insolvent by the end of  the lease 
period.  Isaios  2.9,28-29  is  very  germane,  and  may  be  taken  as 
illustrative.  The  speaker informs us  that  Menekles  had become joint-
lessee of the property of the children of Nikias (2.9). This statement not 
only  indicates that it was permissible for two or more people to take a 
lease  jointly,  but more  importantly,  that  Menekles received a  sum  of 
money  as  a result of entering into this lease.  It also  suggests that the 
arrangement was, in fact, a secured loan. 
This loan contract is confirmed later in the speech where we are 
informed that Menekles had to repay a sum of money, and that interest 
on  it had accumulated for a long period (2.28). And to repay the loan, 
Menekles  attempted to sell some piece of land which otherwise would 
have been subject to seizure. It is significant to note that the land would 
be subj ect to seizure if the money was not paid at the proper time to the 
orphan because it had been pledged as security for the loan Menekles had 
taken. And to forestall the situation of seizure, Menekles was compelled, 
407 in the circumstances, to sell the piece of land he had pledged as security 
to payoff  his debt to the orphan. 
But it is important to note also that he could not lawfully sell the 
land without coming to terms with the guardian or legal representatives 
of the orphans of  Nikias. For it was not permitted by law for a man who 
had mortgaged a real estate to sell it at will or pleasure.(Dem.41.7-10) 
Significantly, since the mortgaged land was security of the orphans, they 
had a share in it by law. It could therefore not be sold without the consent 
of their guardian or legal representatives, or the person who held it as 
security.565  Menekles  may  therefore  have  certainly  consulted  the 
orphans'  legal  representatives  and  come  to  terms  with  them  before 
putting up the land for sale. 
When the landed property of  an orphan is leased, the orphan does 
not face  the same risk as he would otherwise have faced in leasing his 
liquid estate. While the orphan, in leasing his liquid property, seems to 
relinquish  all  rights to  his money in return for  a promise to  repay,  in 
leasing  his  real  property he  does  not part with  the  ownership  of the 
property  he  leases.  The  lessee  indeed  has  a  right  to  the  use  of the 
property; but he does not acquire the right to alienate it, or to exchange it 
for cash. In case he attempts to sell the property to an unsuspecting third 
party the sale would not be valid. And if the lessee refuses to vacate the 
408 property at the end of  the lease period he could be evicted.  Furthermore  , 
if the lessee resists eviction he could be prosecuted by the orphan by a 
SlK'T)  €~OUAT)S with stiff  penalties ifhe was found gUilty.566 
It would imply, therefore, that if the lessee of an orphan's real 
estate became insolvent, the only thing the orphan stood to lose was the 
payment of rent for use of his property. And to protect him against this 
risk, the lessee was required to furnish real security. It does appear then, 
that the orphan, in fact, did not need to demand security for the value of 
his  property  to  guarantee  his  right of ownership if the  lessee  should 
renege  on his  obligations  to  him.  For,  as  Harris  rightly  notes,567  his 
ownership is already protected by the laws; and after all, a lessee would 
not possibly be able to abscond with a building or a plot of  land leased to 
him,  those  assets that would have constituted the bulk of an  orphan's 
patrimony. 
The  position  of the  orphan  in  a  lease  of his  landed  property 
therefore appears different from his position in leasing his liquid estate. 
In  leasing his landed property he agrees to permit the lessee to  occupy 
and  make use of his property for a certain period of time in return for 
payment of rent. As long as the lessee pays his rent on time, he never 
falls  into debt to the orphan.  Thus at the  outset the  lessee in a landed 
565  See Dem.53.10. Cf.Harrison, Law (i), p.267. 
566  Cf. Harrison, Law (i), p.217-221; Harris, CQ 87(1993),78-79. 
567  Ibid. 
409 property is in a different position vis-a-vis the orphan than the borrower 
is vis-a-vis the orphan (the lender) in a loan transaction. 
It becomes obvious then, that in leasing a real property the lessee 
and  the  orphan are on equal terms. For the orphan has an obligation to 
the lessee to allow him to use his property, and the lessee in tum has the 
obligation to pay rent. Provided that the lessee does not fall into arrears 
but makes regular payments of  rent, he remains on equal footing with the 
orphan.  Each has both a right and an obligation towards the other, and 
neither is in debt to the other as long as the lessee fulfils his obligation of 
regularly paying his rent on the property. But if  the lessee failed to make 
regular payments of the rent, he became indebted to the orphan; and in 
the  event of his becoming insolvent at the  end of the lease period, the 
orphan could seize the property pledged as security in lieu of  the rent. 
It would appear also  that leasing  an  orphan's  estate  gave  two 
obvious  guarantees  to  him.  For one  thing,  at  his  age  of majority  he 
received  exactly the  same property left by the  father at his  death.  For 
another,  during the period of guardianship the orphan got a steady and 
guaranteed  periodic  revenue  which  could  be  used  to  provide  for  his 
general  maintenance,  and  to  meet  expenditures  on  the  estate.  Thus 
410 leasing the estate enabled the orphan to take over at exactly the stage of 
the property where the father had left.  568 
It is noteworthy also that the  orphan's socio-economic position 
might  be  improved if the lease terms  were  quite  favourable.  And this 
appears to have been especially the case with estates comprising largely 
liquid  cash,  as  it seems to  be implied in Demosthenes  27.57,62.  The 
orator speaks also in general terms, (27.64), of estates of orphans which 
had  been doubled and trebled by being leased, and cites the  particular 
example of the property of Antidoros which was leased, and which grew 
in six years from three talents thirty minai to six talents and more. 
It is the same socio-economic values that the speaker of Lysias 
Against  Diogeiton  implies when he  tells  the jury that,  if the  orphans' 
guardian wished to act justly by the children, he might have farmed out 
their estate and so got rid of a load of cares, or have purchased land and 
used the income for the children's support. (32.23) Significantly, another 
socio-economic implication for  the orphan if his estate was leased and 
improved  on favourable  terms  is  that he  would be  classed among  the 
wealthy  citizens,  and be called upon for  state  services  to  enhance his 
economic and social standing in the society. 
In any case, the economic security that the orphan derived from 
leasing his patrimony would not go without a social cost. Although if a 
568  Cf. Osborne, Chiron 18(1988),313. 
411 guardian decided to administer his ward's property he could lease part of 
it  privately,  the  general  and formal  practice, if a  guardian  decided to 
lease  the orphan's patrimony was that the estate as a whole was leased 
and not a portion or part of  it. But leasing the whole of the estate implied 
leasing property of the ancestry, which might comprise agricultural and 
residential property. 
This  would  mean  that  the  orphan  family  should  have  to  be 
accommodated elsewhere if the guardian himself did not decide to  bid 
for the lease, or the lessee did not agree to sublet part of the estate back 
to  the  orphans.  The  obvious  consequence  is  physical  and  emotional 
disruption,  because sentimental links with the ancestral land,  and with 
any  slave force would be broken. This might particularly be the case if 
the  orphans were almost at their majority, or if the guardian was a very 
close  relative  and  the  property  was  part  of  his  own  past 
history. (Cf.Finley,  Land,  p.236,n.16;  Osborne,  Chiron  18(1988),313-
314)  Some  soft-hearted uncles  might therefore  not lease  their wards' 
estates. 
In  overall  terms,  however,  leasing  an  orphan's  estate  might 
apparently have become a regular feature of managing the patrimony of 
the  orphan. The intentions of a guardian who failed to lease his ward's 
fortune, no doubt, were therefore suspected. 
412 CHAPTER 10 
TERMINATION OF GUARDIANSHIPAND ACCOUNTABILITY 
THE AGE OF MAJORITY: THE EPIKLEROS 
In the majority of cases the transfer of the patrimony of the 
epikleros  from  her  guardian  to  her  husband  at  her  marriage  was 
straightforward.  But where the  status of the epikleros as  well as  that of 
her  patrimony  was  litigated  the  transfer  of the  property  could  be  a 
complicated affair. The case of the daughter of Aristarkhos (I.) in Isaios 
10  is  a typical  example of the latter situation.  The  speech is  delivered 
against  a certain Xenainetos (II.) regarding the property of Aristarkhos 
(1.).  According to the speaker who is suing for the estate of his maternal 
grandfather,  Aristarkhos  (I.)  married  a  daughter of Xenainetos  (I.)  by 
whom he had four children - two sons, Kyronides and Demokhares, and 
two  daughters.  The eldest child Kyronides was however adopted during 
his  father's  lifetime  by  Xenainetos  (I.),  his  maternal  grandfather 
(ls.10.4,5).  With  the  adoption  of  Kyronides,  Aristarkhos  (I.)  was 
technically left with three children, Demokhares and his two sisters. 
When Aristarkhos (I.) died, Demokhares became heir apparent, his 
elder brother having been adopted into another family. Meanwhile he and 
his  sister  came  under  the  guardianship  of Aristomenes  their  paternal 
uncle.  Demokhares,  however,  died  a  minor,  one  sister  having  died 
413 already. Thus the estate of Aristarkhos (I.) devolved on his last surviving 
daughter,  the mother of the speaker (10.5), who was still a minor under 
the  guardianship of her paternal uncle. In effect, therefore, the estate of 
Aristarkhos  (I.)  was still under the  control of Aristomenes, his brother 
and guardian of  his daughter. 
In course of time Aristomenes gave his own daughter in marriage 
to Kyronides, the girl's brother who had been adopted out of the family, 
and handed over to him the estate to which he had lost his right because 
of  his  adoption  (10.5-6).  This  union  was  blessed  with  two  sons, 
Xenainetos (11.), named after Kyronides' adoptive father, and Aristarkhos 
(II.),  named  after  Kyronides'  natural  father  (10.6).  Subsequently, 
Aristomenes  gave  the  daughter  of his  brother  of whom  he  was  the 
guardian in marriage to a man outside the family since neither he, as next-
of-kin,  nor his  son,  Apollodoros,  as  cousin of the  girl,  claimed her in 
marriage by Athenian law. It was from this marriage that the speaker of 
Isaios 10 was born (10.5,6). 
On the death of  Kyronides, Aristarkhos (II.) was introduced into the 
phratry of Aristarkhos (I.) as his adopted son (10.6), and he inherited his 
estate,  the  possession of which he  enj oyed until  he perished in battle 
without  issue.  But  he  left  a  will  in  which  he  named  his  brother, 
Xenainetos  (II. )  as  his  heir.  When  Xenainetos  (II. )  came  before  the 
archon and put in his claim to the estate, he was met by a competitor, the 
414 son of the daughter of  Aristarkhos (I.), who challenged the validity of  the 
will, and claimed the estate for his mother. It is clear from the speech that 
before  Demokhares  died,  his  father's  estate  was  certainly  not  in  his 
hands.  He \vas still a minor under the guardianship of his paternal uncle 
who managed the estate on his behalf. It seems probable that things went 
on well with the orphans until Demokhares deceased, which event created 
a dicey position for his sister the reconstruction of which seems to elude 
commentators. The crux of  the matter is whether Demokhares' sister was 
epikleros of  her father Aristarkhos (I.), or of  her brother Demokhares. 
The legal juggle regarding the status of the woman vis-a -vis the 
estate in dispute can hardly be denied. But the situation may not seem so 
difficult  as  Wyse would want us to believe,569  if a more dispassionate 
examination of the state of affairs is made. Of course, we may search the 
sources  in vain for  a  precedent of the  situation in Athenian law.  Prof. 
MacDowell  rightly senses it in his observations on an epikleros  whose 
father dies while she is still a minor.57o None the less, if  one trusts all the 
implications of  the speaker's narrative, his mother had a legal right to the 
estate of  her father even before she was married to the speaker's father. 
It is explicit from the speaker's account that Demokhares had not 
actually entered into possession of  their father's estate at the time he died. 
The property was still in the hands of  their guardian, holding it in trust for 
415 them, later to be handed over to him at his majority. But we are informed 
severally  in the speech that Demokhares died a  minor before he could 
take  possession of the  estate.  And at  the  time he  died,  his  sister,  the 
speaker's  mother  was  also  still  a  minor  and  not  yet  married.  It  is 
important  to note that after the  death of Demokhares the  guardianship 
obligations of Aristomenes were still in force since the speaker's mother 
was still a minor. Thus technically, her father's property devolved on her, 
but in fact, it was still under the control and management of her paternal 
uncle  and  guardian, Aristomenes, until  she got married at her puberty. 
And in conformity with the law the estate would then pass from the hands 
of her guardian to her husband, and then eventually to a son born out of 
their union.
57
! 
One may also question whether a boy, while still a minor, could 
be the  'owner' of an estate though his guardian was looking after it. This 
may seem a hard question to answer. In theory or technically, however, 
the property is his, whether he inherited it automatically as a son, or by 
collateral  kinship  in  conformity  with  the  Athenian  law  of succession 
(Dem.43 .51).  But if the  test  of ownership  is  the  right  to  dispose  of 
property,  then the minor boy would not be the practical  'owner' of the 
property  until  he is  certified to  have  attained his  majority,  since  as  a 
569 
See p.649. 
570  Law, p.98. 
571 
See Dem.46.20. 
416 minor he could not make a will at all in order to dispose of property, as 
contained in Isaios 10.10. 
The  state of affairs  therefore points to  the  conclusion  that  the 
speaker's mother was epikleros  of her father  and not her brother who 
never  entered  into  possession  of the  estate.  This  conclusion  appears 
contrary to the opinion of de Ste Croix on Is.I0.4 that "a sister inherited 
the estate of a brother who died while still a minor" and should therefore 
be  treated as  an exception to the rule.
572  It is also poles apart from the 
contention  of Wyse
573  that  the  speaker  is  merely  calling  his  mother 
epikleros  to  whip up indignation in the jury against his  opponents  for 
abuse of guardianship. 
Harrison  has  seeming  doubts  about  the  position,  and  therefore 
stays out of any detailed discussion of Is.l  0.4, but nevertheless notes that 
'a woman without brothers might be entitled to  inherit from  a relative 
other than her father,  and if she did it is  fairly certain that she was not 
technically an epikleros.  574  This may certainly be possible in some other 
cases,  but we may conveniently discount it in the case of this speaker's 
mother  the  events of which point to  her right to her father's  estate on 
grounds  that her brother never entered into possession of the property. 
Schaps'  claim is probably in line with the  situation and in conformity 
572  G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, 'Some Observations on the Property Rights of  Athenian Women' CR 
84(1970),276. 
573 
See p.656. 
417 with  the  often-quoted  law.  As  he  notes,575  a  man's  sons  were  his 
automatic heirs, and his estate was divided among them; daughters, in the 
presence of sons had no claim. If there were no sons, natural or adopted, 
the  daughter became an epikleros;  she married the next-of-kin,  and the 
sons of  this union, when they came of  age, were the heirs of  the property. 
As noted above, where there was no litigation about the  status of 
the epikleros, and for that matter her patrimony, the transfer of her estate 
from  her guardian to her husband, which of course embodied rendering 
account of its management by her guardian was quite straightforward. In 
Isaios  11  for  instance, a niece is adopted by will by Hagnias  (11.),  and 
technically  inherits as epikleros.  There is no mention of a guardian for 
her,  but  she may most probably have  lived under the  guardianship  of 
either Glaukos or Glaukon, named as residual heir in the will; or both of 
them, half-brothers of  Hagnias (11.8-9). 
Furthermore,  there  is  no  evidence  that  her  position  was  the 
subject of dispute at any point in time.  In the event of her reaching her 
puberty,  she would either have to be married to one of them or be given 
away in marriage together with her patrimony. But she dies still a minor, 
and  the  residual  heir who inherits  is  successfully challenged in  court, 
resulting  in a  protracted and tedious litigation over precisely who  was 
entitled to inherit that seems never to have ended. If she had not died a 
574  Law (i),p.l08-9,112-14,136-8,142-236. 
418 minor,  she would have received her patrimony with no difficulty at  her 
majority. 
And in Demosthenes 43, Philomakhe (II.) becomes  an  epikleros 
and  is  claimed  by  Sositheos  (Dem.43.l3,55),  who  represents  her 
throughout the trial. It is not clear whether she became an epikleros in her 
infancy and lived under the guardianship of Sositheos who later took her 
to  wife  at her puberty,  or the  father  died just when  she  reached  her 
puberty  at  which  time  she  was  adjudicated  in  marriage  to  Sositheos. 
Neither is it clear whether she went under the guardianship of some other 
paternal  or  maternal  relative  and  was  later  claimed  in  marriage  by 
Sositheos;  though this last situation seems to be a remote one.  At any 
rate,  it is reasonable to assume that her position was not disputed in any 
way, and her patrimony went into her hands accordingly. 
Thus in a normal situation for the epikleros whose status or property 
did not come under any dispute, accountability regarding her patrimony 
may take two forms. At her marriageable age the epikleros continued to 
live under the legal authority of the man under whose guardianship she 
had  been placed at the death of her father if he took her to wife.  There 
was no account of  her estate rendered at this stage. He as her husband and 
legal  representative would normally continue to  administer and control 
her patrimony. But if  the guardian did not take her to wife but married her 
-
575  D.M.Schaps, 'Women in Greek Inheritance Law' CQ 69(1975),53-7,esp.54. 
419 off to another man, her patrimony transferred to the administration of  her 
husband. The guardian then became accountable to her husband regarding 
her estate, and her tutelage under her former guardian terminated. 
The age of majority, that is, the marriageable age, of the young 
epikleros has three obvious domestic and political implications for her at 
her  marriage.  First,  her  guardianship,  unlike  that  of a  male  orphan, 
persisted under her husband. Secondly, she as  a wife, and an epikleros 
one  at  that,  was  naturally  expected  to  begin to  bear children  for  her 
husband,  hoping  that  sooner or later  a  son would be born to  assume 
responsibility of her patrimony, and to continue her father's lineage. But 
the  children were not for her husband alone; they were citizen children, 
and therefore for the state; and society expected them to play their role as 
. .  f  h  .  d  h  576  CItIzens 0  t  e communIty an  testate. 
It is significant, however, that either way the husband was in no 
way the inheritor of the estate, nor could he dispose of it to anyone else. 
The law does not give the husband of an epikleros unconditional right to 
ownership  or disposal of her property.577  None the less, he could enjoy 
the profits from the lease or investment of  the property. But as a husband 
of the epikleros, he had a solemn task to perform; that is, to procreate a 
son  to  his  wife  who  should  take  over  the  estate  immediately  after 
576 
Cf. Dem.59.122. 
577  Is. 8.31; 10.12,23; Dem.46.20. 
420 attaining his age of majority.578 It is at this stage that the husband of the 
epikleros rendered accounts of his management of his wife's property to 
the adult son and handed everything to him as required by law. Thus the 
husband's administration and control of the estate of his epikleros  wife 
terminated at this point. It does not, however, mean that his guardianship 
of his wife terminated in practice at this stage. 
The  speaker's  interpretative  remarks  on  the  law  quoted  in 
Demosthenes 46.20 regarding the epikleros, and a paraphrase of  the same 
law  in a fragment  of Hyperides,  (frag.39),  seem to  imply that  sons  of 
epikleroi  assumed  full  guardianship  of their  mothers  in  the  technical 
sense. That is, to represent their mothers in every kind of  legal transaction 
besides  being responsible for their property and support after reaching 
their  manhood.  But  a  fragment  of Isaios,  (frag.26),  which  is  a  terse 
summary  of the  first  part of the  law in Demosthenes 43.51  and 46.20 
merely  states  that  sons  of epikleroi  should  have  possession  of their 
mothers'  property two years after attaining their puberty. This fragment 
does not mention them as being guardians of  their mothers, although it is 
implicit that the sons should provide for their mothers' maintenance once 
they  assume control of their property. I should believe that this is what 
the  law itself means. Having taken full  management and control of his 
578  Dem.46.20. Cf. Asheri, His to ria 12(1963),16. On the pitiful position of  the husband of  the 
epikleros, see Arist.Eth.Nic.1161Al, and add Asheri note 69, ibid. 
421 mother's  estate  at  his  age  of majority,  the  son  of the  epikleros  was 
obliged by law to contribute to her maintenance. 
The law referred to on page 318 above as quoted by Apollodoros, 
the  speaker of Demosthenes 46, does not in fact imply that the son of a 
married epikleros  should assume full  legal representation of the mother 
on taking management and control of her patrimony. It is certainly in the 
interest of Apollodoros to argue that he should assume full  guardianship 
of his epikleros widowed mother in the legal sense of representing her in 
every  kind  of  business  transaction  and  being  responsible  for  her 
maintenance and the administration of  her patrimony. For he is contesting 
the document purported to be his father's will that makes his stepfather, 
Phormion,  have absolute authority over his mother's estate. However, I 
think  that the crucial or controlling phrase in the  text of the  law itself 
regarding the woman's maintenance is  O"l,,-OV  1-1€,-pav  '-11  1-11l'-PL  (to dole 
out food to his mother). That is, to provide maintenance for her. And I 
believe that besides contributing to her maintenance while his father was 
still alive, this law does not imply official assumption of guardianship of 
the mother and becoming her legal representative as Apollodoros would 
wish the jury to accept. Thus their adult son contributed a portion of the 
estate under his control towards the mother's care. But the husband of  the 
epikleros  continued  to  be  the  legal  guardian  of his  wife,  though  his 
control of  her estate terminated at their son's majority. 
422 It is important to note also that when the son of the epikleros has 
taken  over  the  management  and  control  of the  estate,  his  mother's 
position as epikleros would also be deemed to have lapsed in fact if  not in 
law.  Indeed,  the  purpose  of her  unique  position  was  to  maintain  her 
father's estate in his family by serving as a channel for transmitting it to a 
male heir born by her. And once the male heir is born and is certified to 
have reached manhood, she would appear to have completed fulfilling her 
role  and exercising her function.  Her special status would thus seem to 
tenninate when the son comes into the inheritance of  his grandfather. 
THE MALE ORPHAN 
With  regard  to  the  termination  of guardianship  of the  male 
orphan,  I  shall  try to  establish  this  by drawing  on  three  passages  in 
Demosthenes  which  have  been  the  cause  of one  of the  most  vexed 
controversies in Athenian prosopography, though I do not intend here to 
resolve the riddle. The irritating passages come from Demosthenes' first 
speech (Dem.27) in his suit against Aphobos. When the orator begins to 
present the facts of  his case to the jury, he says to them: 
" Demosthenes my father, men of the jury, left behind an estate of 
nearly fourteen talents, and myself aged seven, and my sister aged five, 
and moreover our mother, who had brought him as  dowry a fortune  of 
fifty minae." (27.4) 
423 And  after  recounting  the  terms  on  which  hI'S  g  d'  uar  Ians  were 
appointed he observes: 
"'  But these men, who took at once their own legacies from the 
estate, and as our guardians administered all the remainder for ten years, 
have  robbed  me of my entire  fortune  except  the  house,  and  fourteen 
slaves  and  thirty  silver minae,  which they have handed  over to  me  -
amounting to about seventy minae." (27.6) 
He reiterates the same sentiments in 27.17, and 29.34,59. Then towards 
the end of  his speech Demosthenes laments: 
" If I had been left an orphan of a year old, and had been six years 
more  under their guardianship, I  should never have recovered even the 
pitiful amounts I now have." (27.63) 
These statements, as noted already, have been the subj ect of what 
seems to be an endless debate for more than a century now. The bone of 
contention is the age of  Demosthenes when his father died, and his exact 
age  when he attained his majority in relation to the age at which boys 
reached  manhood  in  Athens,  One  school  of thought  led  by  Schaefer 
strongly believes that the Demosthenic evidence indicates that Athenian 
boys reached their age of  majority and got registered in their demes when 
they were already seventeen years and had entered their eighteenth year. 
It is thus concluded that Demosthenes was above seventeen years, though 
not yet eighteen when he reached his majority. But the other championed 
424 by Hoeck, maintains that boys came of age at the beginning of the year 
after their eighteenth birthday; and that Demosthenes was eighteen years 
when he attained manhood.
579 
Other  statements  that  the  vanous  critics  use  to  support  their 
respective  claims may also be noted.  In the same speech, Demosthenes 
maintains  that  Therippides  managed  his  factory  for  seven  years. 
(27. 19)This gives a period of  nine years in all. In a neighbouring passage, 
however,  interest  from  the  profits  earned  during  Aphobos' 
superintendence  is  calculated for  a  period of eight years,  which  must 
represent the time of Therippides' control of the property. This makes it 
look  like  Therippides  was  manager  for  well  over  seven  years.  Then 
elsewhere  in  the  same  speech Demosthenes  claims  that  Aphobos  has 
refused to pay back the dowry for his mother which he took and kept for 
ten  years  (27.69).  The orator's claim implies Aphobos'  control  of the 
dowry  for ten years which tallies with the period Aphobos and his co-
guardians administered the estate. These are auxiliary references. 
But  turning  to  the  three  main  passages  cited  before,  and 
examining them from a different and neutral perspective, I think that they 
illustrate  two important events in the life of the younger Demosthenes, 
the  one political, which concerns also every youth in Athens; the other, 
579  For both arguments as advanced by the critics, see references for n.  187 on p.127 above. Add  . 
Lacey, Family, p.l06-107,141,279 n.63; Saller, CP 82(1987),21-34; Engels, CP 75(1980),112-120, 
Wyse, p.610-611; Schaefer, (1858),2. 19ff; Hoeck, Hermes 30(1895),347-54. 
425 familial,  and especially relates to orphans in the  society. Politically, the 
passages emphasise the period or moment of transition from childhood to 
adulthood. They also stress the beginning of  civic involvement in the city. 
And of course, the most important moment of this transition is certainly 
the  dokimasia.  At  this  vetting  procedure,  the  young  Athenian  was 
certified old enough and fit to be enrolled  (E:')"ypa<pE0'8uL) as a citizen unto 
the register of his deme.
58o But the notion of being a citizen or a member 
of the deme implies becoming a man and stopping being a child. 
This socio-political process or notion of childhood catabolism and 
adulthood anabolism, as it were, is reflected in or emphasised by certain 
common tenninologies such as 8oKq1<10'E0'8uL  ELS  av8pus,  (to be certified 
to  manhood)  or  av8pu  Yl:YVE0'8uL,(to  become  a  man)  or  av8pu  EtVUL 
80KL~U0'81lvUL,(to have been certified to be a man)  or E:~EA8e1v  EK  'TTUL8wv, 
or  U'TTUAAaTTE0'8uL  E:K  1Tut8wv,(  to  emerge  out of childhood),  which  are 
used to characterise the transition.
58t Thus the age of  majority is not just a 
question  of becoming a citizen but also  of becoming  a man.  It in  fact 
connotes  a  leap  from  the  youth  to  face  the  hazardous  challenges  of 
adulthood  life.  At  this  age,  the  young  Athenian  was  thought  to  have 
become an adult, and thus capable of  taking part in the politics of the city 
and carrying out his responsibilities as a man. He was liable for military 
service; and qualified also to vote and be voted for in the Assembly. 
580  Arist. AP 42.1-2; DemAO.ll. Cf. Lacey, Family, p.94-5,128-9. 
426 I refrain from going into the details of the tedious and difficult 
processes in the calculation of  conciliar and civil years in Athens, and the 
exact  year of birth of the young orator.  But the  Demosthenic passages 
suggest that at the time he sued Aphobos, Demosthenes was considered to 
have  come of age to  be able  to  exercise his  rights  as  a  citizen in this 
particular case of suing his guardian in court. For other procedural rights, 
however,  he might have to wait till  he had completed two years  as  an 
ephebe;582  a status that I think provides the notional and ritual separation 
between  the  two classes of childhood and adulthood.  Quite invariably, 
there appears to be a general consensus among critics or commentators on 
this important event in the life of  Demosthenes. 
The other aspect that the statements highlight, but which seems 
not  to  have  been noticed by critics  is  familial,  or social.  In  domestic 
affairs,  the passages point fairly clearly also to the period of termination 
of  guardianship  over  the  orphan.  The  sources  on  family  laws  and 
customary practices of the Athenians in fact suggest that one of the most 
marked continuities of ethical norms in Athenian society is the belief in 
the  need to  continue the oikos through both economic stability and the 
generational continuity of children. Significantly, economic stability and 
generational continuity of  the oikos begin at the child's age of  majority. 
581  See Is.7.3,34; 9.29; Lys. 32.9-10; Dem.27.36; 30.6-7; 36.10; 38  .. 12; Aeschn. 3.15.  aw  69 
582  Dem. 30.15; Lys.10.31;21.1; Arist.AP,55.3. Cf. Harrison, Law (1 ),p.75,n.1; MacDowell, L  ,po  . 
427 At this age, therefore, the Athenian male orphan, like his ordinary 
male  counterpart,  was  considered  to  be  mature  having  passed  from 
childhood to adulthood. His tutelage under his guardian came to an end. 
He  was  released from  all  legal  control  of his  guardian  after the  usual 
dokimasia.  The Athenian male orphan then became morally accountable 
for his own actions, and was punishable for his wrongs. And of  course, he 
could also sue for wrongs done him. But for him, this also meant a radical 
change  in  oikos  role  and  responsibility.  This  period  also  marked  the 
beginning  of the  continuity  of his  deceased  father's  oikos,  and  to 
strengthen  the  foundations  for  the  economic stability of the household. 
This  social role or position with its attendant economic responsibility is 
emphasised  with  a  motif of the  knee  in  Greek  culture  in  the  second 
speech of  Demosthenes in his suit against Aphobos. He tells the jury: 
"Men of the jury, when my father saw that he was not to recover 
from  his  illness,  he  called  together  these  three  men,  and  causing  his 
brother Demon to sit with them by his side, placed our persons in their 
hands,  calling us a sacred deposit. .. ; he committed me together with my 
property, to the care of them all in common, charging them to  lease the 
property,  and by their joint efforts to preserve the estate for me.  At the 
same  time he gave to  Therippides the seventy minai, and betrothed my 
mother to the defendant with her dowry of eighty minai, and placed me 
on his knees." (Dem.28.15-16) 
428 The placing of the  younger Demosthenes  on the  knees  of his 
father  is  very  significant.  It is  a  symbolic  expression  that  he  was  to 
assume his father's role in the oikos at a point in the future and begin to 
fulfil  the  functions  concomitant with the position.  This implies that he 
was  to  be his father's successor and live-wire of his father's household. 
But the young orphan could not assume this social role and take over the 
responsibility  of oikos  management  until  he  had  attained  his  age  of 
majority.  In a non-legal argument appealing to the jury for a favourable 
judgement  for  him and conviction  for  his  guardian later  in  the  same 
speech,  Demosthenes  makes  his  position  in  his  father's  oikos  more 
explicit than before as follows: 
"Do  not,  men  of the  jury,  be  to  us  the  cause  of such  deep 
distress;  do  not  allow  my  mother,  my  sister  and  myself  to  suffer 
undeserved  misfortunes.  Rather,  my  sister  was  to  be  the  wife  of 
Demophon with a dowry of two talents, my mother the wife of this most 
ruthless  of all men with a dowry of eighty minai, and I as  my father's 
successor was to perform state services as he had done." (Dem.28.19-20) 
An implicit but essential  extension of the male  orphan's oikos 
role is the responsibility of self-maintenance. At his age of majority, the 
male orphan was regarded as an adult capable of supporting himself and 
maintaining the household. This socio-economic significance of his new 
429 status is reflected in what a guardian tells his ward at his age of majority 
in Lysias: 
"Now I  have  spent  a  great  deal  of my  own money  on  your 
support:  so long as I had the means, I did not mind; but at this moment I 
too  am  in  difficulties  myself.  You,  therefore,  since  you  have  been 
certified and have attained manhood must henceforth contrive to provide 
for yourself." (Lysias 32.9-10) 
But the male orphan cannot fend for himself and maintain the 
oikos'  economic  stability  as  his  father's  successor without  getting  his 
patrimony  under  his  management  and  control.  Thus,  following  his 
dokimasia,  came  the  accountability  also  of his  guardian;  a  kind  of 
domestic  Eu8uvuL.  In Athens, politicians and other public officials after 
they  demitted office were required to  account for  their  stewardship or 
conduct while in office to the people and the state. The accountability had 
two  features.  He was expected to render an account of any state money 
placed in his charge (AO')'OS)  while in office. But he was also required to 
undergo a public scrutiny or inquiry (eu8uvos) regarding his past conduct 
or behaviour in office. If he was found to have embezzled state funds, or 
committed any atrocities against anybody, he was liable to prosecution. 
In the  same vein,  the  guardian at  the  age  of majority of his 
warde s), and therefore the end of his own stewardship as a guardian, was 
430 'required  to  give  account  for  his  stewardship  to  his  ward(s).  In  this 
respect.  his guardian had two important obligations to him.  In the  first 
place, it was obligatory for the guardian to hand over the property of his 
ward to him to begin his adulthood life. But of equal importance also is 
the state of the orphan's patrimony. As manager of the orphan's general 
affairs,  the  guardian must provide accounts of his  general  control  and 
management of  his ward's fortune. The guardian must be able to show in 
his  accounts that the property now being handed over was equal to the 
estate left by his ward's deceased father. The accounts must, in fact, also 
reflect  accumulated income  from  the  estate,  whether  it  was  managed 
personally  by himself as  guardian,  or leased out to  lessees,  minus  all 
expenses incurred by the guardian in respect of his general maintenance 
and support of the ward during his period of tutelage.
583  But whether or 
not  the  guardian would show honest and proper accountability is  quite 
another matter. 
ORPHANS UNDER HONEST  AND PERFIDIOUS GUARDIANS 
The issue of honest guardianship is actually not the  subject of 
any  of the  surviving  forensic  speeches,  though  a  few  of them  make 
passing references to cases of this type.  Naturally, the affairs of honest 
guardians  would be less likely to  appear in court,  whereas  matters  of 
5~  29  Lys.32.19-29;  Dem.27- . 
431 perfidy seemed to have been the order of the day, as can be noticed from 
the  law-court speeches. It is,  however, noteworthy that despite various 
acts  of perfidy by most guardians,  evidence for bodily ill-treatment or 
attempted murder of  an orphan, or that a guardian was likely to cause any 
serious personal danger to his ward is lacking. 
Of course, physical distress was obviously sometimes caused by 
failure to provide sustenance. For instance, in Isaios 5.10, it is alleged that 
the  orphans  under Dikaiogenes  (III.)  were  unprotected,  penniless  and 
lacked  all  the necessities of life. Note may also be taken of the case in 
Lysias 32.10, where the defendant is alleged to have turned his wards out 
of doors  barefoot  and  in  worn-out  clothes  as  soon  as  the  elder  boy 
attained his majority. The single worst personal offence alleged against a 
guardian of  which we know appears to be the charge in Isaios 5.11. Here, 
it is  alleged that the defendant sent his ward out as  a body servant or 
attendant with his own brother to Korinth. This probably means that the 
boy was sent as a military attendant on a campaign. The sources indicate 
that the body-servant in peace and war-time was generally a slave;584 and 
Naber585  maintains it is incredible that this servile office could have been 
imposed on an Athenian citizen of good family.  He thus concludes that 
although Isaios might not be exaggerating, the text is corrupt. 
584  Thucy.7.75; Lys.32.16; Dem.49.22,55;54.4. 
585  Mnemosyne N.S. 5(1877),403ff., noted by Wyse, p.419. 
432 Nevertheless, the seriousness of the case obviously lay rather in 
the shame in sending away the orphaned boy as an attendant, whether or 
not  it was for pecuniary reasons, than in the danger of it all.586  In any 
case, it is not even alleged that it was the aim of  the guardian to get rid of 
his  ward.  And in the rest of the  available sources,  charges of personal 
maltreatment of  orphans, or allegations of  a plot by their guardians hardly 
occur.  Thus although there are several cases of perfidy or wickedness in 
guardianship, the evil reputation of guardians is not justified by facts  of 
any menace to the life of the ward, like bodily ill-treatment or attempted 
murder,  but by facts  of seizure of patrimony and failure  to  render just 
accounts. 
It is  very  obvious  that  the  orators  highlight  several  cases  of 
plunder of  orphans' estates by their guardians, and that sources on honest 
and  dutiful  guardianship  are  scarcely  adequate.  But  this  is  primarily 
because  the law-court speeches that we have naturally discuss only the 
disputed  cases.  N one  the  less,  there  is  evidence  for  guardians  who 
dutifully and honestly discharged their responsibilities to their guardians. 
The  speaker of Isaios  9,  for  instance,  informs  us  that  his  homopatric 
brother, Astyphilos, lived under the care of his father who managed his 
patrimony. When he reached his manhood, he received all his possessions 
in  so  correct and regular a  manner that he never had any complaint to 
586  Cf. Joliwicz, JRS, 37(1947),85. 
433 make against his stepfather who had become his unofficial guardian. And 
when  Astyphilos'  sister reached her puberty, his stepfather gave her in 
marriage  to  a  man of his  choice  and  administered  everything  else  to 
Astyphilos' complete satisfaction. (ls.9.29) 
Demosthenes  also  informs  us  of  the  dutiful  and  efficient 
management of the affairs of the orphan, Antidoros, as a result of which 
his patrimony trebled at the end of  his tutelage. (27 .58) And, although the 
orator speaks in general terms of estates of orphans having been doubled 
or trebled because they were leased, so that the owners had been selected 
among the wealthy citizens and called upon for state services (27.64), we 
get  indications of guardians who dutifully and honestly performed their 
duties  to their wards. In his For Phormion also, the orator tells the jury 
that when Pasikles came of age, Phormion, his guardian, relinquished his 
lease  of  the  orphan's  estate  and  handed  over  everything  to  him 
accordingly.  This honest conduct made Pasikles and his  elder brother, 
Apollodoros,  release  and  discharge  Phormion  from  all  claims  on  the 
estate. (36.10) 
However, the general image of guardians as presented to  us  in 
Attic  forensic  speeches  is  one of consistent trickery,  mismanagement, 
deceit, misappropriation and outright looting of the estates of their wards 
under their control. In Isaios' On the Estate of  Kleonymos, a dim view of 
the general honesty of  guardians is painted. Kleonymos the testator, in his 
434 will bypassed the allegedly rightful claimants of  his property, not because 
he had any ill-feeling towards them but because at the time of  making his 
will  they  were  minors under the  guardianship of their paternal  uncle, 
Deinias,  whom he feared might obtain absolute control of the orphans' 
property.587 In Isaias 2, it is not explicitly stated that Menekles had been 
the  guardian of the orphans of Nikias. But it seems most likely that he 
was  \"hen he became part-lessee of the orphans' estate.(2.9) And when 
the elder son came of age  and Menekles had to repay a contracted loan 
together with the interest on it to the orphan, Menekles did not have the 
money  readily available.588  And although the orator does not make the 
matter very clear, the case, no doubt, points to poor guardianship. 
In Isaios 5, Dikaiogenes (III.) is painted as a pitiless and grabbing 
guardian.  (5.9-11)  The  allegation  that he bought the  house  which  the 
orphans under him inherited from their father and demolished it and used 
the site to make a garden adjoining his house in the city while the orphans 
were  minors is  striking.  It is not clear whether the house was  sold to 
Dikaiogenes  (III.)  by  creditors  of  the  orphans'  deceased  father, 
Theopompos. But the speaker's statement, " what the father Theopompos 
left  them he gave over to their enemies," (5.10)  seems to  suggest that 
Theopompos might perhaps have died insolvent; and so his creditors took 
587  Is.1.10. 
588  2.27,28. 
435 possession of the estate, which might have been pledged as security, and 
subsequently sold to Dikaiogenes (111.). 
Under Roman family or guardianship law, as noted by Wyse,589  a 
guardian  might buy property from his ward on two main grounds.  The 
first situation is when the property of  the ward was sold by a creditor. But 
I think that this situation would be possible only if the property became 
insolvent. Secondly, the guardian could buy the ward's property when the 
sale was a portion of the property that the guardian did not manage, with 
the  consent of the managing guardian.  Since the Romans separated the 
custody of the orphan's person from the administration of his property, 
the guardian who had charge of the orphan's person could buy a portion 
of the  ward's estate but with the  approval  of the  other  guardian who 
administered and controlled his property. 
The  Athenian  rules  on  the  matter  of a  guardian  buying  the 
property  of his ward,  thereby alienating it,  however,  are  unfortunately 
skimpy, if not non-existent. Wyse maintains that the Athenian guardian 
could alienate his ward's estate as well as become himself a buyer.  590 But 
we  may  note  the  prohibitive  clause  in  Plato's  will,  as  reported  by 
Diogenes Laertius: 
589 
Wyse, p.418. 
590  Ibid. 
436 .. This it shall be unlawful for anyone to sell or alienate, but it shall 
be the property of  the boy Adeimantos."s91 
Although Plato may have directed this prohibitive statement particularly 
to the guardians of  Adeimantos, his son, and may perhaps not be taken as 
a general  rule interdicting alienation of the  orphan's property,  it  does 
appear that the Athenians refrained from the sale of a ward's property. 
F  or one thing, although an Athenian may have been legally entitled to sell 
his land, such behaviour might arouse strong prejudice against him. This 
is because to sell off ancestral property, as the speaker of Isaios 5 seems 
to  imply  (5.41-47),  is  the  characteristic  behaviour  of a  man  who  is 
wasting rather than investing the proceeds.592 
Furthermore,  at  his  majority,  the  orphan  had  a  claim  against 
either his guardian or a lessee, if  his estate was leased, or perhaps against 
both for his actual land if any part of  his property was land. And the fact 
that much importance was attached to ancestral shrines would certainly 
make it improbable to accept another piece of land as a substitute for his 
own,  or make a total sale of a ward's land quite feasible.593  In any case, 
the  overall situation as described by the speaker of Isaios suggests that 
there certainly must have been some truth in the charges levelled against 
Dikaiogenes (111.), the wicked guardian as he was. 
591  Diog. Laert. 3.41. 
592  Aeschn. 1.95-105. Cf. Todd, Law, p.245-246. 
593  Cf. Harrison, Law (i ), p.295. 
437 According  to  the  speaker  of Isaios'  On  the  Estate  of Kiron, 
Diokles  is  not only a  greedy usurper but also  the  most villainous  and 
heartless  guardian.  And  the  plaintiff  does  not  merely  make  these 
allegations against Diokles but calls witnesses to prove them. (8.40-43) In 
Isaios  7.6-8,  Eupolis  (I.)  becomes  guardian  of  his  brother's  son, 
Apollodoros.  But he so badly administers the affairs of Apollodoros that 
it takes two lawsuits to convict him and retrieve what he had embezzled. 
The  speaker of Isaios  10  presents an interesting situation of yet 
another  case  of alleged perfidy in guardianship.  The  speaker's mother 
becomes  a  young  epikleros  to  the  whole  estate  of her  father.  At  her 
puberty,  her  father's  next-of-kin  under  whose  guardianship  she  lived 
marries her off  with only a dowry (10.4,5), and in collusion with the girl's 
brother who has been adopted out of the family, keeps all the remaining 
part of the woman's patrimony. But when her husband tries to negotiate 
for the return of her patrimony to her, he is met with the blunt threat by 
the alleged usurper that he would hand the property over, and at the same 
time  take  it  back  by  claiming  the  epikleros  according  to  law  if the 
husband does not keep quiet and be content with the woman and only the 
dowry on her.(10.19) And because the man does not wish to lose his wife, 
the threat temporarily settles the matter until the eldest son of the woman 
takes up the issue again on attaining his majority. 
438 In Lysias 32, it is the same dim picture of  dishonesty and rapacity. 
Diogeiton who becomes guardian of the orphaned children of his brother 
is  alleged to have misappropriated their patrimony and reduced them to 
beggary. The case of  Demosthenes the orator is so notorious that it would 
sound too tedious to recount the degree of  perfidy. We may only note that 
out  of an  estimated patrimony of nearly fourteen  talents,  his  guardians 
handed over to him at his majority, only thirty silver minae besides his 
father's house and fourteen slaves.
594 
The catalogue of  persistent greed and misappropriation on the part 
of  guardians  suggests  a  very  vulnerable  position  of orphans  in  the 
Athenian  society,  and  creates  the  great  impression  that  the  Athenians 
presumably had no effective laws regulating the conduct of the practice 
of guardianship and the behaviour of guardians. However, it seems that 
the fmancial injustice allegedly suffered by orphans at the hands of their 
guardians  was not so much due to  an absence of laws as  the means of 
enforcing them to protect the interest of  the affected minor orphans. For it 
is  evident  that  orphans,  whether  in  their  minority,  or  at  the  age  of 
majority, did not lack avenues, public or private, to exact vengeance from 
their  perfidious  guardians.  For  naturally,  rights  do  not  only  go  with 
responsibilities but also with remedies. Thus just as orphans had rights so 
also did they have remedial processes by which their guardians could be 
594  Dem.27 .4-7. 
439 compelled either to act responsibly if  it was noticed that their affairs were 
being  mismanaged,  or  to  recover  their  looted  patrimony  from  their 
scoundrel  guardians.  But  because  a  minor  could  not  prosecute  his 
guardian,  in the majority of cases, the orphan had to wait till he was an 
adult to stop the drain on his patrimony. 
ACTIONS AGAINST  PERFIDIOUS GUARDIANS 
A judicial process available to the orphan which could be used against a 
perfidious guardian for maltreating his ward was volunteer or third party 
prosecution (0  POUA0I-L€vos). Ancient literary sources credit Solon with the 
introduction  of the  third  party or volunteer prosecution into  Athenian 
judicial  procedure.  Aristotle  informs  us  that  among  the  three  most 
democratic features of  Solon's constitutional reforms was "the permission 
granted to anybody who wished to take vengeance on behalf of wronged 
persons." (AP, 9.1 :i
95 
Plutarch  records  an  expanded  version  of the  tradition  in  the 
following words: 
" Solon, thinking it necessary to make still further provision for the 
weakness of the people, gave every citizen the privilege of taking legal 
595  See also Dem.22.25-30; 24.212-214. Cf. Alen, D.S. Prometheus, p.39; Todd, Law, p.100. 
440 action  on behalf of one who had suffered wrong ...  to  step  forward  to 
punish the wrong-doers.,,596 
There  is  some  kind  of scepticism  about  the  fact  that  Solon  was  the 
originator of the institution of volunteer prosecution. It is  maintained597 
that the process was already in existence, but he may most probably have 
extended  its  scope.  At any rate,  volunteer or a  third-party prosecution 
became a firmly established Athenian legal process. 
In  cases  involving  orphans,  public  and  private  actions  were 
available  which  anyone  could  volunteer  to  initiate  against  not  only 
mischievous guardians but also anyone believed to have committed any 
offence  against an orphan. Among the private and public actions were, 
impeachment  for  the  maltreatment of an orphan  (€LcrO:Y)'€ALU  KUKWcr€WS 
op<puvou  and <pUcrLS)  on the one hand, and SLK'T)  €1TLTP01TllS  and SLK'T)  crt:rou 
(indictment  for  guardianship,  and for  maintenance) on the  other hand, 
There was also €1TLKATJpOU  KUKWa€WS  which could be instituted against a 
d'  hId "  \  598  guar  Ian or anyone w  0  rna treate  an €1TLKI\ 'T)pOS. 
It  is  not  evident  what  kinds  of  act  or  neglect  constituted 
maltreatment of an orphan for which an action could be taken.  But the 
procedure for €lcrU'}''}'€ALU  KUKWcr€WS  op<puvou  could be initiated by a third 
596  S%n, 18.5. For a detailed discussion of  volunteer prosecutors, see Christ, Litigious:.p.118-159; 
Osborne  'Law in Action in Classical Athens' JHS 105(1985),40-58.  , 
597  See Christ, ibid, then p.256,n.6.  .  L'"  127 
598  Arist. AP 56.6; Harrison, Law (i), p.115-121; MacDowell, Law, p.94-95; Christ,  ztzgzous, p.  -
130; Rhodes, Commentary, p.629-630; JHS 105(1985),40-58, esp.48-49. 
441 party against a guardian or anyone, if it became obvious that an offence 
had been committed against the orphan. To be impeached by €LO"O:Y)'€AlU 
was  an  unusually  a  great  charge,  a  criminal  prosecution,  reserved 
principally for offences against the state. These crimes included treason  , 
attempting  to  overthrow  the  constitution,  deceiving  the  people,  and 
.  599 B  h  .  pelJury·  ut t  e actIon covered wards who, during their minority were 
not legally in a position to complain of injustice from their guardians as 
\Yell as adult orphans. 
In most Athenian cases,  either criminal  or civil,  the  prosecutor 
stood to lose money or his civil rights if he failed to obtain 20% of the 
number of votes cast,  to prevent trifling or malicious law-suits.  But in 
cases  involving  orphans  and epikleroi anybody  could volunteer to  lay 
information before the archon against a  scoundrel guardian,  or anyone 
believed to have wronged the ward without any risk or constraints.
6oo 
Two cases of public impeachment by a third party on behalf of 
orphans  in their minority may be noted.  In Isaios  11,  On  the Estate of 
Hagnias,  the prosecutor is  the unnamed fellow  guardian of the  son of 
Theopompos representing their ward in the  action.  The plaintiff claims 
throughout  the  trial  that  Theopompos  had  wronged  their  ward  by 
defrauding  him  of his  father's  share  of their  father's  estate,  which 
599  Dem.49.67; Hyper. 4.7-8. Cf. Hansen, Eiaayy€ALa,  p.l2-20; Hunter, Policing, p.144.  . 
600 See Arist, AP 56.6 noted above. Also Is.3.46-47;11.6; Dem.36.47. Cf. Thompson, De Hagnzae, 
pA2; Hansen, JHS 100(1980),90. 
442 Theopompos should have given to the orphan on the death of  his brother. 
And  in  Demosthenes  58,  we  have  another  reference  to  a  public 
impeachment  brought  by  Theokrines  of  Hybadai  against  a  certain 
Polyeuktos.
601 
The  okrine  s  seeks  to  prevent  the  orphan  from  being 
transferred from the household of  his adoptive father, Aiskhylos, who has 
since died; evoking that the transfer would result in the misappropriation 
of the  orphan's  patrimony  by  Polyeuktos  who  has  married  into  the 
family .(Dem.5 8 .32). 
Instituting an action of ELcrU')'')'EALU  (a public suit) against a bad 
guardian  on behalf of an  orphan involved no risk on the  part  of the 
plaintiff, but it could be damaging to the accused. For it put the defendant 
in a very great danger of losing his rights if he was found guilty, which 
could also lead to his deprivation of  his guardianship of  the ward.
602 
Another legal action which a volunteer prosecutor could initiate 
on  behalf  of  a  ward  in  his  minority  was  <pO,crl8  0P<pUVLKOU  O'LKOU 
(prosecution regarding an orphan's estate), by which a guardian could be 
compelled to lease his ward's patrimony if he failed to do so.  A case in 
point is what we have in Demosthenes 38.23. It is in connection with the 
estate of two young orphans, Nausimakhos and Xenopeithes. Nikides, a 
601  For the background of  this Polyeuktos, see Davies, APF, p.7. 
602  Is.11.13,31-32. Cf. Harrison, Law (i), p.118; Rhodes, JHS 105(1985),48. 
443 volunteer  prosecutor603  indicted the uncle of the two  boys,  also named 
Xenopeithes,  and obviously one of their guardians, by the procedure of 
~a.(ns, arguing that the orphans' estate must be leased until they reached 
their majority. When, however, the case came to court, the orphans' uncle 
successfully argued that he could manage the estate himself, and it was 
therefore, not necessary to lease it. 
It would appear difficult to see why <t>a.O'LS,  a public action open 
to a volunteer prosecutor in criminal cases, should be used for the offence 
of failing to lease an orphan's estate. As Prof. MacDowell points out,604 
the orphan's estate was not an object that could be confiscated and sold 
for  the  benefit of the  state  and the  prosecutor.  That  would have  been 
completely  unjust to  the  innocent orphan.  It is  not clear what kind of 
reward  a prosecutor stood to  gain,  or what privileges or immunities he 
could enjoy in initiating this kind of  impeachment regarding the estate of 
an orphan. Demosthenes 38.23 sheds no light in that respect, neither does 
it hint to  the kind of penalty605  that could be exacted from  a convicted 
guardian in such a case. 
In  any  case,  the  availability  of  the  procedure  to  orphans 
demonstrates  the  deep  public  concern to  protect their  interests  against 
their own guardians, since they could not take legal action for themselves. 
603  The identity ofNikides is not known, but I should assume th~t he was probably a co-guardian for 
the orphans who played a minor role in the administration of  ~err estate.  -197 
604  MacDowell, , The Athenian Procedure of  Ph  as is, ' SymposlOn  1990 (1991),187-198, esp.196  . 
444 The  procedure of <pQ.<J"lS,  however,  is  evidently rare  in prosecutions of 
guardians reported in the law-court speeches, most probably because of 
inherent limitations. And if  the prosecutor was subject to constraints such 
th  .  d  b  H  .  606  as  ose  mentIone  y  arrIson,  then  it  is  not  surprising  that  we 
scarcely  come  across  impeachment of this  nature  by orphans,  though 
there are cases of  orphans whose estates were not leased. 
If the orphan, at his majority, was dissatisfied with the accounts 
rendered  to  him  regarding  the  administration  of his  estate,  he  could 
himself  bring  a  suit,  8LKT)  E.1TVrpo1Tf)s,  prosecution  for  guardianship, 
against  his  guardians.  In  some  of these  cases,  the  wards'  relations 
supported the orphans. In Isaios 7,  for instance, Apollodoros, supported 
by his stepfather is said to have prosecuted his uncle and former guardian 
for  bad guardianship.607  In Lysias  32,  the  husband of the  daughter of 
Diodotos helps her brothers against Diogeiton , their guardian, uncle and 
grandfather. 
But in other cases of indictment for bad guardianship, we notice 
that  the  wronged adult orphans  themselves  single-handedly  sued their 
guardians for the restitution of  their estates, though it is possible that they 
might get some support from other relatives though the support might not 
be  quite  overt.  Demosthenes'  own  legal  battle  against  Aphobos,  his 
60S  On this see MacDowell, ibid. 197, and n.21. 
606  Ibid, p.116. Cf. also Rhodes, ibid,47; MacDowell, Law, p.95. 
607  Is.7.7-8. 
445 guardian,  which  was  followed  by  a  prosecution  for  eviction  against 
Onetor, is a typical example of an adult orphan indicting his guardian for 
bad  guardianship  and to recover his  patrimony.  And  in  Demosthenes 
38.1ff  ..  Xenopeithes  and  Nausimakhos  revive  a  series  of actions  by 
prosecuting  the  heirs  of  their  guardian  for  their  guardian's 
mismanagement of  their affairs. 
In  a  situation where more  than  one  guardian administered  the 
affairs  of an  orphan,  the  orphan  could  institute  a  suit  against  each 
separately, (Dem.29.6), for a specified proportion of the amount claimed. 
And if  the prosecution was to be made against the heirs of  the guardian in 
the event of his death, the action was instituted against each heir, as the 
suits  of Demosthenes against his  guardians,  and the  action against the 
heirs of  Aristaikhmos clearly illustrate. 
The separate prosecution of guardians who mismanaged the affairs 
of their ward brings into focus  the indictment of Demon, the  father of 
Demophon,  by Demosthenes. Discussing the  genealogy of the  younger 
Demosthenes,  and  citing  Demosthenes  29.43,  Pomeroy  notes
608 
that 
Demophon  was  about  twenty-five  years  when  the  elder  Demosthenes 
betrothed his five-year old daughter to him, expecting them to marry ten 
years  later.  This  statement implies that Demophon was  already of age 
when the elder Demosthenes died. 
446 Pomeroy's  claim corroborates  the  speculation  by  Davies609  that 
Demophon  must  have  been  about  twenty-four  years  when  his  uncle 
deceased.  It also reinforces Calhoun's contention610  that besides having 
property  of his own during his  father's lifetime,  Demophon must have 
had  a  contingent  interest  in  the  estate  of his  father,  so  that  when 
Demosthenes sued him (Demophon) for the large sum of ten talents he 
deemed it expedient to sue his father as well, perhaps in anticipation that 
the father might attempt to save Demophon's property by claiming that it 
is his own. And in a recent article, Burke also maintains that Demophon, 
like  Aphobos,  was not more  than  thirty  when the  elder  Demosthenes 
died;611  implying that Demophon was already a man at the time his uncle 
died.  But  the  facts  and  situation  of the  case,  particularly  regarding 
Demon's connection with the estate and the subsequent litigation, make 
these presumptions seem less plausible. 
If it was a situation of Demon attempting to protect the property 
of his  son,  Demosthenes  would  certainly  have  complained  and  gone 
ahead with an independent suit against Demon. The case of  Demosthenes 
versus  Onetor should suffice to illustrate the point. After Demosthenes 
was declared victor in his suit against Aphobos, he was compelled to go 
to court against Aphobos' brother-in-law Onetor. According to the orator, 
608  Families, p.166. 
609 
APF, p.116. 
610  See TAPA 65(1934),89,then note 24. 
447 the two had conspired to conceal Aphobos' possessions by claiming that 
he  had divorced his wife, Onetor's sister, without refunding her dowry, 
thereby  giving  Onetor  prior  right  over  Aphobos'  house  and  farm  in 
restitution of  the dowry(Dem.30.8-9;31.6). As a measure and proof of  the 
matter,  they had affixed harai to the property which they pointed out to 
Demosthenes  when he attempted to  seize the  estate.  Demosthenes was 
thus  prevented  from  collecting  his  judgement  against  Aphobos. 
Consequently, Demosthenes brought an independent suit against Onetor 
to  eject  him  from  the  property,  the  speeches  of which  survive  in 
Demosthenes 30 and 31. 
In this  case,  there  is  a  definite  complaint  at  issue.  But  in  the 
Demon  case,  there  is  no  firm  evidence  for  any  particular  complaint 
against  Demon,  except  that  he  had  taken  part  in  the  plunder  of 
Demosthenes'  fortune.  Demon, however, was not one of the  appointed 
guardians  of Demosthenes;  and,  how part of Demosthenes'  patrimony 
came under his control, and how much he got involved in the looting of 
the  orator's estate is not stated.  So  on what grounds  did Demosthenes 
drag Demon into court? It is also very significant that for Demosthenes to 
have  referred to  Demon as  fellow-guardian  of Aphobos,  (J"UV€1TLTP01TOS 
(Dem.29.56), and partner in his crimes, KOLVWVOU  TWV  a.8LK1")~a.TWV (29.20), 
during  his  (Demosthenes')  tutelage  implies  that  in  a  way,  Demon 
611  C et M 49( 1998),46. 
448 certainly  had  a  hand  in the  administration  of the  orator's  patrimony. 
There is no doubt, therefore, that this constituted the principal reason why 
Demosthenes prosecuted him for complicity with the other guardians to 
loot his property. 
But we know very well  that Demon was not one of the  legally 
appointed  guardians  of Demosthenes.  And  so  how  did  he  become 
connected with the management of the orator's estate? It is at this point 
that  Professor MacDowell's suggestion regarding the age of Demophon 
and the status of  Demon in respect of  the administration of  Demosthenes' 
estate  during his  guardianship becomes very germane.  As he  notes,612 
when  the period of Demosthenes'  guardianship began,  Demophon was 
not yet at his majority, though he was old enough to participate actively 
in  what  was  going  on,  judging  from  Demosthenes  28.14  (possibly 
between fifteen or sixteen years of age). And for the first year or two his 
father was legally responsible for him. Thus when Demosthenes reached 
manhood  and  indicted  Demophon  for  misappropriating  his  patrimony 
during the ten years' guardianship, Demon, his father would have been 
legally answerable for the management of business during the first year 
or  two.  He could thus be rightly called co-trustee,  O'UV€1Tl-rP01TOS,  with 
Aphobos  during  that period.  Demophon,  therefore,  was  not yet  adult 
when the elder Demosthenes died. 
449 However,  Demosthenes'  suit  against  him  (Dem.29.6)  was 
procedurally  legal  because  technically  he  was  one  of his  guardians 
despite his youthful age. In practice, though, he had to be represented by 
his  father because he himself could not be legally answerable.613  And in 
any  case,  it is most certain that  Demosthenes indicted Demophon and 
Demon together in a single suit, and that the proceedings against Demon 
were  probably  not  a  separate  case  from  those  against 
Demophon.(Dem.27.l2)614 Thus, in a situation where a guardian was not 
at the legal age (though this seems quite rare), a suit against him for bad 
guardianship would of  necessity imply a suit against his father or his legal 
representative. It is on such grounds that Demon became connected with 
Demosthenes' suit against Demophon. 
To return to the matter of actions against mischievous guardians 
for  mismanagement and misappropriation of their  wards'  estates,  it  is 
evident that besides formal legal actions there were other avenues in the 
form  of arbitration,  public  or  private,  to  safeguard  the  interests  of 
orphans.  Demosthenes tells  the jury that  when  it proved  obvious  that 
though  Aphobos had his  mother's  dowry,  he  would  not  maintain  her 
neither would he put up their estate for  lease,  Demokhares, his  aunt's 
husband  remonstrated with him about the matter.  , 
612  Symposion (1985), 256-257. 
613  See Is.10.10. 
614  Cf.MacDowell, Symposion (1985),257  ,n.21. 
450 Weare  told  (27.15),  that  Aphobos  admitted  his  fault  but 
explained that he was having a  little spat with the  wo  b  man a  out some 
jewels,  and that  as  soon as  that was  settled he  would act  accordingly 
regarding  her maintenance and everything else.  And in his  suit against 
Onetor, the orator informs us of  several discussions and arguments held at 
arbitration before the archon regarding his affairs when it became very 
clear that his guardians were proving false  to their trust and looting his 
estate.(Dem.27.49-51; 30.6-7) 
Furthermore, in Lysias 32, the jury is told that when it became 
very  obvious that Diogeiton had proved a bad guardian of his brother's 
orphaned  children,  many  private  arbitration  attempts  were  made  by 
friends  and relatives to make him render honest and just accounts of his 
guardianship. But Diogeiton also attempted on several occasions to resist 
the  efforts to arrive at an amicable solution of the dispute.  And it does 
appear  that  it  was  at  the  last  arbitration  meeting  when  the  orphans' 
mother gave the damning evidence against him. (32.2,12-13,15-18,26) 
Athens'  eulogists praised the  Athenians  for  their  willingness  to 
institute  military  intervention  to  help  other  Greeks  wronged  by  other 
powerful  city  states,(Lys.2.12,14,22),  and  to  take  vengeance  on  their 
behalf, (Dem.60.11). It does appear that it was the same basic ideal that 
was invoked regarding life in Athens itself by establishing the institution 
of any willing person, (0  ~ouA6~EVOS), to indict a wrong-doer on behalf of 
451 his victim in certain circumstances. None the less, the Athenians do not 
appear  to  have  employed  volunteer prosecution  to  assist  their  fellow 
neighbours to any appreciable degree. What seems obvious is that they 
typically  prosecuted only in  cases where  they  were  in  fact  victims  or 
personally involved in the trial.  For it appears that there are  only four 
surviving  speeches  (Hyp.1;  Din. 1  ;  Lyc.1;  Lys.22)  in  which  each 
prosecutor claims to be acting as a purely disinterested party.615 
And although the city could have assumed the role of  legal patron 
of weak  citizens  including  orphans  and  epikleroi  by  entrusting  state 
prosecutors with the protection of their interests, the Athenians seem to 
have viewed direct intervention by the state, particularly in family affairs 
as  inappropriate,  despite  the  family  laws  in  Demosthenes  43.54  and 
43. 75.  Christ is probably right that this is because to the Athenians, no 
harm  to  a  private  individual  constituted  any  threat  to  the  collective 
interest of  the city that was so great as to warrant intervention by the city 
through  its  agents.616 And  although  the  city  instituted  the  third-party 
prosecution with its attendant privileges on behalf of orphans, it appears 
that very few citizens were willing to undertake this duty. 
Thus in general, the city apparently lacked a legal safety net for 
the weak. Consequently, Athenians were generally left to help themselves 
615  Cf. Osborne, JHS 105(1985),40-58, esp.51; Allen, Prometheus, p.40. For a more detailed 
discussion, see Allen, ibid. chapters 7 and 8. 
616  Litigious, p.120-130. 
452 as best they could by resorting to the law-courts  It is not s  "  h  .  urpnslng ten, 
that  despite  the  avenues  for  arbitration  and the  legal  processes  put in 
place  by the  society to protect the  welfare  of those  unable  to  act  for 
themselves,  the  mechanisms  appear  hardly  effective  in  protecting  the 
interests  of orphans  in  their  minority  in  the  majority  of cases.  For 
although the measures aimed at preventing exploitation of the orphan's 
vulnerable  position,  mismanagement  of his  affairs  persisted  in  the 
majority of cases until he attained his majority before he himself would 
prosecute his scoundrel guardian(s).617 
It is a fact that in most cases when relatives and friends became 
aware  of abuses  against  orphans  in  their  minority,618  they  appeared 
unwilling to stand up for the interests of the victims. We may search the 
sources in vain for evidence for this apparent reluctance of relatives and 
friends  to  champion  the  cause  of wronged  orphans.  However,  Christ 
suggests619  that in spite  of the  privileges  of a  third-party prosecution, 
where  guardians were very closely related to their wards, relations and 
friends who were not so close to the injured wards felt no urge to take any 
actions  against  the  guardians.  This  tends  to  worsen  the  position  of 
epikleroi  who  would  find  it  very  difficult  to  get  a  man  outside  the 
household  willing  to  champion  their  cause  if  their  affairs  were 
617  For examples of  orphans indicting their guardians at their majority, see Is.7; Lys.32; Dem.27-31; 
36; 38. 
618  See for instance, Dem.30.6,7; Lys.32. 
453 mismanaged by their guardians or legal representatives. And it would be 
more difficult for an orphan whose guardian himself took the lease of  his 
ward's estate and then failed to pay the rent during the period of  the lease. 
At his age of  majority, however, the orphan could bring a private 
suit against his guardian regarding his guardianship, 8tK'll  E1Tl,TP01Tf)S, if  he 
felt  strongly that his guardian had not rendered fair and honest accounts 
to  him.  But  the  orphan  could  take  such  action  not  without  overt 
constraints  on his position.  In the  first  place,  a  law paraphrased  in  a 
speech of  Demosthenes specifically states that an aggrieved orphan could 
initiate  action  against  his  wicked  guardian  only  within  five  years  of 
attaining his majority. (Dem.38.17-18,27) This implies that after the five-
year period the courts would no more entertain the case. 
It  is  also  most  probable  that  written  records  concernIng  the 
orphan's affairs were not kept by either testators or guardians in some 
cases.  And  even  if records  were  kept,  vile  guardians  could  easily 
manipulate the documents. Diogeiton's case may be illustrative. Having 
concealed  Diodotos'  death  from  his  wife  for  some  time,  Diogeiton 
removed also all the documents relating to his brother's assets, ostensibly 
in  order to recover the debts owed to Diodotos. (Lys.32.7-8) Claims of 
misappropriation would therefore seem difficult to  prove in many such 
cases. 
619  Christ, Litigious, p.129; Humphreys, Family, p.5. 
454 Furthermore,  the  likely  social  stigma  that  an  orphan  might  be 
branded  as  ungrateful  to  his  guardians,  and  perhaps  sycophantic, 
(Dem.38.3,20;  Aeschn.3.255),  could  also  be  a  social  constraint.  This 
situation is most likely to arise when arbitration attempts to resolve the 
issue  amicably break down; and especially more so since there were no 
obvious benefits for taking up the responsibilities of guardianship of an 
orphan.  It is  thus  possible  that  some  orphans more  often  endured  the 
deprivation in order to avoid the social stigma than to seek redress at the 
courts,  and try as much as possible to reconstruct their lives even in the 
face of  naked robbery of  their estates by their perfidious guardians. 
Moreover, the financial risk, besides the political dangers to the 
orphan who had just begun his adulthood life, could also be off-putting. 
F  or if  the orphan failed to convict his guardian by not getting one-fifth of 
the jurors' votes, he was subject to a penalty of one-sixth of the value of 
his  claim,  and a  loss  of his  civic  rights.  Even where  a  guardian  was 
convicted, his penalty was assessed by the jury and not necessarily what 
the orphan would claim in the suit; and sometimes the orphan could have 
difficulty  getting  the  court's  verdict  against  the  guardian  enforced  in 
order to recover what was his due.(Dem.27.67; 30;31)620 
The evidence for the apparent catalogue of corrupt guardians, and 
the series of suits against them by their aggrieved wards seem to reflect a 
455 certaIn  feature  of Athenian  society.  Very  close  relatives,  as  noted 
above,621  were the  commonest guardians in  Athens.  But the  perfidy of 
some of  them, as the sources indicate, went beyond human imagination in 
spite  of the  blood  ties  between  them  and  their  wards.  The  alarming 
situation,  however,  does  not just suggest  a  mere  household  or  family 
cancer destroying the fabric of  kinship ties. It is suggestive of a decaying 
society. As to the roots of this social decay, that is not the subject of my 
present concern. But it is claimed by Wevers
622  that the  situation is the 
consequence of the grip of opportunism, greed and avarice on the part of 
the  wealthy  in  the  society.  For it  is  very  evident  that  here  we  have 
guardians the majority of whom were men of means, using their position 
of trust to increase their own wealth at the expense of their wards.  This 
conclusion  contradicts  Burke's  claim
623  that  the  patrimony  of 
Demosthenes was squandered by his guardians because his father's estate 
comprised mainly invisible or liquid assets. 
ORPHANS UNDER STEPFATHERS 
The  essential  prerequisite  for  step-fatherly  conduct  is  the 
remarriage of a woman with minor children from a previous marriage. It 
would  appear  that  this  circumstance  was  commonplace  of Athenian 
620  Cf.Harrison, Law (i), p.120; Christ, Litigious, p.129.  ..  . 
621  See' Orphans in Classical Athens.' Cf. Cox, Household, p.144; Hamson, Law (1), p.99-101, 
MacDowell, Law, p.93. 
622  Weyers, !saeus, p.112. 
456 family life in the classical period.624  For in the majority of  cases, the first 
marriage of women had produced children. But most first marriages had 
been  terminated by demographic realities including natural plagues, the 
large  age  span  between  husband  and  wife,  and  women's  death  in 
childbirth and men's in war, producing a society in which a considerable 
number of widows as well as widowers were not uncommon.  In ancient 
Athens  too, more widows than widowers re-married; and since it was a 
common  practice  for  remarried  widows  to  take  along  their  orphaned 
children to their second marital homes,625 step-fatherly situation was quite 
inevitable. 
The  circumstance  of step-fatherly  practice  resulting  from  the 
remarriage of  a widow, however, had various facets. One of  the situations 
is  where  a  widow with a  minor child is  betrothed in marriage  to  the 
guardian of  her child by her deceased husband. Two instances of  this kind 
of situation are Demosthenes and his sister,(Dem.27-29),  and Pasikles, 
son  of Pasion (Dem.36,  and 45).  In the  case of Demosthenes  and his 
sister,  however,  Aphobos  to  whom  their  mother  had  been  betrothed 
reneged.  If their  marriage  had been  completed,  Aphobos  would  have 
623  See C et M 49(1998),45-65. 
624  Watson, Ancient Stepmothers, p.50. 
625  Cf. Thompson, CSCA 5(1972),222-223, and n.59; Isager, CetM 33(1981-82),86-88; Hunter, JFH 
14(1989),296-30. 
457 concurrently  combined  the  status  of  the  children's  guardian  and 
stepfather. 
With regard to Pasikles, we learn from Demosthenes 36.8 that 
Phormion  took his  widowed mother,  Arkhippe,  to  wife  in accordance 
with Pasion's will. This evidence tallies with that in Demosthenes 45.28 
where the woman had been betrothed in a second marriage to Phormion, 
by  her  deceased  husband.  In  the  former  speech  (36),  the  speaker 
persistently accuses Apollodoros, Pasion's elder son, of  extravagance and 
wanton dissipation of their patrimony, alleging that at the death of their 
father,  Apollodoros spent so much money out of the undivided estate to 
the  effect that Pasikles' guardians felt obliged to protect the interest of 
their  ward by dividing the property (36.8-9).  This  implies  that  Pasion 
appointed more than one guardian for  Pasikles, though we are not in a 
position to know the number of  guardians appointed for the young child. 
However, in Demosthenes 45.37, one Nikokles is  mentioned as 
one of  the guardians of  the boy; and since no other persons are mentioned 
besides  Phormion and Nikokles, it is reasonable to presume that it was 
only  Phormion  and  Nikokles  who  were  designated  as  guardians  for 
Pasikles.626  Significantly,  however,  the  document  purported  to  be 
Pasion's  will  as  cited  in  Demosthenes  45.28,  makes  no  mention  of 
guardians appointed for Pasikles, neither does it say anything about the 
458 status  of  the  property  bequeathed  to  him  and  his  elder  brother  , 
Apollodoros. 
Schucht and Drerup627  may probably be right that Apollodoros 
did  not  intend the  full  text of the  purported will  to  be read  to  court. 
Presumably,  he  selected  those  sections  of the  alleged  document  that 
related  to  his  mother's betrothal  to  Phormion and the bequests  to  her, 
leaving  out essential details regarding the  guardianship of Pasikles and 
the  state of their patrimony at the death of their father.  For it is evident 
(Dem.45.27) that he so vehemently objected to the marriage that it could 
not take place until he left Athens on a campaign. But if this was not the 
situation,  we  cannot  assume  that  the  guardians  for  Pasikles  were 
appointed  by  testament.  And  the  contention  by  commentators  that 
Phormion and Nikokles acted as  the guardians of Pasikles according to 
Pasion's  wi1l
628  must  be  considered  as  tendentious  and  evidentially 
intrusive,  not based on any  textual  evidence.  It  is  quite  obvious  that 
Phormion  and Nikokles  acted as  guardians of the  young  Pasikles,  but 
whether they were guardians by testament is not evident in Pasion's will 
as quoted in Demosthenes 45.28. 
The  second  circumstance  by  which  an  orphan  lived  with  his 
stepfather is where an appointed guardian loses his rights of guardianship 
626  Cf. Harrison, Law (i), p.99, n.4; Davies APF, p.435; Trevett, Apollodoros, p.167-~6~. 
627  Schucht, De documentis, 77-79; Drerup, 'Urkunden,' 334, both noted by Trevett, IbId. p.183. 
628  See Davies, APF, p.435; Trevett, Apollodoros, p.8,26. 
459 to the husband of  his ward's mother. This situation is obviously the result 
of bad management of  the ward's affairs, as in the case of Apollodoros in 
Isaios  7.  In this speech of Isaios, we are informed that at the death of  his 
father,  Apollodoros  was  still  young,  and  therefore  came  under  the 
guardianship  of  his  paternal  uncle,  Eupolis.  (7.5-6)  The  young 
Apollodoros' mother was later remarried to Arkhedamos and so moved to 
live with him (7.7), while the orphan lived with his guardian. But as the 
speaker  recounts,  Eupolis  deprived  the  young  Apollodoros  of all  his 
fortune  by fraud,  and mismanaged his  affairs,  causing  him to  live  in 
apparent poverty and distress. (7.6) And his stepfather, "  seeing that he 
was  deprived of all his fortune, took him to his own house and brought 
him up while he was a boy." (7.7) 
The  speaker does not tell  us  by what means or procedure  the 
young  Apollodoros  was  transferred  from  the  household  of his  legal 
guardian to that of  his stepfather. It would seem that it was by some form 
of arbitration, most probably on the initiative of the orphan's mother;629 
or  perhaps  just by  mutual  agreement  after  some  kind  of negotiation 
between the two men. But it is evident that Eupolis subsequently lost his 
guardianship rights to Arkhedamos, Apollodoros' stepfather who took up 
the responsibility of  bringing up the boy. 
629  Cf. Lys.32.11-12. 
460 Furthermore,  step-fatherly  situation  could  arise  where  a  mInor 
child' s  mother was remarried not by testament  to  the  guardian of the 
child.  Four cases of this step-fatherly situation readily come to mind. In 
Isaios  8.  the  grandsons of Kiron claim his property as  natural  heirs in 
conformity  with  Demosthenes  46.20,  and  against  the  background  of 
Demosthenes  43.51.  According  to  the  speaker,  his  grandfather  and 
grandmother  remarried  (8.7-8),  and  his  opponent,  Diokles  had  three 
homometric sisters (8.40). We have no knowledge of  Diokles' father. But 
the  fact that Diokles had three homometric sisters implies that he was a 
stepson brought up in a second marital household. 
The speaker alleges further that Diokles represented himself as 
the  adopted son of his half-sisters' father at his death (8.40-41), though 
\\'e are  not told by what means or procedure that was  effected.  But as 
adopted  son,  Diokles became guardian of his three half-sisters and got 
possession of all the estate of Kiron to  which his three daughters were 
epikleroi. The evidence seems striking if the allegation is true. For Kiron 
who  had  daughters  was,  by  law,  prevented  from  adopting  a  son  by 
testament  unless  he  willed that  the  adopted  son  should marry  one  of  , 
them.(Is.3.42,68; 10.13) And it is presumed, on the basis of Demosthenes 
d 
"  .  630 
41.3, that the same prohibition applied to a  optIon lnter VlVOS. 
630  Cf. Wyse, p.621. 
461 It  is not evident in the  sources whether a father like Kiron with 
daughters  already married,  could lawfully adopt a man who was not a 
son-in-law. That Diokles allegedly represented himself as the adopted son 
of his  deceased  stepfather therefore  seems  rather questionable.  It may 
therefore not be surprising that the speaker is disputing his position. But 
we  have an instance of a situation whereby a stepfather could adopt his 
stepson.  Plutarch
631  adds to  our knowledge  of this  situation  where  he 
informs us that Isokrates, having brought up his wife's son by her first 
marriage as a stepson, adopted him as his heir. 
In Isaios 9, we are not told who became the guardian of  Astyphilos 
during  the  time between his  father's death (9.17-19),  and his  mother's 
second marriage (9.3-4,23,27). But it is most likely that he lived under the 
guardianship  of his  maternal  uncle,  Hierokles,  with whom his  mother 
might also have lived until her remarriage to Theophrastos (9.27). For it 
is certain that Astyphilos did not live with his paternal uncle, Thoudippos, 
for two fundamental reasons. First, Thoudippos is alleged to have caused 
the  death  of  Euthykrates,  the  father  of  Astyphilos  (9.1 7  -18,20). 
Furthermore, the speaker informs the jury that  "Euthykrates, the father of 
Astyphilos, on his death-bed charged his relatives never to allow any of 
Thoudippos'  family  to  come near his  tomb."  (9.19) It is  therefore not 
possible that Euthykrates would have appointed Thoudippos, or any other 
631  Mor., 838a, 839b. 
462 kinsman of Thoudippos to be guardian of his son.  We do not !mow for 
how long Astyphilos' tutelage under his maternal uncle lasted. But it does 
seem  that his guardianship did not last long under Hierokles as  he was 
still  a young child when his mother got remarried and thus took him to 
her second marital home. (9.27-28) 
The speakers of Isaios  11  and Demosthenes 43  also inform us of 
yet  another  step-fatherly  and  stepson  situation  arising  out  of non-
testamentary  remarriage of the  orphan's mother.  Hagnias  (11.),  as  it  is 
recounted,  had two  maternal  half-brothers,  Glaukon  and  Glaukos,  the 
former  of whom he adopted as his heir in the event of the death of his 
adopted niece. (ls.ll.8-9; Dem.43.3-5) We of course have no knowledge 
of the childhood life of  Hagnias (11.). But the fact that he had homometric 
brothers one of  whom, possibly the younger of the two, he selected as his 
contingent  heir  implies  that  he  would  also  most  probably  have  been 
brought up as a stepson by Glauketes, his mother's second husband.
632 
It is significant that despite the various circumstances giving rise 
to  stepfather-stepson situation, we can easily notice two main categories 
of this  kind  of family  life  in  the  Athenian  society.  There  was  the 
testamentary  step-fatherly  situation  whereby  a  testator  betrothed  his 
widow in a second marriage in a will to the guardian he would designate 
632  Cf. Thompson, De Hagniae, p.II-13, add n.17 on p.ll; Davies, APF, p.~7-84; Broadbent, Studies, 
p86. We may cite also the remarriage of  Khrysilla by Kallias (III), the guardIan of  her two orphaned 
463 for  his  orphan(s).  The  other category  is  what  could be  termed  as  the 
informal  or  customary  step-fatherly  situation  arising  from  the  non-
prearranged remarriage of  a widow with orphans to a man. 
The  status  or position  of Astyphilos  in  the  household  of his 
mother's second husband, Theophrastos, in Isaios 9 noted above attracts a 
few  further  comments.  Harrison  633  and  Wevers634  maintain  that 
Theophrastos  was  the  guardian  of Astyphilos,  without  qualifying  the 
nature of the guardianship; and I cannot find it easy to  accept their bare 
claims.  If Theophrastos was guardian of Astyphilos because Astyphilos 
came under his care and protection, and was brought up by him by virtue 
of the fact that Astyphilos' mother was remarried to the man, so be it. 
But  if  their  claim  is  based  on  the  formal  principle  of 
guardianship of orphans as it operated in Athens, then their stance needs 
further  clarification.  For I find no hint in the  speech that Theophrastos 
had been formally or informally appointed as guardian of the orphans of 
Euthykrates. If  there is any hint at all of  a guardian based on the principle 
and practice of  guardianship, then it was Hierokles who had supported his 
sister and the orphans until she was given in the second marriage by him, 
at which time the sister went away with the children. (9.27) 
sons. See Andok. On the Mystries, 124-127; Thompson, CSCA 5(1;72),212; Cox, CJ 85(1990),34-46; 
Household, p.90; F.D.Harvey, , The Wicked Wife of  Ischomachos  EMC 28(1984),68-70). 
633  Law (i), p.97. 
634  !saeus, p.112. Cf. also Wyse, p.642. 
464 And,  indeed,  if Theophrastos  had  been  appointed  as  guardian 
either inter vivos  or by a  will by Euthykrates, as Harrison and Wevers 
seem to imply, he would not need to be kicking his heels until he got the 
orphans' mother in marriage before receiving them into his household. It 
may be argued that though appointed as guardian, Theophrastos may not 
haye  been able to effectively care for the children, young as they were, 
unless he got a wife in his household. Presumably so, but why not some 
woman  other than the  orphans'  mother?  Thus  though the  argument is 
plausible,  we cannot easily assume what the speaker does not say,  and 
imply.  Quite guardedly, Harrison does not make reference to the speech 
again in his general discussion of  guardianship, neither does he cite it as a 
supporting evidence in his footnotes on guardianship but once, although 
he cites severally other speeches in the corpus of  Isaios in that discussion. 
(p.97-121) 
Perhaps,  Theophrastos'  management  of the  paternal  estate  of 
Astyphilos, (9.28,29), may have prompted Harrison and others to assume 
that  Theophrastos  was  guardian  of  Astyphilos.  Two  possibilities, 
however, may have given Theophrastos the opportunity to have the estate 
under his control. Theophrastos may possibly have taken a lease of the 
635'  . 
estate from the orphans, arranged by the archon;  and hIS  eagerness In 
635  Is.2.9,27; 6.36ff. 
465 planting and improving the land, as observed by the speaker,636 is natural 
in order to get returns from his investment. Secondly, the estate may have 
been in the hands of Hierokles, maternal uncle and brief guardian of the 
orphans,  who  might  have  handed  it  over  to  Theophrastos  for  their 
support, once they passed from his tutelage, albeit informally, and went 
under the care and protection of  Theophrastos with the remarriage of  their 
mother  to  him.  It is  most probable, therefore,  that Hierokles'  desire  to 
retrieve,  at least, part of the estate with the decease of Astyphilos, may 
have motivated him to align himself with Kleon to deprive the plaintiff of 
the property, if  the allegations levelled against him are true.(9.22,26) 
My  conclusion  thus  is,  Theophrastos  was  not  a  guardian  of 
Astyphilos in the legal context of the practice. If there was any trace of 
his guardianship at all, it had fused into his status as a stepfather with the 
remarriage of the orphans' mother to him.  It is noteworthy, that unless 
otherwise specified by a testator either verbally or in a will, it is nowhere 
indicated by Athenian practice and law that a man could automatically 
assume  guardianship  of a  minor child  and  become his  or her official 
representative merely by being his or her stepfather. 
As  the  speaker of Isaios  7  informs  us,  it  was  only  when  the 
orphaned Apollodoros had been deprived of  all his fortune by his official 
guardian that his stepfather, Arkhedamos, took him to his own household 
636  Is.9 .28,29. 
466 and  brought  him  up.  And  the  fact  that  Arkhedamos  waited  until 
Apollodoros  reached manhood before assisting him to  institute  actions 
against his official guardian to secure restitution of his patrimony(7.7-8) 
illustrates  that  the  stepfather was  not an  official  representative  of the 
orphan, in spite of  his marriage with the orphan's mother.637 
By and large,  it would appear that whether an orphan's mother 
was betrothed by testament to his or her official guardian, or she was later 
remarried  to  a  man with  whom she  lived  with  her orphaned child  or 
children, the position of  the orphan(  s) vis-a-vis that of  the man obviously 
became  ambivalent  and  dichromatic.  This  is  so  because,  while  the 
mother's second husband became a stepfather to the orphan, he was also 
at the same time his or her guardian, though where the orphan's mother 
was not remarried by testament, the powers of  the stepfather were limited 
in a way, as noted above. 
N one the less,  whatever be the  situation,  it is  obvious that the 
stepfather  gained  managerial  control  of the  orphan's  patrimony,  and 
either leased or himself managed it until the orphan reached his or her age 
of majority. For instance, Kallias (III.) is noted to have leased the estate 
of his  stepsons, and appears to  have indicted the lessees for  attempting 
not  only to offer inadequate security but also to  deprive the orphans of 
637  Cf. Harrison, Law (i), p.l08; Cox, CJ 85(1990),44-45. 
467 their  patrimony.638  And in  Isaios  9,  the  speaker  informs  the  jury that 
Astyphilos'  stepfather not only brought him up and gave him civic and 
religious  education but also he effectively managed his  paternal  estate 
and  doubled  its  value,  gave  Astyphilos'  daughter  in  marriage  and 
managed everything else to Astyphilos' complete satisfaction. (9.28-30) 
It  appears  also  that  where  an  orphan  had  a  great  fortune,  his 
guardianship  as  well  as  that  of his  estate  could  be  solidified  by the 
marriage of  the guardian to the deceased's widow, as Demosthenes seems 
to  imply.  (Dem.27.4-5;28.l5;29.43,45) In any case,  the  stepfather was 
accountable  to  the  orphan.  And  in  the  event  of mismanagement  or 
maltreatment,  the  archon  or  anyone  could  on  his  behalf bring  the 
stepfather to justice; or the orphan himself if  a male could at his majority 
prosecute  his  stepfather  for  the  restitution  of his  patrimony.  It  is 
noteworthy, however, that especially if  an orphan's mother was remarried 
to  his guardian not by testament arranged by her deceased husband, but 
by ordinary marriage procedure,  it does seem that the orphan's rights, 
apart from his right to know how his patrimony had been administered, 
during  the  period  of his  tutelage  under  his  stepfather  derived  from 
gratuitous  considerations of the stepfather.  The stepfather had no other 
legal obligations to his stepson in such a situation. 
638  P Oxy.31.2537 v 8-11, noted by Davies, APF, p.266; Cox, CJ 85(1990),44. 
468 JOINT-OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY, COLLATERAL 
INHERITANCE AND THE ORPHAN 
The equal division of a  paternal estate  among surviving  sons 
irrespective of  age is a trait of  Athenian culture attested in the sources. In 
family  la\vs and the forensic speeches of the orators, we hear of sons as 
being  entitled to  equal shares of their patrimony, and as  having shared 
their paternal estate equally at the decease of  their father. In Demosthenes 
.+3  for instance, we are told of the five sons of Bouselos having received 
from their father equitable shares of  his property as was fitting. (  43.19) 
Even females were also entitled to equal shares of the paternal 
inheritance.  Isaios  informs  us  that  under  a  will  Dikaiogenes  (III.) 
received  a  third of the  estate of Menexenos (I.)  as  the  adopted son of 
Dikaiogenes (11.),  the son of Menexenos (I.); and" of the remainder an 
equal share was adjudicated to each of  the (four) daughters of  Menexenos 
(1.)" on the death of their only brother. " When they had thus divided up 
the  inheritance, having sworn not to  transgress the  terms agreed upon, 
each  remained  in possession of the  share  which he  had received  for 
twelve years.,,639 
We do not know the procedure Bouselos used to distribute his 
property to his sons during his lifetime. But Plutarch640 informs us that on 
the  decease of a  father,  the division of his estate by his surviving sons 
639  Is.  5.6-7. 
469 was done by lot that occurred in two different ways. If  the brothers agreed 
amicably  on  a  fair  distribution  of  the  inherited  property  into  the 
appropriate number of  shares, they went ahead to cast lots for the portions 
thus divided; and the lot was cast either privately or in the presence of a 
trusted  friend.  But if they could not agree as  to  what constituted a just 
division,  they  might  appeal  to  the  archon  eponymous  to  appoint 
proportioners, who would then divide the property equally, and cast lots 
to determine which portion was to fall to each brother.641 
Despite the existence of customary practice alongside of statutory 
law regarding division of inherited property, there is evidence that some 
Athenian sons preferred to hold their inherited patrimony in partnership 
rather than to distribute it equally among themselves, or waited until late 
in life before sharing their patrimony. The speaker of  Demosthenes 44 for 
instance,  tells  the jury that Meidylides wished to  give his  daughter in 
marriage  to his own brother Arkhiades; but Arkhiades declared that he 
did not wish to marry, and for this reason allowed their inherited property 
to  remain undivided.
642  In general,  however,  whether or not the joint-
ownership of the paternal estate was meant to resolve disagreement as to 
what constituted a fair or just division of the property with its attendant 
640  Moral. 483D. 
641  Cf. Harry L. Levy, ' Property Distribution by Lot in Present-Day Greece' TAPA 87(1956),42-46, 
esp.42. Isaios is silent in 5.6-7 on the procedure by which the husbands of  the four daughters of 
Menexenos (I.) received their wives' shares of  their patrimony, but the aorist of  AO:YXo.vw,  EAaxe, in the 
text suggests that the distribution was done by lot. 
642  Dem. 44.10. Cf. Aeschn. 1.102; Is.2.28-29; Lys.l8.21; Dem.47.34. 
470 bitterness  and potential  family  wrangles,  as  is  evident  in  Isaios  9.17-
18,20,  we  are not in a position to know.  What is  evident is that in the 
course  of time,  the joint-ownership of paternal property could lead to 
bitter family disputes once each son begins to  rear a family,  or obvious 
robbery of  orphans with the decease of  the orphans' father. 
The case of the orphans of Diodotos in Lysias 32 readily comes to 
mind.  According to the speaker, Diodotos had amassed great wealth by 
trade, and his property at his death amounted to approximately 15talents 
28  minai.  Besides,  Diodotos'  estate  included  a  share  in  their  visible 
patrimony which he held in partnership with his brother, Diogeiton. Out 
of  this  vast  fortune,  Diodotos  had  made  considerable  financial 
arrangements  for  the  support of his  family,  including  a  dowry  of one 
talent  each  for  his  wife  and  her  daughter  if he  died  in  battle  (32.4-
7,13,15). Everything seemed regular except Diogeiton's failure to pay the 
full  amount of  the widow's dowry at her remarriage (32.8). But when the 
elder  boy  came  into  his  inheritance  following  his  age  of majority, 
Diogeiton told him that his father bequeathed to him only 28  minai, and 
said nothing about the 15 talents. 
But as is evident in the speech, it became obvious that Diogeiton 
had misappropriated the orphan's patrimony. The speaker does not tell us 
how  much of the  estate  held  in  partnership  was  due  Diodotos  which 
should have gone into the hands of  his orphans, neither do we know even 
471 the position of the patrimony itself held in partnership. The situation thus 
illustrates  the potential insecurity for  the  orphan whose  father held an 
inherited  property  in common with  his  brother.  For if Diogeiton  had 
misappropriated the individual property left behind by his brother to his 
orphans, he would as well have taken absolute control of  the estate he and 
his brother held in partnership, though in law, half the share of it should 
have been given to his orphans. 
The  posi  tion  of  the  male  orphan  in  matters  of  collateral 
inheritance  was  equally  undefined.  It  is  common  knowledge  that 
inheri ting  from  a  deceased  father  as  a  son,  natural  or  adopted,  was 
straightforward without any complications. Thus, in Demosthenes 43, the 
five  sons  of Bouselos had inherited from their father without quarrels; 
and Hagnias (II.) might certainly have inherited from his father Polemon 
with no difficulty; just as Theopompos as well as Sositheos might as well 
have  got their patrimony without any legal  dispute.  In the  same  vein, 
Demosthenes the orator, and the orphans in Lysias 32 got their fathers' 
estates with no opposing claims from any relatives; and it is most certain 
that the orphans in Demosthenes 44.9 also got their patrimony with no 
legal battle. 
Thus one would imagine that  succession in Athens  transmitted 
easily from father to son. But it does seem that actual social practice was 
sometimes  at variance with what could be expected;  and that in some 
472 cases  the  real  situation  was  much more  complex  than  the  superficial 
picture that patriarchy or patrilineality presented to the ordinary Athenian. 
Particularly,  when  we  have  a  situation  in  which  we  find  the  orphan 
involved  in  collateral  inheritance,  the  law  of succession  as  quoted  in 
Demosthenes 43.51,  seems to have no guarantee for  the  interest of the 
orphan.  The case of the orphan of Stratokles in Isaios  11  regarding the 
estate  of Hagnias  (II.) may be taken as  representative.  A deposition in 
Demosthenes  43.31  indicates  that  Phylomakhe  (II.)  got  the  estate  of 
Hagnias  (II.) awarded to  her on the grounds that she was the sole aunt, 
that is, first cousin once removed of  Hagnias (II.) on his father's side, and 
therefore nearest of  kin to him. (43.32) 
However,  before  Phylomakhe  (II.)  and  her  husband  Sositheos 
could possess the property for any length of time, Theopompos, Stratios, 
and Stratokles, all second cousins of Hagnias considered putting in their 
claims since the rej ection of a will which Phylomakhe (II.) had defeated 
made  other  collateral  relatives  have  interest  in  the  inheritance.  As  it 
happened, Stratios and Stratokles died before the case came for trial; but 
Theopompos went ahead and submitted his claim to the archon. And by 
and large, he triumphed in the subsequent trial as is evident in Isaios 11. 
But  sooner  than  later  after  Theopompos  had  entered  into 
possession of  the estate he was prosecuted by a fellow guardian of  the son 
of Stratokles for robbing the orphan of his property by refusing to give 
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against the charge, as is generally known, is the subject of Isaios 11. But 
he  also had to face another trial for a prosecution of one or more of his 
\yitnesses  for  petjury  (11.45,46).  However,  Theopompos  won  in  both 
cases and kept the estate in his possession until he died. 
One would have thought that the victory of  Theopompos meant a 
victory for Stratokles as well, ifhe were alive (11.21). And even with his 
death, it would seem that his son should have been given what was due to 
his  father (1l.1 ,5).  But this could only be possible if the estate was the 
property  of the  father  of Theopompos  and  Stratokles.  In  the  present 
circumstances, however, though an orphan of his father,  Stratokles' son 
could not legally continue the suit from where his father left off. He could 
also not put in a claim himself as his father's heir because it does appear 
that the law does not cover sons of cousins' sons. Here, it is obvious that 
the orphan's rights as an indirect heir were simply not recognised by the 
court.  This  shows a  complete contrast to  the immediate and automatic 
rights of the heir to the father and therefore the undefined position of the 
orphan in collateral inheritance. 
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This  study points to  certain  significant  conclusions  that  are 
numerous  and varied,  some of which have  been incorporated into  the 
main  texts  of the  various  chapters.  The  following  final  remarks  may, 
ho\yeyer, be noted. 
As to how the decadent and volatile socio-economic conditions in 
the  sixth  century  B.C.  that  necessitated  the  appointment  of Solon  to 
introduce  reforms  in  the  society  affected  widows  and  orphans,  the 
evidence  for  it  appears  sparse  and  indirect.  But  inferences  from  the 
slender pieces of evidence indicate that if a husband in slavery died his 
\yidow  and  orphan(s)  continued  to  live  in  slavery  to  the  deceased's 
creditor. In the same vein, the death of an insolvent tenant, though not in 
slavery, but whom a prudent landowner decided to retain on his farm, did 
not necessarily relieve his orphans of  their subservient position. 
Among  Solon's reforms  were  two  significant  innovations  that 
concerned widows and orphans. He redefined the role of  the archon, gave 
him  wide-ranging  powers  to  protect  and  guarantee  the  interests  and 
welfare of widows and orphans, and made family matters in general as 
some of  his areas of  jurisdiction. Solon ruled also that the right of  anyone 
(0  ~ouA6j.LEVOS) to take a legal action against suspected offenders which 
was used principally in public cases, could also be used in private suits in 
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to  sue  in  court  themselves.  But  although  the  archon's  executive  and 
supervisory role was indispensable, his authority had to be activated only 
if a third party called upon it. 
The cumulative impact of a composite of demographic factors 
\"as  the ubiquity of widows and orphans in many Athenian households. 
The immediate impact of the loss of a spouse on the Athenian wife was 
the  status of her marriage, and that also  affected her residential status. 
Although  the husband's death naturally terminated the  wife's marriage, 
the \vidow's residential position also depended greatly on her own choice 
as  an  individual,  either to  continue  to  live  in the  deceased husband's 
household until she also died, or leave to live with her kindred. 
In certain situations the widow of a deceased husband had no choice but 
to  vacate his household.  This was the case of widows whose husbands 
were  executed  by  the  state.  In  the  majority  of cases,  widows  who 
remained  in  their  deceased  husbands'  households  were  either  older 
widows who lived with their adult sons, or pregnant widows who enjoyed 
special protection by law (Dem.43.75). 
The Athenians had an unenthusiastic and uncommitted attitude 
towards  widows  in  the  society.  Even  widows  of warriors  were  not 
supported by the  state.  However, widows had the  right to  support and 
maintenance derived from two main sources.  There was the moral and 
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was reinforced by the law disfranchising sons who were convicted for not 
living up to their duties to their parents (Andok.l.74). The second source 
of a widow's  support was  her dowry  in  the  property of the  deceased 
husband if she decided to live in his household. This made the sones) who 
inherited  from  the  father  morally  and  legally  obliged  to  maintain  the 
\yidowed  mother.  The  loss  of the  husband  could  establish  a  closer 
correlation  between the  surviving  children  and  the  widow  than  would 
haye been the case regarding a married woman (Dem. 27-29;55). 
A widow who lived in her deceased husband's household could 
\yield considerable power and influence; especially in matters of  adoption 
of her son, and funeral rites for her deceased husband. (Is. 7  .14;8.21,22). 
She  could  also  punish  or reward  a  slave  in  the  deceased  husband's 
household as she thought fit (Lyk.2 frag.1.1-3). The loss of a spouse and 
changes  in  household  position  resulted  in  the  majority  of widows 
vacating  the  defunct  husbands'  homes  to  live  with  their  kindred.  An 
interesting feature of the status of  the marriage at the loss of the husband 
is  that the widow's change of household status was automatic by mere 
operation of law without any formal  act to  effect the  change,  and the 
widow could leave the deceased husband's house without ceremony. 
The  widow,  however,  had a  title  to  her dowry.  Action  for  the 
restitution of the  dowry, however,  appears to be discretionary,  and the 
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to  initiate any action for it (Dem.59.52; Is.8.7-8). If a widow left at the 
death of  her husband to live with her kindred, her right to maintenance by 
them derived from convention rather than from any legal statute. Societal 
sanctions.  however,  could  damage  the  social  and  political  status  of a 
guilty  kin  for  neglect.  Younger  widows  and  widows  with  substantial 
financial backgrounds could be very competitive on the marriage market, 
and got remarried earlier than the less privileged ones. 
I have denied as a wrong opinion the view that a widow had a 
choice  as regards the person to whom she should get remarried. I think 
that any exercise of  choice by a widow in her second or third marriage, as 
the  case  may be,  seems  to  undercut  the  principle  and  procedures  of 
betrothing and giving in marriage of the woman as contained in the law 
quoted in Demosthenes 46.18.  It also seeks to take away the conferred 
authority of the father or the legal representative of the woman who had 
such rights to give her in marriage. 
Among the reasons why a widow got married again was her dual 
role as a woman to bear children for her husband to maintain his family, 
and also for her own natal kin for the purpose of succession in her own 
family if she were an epikleros.  Marriage in Athens had socio-political 
objectives also; one, as a  form of alliance with powerful socio-political 
groups, another, as a counterpoint chain between feuding families. These 
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widowed sister to give her away in a second marriage. 
A  pregnant  widow  was  granted  special  permISSIon  and 
protection by law to remain in the deceased husband's house under the 
guardianship  of the  man  appointed  to  be  guardian of the  posthumous 
child  when  it  was  born,  until  she  gave  birth  to  the  child.  I  think  it 
misleading for commentators to regard Harpokration's citation of m:ros 
as  it occurs in Demosthenes 27.15  as state provision of food to  widows 
and  orphans.  The lexicographer is  certainly showing awareness of two 
entirely different facts: (i) a material fact; that is, maintenance for women 
and orphans as part of Solon's laws, evident in AP 56.7; (ii) a linguistic 
fact, indicating the occurrence of  the word in the orator's speech. In these 
two instances, the lexicographer does not imply state provision of food to 
widows instituted by Solon. 
The  pregnant  widow  became  the  agent  through  whom  her 
deceased  husband could be avenged by his  son.  She  also  became  the 
taproot  for  the  future  growth  and  continuity  of her  husband's  lineal 
descent, as well as the regulator for the right succession in her husband's 
household in order to maintain a stable social and political order in the 
community and the state at large. 
The  orthodox  opinion  that  Athenian  women  were  excluded 
completely  from  the  politics  of  Athens  cannot  be  quite  tenable, 
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was  closely  linked  with  political  life  in  Athens.  The  woman's  own 
citizenship, in the first instance, and her marriage by €,),,),u'll, in the second 
instance  as  an  Athenian  woman,  became  a  sine  qua  non  of,  and  an 
essential evidence for the citizenship of  her children, and in political suits 
against  them.  Thus  the  pregnant  widow,  like  her  ordinary  married 
woman  counterpart, had a dual political role to  play deriving from her 
status.  At the state level, to produce legitimate offspring for the state to 
fulfil their father's role in state politics; at the local community level, she 
had the civic duty to produce citizen children in order to maintain a stable 
social  and political order in the community.  The Athenian woman was 
thus not completely excluded from Athenian politics. 
The widow, like any married woman in Athens, had no title to 
her husband's estate. Some Athenian husbands, however, in their wills, 
gave  substantial amount of dowries to their widows in second marriages, 
and willed various kinds of bequests to them. The trousseau of a widow, 
like that of the ordinary married woman, did not always form part of her 
dowry, unless otherwise stated by the giver. The Athenian widow could 
own considerable gifts and bequests from a father, or a devoted husband. 
The  widow retained her ownership rights as long as she remained as  an 
independent  widow.  But if she  got  remarried  she  lost  her  rights  of 
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to control her own personal property, and could dispose of  it. 
Older orphans in Athens who had attained the age of majority 
did  not need guardians.  Appointed  guardians  were  most  often nearest 
relatiyes.  A  reason for the  choice of nearest relatives was that kinship 
sentiments  would  restrain  the  hands  of  nearest  relatives  from 
mismanaging the affairs of  their wards. It was, however, usual for fathers 
to  appoint trusted friends  as  guardians of their children.  An appointed 
guardian assumed his responsibilities immediately the decease of a father 
occurred. In the event that no guardian had been designated by the father, 
the  affected  family  in  consultation  with  the  archon  appointed  one  to 
assume immediate responsibility. 
Most of  the laws concerning the epikleros tend to have the adult 
epikleros in mind, implying a rare occurrence of the minor epikleros. A 
son  adopted by testament as  guardian of an epikleros required judicial 
certification before he could act in the capacity for  which he had been 
appointed.  1 think unfounded the uncertainty in scholarly  circles  as  to 
whether an epikleros in her minority could be claimed before she reached 
her puberty, or a guardian was appointed for her until her age of puberty 
before she was claimed. As 1 have argued, it is evident from the sources 
(Dem.43.51;46.22; Is.3.42,58,68-69,72-73;10.13) that an epikleros in her 
minority  could,  in fact,  be claimed in advance of her puberty by her 
481 father's next-of-kin as soon as the father was dead. An interesting feature 
of the status of  the epikleros is that, although she was the inheritor of  her 
father's  estate,  she  in  tum  was  inherited  in  that  she  was  always  an 
appendix 'property' and was claimed together with her patrimony. 
The majority of the responsibilities of a guardian would, under 
normal circumstances, have been filial duties that every Athenian father 
would have rendered to his own children. But they became special duties 
for the guardian because of  the peculiar status of  the orphan and the legal 
consequences  for  a  guardian who  neglected  his  duties  to  his  ward  or 
wards. The guardian was to protect not just the minor child but the people 
dealing  with him, since if a transaction had been entered into with his 
advice, it would be difficult or impossible for the minor to get it set aside. 
One category of  orphans who also drew special attention from the 
state was orphans of  Athenian warriors. Although there is no evidence for 
state  support  for  female  orphans  of warriors,  the  male  orphans  of 
Athenians who died fighting for the state received public support in the 
form of a grant of one obol a day per son. Public support continued until 
the  orphan reached his majority;  though this  did not mean a  complete 
take-over of all the duties to  him.  By the middle of the fourth century, 
however, public support for war orphans had been discontinued. 
The law in Isaios  10.10 does not only preclude a minor from 
making  a  will,  but also restricts  the  minor orphan  from  managing his 
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la\\',  however, is not just an imposition on the child's legal capacity but 
establishes an inherent counter protection for him so that his inexperience 
would  not  be  exploited.  The  lease  of an  orphan's  estate  was  not 
mandatory unless otherwise directed by the deceased father in his will. 
The archon's role in the lease of an orphan's liquid estate was limited. A 
guardian who himself managed the patrimony of  his ward without taking 
it under lease did not need any administrative consent from the archon, 
neither did he need to provide security for the property. An orphan whose 
estate was leased acquired a legal share in the security provided by the 
lessee.  In the event of default the lessee's property pledged as  security 
became subj ect to seizure by the orphan. 
Guardianship of the male orphan terminated at the age of 18, the 
recognised  age  of majority  for  males  in Athens.  That  of the  female, 
however, continued even after the recognised minimum marriageable age 
of 14, until her death.  I maintain, contrary to a seeming general opinion, 
that a female orphan on whom the father's property devolved at the death 
in the minority of an only brother who would otherwise have succeeded 
to the father, became an epikleros of  her father but not of  her brother who 
never entered into possession of  the father's estate. 
The patrimony of an epikleros  might continue to  be under the 
management of her certified guardian if he took her to wife; no accounts 
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her  but  gave  her  away  in  marriage,  her  property  transferred  to  the 
administration  of  her  husband.  Her  former  guardian  then  rendered 
accounts of her property to her husband who controlled and managed it 
for her maintenance and support in her marriage. Either way, the husband 
was  in no way the inheritor of the estate, but held it in trust for a future 
son born from their marriage who then inherited it at his age of  majority. 
The purpose of the unique position of the epikleros was to retain 
her father's estate in his family. She fulfilled this objective by serving as 
the agent for transmitting the estate to a male heir born by her. Once the 
male  heir  was born  and was  certified  to  have  attained  manhood,  she 
would  have  finished  playing  her  role.  On  her  son's  coming  into 
possession of the property, her position as epikleros was deemed to have 
lapsed in fact if  not in law. 
The  age  of majority,  and  for  that  matter,  the  termination  of 
guardianship of  the male orphan was not just a question of  being a citizen 
and qualified to take part in the politics of the state. He, like his ordinary 
male  counterpart,  was  considered  to  have  matured  from  childhood  to 
adulthood. This change also means a radical shift in his role in the oikos, 
and his responsibilities in two major respects. In the first place, the male 
orphan  at his majority was regarded as  a  fully-grown  man capable  of 
making his own decisions and maintaining himself. Secondly, his age of 
484 majority marked the beginning of the social and economic continuity of 
his deceased father's household. 
The orphan's age of majority signified the accountability of his 
guardian.  The orphan's guardian had two important final  duties to him. 
He was obliged not only to hand over the orphan's patrimony to him to 
begin his adulthood life, but as manager of the orphan's general welfare, 
to  provide  accounts  of his  general  control  and  management  of his 
patrimony. Orphans in either their minority or their majority did not lack 
avenues,  private  or public,  to  seek redress  in the  event of any  act  of 
injustice  against  them  either  in  respect  of their  personal  welfare,  or 
regarding  their  estates,  and  to  exact  vengeance  from  their  perfidious 
guardians. In a situation where more than one guardian administered the 
affairs of an orphan, they could be sued separately for a definite portion 
of the total amount claimed from them. In the majority of  cases, however, 
because  a  minor  could  not  prosecute  his  guardian,  matters  of 
misappropriation  remained  unresolved  until  the  orphan  reached  his 
majority before taking action himself against his offending guardian. The 
case  of the  epikleros  was more  serious  than  that  of the  male  orphan, 
especially if the guardian who would have pilfered her patrimony took 
her to wife at her puberty. 
Some orphans lived with their stepfathers.  If the  mother of an 
orphaned  child had been betrothed in marriage  to  the  guardian of the 
485 child by the deceased father, the orphan had the legal right to support and 
maintenance by his guardian-stepfather, who also saw to all legal matters 
in respect of his estate. But if the mother was not betrothed in marriage 
by  testament to his guardian, the orphan's rights other than his right to 
know how his patrimony had been administered by his stepfather during 
the time he lived with him derived from gratuitous considerations of the 
stepfather rather than from any legal obligations. 
The practice that some brothers preferred to hold their inherited 
patrimony in common, or waited until late in life before sharing it could 
lead  to  deprivation  of an  orphan's  property  by  the  deceased  father's 
brothers. If the orphan came under the guardianship of his paternal uncle 
with  whom  his  deceased  father  jointly held  their  paternal  estate,  the 
paternal uncle could take absolute control of the jointly owned property, 
and leave nothing for his brother's orphan in the event of  mismanagement 
of the orphan's affairs. 
In matters  relating  to  collateral  inheritance  too,  the  Athenian 
courts did not recognise the rights of  cousins' orphans as indirect heirs, in 
that the Athenian law of  succession (Dem.43 .51) did not cover the sons of 
cousins'  sons,  though it guaranteed the  rights of cousins'  sons.  In the 
circumstances,  the  orphan of a  cousin's son could not lay claim to  an 
estate to which his deceased father, as the son of a cousin, was entitled. 
This makes the situation appear that actual social practice was sometimes 
486 at variance with the principle of automatic rights of succession and puts 
the orphan in a very undefined position in collateral succession. 
The Athenian orphan was an automatic heir to his father's entire 
estate; but the Akan orphan in Ghana has no such rights at customary law. 
His  or  her  father's  brother or nephew  succeeds,  and  he  or she  as  an 
orphan, lives at the mercy of the father's heir with no specific rights to 
maintenance and support. In general, customary practices and legal rules 
protected the rights and welfare of  the Athenian orphan; but for the Akan 
orphan, customary and legal protection still remains a mirage. 
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